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Abstract 
 
A few days before Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011, he reminded the Egyptian people that 
’istiqrār (‘stability’) was his legacy both domestically and internationally. Their choice was between 
‘stability’ and ‘chaos’, he threatened. This thesis argues that stability is a mode of governmentality 
whose power cannot be fully appreciated at the level of political discourse only. Rather, stability as a 
practice of government is entangled with peoples’ values, aspirations, and the intimate politics of 
everyday life.  In Egypt between the Free Officers coup of 1952 and the January 25th revolution of 
2011, ‘stability’ embodied access to both tenured employment and the means to reproduce the 
conditions of ‘a good life’ in the context of the family.  Adequate understanding of stability and its 
ubiquity as an ideal must take into account the complex ways in which state projects and imaginative 
appropriation of those projects intersect.  The thesis draws on fieldwork in an industrial 
neighbourhood of Cairo central to political movements of Egypt to analyse the everyday politics 
surrounding access to tenured employment in the context of the casualisation of labour and 
deregulation of capital since the inception of neo-liberal reforms in Egypt in 1991. By analysing the 
politics of labour at a site of strategic interest to the Egyptian regime from Abdul-Nasser to Mubarak, 
the thesis highlights how adequate understanding of political economy, practices of governing and 
neoliberalism must include both the shop floor and the home.  
 
The material for this study is drawn from twenty-two months of ethnographic research on the 
shop-floors and in the homes of the company town of Egypt’s oldest public-owned fully integrated 
steel plant, the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company (EISCO) in Helwan.  I explore how the politics around 
tenured employment enabled the state to tighten its grip over what historically used to be a leading 
site of militant labour activism.  I argue that the state capitalised on workers’ valuation of relationality 
and reproduction, represented in their aspiration for ’istiqrār  (‘stability’), by confining new temporary 
fixed-term employment to children and relatives of EISCO permanent workers. In the face of the 
increased precariousness of work and life conditions under neo-liberalism, permanent work contracts, 
I propose, acted as a potential property right that transformed a group of militant workers into a 
privileged group and set their interests against the rest of the working class outside the plant. The 
thesis shows how the constant innovation in property relations and the re-appropriation of the 
meaning of work in people’s lives, by turning ‘stability’ from a social value into a productivist and 
calculative one, perpetuated the capitalist labour regime and values in workers’ communities.  
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Notes 
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Studies (IJMES). To make sure I convey the meaning that my informants communicated, I used the 
original words said in Egyptian dialect rather than their classical Arabic root. The letter jīm (J) is 
therefore transliterated as gīm (g) and the letter qāf (q) as hamza (ʾ). 
 
Except for public officials and public figures known widely to the community or the reader, 
informants’ names have been anonymised to protect their privacy and ensure their security. 
 
For currency exchange, one Great British Pound (GBP) is equivalent to 10.54 Egyptian Pounds 
(EGP).  
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Introduction 
 
 
In April 2012, almost one year into the revolution of January 25th 2011, I visited the Egyptian 
Iron and Steel Company (EISCO), where I had conducted the ethnographic fieldwork for this PhD thesis 
between November 2008 and August 2010. Sitting with workers in a room adjoined to the shop-floor 
of the Hot Steel Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, we enthusiastically discussed the new political situation 
in Egypt as we sipped tea and shared oranges. Only a handful of my friends at EISCO had participated 
in the revolution in a personal capacity. EISCO as an institution, however, had remained a fortress of 
silence throughout the first eighteen days of uprisings and the following mobilisation over the next 
year. Labour activism had escalated throughout Egypt since 2006; an estimated two million workers 
had gone on strike between 2006 and 2009 (Bishara, 2012) and the strike wave was said to be the 
strongest and longest since WWII (Beinin & El-Hamalawy, 2007). The collective actions led the way to 
the destabilisation of the regime.  Following Mubarak’s ousting, workers across Egypt adopted more 
radical tactics, from kidnapping managers to occupying local governors’ offices, from cutting off roads 
to lying on railway tracks in order to demand permanent employment, higher wages, better working 
conditions and, at times, to challenge the military council that was then ruling Egypt. Yet at EISCO 
none of that happened. EISCO did not catch the momentum of the strike wave prior to the toppling of 
Mubarak, and the only protest that did emerge during the revolution  called on the military council to 
send troops to stop the theft of the machines by local armed groups taking advantage of the 
momentary collapse of the police. I was covertly hoping that  with the revolution, EISCO would turn 
into the militant bastion it had once been, but I was disappointed.  
 
My disillusionment was similar to that I first experienced upon starting fieldwork.  Most of 
what was written about EISCO’s recent history focused on  the militant occupations that took place in 
1989, which were ruthlessly responded to by state security personnel who stormed the plant, killed 
ʿabd al-Hay al-Sayed Hassan, a worker  in the steel department, tortured the  captured protest leaders, 
and detained hundreds of workers as well as members of the public, who stood in solidarity. I started 
my fieldwork naively imagining EISCO to be the militant site of labour activism I had read about, but 
soon realised that the events of 1989 remained only the object of leftist nostalgia. Since that time, 
very few collective actions had taken place at EISCO. The plant had turned from a once-leading site of 
labour activism in Egypt to a conservative camp.  In a context where protests had taken place in the 
plant in the past, and were now proliferating throughout Egypt under Mubarak and later in a 
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revolutionary context, I found myself wondering why some workers joined collective actions while 
others did not. This thesis, then, traces the social history of EISCO in an attempt to explain the radical 
changes in the character of the plant since the major strikes of 1989 and the onset of neo-liberal 
reforms in Egypt in 1991. It shows how the neo-liberal reforms introduced under Mubarak overlapped 
with other governing practices of the state, which together enabled some workers to access state 
resources and enjoy a good life and dispossessed many others who could not set foot in the plant nor 
secure the same long-term benefits. The emerging class differences among workers are thus the 
object of this thesis. The case of EISCO illustrates how the state, contrary to the prevailing 
assumptions of its withdrawal in the face of market forces, actively contributed to silencing a large 
group of what was once a militant labour force, and gave the class struggle a new course. In the 
following pages I explain how managers at this state enterprise manipulated the meaning and value 
that workers allocated to work and stability in a way that turned permanent work contracts into a 
potential form of property right and a new claim for class exclusions.  
 
I. The Context 
 
EISCO is Egypt’s oldest fully integrated public sector steel plant.1 It is located in al-Tibbin a 
southern district of Cairo, to the south of Helwan, a city which Nasser turned into an industrial hub in 
the 1950's. Having reached 25,527 workers in 1982, EISCO’s labour force was gradually reduced to 13, 
225 by the end of 2009, which still makes it one of the largest factories in Egypt. 2  EISCO bears 
resemblance to many landmarks steel plants such as Stalin’s Magnitogorsk, Nehru’s Bihlai and 
Suharto’s Krakatau, which embody the nationalist ideals of modernisation and self-determination of 
their times. The mere space it occupies is gigantic. It is built on 4,000 feddan (4152 acres)of land, in 
addition to a whole company town- called madīnat al-Ṣulb (‘the steel town’) - constructed around it to 
accommodate around 3000 households of EISCO workers. Up to three generations of EISCO 
employees, who came from governorates all over Egypt, turned al-Tibbin into their new home. The 
company town includes hospitals, schools, sporting clubs, an industrial technical college, and a range 
of facilities that enabled EISCO families to sustain a new life away from their original hometowns and 
extended families.   
 
                                               
1
 The plant is also commonly known as Hadisolb on the market. The name I have used in this thesis, EISCO, refers to 
the official name, which is translated from the original Arabic Sharikat al-Ḥadīd w al-Ṣulb al-Miṣriyya. 
 
2
 See Figures 1-4 in Appendix for maps and photos of Helwan and of EISCO. 
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To build EISCO and its company town, the state confiscated the agriculture land of the 
historical residents of al-Tibbin, al-tabābna. The latter continue to refer to themselves as ʾaṣḥāb al-
ʾarḍ (‘the owners of the land’). With the land grab, al-tabābna were driven out of their land to the 
margins of the company town in informal housing, generically referred to as bīyūt ʾ ahālī (‘family-built 
houses’).  Some large families received compensations for the confiscation of their land, often at 
below market rates, but the majority were left dispossessed.  Al-tabābna thus faced a similar fate as 
that of al-Nuba residents, who were dispossessed by Egypt’s national mega project, the High Dam in 
Aswan; although the first’s plight received significantly less public attention in the historical narratives. 
To add insult to injury, al-tabābna have continuously been viewed unfavourably by EISCO residents of 
the company town, who treat them with condescension. This is evident in the way EISCO households 
refer to the first as “rubbish” or “sūqqiyīn” (‘people of the market’) or “thieves” to distinguish 
themselves from them. Although EISCO workers are meant to be part of the ‘working class’, they do 
not see themselves as part of that same class that al-tabābna belong to. How the two groups interact 
with one another and include and exclude others is a central query in this thesis. 
 
Agriculture land played another important role in the social history of EISCO.3 The vast 
agriculture areas around the plant facilitated the recruitment of a large group of workers from the 
villages and semi-rural areas around. Workers came from various districts such as al-Badrashin and al-
ʿayat, al-Wasta and al Fishn districts on the west bank of the Nile and al-Saff and ʾ atfih  districts in the 
south of EISCO.4  Most of the workers who were born and bred in these regions continue to live in 
them today, making a significant portion of the labour force simultaneously embodying the 
subjectivities of both workers and peasants. The importance of the ties of Baladiyyāt (‘ties between 
people who originate from the same home village or town’) to the sociality of workers from these 
areas, adds to the sense of intimacy and familiarity among EISCO employees. Nomads, generically 
known as ʿ arāb (‘Arabs’), who have settled in villages adjacent to the mountains that surround EISCO 
also took employment in the plant. EISCO thus became a ‘melting pot’ that brought together people 
from all walks of life in Egypt. The original sin behind its inception however, which dispossessed 
                                               
3
 See Figure 5 in Appendix for an indication of the agriculture areas around EISCO. 
 
4
 It is worth noting that these districts are very large in population size and play an important role in the politics of 
localism that transpire at EISCO. al ʿayat alone, for example, is home to 39 villages. According to the 2006 household 
census of Egypt, al-Badrashin is home to 63,836 residents and al ʿayat is home to 34,586 residents. To the south of 
EISCO, Al-Saff is home to 45,131 inhabitants and al-Wasta is home to 37,916 residents, while data for ʾatfih is 
unavailable.  Helwan alone, separate from the above, is home to more than half a million residents- amounting exactly 
to 643,327.  
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generations of original inhabitants from their land before a single proletarian had even set foot in the 
plant, was perpetually silenced. The continuous ecological disaster in the nearby agriculture areas, 
which suffered from the pollution and industrial waste of EISCO was also never highlighted as part of 
the ecological debt which EISCO’s ‘success story’ owes to other communities. It is this history of EISCO, 
told from the viewpoint both the main industrial complex and its fringes, that I then attempt to relate 
in the following chapters. 
 
 
Let me however first start here by a brief historical overview of this industrial mega project. 
EISCO’s main industrial complex in al-Tibbin connects to the plant’s own railway, transporting the iron 
ore from the mines located in the Western desert in al-Wahat. With a massive industrial site and 
production units stretching across Egypt, EISCO’s topography reflects its place in the national 
imagination.  At the time of its inception, steel production was seen as indispensable to national self-
determination and modernisation, which gave EISCO its symbolic and historical fortitude. Some even 
went as far as calling it “Helwan’s High Dam” in reference to the Aswan High Dam, the landmark 
national project, which was built during the same period despite the Western forces and their 
reluctance to finance it. EISCO was uncontestably considered Egypt’s pride and a symbol of its post-
colonial power.  
 
In his inauguration speech at the plant in 1958, President Gamal Abdul Nasser called EISCO 
“Egypt’s-dream come-true” (Nasser, 1958).  The plant, according to him, was to liberate Egypt from 
years of dependence on foreign countries for the supply of steel. Former rulers, he said, had 
repeatedly promised the Egyptian people such vital project but failed to realise it because of their 
colonial alliances. EISCO thus became the symbol of a strong post-colonial state. This symbolic status 
reflected in EISCO’s political importance to successive regimes that followed Nasser’s. Even during 
Mubrak’s time, when liberalisation was peaking and aggressive capitalist policies destroyed national 
industries, EISCO continued to be a ‘strategic’ industry to the regime, which vetoed its privatisation 
and only restructured parts of it.  
 
 Following the 1952 Coup, Nasser envisioned Helwan as an industrial hub. In a matter of years, 
the formerly largely agricultural area became home to various industrial projects ranging from steel, 
coke, cement, car manufacturing, ammunition and military aircraft to lighter industries, such as 
spinning and weaving and the manufacture of telephone equipment. The slogan of Egypt's first five 
year plan (1960-1965) “from the needle to the rocket” (Waterbury, 1983 p. 81), alluding to the scope 
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of industrial activities in which Egypt would be self-sufficient, was becoming a reality in Helwan.  EISCO 
itself was established in 1954 with West German technological assistance from the company Demag 
which is famous for setting up steel plants across the global south. It was Egypt’s first fully integrated 
state-owned steel plant, which mines the iron ore, transforms it into steel and produces a wide range 
of semi-final and final products such as plates, sheets, sections, billets and coils that cover a wide 
range of market demands.5  EISCO first planned to produce 300,000 tonnes of ingots every year, which 
would enable the country to substitute all its then current steel imports (Waterbury, 1983).  Almost 
ten years after its inauguration, a deal was signed with the USSR in 1967 to expand EISCO’s 
production, whose total capacity has now reached 1.2 million tonnes of ingots a year. That Egypt’s 
‘socialist’ era was mostly set up by West German assistance speaks to the many transitions in the 
Nasserist project and its recourse to a socialist alternative only when attempts to attract funds from 
the West had failed and the 1956 tripartite aggression changed the geopolitics of the region. The 
historical biases of Nasser’s nationalist policies are thus inscribed on EISCO’s structures. 
 
 EISCO was established when ideas around economic planning were being radically shaped and 
the public sector was emerging as an important player in Egypt’s post-colonial agenda. The creation of 
the National Production Council and the separation of the Ministries of Industry and Commerce 
following the seizure of power by Nasser and his colleagues, marked Egypt’s intention to expand the 
state’s economic role (Tignor, 1998).  ʿAziz Sidqi, Egypt’s first minister of industry and the chief 
architect of the public sector made industrial progress a priority across the government. He used his 
ministry, which was set up in 1956, to give the public sector a new centre of gravity. Educated in the 
United States of America, he earned a Ph.D. in regional economic planning from Harvard University in 
1951 with a thesis titled “Industrialization of Egypt: The Case Study of Iron and Steel” (Tignor, 1998). 
Sidqi was eager to put in practice the work on his thesis were he proclaimed the benefits of state 
planning.   
 
The private sector continued to be an important player until 1961. Between 1957-1959 while 
drawing Egypt’s first five year plan of 1960-1965, it was estimated that “private interests were to be 
responsible for 64% of industrial investment and in the first year of the plan alone the private sector 
was to procure 70% of all domestic investments” (Waterbury, 1983 p. 72). This exemplifies the trust in 
the private sector as a major contributor to Egypt’s industrial modernity. It included reliance on 
                                               
5
 This was a clear divergence from the predominance of scrap metal, often imported, in the production of steel by 
private enterprises prior to the inception of EISCO. 
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western private finance, at least until 1956. In 1957 when the technocrats in government, mostly 
educated in commerce and planning from western universities, were developing Egypt’s first five year 
plan, Egypt was simultaneously increasing its political and military alliance with the Soviet Union, 
accepting large loans for the development of its projects and sending economic experts to the Soviet 
Union for advice about the first five year plan (Tignor, 1998).  Although rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union did not lead to establishment of socialism then, it did however reinforce the discourse on the 
centrality of state planning. This was, as Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, prominent journalist and a close 
Nasser aide, said an “Egyptian brand of socialism” which relies on economic progress, rigorous 
planning, state ownership of the vital sectors (Tignor, 1998 p. 171). Public enterprises like EISCO thus 
represented the exercise of ‘rationality’ and the ability of the state to govern the economy. 
 
It was after Britain and the U.S. withdrew the credit they offered to the Egyptian government 
to finance the construction of the High Dam that the public sector in Egypt was significantly enlarged, 
especially following the socialist decrees starting in 1961.6 The politics that ensued highlight the 
different roles the state assumed with regards to the public sector and the importance of geopolitical 
changes to asserting the state’s control over the economy. In July 1956, Nasser responded to 
Washington and London’s decision by nationalising the Suez Canal, which was in turn followed by the 
tripartite aggression on Egypt later this year. Nasser retaliated by Egyptianising all commercial banks, 
insurance companies and  commercial agencies for foreign trade. French and British banks and assets 
were put under the control of the Economic Organization (EO) Al-Muʾassasa al-ʾIqtiṣādiyya, a public 
holding company established in 1957 and a major player in the organisation of the public sector 
(Waterbury, 1983). The EO included the British and French companies sequestrated after 1956 and 
took administrative responsibility for all the state-run enterprises including the newly created Iron and 
Steel Company  and other mixed enterprises where the public  share was 25% or more. By 1960 The 
EO “controlled sixty four companies (including five banks and six insurance companies) employing 
80,000 and assets worth 80 million EGP” (Abdel-Malek, 1968 p.111). Less than a year later, in 1958 the 
ministry of Industry was given the responsibility to license the establishment of all new industrial 
plants, private and public, as well as any expansion, change of location or change of purpose of 
enterprises already established (Waterbury, 1983). In 1960 the public sector was expanded further 
when the Misr Bank and Central Bank were nationalised. Misr Bank acted as the holding company for 
                                               
6
 The refusal to finance the High Dam was primarily in response to Nasser challenging the Western arms embargo on 
Arab nations in a state of war with Israel. Nasser contracted with Czechoslovakia for the delivery of Soviet weaponry 
and aircraft (Waterbury, 1983). The break of the embargo came after Israeli attacks on Egyptian soldiers in Gaza in 
1955. 
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twenty seven industrial and commercial enterprises, including the largest textile centre in the Middle 
East, the Mahalla al-Kubra, and its various affiliates accounted for 60% of textile production 
(Waterbury, 1983).  Three public holding companies, The EO, Misr Group and the then nascent Nasr 
Group (with forty eight companies) were to manage diverse products that would compete against one 
another and guarantee efficient management of the three holding companies by means of 
competition. Although the state was expanding its control over the public sector, it was still 
committed to a capitalist logic of competition and market profitability. 
 
A somewhat divergent path emerged in 1961 with the socialist decrees (primarily Law 117, 118 
and 119) that enabled mass nationalisations of assets, put a significant chunk of the non-agriculture 
sector under public ownership and changed the logic of governing the economy.7  The socialist 
decrees marked Nasser’s attempt to depart from the logic of state capitalism adopted till then and to 
introduce ‘true socialism’.  Competition between companies under the three holding companies was 
thus deemed incompatible with the new laws and in December of 1961 the three existing 
organisations were dismantled and replaced by a new organisation, The Supreme Council for Public 
Organisations, which included thirty nine General Organisations grouping 438 companies organised 
along sectoral lines (Waterbury, 1983). Centralised planning rather than market competition was the 
new governing ethos of the companies. The Ministry of Industry alone had eight general organisations 
and Sidqi fiercely asserted his ministry’s right to determine basic strategy of industrialisation and the 
path of development in general (Waterbury, 1983).  By 1965 the public sector had been expanded to 
its greatest size in Egyptian history. It accounted for 40% of output, 45% of domestic saving and 90% 
of gross national formation (Waterbury, 1983). The socialist laws “left the power of the state virtually 
unchallenged” (Tignor, 1998 p. 163). Nasser’s regime announced that it would achieve “popular 
control of economic institutions” by way of public sector control (Tignor, 1998). However, Egypt’s 
socialist era was not intentionally socialist nor ideologically driven. The recourse to socialist ideology 
only took place after the West withdrew the funds it initially offered and after Nasser deemed private 
capital to represent a threat to the stability of his regime (Waterbury, 1983).  
                                               
7
 There are different interpretations as to why nationalisation policies were implemented. One argument suggested 
that the private sector failed to meet its national obligation to invest as the plan period began, thus violating 
restrictions imposed on profits distribution that required that 5% of profits be invested into state bonds. Sidqi was 
probably  also happy to enlarge his industrial empire. Others argue that Nasser felt the need to pre-empt the potential 
monopoly that some sections of the private sector presented, and its challenge to his stability. In this sense the 
pertinent decisions were not related to economics, but a political strategy of Nasser’s to ensure his hegemony (Mabro 
, 1974 p.128) and to diminish any rivalry. This last view was later confirmed by Heikal who suggested that the 
nationalisation and sequestration was driven ahead by Nasser alone, with limited consultation - partly out of distrust 
out of the bourgeoisie.  
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In addition, the socialist laws in force since 1961 did not have time to develop and the period 
that followed was considered an “arrested transition to socialism” (Mabro and Radwan, 1976 p. 240).  
The persistent antimonopoly position of the Free Officers (Vitalis, 1995 p. 215–217) was met by the 
imperative of development. It followed that “if capitalists would not invest to grow the national 
economy, then the state would expropriate their resources and do it for them” (Elyachar, 2012 p. 82). 
These were the views that shaped the making of the public sector in Egypt. But the extent to which 
they managed to bring about socialism is debated, primarily because of Egypt’s continued integration 
in international markets and politics, its reliance on external capital and significant production and 
political crises. Even before 1967 Arab Israeli war, which drained the resources of the state towards 
the war, by 1962 Egypt was facing a balance of payment crisis caused primarily by a drop in reserves 
from exports which struggled over the years to compensate for the successful Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) policies.8 Some like Waterbury (1983) hold a more conservative opinion that 
labour productivity’s drop with the overstaffing of the public sector, which was assumed at 20%,  
contributed to this imbalance. Drains on foreign reserves from payments to Britain for property 
nationalised in 1956, compensation paid to shareholders in the Suez Canal Company , and payments 
to the Sudan to cover the costs of resettling Nubians who were to be displaced by the High Dam also 
added to Egypt’s international foreign exchange commitments (Waterbury, 1983). Hegemonic 
accounting standards of maintaining a balance of payments’ balance and avoiding major deficits being 
a priority by put significant pressure on Egypt. In 1962 it reached a standby agreement with the IMF 
and drew credits of 20 million EGP requiring the devaluation of the pound as a conditionality, which 
coupled with a balance of trade deficit, fuelled Egypt’s inflation hike and put the country in a murky 
financial position that was a subject to later financial and political attacks, especially following the 
1967 War. Egypt’s integration in the world economy and continued reliance on Western hegemonic 
accounting systems thus brought a new era where the state  as a ‘rational planner’ and a controller of 
the economy was attacked. New alliances between the state and capital enabled the state to continue 
its control over the economy. These shifting practices of the state were experienced and articulated in 
everyday politics at EISCO.  
 
a. A People’s History of EISCO 
 
                                               
8 A large portion of foreign exchange from exports dropped significantly with the worm infestation of 
cotton harvest in 1961 which affected 40% of the harvest (Waterbury, 1983). 
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Like most contemporaneous public plants, EISCO offered its employees permanent contracts 
for life, in addition to perks and benefits that guaranteed them a good life. These included annual 
raises, a pension fund, union representation, subsidised housing, free health care, transportation to 
and from the plant, a recreational and sports club, subsidised annual summer holidays, interest-free 
loans in times of need, a cooperative that sold consumer goods in instalments, and a monthly food 
allowance. This Fordist inspired employment system maintained the stability of the workforce by 
incorporating workers' social and domestic lives within the plant’s circle (Burawoy, 1979; Harvey, 
1989;  Parry, 2001). The life stability and  many opportunities for upward social mobility that these 
arrangements offered earned the public sector widespread appeal among Egyptians. Having started 
with an original labour force of 4,500 employees in 1960, EISCO’s labour force thus grew rapidly to 
21,372 in 1974 and to 25,062 in 1990, right before the neo-liberal reforms in 1991.   
 
The life and family histories of the different generations of EISCO workers show the changes in 
the prospects of social mobility that came with working at EISCO over the years. The first generation 
of workers was the most upwardly mobile. The plant's recruitment criteria were quite lax in its early 
days. Many workers had little or no formal education, and a few remember being offered jobs the 
following day after they applied for work. Many who started work in the plant were thus originally of 
modest background but soon experienced a rise in social status and improvement in material 
circumstances.   
 
With more technological advances, and especially after the inauguration of new mills with 
Soviet expertise in the early 1970s, work became less demanding and more attractive to a wider pool 
of people. The gains that the first generation had visibly made, from housing to social perks, attracted 
others. In 1973 alone 6,000 new workers were recruited at EISCO. The plant’s industrial technical 
college, which students could join at age 16, was now graduating larger groups directly into EISCO 
jobs. In sharp contrast to conditions in today’s labour market, upon enrolment in the technical 
schools, students at the time signed a pledge that they would work at EISCO for at least five years 
after graduation.   Land-owning families in the 1970s sent their children to technical schools to secure 
work at EISCO, and the social taboo around industrial work became more relaxed.  Although members 
of the second generation of workers were less mobile than the first, partly because they were 
originally of richer backgrounds and because their numbers were greater, they still benefited from the 
improvement in life conditions afforded by the plant's opportunities.  
 
22 
 
In time, permanent workers at EISCO acquired a status in their communities and had higher 
expectations about the sort of lives they should lead. ʿamm ʿUmar, a production worker said that 
when buying clothes in Helwan, he never tells the salesperson he works at EISCO; otherwise they 
would triple the price. Responding to my surveys in the plant, many replied to the question, “What is 
the most important benefit you gained from working at EISCO?” with “kul hāga” (‘everything’) and 
workers often described the plant with generous terms such as al-sharika dih ʾummi ʿatāʾhā gheir 
mutanāhī (‘this company is my mother, it gives endlessly’), or “I did not own land, but this job is my 
piece of land” or “I am retiring from the plant as a bey”.9  Their reflections explain how the stability of 
their work allowed them to plan for the future and to make their aspirations for upward social 
mobility concrete, whether through offering their children the opportunity of higher education or 
through stable jobs in the plant, building family houses for their nuclear families, marrying their 
children into well-off families, or buying land. Hajj Medhat, a retired worker, summarised the life 
conditions of many workers in a somewhat intense way when he said: “we were nothing when we 
came to the plant, now we have become something, a big thing”. Those who joined the plant later as 
temporary workers starting from 2007 lived a different reality conditioned by the devaluation of 
EISCO’s market status since the 1980’s. 
 
b. Withstanding Neo-liberalism? 
 
By the mid-1980s EISCO began to feel the effects of Sadat’s infitah (‘open door’) liberalisation 
policies, in effect since the 1970s and continued by Mubarak. Trade liberalisation, the proliferation of 
the private sector and the state’s withdrawal from the centralised allocation of jobs affected working 
conditions. The liberalisation policies exacerbated EISCO’s financial position and the losses it  struggled 
with since its inception.10  The ratification of the Public Enterprises Law (Law 203 of 1991) marked the 
start of the IMF’s Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in Egypt and its neo-
liberal era in 1991. ERASP brought EISCO’s  severe downturn by significantly weakening its financial 
position and transposing its losses directly to workers.  The 1991 Public Enterprise amendments  
                                               
9
 A bey was originally an Ottoman court title, but is used generically in Egypt today to reflect somebody of high status. 
 
10
 Demag, the company that helped to set up the plant, was accused of faulty installation, of selling Egypt second-rate 
furnaces and installing them poorly. This made coke consumption high and the oxygen conversion process obsolete by 
the time of EISCO’s inauguration (Waterbury, 1983). The plant thus never reached its potential production capacity 
since its inception. Liberalisation policies exacerbated EISCO’s original  accumulated debts  from the  underutilisation 
of capacity,  excessive rates of coke and ore consumption, and what some called “a high share of labour costs relative 
to the labour value of output” (Waterbury, 1993, p. 104). 
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facilitated the restructuring of plants owned  by the state with the aim of running them according to 
‘market rules’ and preparing them for privatisation (Posusney, 1997).  Public enterprises were 
rearranged by sector into 27 holding companies to separate ownership from management. Although 
the government initially promised that loss making enterprises were to be sold, in reality it was  its 
profitable ones that went first. In fact in 1989–90, on the eve of the reforms, 260 out of 314 
nonfinancial state-owned enterprises were profitable and only 54 were suffering losses(Mitchell, 
2002). EISCO was never privatised, but the legal changes opened the way for more corruption in the 
plant.11 Later other neo-liberal policies regarding trade, financial markets and labour increased the 
plant's accumulated debts.12  
 
A second and more technologically advanced integrated steel plant was established in 1982; 
the Japanese-built Ezz El Dekheila (EZD). Later sold to the ruling National Democratic Party’s oligarch, 
Ahmed Ezz, EZD established a monopoly on steel rebars, which constitute an average of 80% of steel 
sales in Egypt (Selim, 2006). The fierce competition primarily from EZD and the reduced state 
investment on machinery with the public-sector cuts imposed by ERSAP undermined EISCO’s position 
in the market.13 In 2009, EISCO’s steel rebars producing mill was thus closed down and most of the 
sales in the plant came from other steel products. Around 50% of EISCO’s sales were for example 
generated from one mill- the steel coil rolling mill. The hike in energy prices, which came with ERSAP, 
also reduced the competitiveness of EISCO’s steel products, which already struggled under the 
liberalisation of imports and the competition from smaller private sector steel mills that slowly spread 
across the country (Abdel Khalek, 2005). Yet, despite this bleak scenario, the protection EISCO 
received as a public entity, and especially one that is strategic to the regime’s legacy as a continuation 
of Nasser’s Revolution, enabled it to survive on continuous access to bank overdrafts whose value 
                                               
11
 By 1998 it was hard to see EISCO as surplus generating enterprise. Unsold stocks reached 20% of annual plant 
production, up from 3.7% in 1988. As in many other enterprises, management devised the tactic of selling products to 
customers on credit to remedy the unsold stocks problem. This practice opened the way for more corruption as it 
coincided with the deregulation of capital markets, which saw many businessmen borrowing from banks with little to 
no collateral, not repaying their debts and fleeing the country leaving those who commissioned these deals and the 
workers whose lives depend on the plant to bear the costs. These practices at EISCO, for example, culminated in the 
CEO, in charge from 1991 to 2005, being sentenced for 14 years in prison on corruption charges.  
 
12
 Abdel Khalek (2005) identified that the interest rate liberalisation stipulated by ERSAP, without a prior debt 
restructuring for public plants, multiplied the total value of EISCO’s debts and its debt servicing costs. These were 
found to reach 5 billion Egyptian pounds by 2005 (approx. 500 million GBP) and cost an annual 463 million Egyptian 
pounds (approx. 46.3 million GBP) in debt servicing (Gamal, 2005). 
 
13
 ERSAP stipulated that public sector spending as a percentage of GDP be reduced from 17% to 7.8% and be focused 
on three major sectors: a) infrastructure b) sectors with high social yields such education, health and research and c) 
areas that are unattractive for the private sector like poverty elimination (Abdel Khalek, 2005). 
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increased fivefold  during the 1990s to reach a staggering 239% of the plant’s capital by 1997 (Abdel 
Khalek, 2005). 
 
  EISCO remained protected from aggressive capitalist policies that ensued in other public 
enterprises. A system of early retirement, for example, was legalised in Egypt in 1993 and introduced 
at EISCO in 2001 to cut down the labour force.  Although a total 4,090 workers opted for retirement 
packages by 2009 and gave up work early , the program soon became unpopular. 3,200 of the early 
retirements took place in the first year of 2001 but only 890 over the following 8 years (i.e. around 110 
per year). When workers still on the payroll saw the first batch of retired workers struggling to make a 
living outside the plant and the state’s promises of re-training workers upon retirement evaporate, 
many decided to keep their jobs. Unlike other plants however, where early retirement continues to be 
forced upon workers, after 2001 management exerted little pressure on workers at EISCO to retire. 
The political importance of EISCO meant that making it a profitable enterprise was not always the 
regime’s priority and it decided to sustain it even when labour ratio was not considered “optimum for 
market profitability” (Waterbury, 1983). It is in these details that one sees the variations and 
dislocations of the neo-liberal agenda in Egypt and how the different logics of the state co-exist.  
 
 But EISCO was not totally shielded from ruthless neo-liberal policies. Like most other public 
enterprises, the steel plant was subject to a halt in new employment since 1991. The labour force was 
thus naturally slimmed down over time. To offset recent labour shortages brought about by this 
natural slimming down and the early retirement of workers, management began recruiting workers on 
fixed-term temporary contracts and daily wages. This became part of an on-going global strategy to 
make employment relations flexible and subject to market rules. The drastic change in economic 
policies could easily be seen in the variations in  size and composition of the labour force at EISCO. In 
aggregate, employee numbers were cut in half between 1990 (25,062) and 2009 (13,225). Of the 
latter, 2,246 (17%) were newly employed on temporary, 6-12 month fixed-term contracts, and 10,979 
(83%) were permanent employees. Female employees had dropped from 310 in 2000 to 110 in 2009, 
of which only three were on temporary contracts, reflecting the sexism ingrained in the new 
conditions of work . Temporary work was introduced at EISCO in 2007 after a 16 year hiring freeze and 
four years following the legalisation of temporary work  under the new Labour Law 12 of 2003, which 
was debated in parliament for almost a decade before being ratified.  A ministerial decree annexed to 
the new law stipulated that temporary workers would obtain permanent work following three 
consecutive years of work in the same workplace. This fuelled demand for temporary jobs at EISCO 
25 
 
amidst hope of securing permanent contracts. Those who did not secure temporary employment 
joined the plant as daily waged workers in the hope of climbing up the labour hierarchy, from daily, to 
temporary and eventually permanent positions. Accessing secure employment was increasingly 
difficult with unemployment rates estimated at 30% and especially high among university graduates.14 
A new labour politics was initiated in the quest for stability. Permanent labourers with secure 
'indefinite' employment, temporary labourers with fixed-term contracts, and casual and daily 
labourers are all now part of the new labour hierarchy at EISCO and work together side by side on the 
shop-floors. The rest of this study explains how these politics of labour play out in reproducing 
perpetual domination under the capitalist labour regime. 
 
c. The Terror of Possibilities  
 
One would expect however, that its murky financial position and the gradual introduction of 
repressive labour policies would deter new workers from wanting to work at EISCO and lead older 
ones to protest their deteriorating conditions. But the plant’s historical trajectory shows the nuance in 
the capitalist project that is intertwined with the interests of an authoritarian state and its utter terror 
from the possibilities that the labour movement can create.  As mentioned earlier, in 1989, EISCO was 
home to some of the largest industrial protests in Egypt’s history, when workers stood against the 
corrupt union which agreed to increase incentive pay for managers and white collars and not blue 
collars. This lead to a major uprising and two plant occupations with the police storming  the plant in 
the second and detaining people for the following weeks.  
 
1989 risked destabilising the regime. As a senior plant official explained to me during my 
doctoral fieldwork, the management vowed that such a situation would never again occur in Helwan. 
Given the sheer size of EISCO and its location among many other plants in Helwan, he said, 
management feared that “if EISCO rises, everything else rises”. To the state, EISCO was not just an 
enterprise that is meant to generate surplus; it was also one which, though once a centre of fierce 
opposition, had since been tamed and policed for over twenty years and was now a potential means 
of exerting political control and generating broad electoral support for the ruling National Democratic 
Party. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of EISCO, for example, was required by state security 
                                               
14
 Although the official unemployment rate was 9.9% in 2003, yet Al Naggar (2010) reveals how disguising real 
numbers through accounting techniques hid the more accurate figure reaching up to 30%. He estimates 
unemployment of university graduates to constitute 93% of total unemployment figures. 
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intelligence to be a member of Mubarak’s NDP and once in office, to hold the position of the head of 
the party’s branch in al-Tibbin.  Inspired by the same political calculations, during my doctoral 
fieldwork, the Minister of Industry visited the plant and out of the blue ordered an extra fifteen days’ 
bonus pay to all. The gossip in the plant considered that this was because of upcoming parliamentary 
elections in late 2010. Hence, while the neo-liberal doctrine brought a stagnation of salaries and 
erosion of  benefits in most public enterprises in Egypt (Mitchell, 2002), nominal wages at EISCO rose 
almost tenfold between 1990 and 2009 and by 2009 yearly bonus pay for each worker had reached 14 
months worth of basic monthly wage.  
 
The symbolic importance of EISCO to Egypt’s nationalist history and the level of skill of its 
permanent workers, who can be considered akin to artisans at work, also contributed to EISCO’s 
differential position in recent labour history. The comparative advantage of the steel industry over 
other vulnerable ones in the world market also consolidated the status of EISCO. EISCO’s historical 
trajectory thus reflects the complexities, and at times contradictions and dislocations, at the heart of 
the Egyptian state project.  In the following chapters I map out the multi-layered and contradictory 
practices and representations of the state from everyday encounters with it at EISCO.  
 
II. Value, Class, Property and the State 
 
a. The Politics of ʾIstiqrār and the Anthropology of Value  
 
The everyday politics surrounding access to tenured employment at EISCO prompted my 
interest in how work acquires value in people's lives and how people’s multiple subjectivities 
contribute to the spatio-temporal manifestations of class politics. Such interest in  working out the 
‘meaning of work’ emerged out of an awareness that capitalism secures competitive advantage 
through constant innovation, not only by changing the means of production, as Marx famously 
pointed out, but also by changing how meaning is produced (Foster, 2008). My interests coincided 
with writing the thesis while participating in the revolution of January 25th 2011. The heightened 
political consciousness in Egypt at the time made me mindful of prevalent discourses, particularly the 
wide-spread discourse about ʾ Istiqrār (‘Stability’) in Egypt. The discourse about ʾ Istiqrār was pervasive  
under Mubarak and became tied during the revolution to a clear counter-revolutionary productivist 
state and capital imperative about the importance of ʿAwdat ʿAgalit al-ʾIntāg (“the return of the 
production wheel”) and the threat the revolution posed to ʾ Istiqrār. Meanwhile, the different entries 
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in my field notes, highlighted how often my informants spoke about ʾ Istiqrār  and the importance they 
accorded to it as a social value and a way they gave social meaning to their work.  ʾIstiqrār as a 
discursive tool and an everyday political practice tied well different political, organisational and social 
worlds.   
 
Workers across the labour hierarchy at EISCO describe the object of their work as ʾistqrār. 
Permanent workers with life-time contracts have earned ʾ istqrār, while temporary and daily workers 
hope that in  a few years they will eventually also acquire permanent contracts that will bring it.  But 
what does achieving ʾ istqrār mean in everyday practice? and how is it related to the broader ways in 
which work is valued and people earn respect in their communities? I suggest that ʾ istqrār as a social 
value enables workers to expand on their relations in the community, whether by marrying and 
reproducing, and thus expanding the family’s sense of a good life, or by earning the respect of others 
for fulfilling their obligations to the community. In a sense, ʾistqrār is one way to express the value of 
‘relationality’ that Elyachar (2005) finds essential amongst popular classes and to workshop masters in 
particular, whereby expanding on relations in the community is a much appreciated value. I treat 
ʾistqrār as a value by which workers represent the importance of their actions to themselves and look 
at how permanent work contracts become the symbolic medium, or “tokens of value”, by which this 
quality of ʾistqrār is expressed (Graeber, 2001). 
 
I also explore how EISCO capitalises on workers’ valuation of ʾ istqrār. By turning a social value 
into a productivist one and making people’s immaterial labour into a resource that is part of 
calculations regulating labour regimes, EISCO re-translates the meaning of work as a governing 
technology. This  facilitates the control of the labour force and during the company’s good times, 
surplus extraction. Looking at these politics clarifies how the current permanent workforce is divided 
into those who are able to live by such value – by securing temporary work contracts at EISCO for their 
children, or at least daily waged work, which they hope to turn into permanent work in the future – 
and those who are not. The conflict between the capitalist state and labour is thus  turned into a 
conflict between an aristocracy of labour working at EISCO, who are competing to bequeath 
permanent contracts to their children, relatives and baladiyyāt, and the reserve army of casual 
workers outside the plant, who cannot access employment in the plant on any basis. 
 
What I have called in this thesis ‘the politics of ʾistiqrār’, as in the contestation over how 
people ought to live their lives, ties well the everyday politics from below to the wider overarching 
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politics of governing regimes. As the revolution of January 2011 revelled, it was difficult to miss how 
this everyday politics around access to tenured jobs was related to the on-going reference to 
Mubarak’s ʾistiqrār.  ʾistiqrār has been used by Mubarak since his first years in power. Since then he 
often reminded the Egyptian people that ʾ istiqrār was his legacy both domestically and internationally, 
repeatedly using it as a pretext for conservative and repressive policies. I question how Mubarak’s use 
of ʾ istiqrār related to its ubiquity among some Egyptian groups and its general valuation among many 
people.  I argue that the power of stability as a mode of “governmentality”, cannot be fully 
appreciated at the level of political discourse alone. The ideal of stability predominated during 
Mubarak’s rule through its very entanglement with peoples’ values, their aspirations and the intimate 
politics of everyday life. Governmentality is thus approached here as a set of practices rather than a 
concept (Elyachar, 2005) and following Coronil (1997) I examine power at the intersections of state 
practices and their imaginative appropriation by people.  
 
b. Class and its Everyday Politics 
 
 If the politics of stability divides the working class, how are class relations then articulated? 
How do some workers become embourgeoisified and others remain perpetually proletariat? How do 
the former relate to management at EISCO? I suggest that we must focus on  workers’ multiple 
subjectivities and the relations they foster in different spheres of the household and the community in 
order to get a clearer understanding of how they affect the class struggle at EISCO.  Class remains an 
important tool of analysis of the changes occurring at EISCO. I  argue against the view that ‘class is 
dead’ but also avoid determinist and reductionist class analyses, with their rigid understanding of the 
ownership of the means of production and a teleological view of history that assumes the inevitable 
rise to power of the working class. I treat class as a dynamic social relation developed in interaction 
with the locality. In this sense, class relations are neither ‘fixed’ nor easy to identify. Not every 
manager is bourgeois and not every machine-operator is a proletarian. Rather, I perceive class 
relations as “shaped largely by changing relations of production as well as cultural and political 
factors” (Wilentz, 1984, p. 10).  
 
The object of this study are the ties between neighbourhood, family and work that inform 
work relations and how they are used in privatising capitalist gains, socialising losses, and reproducing 
a capitalist society.  From this perspective, I view labour as “a relational value that emerges in 
between the spaces of commodification and socialisation” (Mollona, 2009a, p. 2). The treatment of 
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labour here is beyond just labour power but one that informs class formation as a relational process. 
Crucially, this highlights that who is a worker is contingent upon how multiple identities intersect and 
overlap (Lockman, 1994a). This wider view of labour and “expanded idea of class” (Kalb, 1997,p.6) as 
relational also benefits from a wider conception of production in society;  one that does not limit itself 
to the production of goods but which follows from Marx and Engels in The German Ideology in 
considering production as simultaneously the production of goods, people, social relations and needs 
(Marx & Engels, 1970).  
 
But I am aware  that the explanation of group formation or class consciousness as contingent 
upon other abstract processes risks reducing class to a descriptive category (Joshi, 2003). Instead, 
following Latour (2005), I hold that recognising the processes of formation and re-formation of groups 
maps the whole social context for us.  I consider class formation then as “an open ended, on-going 
process” where “classes are constantly remodelled by changing economic, political and cultural 
forces” (Lockman, 1994a, p.  xxvi). In sum, classes are:  
 
“Not simply the transcendent, coherent, and empirically well delineated things they 
are often taken to be… Rather a relational concept of class can be used to specify the 
mechanism, processes, and shifts in basic social relationships that constantly generate 
frictions between current repertories of “matter of fact” knowledge, daily work, and 
reproductive routines on the one hand, and the more abstract rationalisation and 
legitimations (ritualised in official public life and institutionalised in great traditions and 
state politics) on the other” (Kalb, 1997, p. 20). 
 
Bearing this in mind, I focus in this thesis on how divisions between workers inside and outside 
the plant and the enmeshing of “networks of relatedness” (Carsten, 2000) in the work regime 
contribute to the on-going class formation and struggle in al-Tibbin. This inquiry is inspired by 
Mollona’s suggestion that “anthropologists of ‘the global factory’ must look at the spatial and 
temporal interconnections between the visible, stable, respectable labour at its core and the 
precarious, invisible and degrading labour at the margins” (Mollona, 2009b, p. xxi). The repercussions 
of the legalisation of temporary employment in public plants from the 2003 labour law are thus 
central to the interconnections that Mollona highlights. The new labour law was criticised for 
attempting to fragment  the working class by pitting permanent and temporary workers inside the 
same workplace against each other and weakening resistance to the neo-liberal project. At EISCO, 
however a somewhat different scenario transpired. Management capitalised on workers’ valuation of 
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relationality and reproduction by limiting new temporary fixed-term employment (and daily labour) 
primarily to children and relatives of EISCO permanent workers. The status of permanent work 
contracts in  the face of increased dispossession was elevated to what Parry has termed in his work on 
India “a quasi-property right” (Parry, n.d.). Permanent workers were thus recruited into supporting 
the restriction of tenured employment to a privileged group. The labour law dispossessed precarious 
workers outside the plant the most.     
 
The emphasis on the fragmentation of workers’ collective power in the literature on neo-
liberalism thus needs to be reconceptualised and viewed as embedded within wider changes in class 
relations in the surrounding locality. As Nash (2005) has correctly suggested the anthropological focus 
on “deterritorialisation, creolisation, hybridisation, or fragmentation – often become reified as process 
and cut off from the political and economic context in which the contradictions between capital and 
human communities are affected”(Nash, 2005, p. 178). At EISCO, the importance of family relations to 
class formation reflects the local entangling of kin relations and systems of governance. As Joseph 
(2008) contends, in  “the support given to families – and especially to connective and patriarchal 
notions of the family – in Arab societies {which} reflects the enmeshing of the kin contract into the 
system of governance and the embedding of family structures into political and other areas of social 
activity” (Joseph, 2008 p.21). Kinship and relatedness are thus treated in this thesis as vehicles 
through which class relations are expressed.  
 
 
c. Wazīfa and New Property Relations 
 
There are numerous questions to explore regarding the relation between class divisions and 
the access to tenured employment, or what is commonly referred to as wazīfa (‘office’ or ‘job’) - 
usually referring to white-collar employment but also indicating permanent blue-collar employment in 
the public sector. For example: why do workers put such emphasis on accessing a wazīfa? And how 
exactly does this inform class formation and class divisions? I take lead from Parry (n.d.), whose 
research at the Bihlai Steel Plant in India shows that permanent work contracts are treated as a quasi-
property right that enables the distinction between public sector workers as members of the middle 
class and contract workers in the unorganised sector as working class.  Parry suggests that unlike the 
contract workers, who as a proletariat only own their labour power, which they sell to the capitalists, 
permanent workers own property in the form of their permanent contract, which gives them lifelong 
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security. Access to job security is in this case what distinguishes permanent and contract workers and 
is reflected in the different aspirations, life structures and material conditions of each group.  
The distinction which Parry highlights in India was also salient in my fieldsite- with EISCO 
households often having very different life cycles, family structures, values and aspirations than other 
workers’ households in the unorganised sector around the plant. Permanent workers at EISCO also 
demanded that priority be given to their own  sons and daughters, if not  more distant relations in the 
allocation of new jobs. The difference between those working inside the plant and others outside, was 
also a discursive one. EISCO workers, for example, were prone to calling others living and working on 
the fringes of the company town, “rubbish”, or “Suqqiyyin” (“people of the market”) or “thieves”. The 
difference between wazῑfa (‘office’ or ‘job’) in the public sector and shughl (‘work’) - namely just work 
with no reference to stable pay or contract, which delineates work in the unorganised sector- was also 
highlighted in everyday languages to distinguish the status of each group. People’s understanding of 
wazīfa as a form of property resonated with historical debates on property relations in the Arab 
world, wherein property was delineated as both milkiya (‘ownership’) and wazīfa (‘office’), 
respectively emphasising different claims to ‘things/objects’ and ‘persons/individuals’ as  two ways of 
thinking of property relations  (Mundy, 2004). 
  
I thus suggest that at EISCO, permanently employed workers and their direct sons, relatives 
and people from their baladiyyāt (‘those who come from the same home village or live in the same 
neighbourhood’) who occupy temporary and daily jobs at the plant, tend to think of their jobs as a 
property and to see themselves as members of the bourgeoisie. Here I follow Hann’s definition of 
property as “the distribution of social entitlements” (Hann, 1998: 7).  This encompassing view of 
property makes sense in a plant like EISCO, which operated at losses for most of its history and thus 
complicates classical understandings of the relation between access to property, ownership of the 
means of production and surplus extraction. Conceptualising workers’ jobs as a form of property that 
is integral to production relations also avoids the ethnocentric and liberal emphasis on materiality in 
property relations, which in turn derive from the tradition of Roman law’s focus on things/objects of 
property (Hann, 1998). 
 
But how can giving employment to sons and daughters of permanent workers turn workers 
who belong to ‘the aristocracy of labour’ into a middle class? The straightforward answer is that 
although passing on jobs to children has been a tradition in public plants since their inception, yet the 
precariousness of life conditions today and the lack of job opportunities, especially for educated 
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graduates, have turned this ‘custom’ into as a ‘right’. However, academic answers are rarely 
straightforward. In this thesis I emphasise the importance of potentiality in understanding property, 
thus following Strathern (1996) who explain it as  “a capacity for development as yet 
unrealised”(Strathern, 1996, p. 17). This is a type of property whose product is extended in the long 
term. In other words, access to a permanent contract gives workers middle class ‘potential’, should 
they be successful in maintaining the security of their jobs and extending that security to their children 
by bequeathing their contracts to them or by other means of acquiring capital. In contrast, those who 
fail to capitalise on it (for example to bequeath it) – those for whom the potentiality of their property 
is devalued by changes in the labour market – find themselves sliding down the labour hierarchy, or at 
best remaining only members of an ‘aristocracy of labour’. Thus in divergence from Parry (n.d)’s 
conclusion, I argue that access to permanent jobs as property does not make workers a middle class, it 
gives them the potential to be one. This potential, I suggest is largely tied to workers’ social 
reproduction and the inter-generational transmission of social entitlements. Whether a group is 
successful in doing so or not is important to their solidly identifying as members of one of class or the 
other. 
 
The following chapters investigate how exactly a ‘potential property’ becomes realised and 
informs class relations. They describe how people slide up or down the class hierarchy, or simply ‘how 
property works’.  Following on from Federici’s (2004) work, I am keen on tracing “the renewed cycle of 
primitive accumulation” where things held in common- from water, to land, to labour, to our genetic 
code- become privatised and create new rounds of enclosures (Federici, 2004).  To do so, I pose some 
broad questions, such as: what are the wider, and perhaps competing, conceptions of social 
entitlements, which give permanent contracts salience in this locality? What do various property-
holding practices tell us about the social relations that entitlements and inequalities are embedded 
within? How is land ownership, and workers’ skills, for example, related to accessing a wazīfa? What 
type of capitalist exploitation and ‘primitive accumulations’ allow the social reproduction of 
hierarchies and class inequalities between organised and unorganised workers?  
 
As Hardt and Negri (2004) famously argue, because labour is an immaterial and collective 
substance and not just an abstraction measured by labour time, it has to  be regulated by capitalism, 
which has no control over its reproduction. Thus new types of property emerge, including bio-
property and require legal innovation to establish their property status and provide protection of this 
immaterial labour. Similarly, Gudeman (2008) suggests that “new forms of property are continuously 
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being devised” (Gudeman, 2008, p. 74) which demand paying continuous attention to daily intrusions 
of the market in new spheres of life.  
 
 Gudeman’s theoretical contribution is highly relevant to life in al-Tibbin.  He suggests a model 
wherein he distinguishes between three terms: the base, limited base and property to delineate the 
changes brought about by new property relations. First, the base is defined as “shared material and 
non-material interests and values that mediate relationships” (Gudeman, 2008, p. 22). The base 
consists of the set of collectively shared components that vary widely across cultures and span from 
transmitted knowledge and shared assets to fixed resources (Gudeman, 2008,).  In this sense, chapter 
one asks: could workers’ skills and tacit knowledge- for example, like those that EISCO permanent 
workers share and have learned over the years- be considered a form of base or collective property? 
The limited base is a further development from the base, defined as “the bounded resource, which 
economists call a limited access commons (Ostrom, 1990)” (Gudeman, 2008, p. 22).   It is  a set of 
mutual relations and identities that are regulated by the market into a more practical and calculative 
arrangement (Gudeman, 2008). For example, skills shared by workers can become a limited base 
through their interaction with capital.15 What Gudeman suggests is that base may be so intimately  
mixed with private property that it becomes colonised by market practice and language with the final 
effect that “base becomes property and property becomes base” (Gudeman, 2008, p. 86). With this in 
mind, I ask how labour, which is immaterial and relational, becomes objectified (other than in the 
waged-labour relation) under various new forms of property in Helwan. 
 
Now if property is constantly being re-invented, how do new forms of property inform class 
relations? Relevant to rethinking property relations is the work of anthropologists who criticise the 
Western stress on the manual and non-manual divide in framing class relations, and who theorise the 
relation between class and property alternatively (Parkin, 2006; Parry, n.d.).  In the Marxian definition 
of class, the proletariat sell their labour to the capitalist bourgeoisie, who own the means of 
production and survive by extracting surplus value (Marx & Engels, 1948).  Although property relations 
remain central to conceptions of class today, it is difficult to explain exploitation under this definition 
when factories, like the Bihlai Steel Plant and EISCO, are often not generating profit in the market 
(Parry, n.d.).  In searching for an expanded concept of class in these contexts, Parry (n.d.) adopts 
                                               
15
 For example, Gudeman explains that in guilds and trade unions, in which apprentices learn skills and knowledge in 
hierarchical circumstances, the “transmission of the property is limited to members who may pay a fee or perform a 
service in return for their access to a heritage that capacitates them to gain a market return, although originally this 
knowledge might have been built from an unpaid heritage”(Gudeman, 2008, p. 87). 
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Lockwood’s (1958) deployment of Weber in looking at "the class situation" in terms of the elements 
of: 
  
"Market situation (including source and size of the purse, degree of job security and 
chances of upward occupational mobility); work situation (the working relationship of its 
members given by the division of labour); and its status situation (its position in the hierarchy of 
prestige)" ( Parry, n.d., p. 6) 
 
But Parry is aware that the economic position of BSP workers should not be synonymous with 
their market position, arguing that their skills are not entirely subject to the market.  Nepotism in 
accessing jobs, the fact that BSP workers treat their work as de facto property, and the expectation of 
customary rights to work until retirement all reduce the role of supply and demand in transferring 
skills.  
 
Like Parry (n.d.), Parkin (2006) is also doubtful of the market’s sole control over skill 
development and its transfer to others, including one's children. Parkin identifies the two main 
exclusionary devices by which the bourgeoisie or  a dominant class  constructs and maintains itself as 
a class as those surrounding the institutions of property and of academic or professional credentials. 
Parkin stresses the classical understanding of property as an exclusionary device. He is not only 
interested in property that members of dominant classes own but also the property that they restrict 
excluded classes from owning. Thus, Parkin (2006) follows Durkheim in thinking of the right of 
property “as the right of the individual to exclude other individual and collective entities from the 
usage of a given thing”, adding that property is defined negatively “by the exclusion it involves rather 
than the prerogative it confers”  (Durkheim 1957, p. 142 Parkin, 2006, p. 130). The central question in 
Parkin’s work is how classes understand themselves as opposing groups, where dominant groups 
accumulate social and material privileges while denying them to others16. Throughout the thesis, I 
address how access to credentials, given the high unemployment especially of university graduates, 
has lost its status, while simultaneously the focus on permanent work contracts as property is 
                                               
16
 Weber's (1968) concept of "social closure", which Parkin adopts in his analysis, further clarifies how classes are 
formed based on the exclusion of others. Social closure denotes "the processes by which social collectivities seek to 
maximise rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles" (Weber 1968 in 
Parkin, 2006, p. 125). Social closure often entails distinguishing a social and physical attribute as a marker of status 
and justification for exclusion.  But at the core, it is motivated by a desire to monopolise economic opportunities 
(Weber 1968 in Parkin, 2006, p. 125). The concept is important because it links social attributes, such as difference in 
gender practices across classes of workers, to their attempts to maintain material gains. 
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becoming more salient. By looking at the way permanent workers restrict casual workers’ access to 
new contracts, I follow Parry (n.d) and Parkin (2006) in emphasising the relational aspects of class. 
 
  Most interesting about contract bequeathing among permanent workers is that it takes place 
beyond the formal dichotomies of the individual (i.e. sons and daughters, or direct lineage) and the 
communal (general public) (Hann, 1998). By looking at the continuum between these two poles within 
which contract-bequeathing practices among baladiyyāt (‘those who originate from the same home 
village or town’), for example, are located, the social relationships within which permanent contracts 
are embedded, and the community values that inform their life choices takes precedence in the 
analysis. Following Thompson (1976), I wish to investigate the “inherited grid of customs and control 
within which that { Property} right was exercised”(Thompson, 1976, p. 337).  Looking into the symbolic 
and social context in which property rights are recognised (Hann, 1998), the thesis maps a tentative 
relation between the value of obtaining higher education credentials, access to land, acquiring skills 
and access to permanent contracts as diverse markers of class differences. Expanding conceptions of 
property relations should therefore highlight both the material and the symbolic in mapping the 
distribution of social entitlements, workers’ own understandings of those entitlements, and the wider 
theorisation of production in social life. 
 
d. EISCO and the Post-Colonial State 
 
 Why do developments at EISCO seem however different from other public factories in Egypt? Is 
there something peculiar about steel factories in post-colonial states? Could we infer a wider role the 
state plays in shaping class relations? Not only was EISCO considered a  landmark project in Egypt, but 
its name and reputation spread across the Arab world. Steel was important to the very representation 
of the Egyptian state as a powerful post-colonial nation. In turn, the nature and politics of the state 
became important to work and class relations at EISCO and I suggest, should become a separate 
object of study.  Perhaps the clout of the steel industry is described best by Kotkin (1995) in situating 
the equally impressive Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Complex in the Soviet Union. “Steel, as the basis of 
the state’s power and identity” Kotkin (1955) explains,  “held a kind of magic aura, a glow nowhere 
more in evidence than at the gigantic Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Complex” (Kotkin, 1995, pp. 70–71). 
This magical aura around the steel plant and its ability to construct working lives and reconfigure 
agricultural land into an industrial town became intertwined with the power of the state itself.  As 
Mitchell (2002) suggests in most post-colonial states, “re-arranging the natural and social environment 
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became a means to demonstrate the strength of the modern state as a techno-economic power” 
(Mitchell, 2002, p. 21). EISCO as a megaproject demonstrates the calculative and disciplining  powers 
of the state.  
 However, in treating the state, I do not ascribe to it an intentionality, nor assume that it is a 
given and objective concept, but see it as “a multi-layered, contradictory, and  trans-local sets of 
institutions, practices and people”(Sharma & Gupta, 2005, p. 6). I adopt the view that the state  comes 
into being  through forms of representation and localised everyday practices (Sharma & Gupta, 2005) 
which give it a coherent structure through power and control (Mitchell, 1991a) and create the vertical 
relations between the state and society (Gupta & Ferguson, 2002). Looking at how the state was 
imagined and practiced through ties between public officials, the plant CEO, members of the board, 
unions, managers, and workers, I map out how political power and neo-liberal governmentality were 
spatialised at EISCO and informed widespread discourses around the state.  
 
But  the state’s contribution to shaping working class relations is more than the connection 
between steel-making and state-making.  Parry (n.d.) highlights that the class division between 
permanent and contract workers is an outcome of the configuration of state policies and not only 
capitalist ones. Similarly Cooper (1992) looks at the complex relations in Africa between nationalist 
movements who aspired to control the state and labour movements that led them to power. He 
demonstrates that changes towards protection and de-casualisation of labour, for example with the 
Mombasa Docks workers in Kenya, had more to do with the expansion of political power of the 
nationalist movement than progressive economic strategies. Likewise in  the Middle East, Owen 
(2004) argues that the comparatively slow pace of recent liberalisation in the region (compared for 
example to Latin America) is a product of continuous debates between public figures and state 
officials about balancing the grip over the political power and enabling economic liberalisation. In 
asking how groups are formed at EISCO, and how class inclusions and exclusions take place, I consider 
the practices and reproduction of state power as central to  class relations in al-Tibbin and to the 
protection of EISCO workers from dispossessions common elsewhere. 
 
III. Anthropology of Labour in the Middle East 
 
Although public plants played a predominant role in Egyptian post-colonial and industrial 
history, there is very little academic work on the social world of those whose lives was spent behind 
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their walls. Theoretical writing on the anthropology of the Arab world focused primarily on Islam, 
segmentation and the harem (Abu-Lughod, 1989), which explains why “economic anthropology of the 
Middle East barely exists” (Elyachar, 2005, p. 22). A rich body of literature covers the history of labour 
in Egypt, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century before the 1952 coup, 
including memoirs written by labour activists  in textile factories, most famous of which are Mahmud 
al-Askari, Taha Saad Uthman and Muhammad Yusuf al-Muddarrik (Abbas, 1968; Beinin, 2001; Beinin & 
Lockman, 1987; Chalcraft, 2001; Goldberg, 1986, 1996a; Lockman, 1994b; Uthman, 1972). These texts 
address wider struggles of labour against capitalism and the state, although do not emphasise  the 
divisions and discrepancies within the working class.  The literature covering  controversies over neo-
liberal reforms in recent decades frames the struggles within the triad of the coherent and too well 
delineated groups of workers, the unions, and the state (Goldberg, 1992; Handoussa & Potter, 1991; 
Posusney, 1997). 
 
The existing literature leads Goldberg to conclude that “we are almost wholly ignorant of how 
these transformations are occurring in individual lives” (Goldberg, 1996a, p. 186). The lives of Egyptian 
workers remain largely unintelligible due to the clampdown on academic research and the policing of 
workers. Under the three successive regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, the state security 
intelligence monitored the day to day working lives of labour especially within public factories. As 
Posusney (1997) argues, accessing workplaces put both workers and researchers at risk, which made 
the latter depend on officially documented strikes by journalists, labour rights centres and activist 
workers or focus on archival research. Only with the relative relaxation of state control during the late 
Mubarak period were some scholars able to conduct limited research inside factories and public 
sector spaces. They include, for example, Toth’s (2002) study following the layoffs in Kafr al-Dawwar’s 
plant, Shehata’s (2009) research inside two textile plants in Alexandria and the yet unpublished PhD 
research of Marie Duboc in Shibbin al-Kum’s privatised textile plant and Marten Petterson’s work in al-
Mahlla al-Kubra. Masters’ dissertations by American University in Cairo graduates also offer 
interesting insights into labour politics during Mubarak’s era. 
 
The informal sector, easier to access with less attention from the state security, made room for 
some ethnographic research on working lives in Egypt. Studies such as Toth’s (1999) of rural migrant 
workers in the construction sector and  Elyachar’s (2005) among workshop masters in al-Hirafiyyin 
have  informed us respectively of the invisible contribution of seasonal rural workers to the 
stabilisation of the state’s economic plans and of the state’s use of social values to expand markets.  A 
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growing anthropological literature also capitalised on the relative ease of research in the informal 
sector to document the experience of impoverishment and everyday politics of community, 
households, space and policing (Ghannam, 2002; Hoodfar, 1997; Ismail, 2006; Rugh, 1984; Singerman, 
1996). 
 
The fact that EISCO appears repeatedly in accounts of workers' industrial action while very 
little is known about the composition of its labour force (other than political affiliations) in terms of 
origin, age and kinship systems bears out Goldberg's observation that “writing labour history in 
general and Egyptian labour history in particular has been closely tied to self-proclaimed progressive 
projects”(Goldberg, 1996b, p. 186). Perhaps this commitment to self-proclaimed progressive projects 
has rendered the analysis of family and community life separate from, if not secondary to, the 
domains of production in Egypt.  In fact Toth (1999) summarises the three major works on organised 
labour in Egypt and laments similarly their pre-occupation with official politics through the focus on 
“the dismal political clout of organised factory workers against the state (Posusney, 1991); the 
discrepancies between industrial organisation and political doctrine (Goldberg, 1986); and the political 
astuteness of those otherwise dismissed as exhibiting false consciousness (Beinin and Lockman 
,1987)” (Toth, 1999, p. 6). The literature on neo-liberal reforms in Egypt-  largely produced by 
economics and political science departments- has likewise  emphasised therole of the state in 
introducing reforms, its relation to the labour market and to business interests (Assaad, 2003; 
Handoussa & Potter, 1991; Heydemann, 2004; Posusney, 1997).  
 
Only a few accounts  provide a picture of people’s everyday lives without considering the state 
as a coherent body. They reveal instead the calculative practices of various actors that separate a 
domain for political control, named the economy, and the resulting artificial creation of two separable 
objects of state and society (Mitchell, 2002). For example, the first ethnographic study conducted 
inside two organised factories by Shehata (2009)  illuminated how certain workplaces function as “a 
state within a state”(Shehata, 2009, p. 127), which in turn reproduces authoritarian practices in 
everyday life. However, local and domestic lives of workers were undermined in the analysis of in the 
reproduction of authoritarian politics, which were instead ascribed to a ‘culturalist’ rationale.  
 
By the same token, state repression in the wider Middle East and the general preoccupation 
with writing on regional wars, religious movements and gender relations limited ethnographic-based 
work on economic transformations and class relations in the region.  Only a handful of  ethnographic 
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studies of labour recently highlighted how  coercion and consent influence the  flows of Syrian migrant 
workers in Lebanon (Chalcraft, 2008), how the social exclusion and violence produced by Bahrain’s 
kafala system- used in employing Indian migrant labour- result from a strategic arrangement by the 
state to protect  citizens from  neoliberalism  at the expenses of migrants (Gardner, 2010) and the 
meaning that workers give to  economic and political transformations in modernised industries in 
Turkey (Sugur & Nicholas, 2004). Other valuable studies have emphasised how religious discourse has 
discounted and articulated workers’ grievances during the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Bayat, 1987) and 
how class relations are delineated within state-owned sectors in Syria (Longuenesse, 1979).17 
Although Lockman (1994a) argues that examining the Middle East’s work history  on the assumption 
of  a supposed common culture or similar historical processes is bound to be unsatisfying, such studies 
he maintains, remain viable when political entities are recognised as historically constructed and not 
natural ones. Mapping out similarities in state formations and trajectories and capital flows that shape  
class struggles helps us understand not just the recent toppling of regimes in the region but also how 
they endured over the years. Such investigation shows how regimes in the region persisted not just by 
means of coercion and policing as mainstream narratives advocate, but also by capitalising on the 
meaning of work, its centrality to people’s lives and the divisions within the working classes.  
 
IV. Research Methodology 
 
The research for this study was conducted primarily with three groups: workers on the shop-
floors of EISCO; leftist activist workers and ex-unionists; and workers’ families in the company town, 
the villages and new satellites cities around the plant. The research spanned 22 months between 
November 2008 and August 2010, with 15 days’ interruption while I visited London in 2009. As a 
native Arabic speaker, I did not undertake Arabic training.  
 
Although I had set out to conduct fieldwork inside EISCO at the same time as residing in 
Helwan, this was not feasible for reasons I explain in the following section on positionality and access 
to the field. Instead, in February 2009 I received permission to conduct research inside the plant. I 
spent a year (until February 2010) visiting the plant three to four days a week and spending the 
remainder of the weekdays visiting different members of workers’ households. Most workers 
operated on a rotating shifts basis – warādī mutaghayra – with the times of the three shifts being 
                                               
17
 See Lockman (1994b) and Beinin (2001) for a review of working class histories in the Middle East. 
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from 6 am to 2 pm, from 2 pm to 10 pm, and from and 10 pm to 6 pm daily. Some shop-floor workers 
and most administrative workers, engineers and management operated on a normal shift – wardiyya 
ʿādiyya – from 8 am to 4 pm. I was only granted access to the plant on a normal shift basis. From 
March 2010 to August 2010, I did concentrated research among EISCO families, especially in the 
company town, where I resided from June to August 2010. The division between ‘family research’ and 
‘work research’ was structured by my experience as a ‘home’ anthropologist, who, given her complex 
relation to the field, became implicated in reproducing the separation of the public and the private 
spheres.  
 
e. Labour Activists and Trade Unionists 
 
While I waited to arrange a permit to access the plant and searched for a family that would 
host me in Helwan, I spent the first three months of the research (from November 2008 to January 
2009) gathering oral historical accounts from leftists, ex-unionists and labour activists from EISCO, 
some of whom I had been introduced to through friends in leftist circles when I was doing some pre-
fieldwork research a year earlier. In addition to gathering oral historical accounts about labour 
activism in the plant, I received a plethora of documents, which they generously entrusted me with. 
These documents recorded different strikes, workers’ demands to management, court cases, leaked 
management documents, and workers’ publications at EISCO over the years. The activists also invited 
me to attend their meetings in a labour rights centre and in the al-Tagamuʿ party branch in Helwan, 
and to visit their houses, where their families kindly received me. 
 
This initial research helped me situate the official politics of the unions and collective actions in 
the plant within a longer historical time-frame than the period I was about to research. Two very 
generous leftist activists and ex-unionists, one retired and the other still a worker in the plant, 
dedicated time to introduce me to other people in the left at EISCO and took me along to their 
meetings. Their presence facilitated my introduction in al-Tibbin. Much of my fieldwork followed a 
similar pattern, in which a usually male informant, friend or research assistant who was culturally 
resourceful and esteemed by others initially helped me to enter male-dominated spaces, until my 
presence among the men was accepted without the need for the third person’s presence. The first 
three months of the research were also used to conduct archival research, at the archives of al-ʾAhālī 
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newspaper, about EISCO’s political and economic situation as covered by different newspapers. The 
newspapers extensively documented the losses EISCO made over the years and the 1989 strikes. 
 
f. Workers on EISCO’s Shop-floors 
 
  Before I settled on the choice of the Steel Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, where most of my 
ethnographic research was conducted, I spent the first six weeks inside EISCO visiting, accompanied by 
representatives from the social affairs department, most of the various mills and divisions to 
familiarise myself with the entire production process. From the beginning, hierarchy and seniority at 
the plant presented themselves as key to sociality. I could not chat to workers directly until I had gone 
through a process of paying respect and interviewing mill heads first, then section engineers, followed 
by senior workers and finally arriving at temporary and daily workers. This tedious process helped me 
capitalise on the contradictions that sometimes appeared in management and workers’ stories about 
work and the state of production. Yet counter-intuitively, many managers were sympathetic to the 
research, particularly alarmed by the state of the plant, and generously shared a lot of details that I 
would otherwise have never known about the ‘high politics’ in the plant. The head of the furnace 
division was keen to show me   areas that he claimed the CEO would deny existed in the plant – such 
as the area nicknamed al-kilār (‘The Killer’), discussed in chapter four. But others, like Sameh from the 
social affairs department,  remained confused and unhappy about the hassle caused by my research,  
asking whether it was not better that I sit in an office and speak to ‘a sample’ of workers, and 
complained that I was not serious enough in my research because I did not carry a questionnaire to 
distribute around. In the days that followed, we reached an agreement where he could sit in offices, 
while I went around the shop-floor, usually accompanied by an enthusiastic engineer or senior worker. 
Sameh was running for union elections and so found the opportunity to talk to people, and 
particularly to discuss favours around booking the plant’s summer vacations, useful.  
 
But the presence of a female researcher who did not carry a questionnaire around and was 
more interested in chatting to male workers was a source of curiosity. It seemed to perplex everyone 
and to cast doubts on both my abilities as a researcher and my ‘moral’ character. In the months that 
followed, I appeared on the shop-floor carrying a black notebook in which I scribbled notes every few 
hours to justify my presence. The black notebook put the contested gender and occupational norms at 
peace. The workers and some of the engineers who perceived value in the research and were 
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enthusiastic about documenting the state of neglect of the plant, unjust working conditions and the 
corruption of upper management, were particularly welcoming of the notebook. The notebook 
reaffirmed that this – whatever we lived during the day – was documented. Some of the workers and 
engineers would come by during my fieldwork and ask explicitly that I document this last fight that 
occurred with management, or this new policy or this argument or accident that had just occurred. 
When I did sometimes write a note about these events in my observations, they made fun, jokingly 
wondering whether it was this last piece of gossip I was now writing about, or another one. Although I 
claimed authorship and responsibility for whatever was in the black notebook,  with time it became a 
collective document we shared on the shop-floor to highlight what needed to be documented, 
included, excluded or sometimes even ridiculed, as, for example, when Karim, one of the temporary 
workers, was making fun of my fascination with finding traditional amulet signs dipped in blood on the 
walls of the shop-floor, and joked that it would fit well into my section on the folkloric aspects of 
working-class habits.  
 
I settled on the German-built Steel Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill after finding that the working 
conditions, state of machinery and technology were more or less representative of the rest of the 
plant. I also chose this mill because its management had organised a week-long training workshop for 
the new temporary workers, which coincided with the time I first visited the mill. I attended the 
workshop, which was in a makeshift classroom off the shop-floor, where the ‘classes’ were ‘taught’ by 
the shop-floor engineers. The classroom setting, with its jokes, gossip, questions, exams, results and 
so forth, enabled the young workers, the engineers and I to develop friendly relations, which made my 
introduction to the shop-floor much more natural. It also gave me the necessary minimum 
qualification, having being sufficiently ‘trained’, to be on the shop-floor. After nine months at the 
Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, I conducted a month’s research at a similar but more technologically 
advanced mill built by Soviet expertise – the Coil-Rolling Mill, in order to compare the production 
process and work conditions in the two mills. Although this research recounts mostly interactions on 
the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, the research from the Coil- Rolling Mill helped in being aware of the 
specificities of the first mill. 
 
 I also spent two weeks towards the end of my research interviewing female employees, 
mainly employees in the plant administration and engineers in the plant, whom I had little access to 
on the two shop-floors. The time I spent interviewing them was particularly amiable and I enjoyed 
how they mocked male employees and how the latter, who were more comfortable with them, 
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sometimes having worked with them for up to thirty years, teased them throughout the day. I was 
familiar with the employees in the industrial relations department, including the women, because 
there was no private place on the shop-floor to change into my overalls and safety shoes, so I visited 
the department every day to change into my work clothing. The women there were very supportive 
and taught me a lot about work through the gossip we shared. The industrial relations department 
was always lively, with sandwiches and eggs distributed in the morning by Mohamed, one of the 
employees, who prepared and sold them to his colleagues, with employees calling to each other 
loudly across corridors, saving-group instalments being collected and friendly employees taking the 
time to chat with me about the plant, marriage, studies and their children. The gossip I learnt in the 
industrial relations department and shared with workers on the shop-floor was also particularly good 
for our exchanges of information, and made the exchanges we had a little fairer. The head of the 
industrial relations department was also very generous. He offered me his private bathroom to change 
my clothes and store them during the day and insisted I had tea every morning before I headed to the 
shop-floor. I learnt a lot from him and from the discussions with other administration employees in his 
office about management’s policies. Although he was rather politically conservative, reading the daily 
state newspaper al-jumhuriyya, and avoided open criticism of the CEO, he was still critical of the 
regime and very eloquent in his social commentaries. 
 
I was not, however, allowed to formally work for a wage at EISCO. The total number of females 
in the labour force during my fieldwork was 110, all of whom either occupied administrative positions 
or were engineers, which meant they had their own offices and socialised very little on the shop-floor. 
There were no female workers on any of the plant’s shop-floors, so the idea that I would work for a 
wage on a shop-floor was out of the question. Given the scarcity of temporary work at the time – for 
example, the only three female temporary employees, who were computer science graduates, were 
also relatives of ‘big shots’ in the plant – securing waged work would have increased the privileged 
position I already occupied.  Once I settled on conducting research in the Steel Plate- and Sheet- 
Rolling Mill, its management enabled me to negotiate some informal non-waged work. I met some 
resistance from workers to my working on the shop-floor as a female that was difficult to bridge 
initially, and I spent the first couple of  months only assuming the role of a ‘formal’ researcher, who 
hung around, asked questions and gathered documents from the mill, before I was allowed to 
contribute to helping the shifts by the main rolling machine that I focused my research on: writing 
production on the board, helping the control room operator and doing some painting during general 
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repairs. Writing production on a blackboard alluded to being a teacher in a class room, which is a job 
widely accepted for females and was thus deemed sufficiently feminine for me to do.  
 
Although female ethnographers doing research in the Arab world often find accessing male 
spaces difficult, the demographic in the plant helped to ease this somewhat. Given that there was no 
recruitment in the plant for sixteen years between 1991 and 2007, permanent employees were in the 
age bracket between 35 and 60 years old (although, given the significant reduction in job openings 
since the early 1980s, they were mostly at least 45 years old, and largely in the age bracket between 
50-60 years old). I was 25 years old at the time of my fieldwork at EISCO, and thus many workers and 
engineers, having married young, treated me like their daughter, and the younger ones referred to me 
as a ‘younger sister’. Of course I received my fair share of being gossiped about for spending too much 
time talking to this engineer, or that worker, and also received looks, flirtatious comments and poems 
slipped into plant documents. However, the possibility of sexual politics was significantly reduced by 
the age difference.  I was particularly careful to stress this age difference by mixing between calling 
the older men ḥadritak, which is a formal way to address people of older age and higher status, and 
the less formal inta (the difference between the two terms is a bit like that between the French vous 
and tu) and like the young temporary employees I also called permanent workers with the title ʿ amm 
(‘uncle’), which is often used to address older people. This thus created a gendered boundary through 
age. The old permanent workers also took on the role of the ‘gender guards’ on the shop-floor by 
monitoring my interactions with the temporary workers, to whom I was closer in age. The male 
workers and engineers insisted on calling me duktura (‘doctor’), which is usually the title given in 
Egypt to anybody that starts a PhD, while the female workers all called me by first name. Calling me 
duktura justified my presence on the shop-floor and created the necessary discursive distinction to 
allow me the material closeness I was sharing. Although I initially felt like a very incompetent 
ethnographer for being called by a title by my informants, I realised later that being called duktura was 
what enabled me to spend time in the workers’ collective makeshift room that was annexed to the 
shop-floor, where we shared tea and food, went underground beneath the machine, sat in offices 
with the engineers and spent hours chatting informally and joking on the benches around the shop-
floor to workers and in various other ways breaking otherwise rigid gender rules.  
 
As well as the title duktura, embodied gender practices enabled me to maintain gendered 
boundaries necessary to conduct this fieldwork in a rather conservative setting.  These practices 
included looking down when walking in a public space, adopting a rigid walking pace that reflected 
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seriousness,  keeping one to one conversations brief and crossing hands when surrounded by too 
many men. Like the embodied norms, I acquired also “embodied skills” (Prentice, 2008) which enabled 
me to understand the tensions around work on the shop-floor, its load and semiotic meaning.  
Although I did not work manually with tools and crowbars, by writing production on the board I was 
engaged  in the negotiations regarding how production is calculated, how workers buy time and how 
the work pace is regulated . Similarly, working in the control room next to the main operator made me 
realise the type of skills and working relations needed to operate the machinery as discussed in 
chapter one.   
 
 I also learnt a lot from chatting to workers directly about events on the shop-floor and 
especially through shared gossip and jokes, which captured the tensions and double meanings that 
direct narratives could not communicate. The work pace was mostly left to workers to organise, which 
they generally did by dividing the work amongst groups every few hours. As a result there were always 
several workers resting and plenty of time for discussion on the shop-floor. The regular breakdown of 
machinery also offered the opportunity to chat to workers freely without interrupting their work or 
jeopardising their safety. When they were not in their annexed room, workers often rested in the 
control room because it was air-conditioned; many conversations took place on the back bench 
behind the operator. The lively and entertaining group discussions enabled me to learn from workers’ 
conflicting memories and narratives and enabled me to debate and discuss my latest findings regularly 
with workers. One way to make our exchanges relatively fairer beyond the usual food exchanges and 
informal connections we shared, was taking photos of groups of workers, printing them and giving 
them as presents on the shop-floor, which workers found were good souvenirs from the workplace.  
 
 I was overall made to feel at ease on the shop-floor and given the space to do what I wanted, 
although the production engineer on the central rolling machine became the main person responsible 
for my presence, whom I reported to for attendance. He facilitated much of the interactions with 
workers and engineers, gave me access to the mill’s official documents but also often restricted my 
movement  in the name of ‘protecting me’ from workers.  The plant engineer helped me access official 
data about employment from the industrial relations division and data on production he had himself 
gathered. I also used a survey on each of the two shop-floors, to get background workers' ages, 
residence, numbers of children, pay and job satisfaction in order to compare them to official mill 
statistics. I had access to the plant’s wider statistics about employees through the industrial relations 
department; although the administration worker responsible feared giving me permission to 
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photocopy them and instead dictated them for me to hand copy over a few days in what seemed to 
his colleagues like comical tutorial sessions.  
 
g. Workers’ Households and Community Life 
 
My access to workers’ domestic lives was first enabled by residing with a family in one of the 
satellite cities of Helwan, before being asked by state security intelligence, as I will explain in the 
coming section, to leave their house. The family of Magdy, a Christian steel worker at EISCO, his wife 
ʾUmm Rami, an unemployed house-wife and their children Rami, an engineering university student, 
Leila a preparatory school student and Wassef their youngest who struggled with learning difficulties, 
introduced me to daily chores and routines of lives in Helwan. When we travelled or went to reside 
with ʾUmm Rami’s extended family, which lives in one of the village of al-Saff, I could easily compare 
the difference in life expectations and structures between Rami and Leila and their relations to their 
cousins whose parents were either peasants or employed in casual work. Magdy, who moonlighted 
with a job as an aluminium wire supplier invested primarily on his children’s education and the 
upward mobility of the family.  
 
Other workers on our shop-floor would generously invite me to spend the day with their 
families or to different wedding and social occasions in the company town, towns around Helwan and 
the villages around the plant. When I met ʾAmgad, who later assisted me with research in the 
company town, he was working as a daily worker on the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill. He was also a 
son of a deceased EISCO worker and a resident of the company town. ʾAmgad was almost my age, 
funny, street smart and an astute social commentator, and we became friends instantly and we 
negotiated working together. A garment worker in a workshop, his mother was among the few 
working women in the area and   became a source of emotional support in the field and a long-term 
friend. Through ʾUmm ʾAmgad's family, including ʾAmgad and her four daughters, I discovered the 
other side of the upwardly mobile communities at EISCO, and how some EISCO families were sliding 
down the labour hierarchy. With ʾ Amgad, I conducted systematic interviews in different parts of the 
company town where he knew people. These household interviews enabled me to gather life and 
household histories that traced transformations within the EISCO community over decades. We also 
conducted interviews in the bīyūt ʾahālī areas, where most of non-EISCO households of the al-
tabābna, the original owners of the land and now largely casual workers, were located. These 
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interviews enabled me to compare both sets of lives and expectations between those of EISCO 
households and those outside. 
 
During the same time, I resided in the company town from June to August 2010.  Duktur 
(‘doctor’) Hussam, a generous friend I was introduced to at EISCO, lent me his house in the company 
town in al-Tibbin to reside in, while he moved to his family house in the nearby village in al-Saff. 
Having joined the plant originally as a blue-collar worker, Duktur Hussam continued to study up until 
receiving a Doctorate in Philosophy. He continues to work in the plant administration having been 
denied the teaching post he deserved at university because of the nepotistic and corrupt networks in 
the academy. Duktur Hussam generously introduced me to households in villages around the plant 
where EISCO workers resided, including his own village of Neguʿ al-ʿarab, but in the thesis I do not 
focus on aspects of village life and households partly because it was difficult to cover such huge 
geographical area systematically in the short period of fieldwork.  
 
My staying in an apartment alone despite being female in the company town was  socially 
tolerated partly because my next-door neighbours were Christian: a retired EISCO worker Mounir, his 
wife ʾUmm Karoline and daughters. Being from a Christian family myself, it was considered as if I 
resided with extended kin.  We did indeed spend most days with the doors open, cooking together or 
visiting each other. Mounir’s family struggled after he left EISCO, making me sensitive to the 
distinctions between those inside and outside EISCO. Spending time with ʾUmm Karoline’s youngest 
daughters in the company town's sports club, attending aerobics classes together, going to the market 
and generally contributing to chores and duties in the company town helped me understand  the 
particular experience of women and children, which was  not covered during my research in male 
spheres inside the plant. Accessing both spheres of household and work enabled me to think of labour 
and class relations in wider terms beyond their formation on the production line. 
 
V. The Researcher and Accessing the Field 
 
At the outset of the research, I planned to find access to the plant while living with an EISCO 
family. My experience in securing both made me aware early on of my structural position as a 
researcher, who was born and lived most of her life in Egypt before pursuing graduate studies in the 
U.K. The complexity of studying one’s own society is well articulated in the anthropological literature 
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that stresses the dilemmas of being simultaneously both insider and outsider. The difficulties faced by 
Arab women conducting anthropological fieldwork in their own societies, for example, have been the 
subject of a volume by Altorki and El-Solh (1988). Difficulties accessing male spaces because of gender 
norms, difficulties bridging class divides and the researcher’s privileges as a Western-educated woman 
are all addressed quite empathetically in the volume. While it is not perhaps helpful to contribute one 
more story that reiterates the above-mentioned difficulties, I do think that the complex relationship I 
had with the field as an anthropologist from Egypt helped me to better understand – though not 
always through pleasant encounters – the structures and relations I had set out to explore. As the 
method of participant observation always seems to, it taught me to learn from the confusions, 
discomforts and contradiction my presence created in the field.  These discomforts, however also 
contributed greatly to structuring my fieldwork. 
 
Finding a family that would be willing to host me seemed almost impossible at the outset. The 
idea seemed so foreign to the different families we approached that one day an old woman in one of 
the villages challenged it openly. She asked where my family house was so I explained it was in Masr 
al-Gadida (Heliopolis in English) - not more than 90 minutes away from al-Tibbin 18. She said: “Why 
don’t you just stay in your family house, instead of research and no research and living in other 
people’s houses and all these foreign things”. I was asking my informants to break both gender and 
class norms; at this close proximity to the anthropologist’s personal and fieldwork life, these norms 
were even harder to transgress. It was not just that my family had a house I could easily commute 
from, but also I came from a Christian family, whose religious affiliation is easily identified in the family 
name. It was highly unlikely that as an identified Christian single woman, I was going to be easily and 
naturally accepted with the level of intimacy required by fieldwork in a largely Muslim society. This 
adds another layer of the insider/outsider dilemmas of home anthropology - being of Christian local 
origins reduced the extent to which I was an ‘insider’. Although I developed strong and lasting 
friendships with Muslims in the community, the intimacy that residence requires was not easy to 
bridge, especially without sufficient earlier interaction. I was thus lucky to meet Madgy’s family who 
were kind enough to receive me in their three story family house.  Magdy, a local Christian who had 
also been active in leftist groups for a short period, was progressive enough to accept my breaking of 
gender and class norms. But it was essentially the religious affiliation, or rather how I was classified as 
                                               
18
 Heliopolis being well-known as a rich district, I often said Madinat Nasr, which is near Heliopolis, still middle to 
upper class but less sine qua non bourgeois. It was difficult to hide my class background by lying about where my 
family lived because people in Egypt tend to ask specificities about the location where you live you once you mention 
the neighbourhood. 
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a Christian by virtue of familial affiliation that facilitated my integration. Christians in the community 
considered me almost like a kin, usually using the word ‘ukhtina’ (‘our sister’) and went out of their 
way to make sure I was sufficiently cared for. If I was aware of my identity as a female and as a person 
from a certain class background my religious affiliation became something that fieldwork rather than 
personal life, made salient. 
 
Meanwhile securing access to EISCO was also problematic. As Shehata (2009) explained, 
official permits were never an option for getting inside public plants and one's own social networks 
were essential to secure this access. I initially tried to approach the matter through ex-unionists 
contacts on the left, but their attempts failed. I reluctantly then turned to family connections, which I 
had been adamant to avoid, not out of conviction in the official channels in a context like that, but 
partly because I was hoping to hide my familial affiliation. I originate from one of two well-known 
Christian political families in Egypt, whose career in politics has spanned over two generations and is 
known for its large land-owning feudal past. Two of these family members were women well-known 
as among the very few women to hold high political position in Egypt. This easily creates the 
assumption that since I was interested in politics, I would follow suit.  The family name immediately 
places me in a privileged position that deters possible normal interaction. The family name also 
affiliated me with the establishment. The main political figure, Makram Ebeid, was a nationalist leader 
who was known and respected for resisting British colonialism in the early twentieth century, more 
recent relatives were members of parliament and participated in government. 
 
As a self-identified leftist, I spent the largest part of my adult years attempting to separate 
myself from the politics of the family and the privileges it brings. I often went by Makram instead of 
Makram-Ebeid among friends and was hoping to do the same during fieldwork. Doing so also gave me 
the opportunity to reflect the genuine experience of growing up without the privileges that the family 
name infers, having been brought up by a single mother of modest middle class background, who 
struggled to cover for her children after ties with my father’s family were severed.   
 
But my plans failed, the connection to the plant was secured through generous family 
members and I got access to EISCO instantly after meeting the CEO. Because of this identity, I was 
never asked how long my research would last.   I capitalised on the fact that the managers responsible 
for my stay were too embarrassed to ask the CEO about my status. For the rest of the fieldwork I had 
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to constantly manage the dialectics of the family name, the privileged position it puts me in and my 
personal convictions and fieldwork requirements.  
 
Although this could be distressing when it was often assumed that one was a simple product of 
their background and when I could not use family resources when many workers asked for help with 
securing jobs for their children, I did manage to convey my commitment and personal convictions 
through everyday interactions. This was suggested when one day a worker who had been repeatedly 
dismissive of me explained that he had thought I was working with the ministers that want to privatise 
the plant and that I was gathering information for this end, but after over six months on the shop-floor 
he was convinced otherwise and wanted to apologise for mistrusting me. With time I also learnt to use 
this background to tweak resources and connections here and there that helped my informants and 
which seemed fair in exchange for the generosity they offered me. Class relations became the 
frequent object of our discussions after reaching a context of comfort in comparing our varying 
backgrounds in wider social commentaries.   
 
It was also this privileged background that shielded me from a much riskier situation that 
threatened to end my fieldwork when the state security intelligence intervened and why I primarily 
bring it up here. 
 
After three weeks of staying with Magdy’s family and persuading the company bus driver to 
take me to work on the same bus, I was called into the CEO's office  who told me he had reports from  
state security intelligence that I was staying at Magdy’s family, was active in the leftist circles and 
visited labour rights centres regularly. 19 Shouting and scolding me, he said I had tricked him and that 
unlike my relative who had secured the access, I was acting immorally by staying in other people’s 
houses and somehow inciting Christian workers to revolt in the plant. Responding spontaneously, I  
managed  to blame my ‘foreign’ supervisors for setting requirements such as residing in Helwan and 
socialising with workers, which were insensitive to the local context, and to pretend that I had only 
visited the labour centres for research purposes.  I assumed the privileged background and pretended 
to be a naïve bourgeois girl whose lack of understanding of real life put her in tricky situations. My 
background helped protect my security and to salvage the part of my research inside the plant. But I 
was asked to leave Magdy’s family immediately, told not to interact with workers outside the plant 
                                               
19
 It might well have been that state security intelligence was no more than a few workers who had followed my 
interactions and talked to the CEO. There was no way to know, but the level of details the CEO had and the fact that a 
close friend was detained two weeks earlier by state security intelligence gave some credibility to the CEO’s story. 
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and warned that next time my family connections would not be enough. We were also lucky that 
Magdy’s family was not harassed and did not have to pay the price of supporting the research. Inside 
the plant I was to be followed by a representative from the social affairs department and a managers’ 
bus was to pick me up every morning from my family house in Heliopolis to make sure I was not 
interacting with workers without management’s consent and was definitely now staying in my family 
house. 
 
For a few months I avoided contact with Magdy’s and other workers’ families in order to 
protect them and myself from unintended consequences. Thus the research on working lives at EISCO 
became separated from my research on their domestic lives. Once I had finished the research inside 
EISCO and was not worried of being thrown out of the plant, I gradually opened up networks in the 
community, until in June 2010 I began staying in Hussam’s house. Staying at Magdy’s family home 
again did not seem however still safe and it made more sense to avoid putting them at risk.  
 
Inside the plant, things were also negotiated indirectly, with the social affairs representatives 
pretending in front of the administration manager to spend the day with me but leaving me as soon as 
we left his office. Towards the end of my research, I began engaging openly again in politics and 
assisted in organising activist events in Helwan with some of my neighbours especially after the 
revolution. Home anthropology was thus more complicated than I had imagined it to be, but in a 
sense also offered plenty of opportunities to use the tensions to expand my understandings.  
 
Perhaps one of the best opportunities that fieldwork offered me was not just researching class, 
but living and re-negotiating these class divisions. The opportunity to engage in the struggles of many 
brave, resilient and generous people against capitalism, the state and various types of injustices, even 
if at a limited level by simply narrating fragments of their rich lives and the long-term friendships that 
have lasted beyond fieldwork, are some things that make PhD research worthwhile.  
 
VI. Thesis Outline 
 
The discussion of the relationship between the development of the value of Istiqrār, work 
contracts as property, and class relations at EISCO is discussed in the following chapters as follows:  
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 Chapter one introduces the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill and asks how the labour process is 
rearranged when public spending on machine renewal is cut. It looks at arguments and disputes that 
take place on the shop-floor to highlight how skills and work relations develop with tenured 
employment. I argue that permanent work contracts enabled workers to develop skills and relations 
that became even more important to EISCO with the neo-liberal spending cuts. Permanent workers’ 
status as an aristocracy of labour is partly produced on the shop-floor. 
 
Chapter two looks at the jokes that are exchanged on the shop-floor to highlight the changing 
relation between permanent workers and engineers, who are the shop-floor managers. The central 
question is how managers control workers under neo-liberal conditions. I look at competing types of 
property on the shop-floor and suggest that the spatialisation of neo-liberal technologies under 
Mubarak’s repressive state weakened middle management and gave permanent workers more 
control over work. 
 
 Chapter three asks why permanent workers and temporary workers say they are ‘like father 
and son’. I argue that the use of fictive kinship idioms at the production point enable permanent 
workers to exploit the labour of temporary ones who, in turn, acquiesce in the hope of securing 
permanent work. But the prevalence of such idiom and the presence of some actual fathers and sons 
at EISCO obscure the privatisation of permanent workers’ collective and tacit knowledge and their 
gradual phasing out through their gradual replacement by new workers.  
 
Chapter four looks at the value of work at EISCO from the point of view of the daily-waged 
workers who work in the plant and aspire to climb up the labour hierarchy. I address how daily 
workers’ valuation of ʿistiqrār (‘stability’) and their hopes and expectations shape the experience of 
work. Hopes and expectations nurtured outside the plant are important to structuring everyday work. 
   
 Chapter five looks at the politics of intergenerational reproduction among EISCO households in 
the company town. It maps out how succeeding or failing in reproducing one’s position in the social 
hierarchy fragments EISCO’s labour force into an upwardly and downwardly mobile one. But I suggest 
ways in which the more salient distinction between permanent workers and casual workers who live 
bīyūt ahali contributes to the on-going divisions within EISCO’s labour force. 
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Chapter six looks at union politics and collective actions at EISCO. Comparing the history of 
activism in the plant to the current one and I argue that direct coercive methods in addition to the 
plant’s capitalisation on workers’ valuation of extending their relations inside the plant did not end 
collective actions but changed their patterns into largely sporadic and non-organised one. 
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Chapter One: Producing Skills, Relations and Workers’ Control  
 
I. Introduction 
It’s Shaʿban’s shift on the rolling mill. The ‘3-high rolling mill’ broke down. It’s a serious break; a 
hot steel slab is stuck vertically between two rollers. In this position, the bottom of the slab is close to 
the hydraulic oil underneath the rollers. There is a general panic on the shop-floor because if the heat 
of the slab reaches the oil, the mill could catch fire. Mazen, one of the old production workers in 
Shaʿban’s shift, comes running down from the control room to help the other men push the slab with 
levers and crowbars. Shaʿban tells Mazen offensively to stay put in the control room. The mood is tense 
but it still seems like a time for jokes.   A worker from the production shift of the furnace at the end of 
the mill gestures with his chin towards Shaʿban, whose back is turned, and looks at Mazen and then 
puts two fingers behind his head- Shaʿban is a donkey, he means.  They both grin.  Another 
maintenance worker passes by and tells production workers standing around the machine, only half-
jokingly: “wardiyya naḥs”- “*you are+ an ill-omened shift”.   
At this point, we hear shouts coming from what looks like an argument that just erupted a few 
meters away. A worker from the maintenance shift shouts at Mazen: “You *production workers+ don’t 
know how to work”. Maintenance workers are accusing production workers of putting the wrong 
pressure on the slab from the control room, which moves the slab from its horizontal position to a 
vertical one.  Mazen, getting angry, raises his voice in responding to the accusations. He instead blames 
the maintenance workers, who do not take enough time to repair the machines, which is why the 
rollers are spaced unevenly. Arguments in general, and between maintenance and production workers 
in particular, were everyday rituals on this shop-floor. I found it mesmerising however, that they rarely 
escalated.  
Towards the end of the shift, Shaʿban comes to the black board on the side of the machine, 
where production workers mark the number of steel sheets produced and the breakdown time during 
each shift. He brings a sheet of paper and compares what is on the board to what he has written, then 
reduces the time of breakdowns on the board and adds a steel slab to the total. Another maintenance 
worker copies that a few minutes later.  ʿ Amr, the young temporary worker who is alternating with me 
in writing on the board today, explains the practice more accurately. Between maintenance and 
production, he says, “kul wāḥid b-yshīl marra, yaʿni binshīl baʿḍ’- “Each one covers for the other once, 
meaning that we cover each other”. The days when they’ve produced a lot, he continues to explain, 
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maintenance and production workers agree to reduce the hours of breakdowns. When production is 
low they agree to increase the number of slabs and increase the breakdown time. Whatever is written 
on the board during the day is thus, always subject to being altered at the end of the shift. 
Neo-liberal cuts on public spending have resulted in the deterioration of the machinery in most 
of EISCO’s mills. The lack of spending on renovations and the reduced quality of cheap spare parts both 
increased the skill needed to offset technological limitations and amplified the load of manual labour 
on the shop-floor. The new division of labour that accompanied these changes was demarcated 
between permanent contract workers, who had been employed in the plant for years and developed 
skills over these years, and new temporary and casual workers, who had been working in the plant for 
no more than two years at the time of my research. On the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, where most 
of this research was conducted, work was never run under Taylorist scientific management 
specifications nor organised in the typical Fordist assembly line known for its de-skilling of the labour 
force. The machinery being already old since the start of operations in the plant, and speculated to 
have been supplied second-hand from German manufacturers, enabled the cultivation of skill since 
EISCO’s inception. This skill became a source of pride for workers and was, counter intuitively, valued 
even more under neo-liberal production conditions. The relations between skilled and manual work 
and the work relations between workers employed under different contract conditions will be the 
subject of chapter three. This chapter however, addresses how technology changed with the policies of 
neo-liberalism and the growing control of permanent workers over the production process.  
The changes in technological conditions also personalised the labour process and required 
greater cooperation and inter-dependence among workers. It therefore capitalised on the social 
relations that were cultivated among permanent workers over the years. Intimate friendships that 
develop with time (ʿishra) and relations between those who share similar local origins (baladiyyāt) 
facilitated this embedding of social relations in the work process. The immediate impression that one 
gets on the shop-floor is of a tense working environment riddled with loud fights and arguments 
among permanent workers. The increase in personal and emotional investments on the shop-floor 
often makes the work environment less agreeable. But the growing dependence on personal relations 
gives permanent workers greater control over their work. In addition, the tacit knowledge they have in 
their skills makes permanent workers rather un-alienated from their work and more difficult for 
managers to replace by other flexible workers providing the same labour power. On the shop-floor, 
having a permanent contract meant that one had a property in his/her skill and a wide network of 
relations, which was helpful inside and outside the plant. 
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II. Situating the Shop-floor 
Most of my fieldwork at EISCO was conducted at the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill (qitāʿ darfalat al-
ʾalwāḥ w al-ṣāg). It is considered part of the hot rolling mills of the plant and is one of the oldest mills, 
which was established in 1954 with the assistance of West German company Demag.  The production 
process in this mill continues to run with the same machinery brought by German manufacturers half a 
century ago.  
The rolling mill transforms steel slabs produced at the other steel mills of EISCO into sheets and 
plates according to specified measures requested by the customer.  Sheets are thinner than the plates. 
The first are later formed into products such as pipes while the latter are used in building bridges, gas 
tanks, reservoirs and industrial floors. The mill is divided into six main sections. The first is a shipment 
area in the backyard of the rolling mill, which receives slabs produced at the steel mills and arranges 
them according to production priorities. The second is the furnace area, which is made up of two main 
re-heating furnaces. The furnaces re-heat the steel slabs to 1830 degrees Celsius in order to prepare 
them for rolling. Next is the central machine of the mill, called ‘the 3-High Rolling Mill’. The 3-High 
Rolling Mill transforms hot steel slabs coming out of the reheating furnace into steel sheets and plates 
of different sizes and lengths. The next section is the cooling and trimming section, which forms the 
product into its final shape. The sheets and plates are then piled up in a final shipment area at the far 
north end of the mill for storage and collection by various customers’ trucks. The maintenance 
workshops lie on the east side of the mill. There is a different maintenance team dedicated to assisting 
workers at each different stages of production. The engineers' offices are located on the second floor 
of the mill, not on the shop-floor. Some administrative offices, such as the quality control and time-
watch department are also located outside the shop-floor on the right hand side to the entrance of the 
mill. 20  
The mill has a total of about 250 employees divided primarily between maintenance and 
production teams. Each shift of workers, made up of six to seven workers, is headed by a head of shift 
(raʾīs wardiyya) and a shift supervisor (mulāḥiz wardiyya), who are generally the most senior workers, 
overseeing four or five permanent and temporary workers. Two foremen, or head of shifts, raʾīs 
warādī, as they are generally called, supervise all production and maintenance shifts. However, like the 
rest of the managerial strata, including engineers, they now work the normal shift only from 8 am to 
4pm while workers’ shifts rotate day and night. Engineers are the managers on the shop-floor. They 
                                               
20
 See Figure 7 in appendices for an illustration of the 3-High Rolling Mill and Figure 8 to 12 in appendices for the 
production process at the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill. 
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oversee everyday operations and plan the work load but do not work manually. The highest position a 
worker can have under plant regulations is that of foreman. Engineers, on the other hand, occupy 
managerial positions ranging from shop-floor roles up to the CEO. Many of the workers, especially the 
senior ones, are however paid higher than engineers. This is also because the incentive pay for the 
rotating shifts is higher than the normal shift. The mill is headed by a head engineer, who in turn is 
supervised by a head of sector. Most decision making power is concentrated with these two. The 
qiyādāt, (‘the leaders’), from the general managers upwards, are given higher remuneration and 
privileges, but on an everyday basis they are all present on the shop-floor and all have managerial 
roles.21  
My research focused on the machine called the 3-High Rolling Mill. This is a particular type of 
hot rolling mills, which is primarily used in steelworks and aluminium processing. Rolling mills are 
machines that process different metals by passing them between pairs of rollers to flatten them until 
they attain the form and size required. Hot rolling mills are usually used for shaping hot metal into 
sections before they are delivered to cold rolling mills for finishing into more precise forms. But some, 
like this mill, produce final products that can be used immediately. On the shop-floor, the rolling mill 
flattened steel slabs into sheets and plates of different height.  The steel slab delivered from the 
reheating furnace passes through the mill several times, with the width of the metal being gradually 
reduced each time the slab passes until it reaches the required width. The machinery on this shop-
floor could produce a limited range of products. It was for example unable to produce sheets more 
than 1.50 m in width and 9 m in length, while other new rolling mills in the private sector are now 
producing sheets to larger specs.  
In the 3-High Rolling Mill, the steel passes through three rollers that are rolling in similar 
directions. The slab is first fed between a pair of rollers and then returned through the second pair on 
top. But this requires lifting by an elevator between both operations and thus new technology such as 
four-high mills, cluster mills and tandem mills for continuous casting have been developed in order to 
reduce the energy used by the machine and improve the quality of the steel product.  Research into 
the history of rolling mills confirms that the type of rolling mill used in the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling 
Mill at EISCO, the 3-High Mill, is obsolete today (Lankford, 1985). The 3-High Mill model was in fact 
first patented by an American steel manufacturer named Bernard Lauth in 1864 with some 
improvements patented in 1872 and 1873 (Durfee, 1891, p. 597). The technology then spread from the 
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 See Figure 6 in appendices for details of the organisation of management on the shop-floor. 
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United States to mills across the United Kingdom. The 3-High Mill was operating for example, in the 
early part of the twentieth century in Glasgow at the Clydebridge 3-High Plate Mill, which operated 
from 1922 to 1962 (“CLYDEBRIDGE STEELWORKS HISTORY,” n.d.). The available photos indicate a 
striking similarity to the mill at EISCO today.  Working with such an old technology thus presented, 
since the onset of the plant, a challenge to workers - enabling them to develop skills early on.  
I was present alongside four rotating production shifts each with 6-7 workers who manned the 
3-High Rolling Mill on a 24 hours basis in three shifts.22 Each shift had at least two workers who were 
on temporary contracts and who did most of the manual work of pushing with levers and crowbars 
when a slab was stuck. Permanent workers, on the other hand, were mostly in the control room of the 
machine, which is slightly elevated from the shop-floor. Management only allowed me to be present in 
the normal shift from 8-4. As a woman, and perhaps because I was the only woman on the shop-floor, 
I was never allowed to do the heavy manual work done by the three men next to the machine. I did 
however assist workers in writing production figures on a black board.  Later, I was also allowed to 
assist the operator in the control room in ‘driving’ the machine by pushing one of the joysticks, 
although my work was not very skilled and I was often brought to replace a brick that held the joystick.   
 
III. Neo-liberalism, Skills and Social Relations  
 
The chapter follows from the suggestion of Mollona (2009b)that “the ‘old fashioned’ world of 
industry and the working class has not disappeared, but rather has taken on new spatial and temporal 
configurations”(Mollona, 2009b, p. xiii). Permanent workers, who are rather like artisans, continue to 
work on the shop-floor with deteriorated machinery that can only function by capitalising on their 
skills and relations. Parry (2005) notes that “different types of industrial processes are associated with 
different intensities of labour and impose work disciplines of different degrees of rigour” (Parry, 2005, 
p. 155). Accordingly, the chapter uncovers how the size of the factory, its specialisation and the nature 
of production in this steel industry organise the labour force in a particular manner. Similarly, Burawoy 
(1979)compares two factories, Allied and its predecessor Geer, which differ in industry size (in terms of 
capital resources).  Burawoy generates evidence suggesting that Allied and Geer responded to 
competition differently; one changed technology while the other reduced workers' piece rates, 
benefits and authority, thus changing the importance given to skill, seniority and unionisation in the 
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 See Figure 13 in appendices for details of the organisation of production shifts at 3 High Rolling Mill. 
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factory and shaping the class struggles emerging on the respective shop-floors. Following these 
authors this chapter maps the relation between neo-liberal restructuring and the particulars of 
production at EISCO in order to understand what becomes of training, skill, job requirements and 
seniority at the plant.  
A small renovation project took place in 1987 on the central rolling machine – the 3-High Rolling 
Mill.  It helped transfer some, but not all, of the work that was done manually to the main operator in 
the control room. Very little renovation took place elsewhere on the shop-floor.  One important 
element in the neo-liberal doctrine adopted by the state in Egypt is the reduction of public sector 
spending.  This also includes lack of investment in capital in terms of spending on the renewal of 
machinery at state-owned enterprises like EISCO. The reduction in public spending was not just limited 
to a block on purchasing new machines or renovating the old ones, but affected even the purchase of 
spare parts. In recent years, EISCO thus shifted towards buying cheaper, but lesser quality, spare parts, 
for example from China and South Korea. In addition, a central maintenance workshop was built inside 
the plant in order to manufacture the needed spare parts locally, thus substituting for imported or 
purchased ones from the private sector. The central maintenance workshop manufactures a range of 
products from nails to oil seals to bushings – supplying the entire EISCO plant.  Hence the internal 
demand on the central maintenance workshop from different shop-floors and mills is, understandably, 
very high.  This in turn prolongs the period needed to deliver the spare parts to different mills and 
slows production overall in the plant.  
The reduction in public spending at EISCO meant that workers in most mills continued working 
with old and worn-out machinery that is liable to repeated breakdowns. Production is consequently 
constantly interrupted, requiring a great deal of skill and manual labour in order to re-invent ways to 
offset the technological limitations. As the anecdote from Shaʿban’s shift at the beginning of the 
chapter illustrates, these production conditions also create constant tensions between workers on the 
shop-floor. Nowhere can this be observed more clearly than between the production and maintenance 
workers, who are always arguing.  Given the evaluation system in place historically, the antagonism 
between maintenance and production workers cannot be attributed solely to the breakdowns of 
machinery under neo-liberalism. Maintenance and production shifts are evaluated in antithesis to one 
another; maintenance on the time they spend repairing the machinery that breaks down (the less time 
they take, the better remuneration) and production on the total steel plates they roll at the rolling mill. 
This system of evaluation, which existed prior to neo-liberal policies, has thus always positioned 
production and maintenance workers in a conflicting relationship. With the machinery dating from 
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1954 and subject to more breaking down during the neo-liberal years, the fights between production 
and maintenance are today part and parcel of the production process. Additional pressure on workers 
to sustain production in turn inflated the fighting and tension on the shop-floor. 
If one were to jump too quickly to conclusions, it could be said that neo-liberal cuts on public 
spending are fragmenting the working class at EISCO by increasingly putting the interest of workers in 
antithesis to one another. The fights and accusations flying across the shop-floor everyday seem, in the 
first instance, to reflect such conclusions. However, as the end of the anecdote shows, maintenance 
workers and production workers do in actuality collaborate together more than the preliminary story 
would imply. In fact they, more often than not, come to an agreement about the hours they are going 
to report at the end of the shift. One could perhaps read these developments along the lines of a 
Burawoy (1979) “making out” thesis, whereby hegemonic capital enables the exploitation of workers 
through their very consent. By making them engage in work competitions over piece rates, 
management gives workers the illusion of control over their work.  Workers, who engage in a constant 
game of ‘making out’ whereby they compare work outputs and appear to trick management, when 
collectively agreeing over levels of maximum production, still enable capital to extract surplus, not 
through coercion but through consent. Burawoy thus reads the competition between different workers 
as benefiting the capitalist enterprise and leaving workers under the illusion of subverting the system. 
However, the developments on the shop-floor of EISCO seem to go beyond attempts of workers to 
‘make out’. Instead I suggest, starting from the very beginning by questioning how and why these 
negotiations take place and in what ways fights are related to the final compromises that are made. I 
argue in this chapter that the skills that permanent workers acquired and the long term relations they 
developed, especially when work was more personalised under neo-liberalism, contribute to the 
power they have on the shop-floor and their overall status. As chapter two will demonstrate, this has 
also been aided by the changes in managerial systems.  
Braverman (1974) associates de-skilling of work with the advance of capitalism and the 
propagation of Fordist work methods. Since his landmark study, researchers of labour have criticised 
this teleological view and have argued that the move towards capitalism did not necessarily involve the 
de-skilling of work in all workplaces (Blum, 2000; Elger, 1979). Others have shown that Fordist 
assembly lines have not always been part of the modern factory regime and many workplaces 
abandoned rigid production systems early on (Carrier, 2009). They highlighted instead how alternative 
systems structured work in a way that was almost equally as effective as the Fordist line by making 
workers part of a bureaucratic system of rules and procedures and incentive pay-structures that gave 
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individual workers more control over  production but reduced ties of solidarity between them 
(Edwards, 1979). The focus on how lateral fights between managers and workers have been turned 
into ones between workers, who compete over piece rates and thus consent to the hegemonic tactics 
of capital, without the need for the despotic coercive measures highlighted by Braverman, became 
rather prominent in studies of the factory following Burawoy (1979). But Mollona (2009b) argues that 
both studies that highlight coercion and consent in getting workers to work, relate their experience of 
work and their consciousness to the division of labour on the shop-floor and undermine the 
importance of other factors such as gender, ethnicity or religion that workers are embedded in and 
bring on the shop-floor. In this chapter, I argue that the division of labour under neo-liberal policies has 
enabled permanent workers to capitalise on the skill they acquired over the years. But the relations 
that workers cultivated over time, primarily because of their seniority and also because of their origins 
in the same local villages surrounding the plant, enabled their skill to be more pronounced and to give 
them more control over the shop-floor.  
The working conditions related by Halle (1984) at the automated chemical plant in New Jersey, 
where workers knew more than managers about how the work was to be done and were more familiar 
with the equipment and its quirks, are similar to that of EISCO workers, who are also proud to know 
more than the engineers about how to operate the machines. As Montgomery (1980) highlights, even 
Taylor himself was aware that the very thing that characterised workers was their collective knowledge 
of work. In speaking of workers at different trades, Taylor thus notes that “the workmen in each of 
these trades have had their knowledge handed down to them by word of mouth…. This mass of rule –
of-thumb or traditional knowledge may be said to be the principle asset and possession of every 
tradesman” (Taylor, 1911 in Montgomery, 1980). Taylor was also speaking of trades’ workers in the 
industrial world and not only of craft trades. The repeated breakdowns of the machinery at EISCO 
allowed permanent workers to master different shortcuts in operating practices that were easier than 
the instructions that management gave. Similar short cuts that workers used in the chemical plant, 
Halle (1984) argues, were often implicitly allowed by managers so long as the final product satisfied 
laboratory inspections. He suggests then that the lessons workers learned from accidents often 
became major technical discoveries and enabled them to introduce minor and unrecorded 
modifications that facilitated the work. Similarly, the breakdowns at EISCO expanded the skills that 
workers had developed earlier.  
In Fordist companies, Carrier (2009) argues, the very design of the machinery and the spatial 
arrangement of production embodied and fostered the goals of management. He thus concludes that 
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“work discipline was built into the very factory itself” (Carrier, 2009, p. 206). The very arrangement of 
the factory space at EISCO, where the shop-floor was loaded with unused machinery, and loads of 
scrap piled everywhere, in addition to worn out technology still in use, enabled workers to have more 
lax work practices and greater control over their work. It also made the work much more dependent 
on social relations among workers, which at times rendered the work rather too emotionally investing 
or ‘nerve wracking’ as one worker put it. In a sense, Carrier (2009) finds the management techniques 
that developed with Fordism, or similar management systems inspired by it, as substituting artisans’ 
patriarchal control of work during the prominence of crafts trade with managerial specifications and a 
spatial control of production in the modern factory. At EISCO, with the complete breakdown of 
machinery and management’s inability to supervise the work, we thus see a circular motion, whereby 
work is moving from a rather spatially and temporally disciplined form- if this form ever existed- to a 
much more personalised practice, at times patriarchal, but largely dependent on workers’ very 
emotional investment and their collective knowledge of work.   
It would be helpful to then describe permanent workers at EISCO as more like artisans that 
belonged to the era of craft trades, who were not turned into simple providers of labour power under 
the modern factory. Mollona (2005a) explains similarly that at the hot department in Morris, the 
steelworks factory in Sheffield where he conducted fieldwork, workers perceive and organise the 
workplace as a blacksmith workshop. Thus he adds that “the knowledge of work in the hot department 
is embedded in human bodies and socially organised in subjective, fragmented ephemeral and 
centripetal spaces of actions” (Mollona, 2005a, p. 189). Following Keller and Keller (1996), Mollona 
argues that work is performed at the hot department “following non-linguistic and non-codified 
constellations of practical tasks associated with specific tools” (Mollona, 2005a, p. 188). The Kellers 
describe this as having four different elements: first, it relies on individual notions of relations between 
‘means’ and ‘ends’ that are specific to every task; second,  it is memorised and retrieved through 
physical movement and does not require thinking- similar to Bloch’s (1998) argument about implicit 
knowledge. Third, when communicated through language it is related through traits of the material in 
terms of colours, shapes and metaphors. Finally, it is ephemeral because it is assembled when a given 
task presents itself. The importance of this tacit knowledge embedded in workers’ skill and conveyed 
through indirect ways is unmistakable in its similarity to the situation of work at EISCO.  
The relation between tacit knowledge, neo-liberalism and the public sector in Egypt is also 
highlighted in the work of Elyachar (2012). Elyachar argues that in both the craft workshops and the 
public sector bank where she conducted research asrār al-mihnah (‘the secrets of the trade’) were 
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recognised as a type of tacit knowledge that were central to market life. She suggests that “secrets of 
the trade usually refer to tacit ways of doing things that were historically transmitted in the course of 
apprenticeship in the “crafts guilds” (tawaʾif al-ḥirafiyya). They did not disappear when guilds were 
dissolved as legal entities” (Elyachar, 2012, p. 87). Following Chalcraft (2004, 2005), Elyachar highlights 
that the secrets of the trade in the crafts guilds were legally recognised as a form of intellectual 
property in Egypt throughout the nineteenth century. Similarly in her own work, her informants 
accepted that the secrets of the trade were the legitimate property of the workshop masters. Tacit 
knowledge in the public sector, Elyachar postulates, is a “collective inheritance, embodied in collective 
subjects. It remained so even if not recognised as a property right”(Elyachar, 2012, p. 90).  
This tacit knowledge at EISCO was equally important for the production and labour processes. 
Although workers did not use the language of ‘secrets of the trade’, they did speak about their khibra fi 
al-ʿamal (‘expertise at work’) which they acquired over the years, and as the  chapter three will 
demonstrate, traded with the younger generation of apprentices who were represented by the new 
fixed-term workers employed at the plant. Speaking of skill in terms of khibra as opposed to mahāra, 
which is the literal translation of skill, reflects the element of tacit knowledge similar to that of the 
secrets of the trade. It is a type of knowledge that is thus acquired through long term physical and 
emotional investment in work and depends on semiotic exercises. Although the tacit knowledge was 
not recognised as a property in legal terms, it was recognised in everyday terms as a property and a 
form of ownership that comes with permanent work. In speaking of property here, however, I follow 
the work of  Hann (1998) who argues that the idea of property “must not be restricted to the formal 
legal codes, which play a major role in our society, but must be broadened to include the institutions 
and cultural codes within which such codes operate” (Hann, 1998, p. 7). Such property, in the tacit 
knowledge of the trade, thus allowed EISCO workers to have de-facto control on the shop-floor. This 
was, as Carrier (2009) argues in relation to work at Imperium described by Halle (1984), a furtive and 
restricted influence compared, for example, to the easily recognisable and extensive control that craft 
trades’ artisans, described by other historians (see Rule 1987), held in work done by household 
weavers or those who took jobs that were put out by merchant capitalists. Nonetheless, Carrier argues 
that “workers exercised significant control because of their collective knowledge of how the plant 
worked… To a degree, workers could control production” (Carrier, 2009, pp. 208–209).  
The collective knowledge of permanent workers was rather valorised within the plant with the 
deterioration of the machinery under neo-liberalism at EISCO. Their knowledge became the substitute 
for spending on renewing machinery and thus enabled production to flow on an everyday basis 
64 
 
despite the limited resources. Yet despite this tacit knowledge being collective in origins, Elyachar 
(2012) argues, because it was unmarked by legal traces of property and possession,  it was thus used 
by different management theorists, practitioners, organisations and firms and transformed into a new 
source of profit by attempting to make the implicit explicit. She thus suggests that: 
“As long as the secrets of the trade were recognised as the property of the guild, the 
profits of tacit knowledge accrued to members of the guild. As secrets of the trade were written 
out of political economy and disappeared as a property right, tacit knowledge lost its status as a 
collective form of individual property. Tacit knowledge was individualised together with the 
community in the communities of practices (Duguid 2008)… Tacit knowledge was but a free 
resource awaiting appropriation of the firm. No property rights wed it to the community in which 
it had been spawned” (Elyachar, 2012, p. 88). 
At EISCO this tacit knowledge was indeed being exploited, privatised and individualised by the 
plant, particularly when in 2007 the plant introduced fixed-term employment after a 16 year hiring 
freeze  from 1991-2007, recruiting young semi-skilled workers. As chapter three demonstrates, this 
very transmission of skills became a means for management to extract profit from the older workers 
by making overall production cheaper and gradually replacing the skilled but powerful and expensive 
labour force with cheaper semi-skilled workers. This individualisation of tacit knowledge, through its 
transmission to apprentices willing to provide labour power and time, is documented in factories that 
have operated since the 19th century. Montgomery (1980) for example, shows how “it was 
technologically possible for the workers’ autonomy to be used in individualistic ways, which might 
promote his own mobility and identify his interests with those of the owner. The ubiquitous practice of 
subcontracting encouraged this tendency”(Montgomery, 1980, p. 14). Montgomery relates how 
subcontracting practices among iron moulders in America- the practice was called the “Berkshire” 
system, which expanded rapidly after 1850 as individual moulders hired teams of helpers to assist 
them in production- undermined the output the mutualistic ethic that was characteristic of work then. 
He argues that such a system tended to fill the trades with trained, or semi-trained, workers who 
undercut wages and work standards. The spread of subcontracting practices thus encouraged many 
craftsmen to move beyond reliance on their functional autonomy in the firm and to use the next 
higher level of craft control, the enactment and enforcement of union work rules (Montgomery, 1980).  
Although the privatisation of tacit knowledge was indeed taking place at EISCO, I argue that the 
focus on the community’s loss of the ‘legal’ property of the tacit knowledge discounts other ways that  
workers managed to retain their property through cultural terms shared and understood by members 
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of the community. I consider permanent work contracts an alternative means by which the implicit 
knowledge of khibra became protected and maintained within the community, despite its partial 
individuation to young flexible workers in recent years. Permanent contracts not only sustained 
livelihoods but also gave a quasi-legal cover for tacit knowledge as property. 
Permanent workers’ position in the division of labour and their employment protection are not 
however the only sources of their power. Montgomery (1980, p. 14) explains that the “simple 
technological explanation for the control exercised by nineteenth century craftsmen will not suffice. 
Technical knowledge acquired on the job was embedded in a mutualistic ethical code, also acquired on 
the job, and together these attributes provided skilled workers with considerable autonomy at their 
work and powers of resistance to the wishes of their employers”. The work relations that developed 
between workers by virtue of their working together on the same shop-floor for a period of between 
twenty and forty years, enabled workers to have growing control over the shop-floor. These are 
evident in workers’ reference to the importance of ʿishra (‘intimate friendships that usually develop 
with time’) relations to their sociality on the shop-floor. By eating together, spending night shifts 
together and working together for prolonged periods, workers develop intimate relations that extend 
beyond simple economic calculations on the production line. In fact ʿishra, as later sections of this 
chapter will illustrate, is considered an extended form of kinship and a form of “relatedness” (Carsten, 
2000) that workers valorise. Granovetter (1985) suggests similarly that economic relations between 
people in different firms are not alienated and impersonal, each rationally calculating how to use the 
other to the best advantage. Instead over the course of time their relations frequently “become 
overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from 
opportunism”(1985, p. 490). Workers even extend the relations of ʿishra to machines as well, and 
explain how the machines are part of one’s body, or that one is often married to two wives, one at 
home and the other was the machine (machine in Arabic- makana-  is female). Labour, as such, is 
“indissolubly linked to the master’s body but also to his machine” (Mollona, 2005a, p. 188). Machines, 
in the hot steel department studied by Mollona, like on at Sheet-and-Plate Rolling-Mill, are “not seen 
as external functional apparatus of production but as symbolic extensions of workers’ bodies, 
metaphorical appendages of their sexuality, powerful technologies of enchantments and markets of 
social status” (Mollona, 2005a, p. 188). Relations of ʿishra enable labour to flow easily on the shop-
floor as a form of tacit knowledge that increases solidarity among workers. 
  In addition, because most workers at EISCO came from the villages around the plant, the 
emphasis on baladiyyāt (relations that develop between people who are from the same home village 
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or home town) was vital to channelling information on the shop-floor and expanding relations that 
gave workers more control. The fact that workers commuted on plant buses back and forth with other 
workers who were their baladiyyāt enabled information, favours and gossip to spread much faster in 
the plant and homogenised work relations. Among workers employed at the plant during the time of 
my research, information often flowed between baladiyyāt, who were largely the second generation of 
land-owning households near the plant. The actual kinship networks based on blood relations among 
permanent workers, although not as pronounced as between permanent and temporary fixed-term 
workers, further added to the belief that workers were the true owners of the plant. In fire stations in 
the London fire brigade prior to 1981, sociality and work control echoed descriptions of crafts workers 
where fireman at the station had a “strong common identity, they were self-recruited, they came from 
a narrow cultural and social background, they spend extended period of times in the company of each 
other and they were relatively free from external supervision” (Salaman, 1986 p. 45–54 in Carrier,  
2009  p. 214). Workers in the London fire stations, like EISCO permanent workers, were embedded in 
social relations that made them form a somewhat cohesive body of autonomous skilled workers. 
Hence, while emphasising the technological changes and the division of labour on the shop-
floor, this chapter does not follow the tradition that sees these as the primary markers of the 
experience of work, rather following Mollona (2009b, p. xvi) I stress “the social-embeddedness of 
capitalist forms of livelihood”. Instead of considering the world as converging to a problematic western 
model of industrial development it is important that ethnographic research highlights how “in many 
cases industrialisation in the south, diverges from the Western type of flexible capitalism. For instance, 
the top world steel corporations in India and Brazil are run like a family business rather than as a 
financial enterprises, with their ‘old fashioned’ conglomerate structures, protecting them from 
economic downturn”(2009b, p. xix). The relations of ʿishra with machinery and with other human 
beings and the relations of kinship and baladiyyāt are important to the way work operated on the 
shop-floor of EISCO. They are particularly important, not just as a social and ‘cultural’ addition to the 
economic relations of workplaces, but because they are deeply entangled with the way people value 
relations in Egypt in general (Elyachar, 2005).  
Fahlawa, as another type of tacit knowledge which is fostered in the plant captures best this 
embeddedness of social relations. Fahlawa “implies such qualities such as sharpness, cleverness and 
alertness” and “a kind of intelligence that springs from experience rather than formal education” (El 
Mesiri, 1978, p. 50; Elyachar, 2012, p. 86). It comes from “continuous interaction with all sorts of 
people, *through which+ a person becomes knowledgeable about human behaviour” (El Mesiri, 1978, 
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p. 50; Elyachar, 2012, p. 86). Elyachar (2012) demonstrates how fahlawa functioned like the secrets of 
the trade as a form of tacit knowledge, in enabling the master of fahlawa to know with whom he is 
dealing and the best way to act in different situations, making information flow “from the coffee 
house, to the workshop, to the street” (Elyachar, 2012, p.68). Fahlawa then functions both in politics 
and in the marketplace as a means for a weaker group to advance against a stronger one or simply as a 
way to access knowledge that is not available otherwise. It is this type of knowledge particularly that 
with the deterioration of machinery on the shop-floor, and the increased tensions and fights that came 
with the personalisation of work, becomes increasingly valorised and of greater importance to work. 
Indeed, management itself tries to exploit these relations by increasingly allocating responsibilities to 
individual persons and blaming people for work faults rather than the machinery. The overall relations 
and skills among workers however, could withstand the tensions arising with the increased pressure of 
neo-liberalism and affirm workers’ control on the shop-floor.  
 
IV. Antiques on the Shop-floor 
 
The work conditions on the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill are not very different from the rest of 
the plant. The state of the equipment and machinery on the shop-floor seemed to largely dictate both 
production capacities as well as working relations. This became apparent very early on when I chatted 
to various people on the shop-floor to familiarise myself with the nature of work. While chatting to the 
quality control inspector of our mill about his roles and duties, the topic of work conditions came up. 
My interlocutor started off by explaining that he had to inspect the product “bi-al-naẓar” -“by the look 
*of it+” and only with a slight help of a milometer to measure the slab thickness. There was no infra-red 
equipment or other advanced tools to check for quality, he added, as is usually the case in other 
plants. A client, he continued, could ask for infra-red inspection but would have to pay an extra cost of 
50 Egyptian pounds (5 GBP) per slab. He recounted this while clearly being proud of his skill that is 
valued at thousands of pounds. Although some of the work could be produced through the sharing of 
tacit knowledge about steel, for example by looking at the sheet or plate colour, its surface and 
texture, larger structural problems could not be treated by these make-shift alternatives. For example, 
only one side of the sheet or plate is usually inspected, not both sides, to see if there are any 
irregularities or product defects. This sometimes creates complications with clients who are dissatisfied 
with the quality of the final product and require further negotiations later on, as my interlocutor 
explained.  
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Following on, the quality control inspector commented on the condition of the plant in general 
saying: “il maṣnaʿ fī dikay”- “the plant is in decay” choosing, to my surprise and amusement, to use the 
very English word -‘decay’- to describe the condition of the plant. My interlocutor then looked towards 
the trimming machine next to both of us and said: “look at this. It is even from before 1958. Nasser got 
this machinery”, “bas ʾiḥnā fiyn w Nasser fiyn”- “but where are we and where is Nasser *today+,” he 
added.23  Above us, a sign which read DEMAG 1961, lay hanging on the overhead crane at the centre of 
the shop-floor, perhaps to remind us that the distant past my interlocutor was mentioning was neither 
so distant nor past. My interlocutor then continued saying “God knows if this is even the right date” 
and repeated to me what I had heard a few times earlier; that this was not even 1954 technology but 
machinery that originated from World War II times, which was sold to the Egyptian manufactures on 
second hand basis. He continued: “in contrast to other mills, like the coil mill, however, this one is 
taʿbān (‘worn out’)”, explaining that no renovations took place here except on the 3-high rolling mill.24 
The coil rolling mill, which was recently modernised, is a symbol of aspiration for the rest of the mills 
and shops.25 
The overall quality of the product in our mill, he highlighted, was thus quite low, leaving it only 
able to produce for “poor countries” like Yemen and Sudan or countries that were economically closer 
to Egypt like Jordan; while the coil mill was now exporting to Spain. The lack of investment in capital 
across the plant, and particularly on our mill, thus presented itself from early on in my research as one 
of the most important factors influencing labour and production processes. 
 
The description of the quality control inspector left me wondering how the Plate- and Sheet- 
Rolling Mill was continuing to operate without making competitive profits and why it was not, for 
example, subjected to a similar fate as that of the steel re-bar mill next door, where production was 
completely halted26. The quality control inspector had the answer ready. “The thing is”, he said, “we 
                                               
23
  The sentence means “we are times away from Nasser’s era”. 
24
 taʿbān is also a way to describe somebody who is sick. As previous sections explain, machines were often spoken of 
in the language of persons. 
 
25
 I conducted one month of research on the coil mill that my interlocutor mentions in order to compare it to this mill, 
since they share similar production process but differ in technological intensity. Having also spent a month and a half 
at the beginning of the research looking at the production process across the different mills, departments and 
workshops at the plant, I find the Plate- and Sheet-Mill more representative of the technology across the plant. The 
coil rolling mill is the exception rather than the rule. My interlocutor is right to point out that our mill in particular was 
largely worn out, but the coil mill would not have been representative of the conditions in the rest of the plant either. 
 
26
 By mid 2009, management decided to shut-down the mill producing steel re-bars completely after being unable to 
survive against the monopoly of Ezz Steel Plant over the steel re-bar market in Egypt. The plant instead focused on 
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produce a lot of scrap. So we also sell a lot of this scrap to the plants surrounding us. Sometimes when 
the product is not of the right quality, it can be re-heated again at the blast furnace and re-produced. 
But most often, selling it as scrap is more profitable”. Two production workers standing around 
eavesdropping joined the conversation to confirm what my interlocutor just said.  Walking back 
towards the other end of the shop-floor, I realised that there could not be any other explanation for 
the amount of half-rolled scrap slabs that pile up every day along the shop-floor, throwing the 
workplace  into disarray, other than that on some level this was ultimately the very produce of this 
mill.  
 
On another occasion, Engineer Gehad, a maintenance engineer on our shop-floor, explained to me 
how management devised production policies to cope with the deteriorating machinery in the mill. For 
example, they adjusted the expected hourly production rates and decided to stop producing  delicate 
products such as the very thin 8mm thick sheets, which require high pressures during rolling that 
eventually weaken the  3-High Rolling Mill. Thus, expected production rates were reduced from 25 
slabs rolled per hour to 22 slabs per hour and from 18 to 15 slabs per hour on the respective re-
heating furnaces.27 Reducing the production rates would thus reduce the load on the machinery. But to 
push my interlocutor further, I asked if the alternative- investing in buying modern machinery- would 
entail dispensing with workers, and whether the best solution was not to invest in buying better 
quality spare parts. “No it was not a better solution” was his swift response. It was not necessary to 
buy top-end machinery to replace this one. Buying even second hand but modernised machinery, he 
found, would improve production without jeopardising jobs; it would mostly allow the mill to save on 
the cost of constant breakdowns, aʿṭāl, which take up important production time. Producing under 
these conditions seemed almost surreal and required adopting theatrical alternatives at times. For 
example, on our shop-floor there used to be a hydro blasting system, which existed in the past in order 
to remove the oxide scales forming on the top of the steel slab as it emerges from the re-heating 
                                                                                                                                                            
producing semi-finished products for other rolling mills outside the plant or finished sheets, coils and sections which 
were not under the monopoly of Ezz Steel. 
 
27
 While highlighting these changes, Engineer Gehad also reiterated how the machines dated back to World War II 
times. The reference to the World Wars by different interlocutors seemed intriguing, given that this is not a historical 
time reference that Egyptians use in every-day language to demarcate the early part of the 20
th
 Century. However, 
KRUPP, one of the German companies which are said to have assisted the Demag company in establishing this mill and 
whose name was on different parts of machinery, was known in the early 20
th
 Century for being the largest steel 
making and arms manufacturing company in Germany, which was based in Essen, until the end of World War II, after 
which it continued to manufacture mainly industrial machinery(“Krupp AG (German company) -- Britannica Online 
Encyclopedia,” n.d.). Perhaps KRUPP’s social history did not have only an impact on the final product, but on the very 
language by which people demarcated time on the shop-floor. 
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furnace and is exposed to air before being rolled at the 3-high mill. This blasting system broke down a 
few years ago and was never repaired. Instead, it was replaced by palm chaff thrown by workers on the 
hot slab while it is being rolled. The primary responsibility of the temporary workers during the shift 
on the 3-High Rolling Mill became throwing chaff into the machine.28 Water hoses were also used to 
replace water pumps that clear oxides off the machine. Another cold rolling mill also broke down on 
our shop-floor, was not restored and instead was left as production memorabilia. The entire plant 
seemed in fact at times to be a giant object of memorabilia. For engineer Gehad, thus, there was no 
alternative but replacing the 3-High Rolling Mill entirely. Confirming what earlier research about the 3-
High Mills had revealed, he added: “il thulāthiyya dih mish mawguda fī il-ʿaālam khalās dih ʾ athariyya 
”– “the 3-high rolling mill does not exist in the world anymore. It is an antique”.   
 
V. A Nerve Wracking Job  
 
The sense of working with a machine, which anywhere else would be considered an antique, 
brought much amusement to both workers and engineers. It was a source of endless joking that 
animated the workday. The palm tree chaff particularly was always made fun of by workers, who found 
that they were living the very rural life on the very shop-floor. But the experience of the machine as a 
medium, which links workers’ labour power to their wages, was in fact less amusing and rather 
frustrating. The everyday experience of production through an antique piece was primarily an 
experience of dealing with endless machine breakdowns. The breakdowns required coming up with 
ingenious ways to accommodate the limitation in technology, thus increasing both manual work but 
also resourceful and skilled work on the shop-floor. Machines’ repeated breakdowns and resulting 
constant interruption of production were, put more accurately, the central main characteristic of 
production on this shop-floor.    
 
According to the way the data is aggregated, there are five types of breakdown that can occur 
in the mill: breakdowns due to mechanical problems, electrical problems, production problems, 
external factors and pre-planned maintenance.29 Needless to say, experiencing the breakdown and 
                                               
28
 See Figure 14 to 19 in appendices for illustrations of the make-shift alternatives used at the 3-High Rolling Mill. 
29
 See Figure 20 in Appendices for an aggregation of the breakdowns over the past few years. Breakdowns due to 
mechanical and electrical faults are usually handled by maintenance workers, who are evaluated subject to their ability 
to reduce the breakdown repair time. Production breakdowns usually come from the 3-High Rolling Mill and the 
reheating furnace. Some production breakdowns occur, for example, from rolling steel at a cold temperature, putting 
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accounting for it are separated by a world of everyday politics.  Figure 15 shows that the largest chunk 
of breakdown time comes from pre-planned maintenance. But pre-planning, for instance, is not always 
the right description for why work stops, sometimes for even a few days. The implicit agreement 
between workers and engineers is that when a maintenance breakdown looks like it is going to take a 
long while to fix, common practice is to document it in the reports as pre-planned maintenance, 
instead of accounting for it as a maintenance breakdown. This practice avoided penalising workers for 
taking too long to fix a breakdown, which managers recognised was prolonged because of the nature 
of the worn-out machinery. It also helped overall production down-time reports of the plant look more 
presentable to outside observers. In a sense, breakdowns required from both management and 
workers resourceful practices to negotiate the limitations of working with such old machinery.  
 
 But machine breakdown and production down time caused more intractable problems than 
the simple difficulty of accounting for them in reports. For example, on the 3–high mill, although 
longer breakdowns, which last for 10 or more minutes, are often accounted for, smaller breakdowns, 
that interrupt production nonetheless, but take less time to fix, are not reported in the daily 
production reports. So even when breakdowns are not accounted for, production is nonetheless 
constantly disrupted and requires workers to be continuously alert in order to handle the machine 
faults as quickly as possible.  These repeated small interruptions to work are in a sense the very anti-
thesis of a Fordist regime, exemplified by a repetitive work based on the separation of task execution 
from thinking and imagination. The small and big machine breakdowns always capitalised on the skills 
of workers to come up with ways to sort the breakdown quickly before it interrupts work or is penned 
in reports.  Even pre-planned maintenances, which on the surface seem less exhausting to handle, 
require much skill and attention. Here is an instance: the rolling bars of the 3 High Mill are routinely 
replaced every few weeks as part of the pre-planned maintenance. The process, however, is never the 
same and most often an extra brick is needed here to support the gear, an extra handle needed there 
to attach the crane wire, or an old production worker needed to make sure the rolling bars were 
removed at the correct pace and so forth. The nature of work required a lot of emotional investment.  
When raw materials were not available causing production down time, engineers came up with new 
tasks, especially for production workers, such as cleaning the roubles in the underground areas 
                                                                                                                                                            
the wrong pressures on the slab or in case of the furnace, reheating the wrong slab set. External circumstances are for 
instance, the lack of raw materials or lack of gas supply from the main blast furnace of the plant to the re-heating 
furnaces in the mill. Although they are distinct, identifying the breakdown source happens manually or individually; 
unlike at the coil mill through computerised alters. This makes breakdowns more contentious here.   
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underneath the machine, where the scale debris accumulated; a task that production workers 
particularly detested for turning them into ‘cleaners’ instead of ‘workers’. Following a fight that 
erupted on the shop-floor when a breakdown occurred on the 3-High Rolling Mill, Sobhy, a 
maintenance worker, thus explained the general frustration workers experienced under these new 
working conditions by saying: “Tūl ma al-makina shaghālla māfīsh mashākil hina. Al-Mashākil b-tibdāʾ 
ʾawil ma al-makana tuʾaf. “So long as the machine is working, there are no problems here, problems 
start the minute the machine stops”.   
 
Breakdowns are thus a pervasive aspect of everyday production on the shop-floor and are the 
very experience of work with deteriorated machinery.  The politics of who is responsible for fixing 
them, how to fix them and how to avoid them altogether largely organised the workplace and the 
working day.  From minor problems, such as a slab that gets stuck and needs pushing with levers and 
crowbars, to a sheet that gets wrongly rolled, is considered scrap and needs lifting by the crane, to 
fighting over who has the priority to use the water hose, which is the make-shift replacement of the 
older hydro blasting system, to even simpler stops due to the lack of raw materials; the breakdowns 
are central to understanding work at EISCO. It required personal investments from workers in using 
their tacit knowledge to come up with make-shift alternatives to production as well as negotiating with 
managers on how to account and accommodate for them. As Mustafa Hakim, a control room operator, 
eloquently put it, this constant alertness and personal investment in the work resulting from 
breakdowns made working in this mill “shughlāna mutʿiba l-il-ʾaʿsāb” “a nerve wracking job”. 
 
VI. A Skilled Brick 
 
  I would have perhaps never understood what Mustafa Hakim meant by nerve wracking, if I had 
not experienced it myself. I had already spent some six months on the shop-floor by early October 
2009, when the idea of assisting a little in production, beyond the teacher-like writing on the board 
that I was previously allocated, had become socially accepted without producing excessive looks, 
gossip and joking around the shop-floor. To encourage me, and perhaps also, to hide his discomfort at 
my contribution to the production process with exaggerated praise of my skill, ʿamm Waleed, one of 
the control room operators, kindly repeated “Allah yinawwar” whenever I assisted him in operating 
the machine in the control room.  Allah Yinawwar, short for Allah yinawwar ʿ aliyk, literally translates as 
“May God Enlighten (you)”. It is an expression generally used in the workplace, and especially among 
73 
 
jobs that require skill, to show appreciation and admiration of another person’s skill and to encourage 
them in their work. The deployment of Allah Yinawwar, expresses personal capacity for ingenuity. It 
becomes a way to collectively and explicitly recognise what is generally implicit.  However, after the 
following incident, I doubted if I would be told Allah Yinawwar ever again and realised that my lack of 
skill was detrimental to the work process. I began believing I was utterly unskilled, even less so than ‘a 
brick’.  
During one of the shifts with production workers on the 3-High mill, I sat to the front of the control 
room next to ʿ amm ʿ Abd al-Fattah, who was the control room operator (or driver, as the men call it) of 
that shift. The control room was originally designed to accommodate two operators. But to save on 
labour expenses, the machinery was adjusted over time, so that it could be controlled by a single 
operator. The second operator had initially been responsible among other things, for the joystick that 
controlled the rollers connecting the furnace to the machine. In the cut-back variant, this was often 
simply replaced by a brick.30 And by pushing the joystick to keep rolling the rollers on which the slab 
will slide, I had thus come to substitute the brick. I was confident of my ability to replace a brick.  
As the light flashing from the furnace signalled a slab emerging, I pushed the joystick, the bars 
began rolling, and the slab came out and slid onto the rollers.  However, the slab was thinner than the 
usual slab size used in this mill and thus got tilted on the way out. My attempts to push the joystick 
back and forth quickly to reverse the rolling direction of the rollers, as ʿ amm ʿ Abd al-Fattah, and other 
workers resting on the back bench of the control room were instructing me, did not succeed in tilting 
the slab back into its straight position. To deal with this, ʿ amm ʿ Umar, the shift supervisor and the rest 
of the shift workers suggested that the crane operator lifts the slab and re-adjust it in the right 
direction. But the sheaves of the crane did not attach to this slab, because they were an outmoded 
type that did not expand or become smaller automatically. The slab was smaller than the standard 
dimensions used by the sheaves of the crane and could not be lifted then. To get round that, the men 
came up with the idea of attaching a long piece of scrap steel to a giant magnet and then fastening it 
to the crane rope. The extra piece of steel was to function as a makeshift hammer that would give a 
blow to the titled steel slab on the rollers and re-adjust its position. Following some directions from 
production workers, the crane operator finally managed to re-adjust the slab on the bars and 
production continued.  
                                               
30
 See Figure 21 for illustration.  
74 
 
 I was deeply embarrassed by my incompetence by then. The whole shop-floor was watching, as 
they often do when production is interrupted in order to first identify where the problem was coming 
from and then collectively come up with ways to go round it, which added more pressure on the 
person in the control room. Being embarrassed by what others thought about my incompetence, made 
me realise why workers, and especially senior workers like Riad, a shift head, paid attention to which 
workers were watching during production and spoke of ‘being embarrassed’ on the shop-floor when 
temporary workers produced mistakes that he was later blamed for. In some way, one was not just 
producing steel, but also producing skill (and thus respectability) which others were legitimising or 
denying by their approving or disapproving looks. I was also terrified because I risked producing a scrap 
piece that could put the shift I was working within in trouble. I grew visibly anxious and suggested to 
the rest of the workers resting in the control room that I maybe should not continue working with the 
operator. It seemed wiser to bring the brick back. But the men, some out of real concern and others 
out of sheer amusement at watching a woman screw up, comforted me by explaining this  happened 
regularly with the smaller slabs and that I should not chicken out or else I would never get the courage 
to learn.  I continued working next to ʿ Abd al-Fattah, when the same incident occurred again with the 
next slab! 
 The whole shift went through the entire process again; with workers attempting to reverse the 
rollers from the control room, then more men congregating around the machine with levers and 
crowbars trying to think of ways to attach the slab to the crane. Meanwhile, ʿamm ʿUmar went down 
from the control room to give the rest of the shift a hand and came back up briefly to report that 
Engineer ʾIbrahim Hussein, the head of maintenance, was furious. He had not stopped shouting and 
was threatening to report production workers to Engineer Sherif, the head of the mill. “Engineer 
ʾIbrahim is saying”, ʿ Umar told us “that reversing the rollers with the joystick is bad for the machinery”. 
Reversing the rollers when a slab was tilted a little was standard practice, which workers used all the 
time in order to offset the limitations of technology and engineers implicitly allowed. But to add to 
today’s messy situation, another unrelated breakdown had occurred in one of the rollers accidently 
and they stopped working. This made Engineer ʾIbrahim more vocal about management’s ‘official’ 
instructions about running the machine.  ʿamm ʿUmar in turn wondered how on earth, with little 
technology available, production workers were expected to adjust the slab in the right direction if not 
by reversing the direction of the bars from the control room. He then said, mocking the engineer’s 
remarks, “dah illi ʿ alā ʾ add mukhinā. Niʿmil ʾ ih? ʾ iḥnā mukhinā sughayyar”, “this is our brains’ capacity.  
What can we do? We have little brains”. This generated heated joking remarks and gossip from the rest 
of the workers, who disapproved of being shouted at by the engineer and objected to being 
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considered stupid. ʿAbd al-Moneim contributed to the joking by saying that the problem was simply 
that Engineer ʾ Ibrahim Hussein was utterly stupid and did not understand anything in production work 
at all. In fact, he said, he had never seen anybody this stupid, always shouting and ill-tempered. 
Workers were very proud of their skills, especially under the new work conditions which made 
production almost a miracle that repeated itself every day. They considered their labour an extension 
of who they were and what they were able to conceive. Labour was increasingly personalised and 
individualised in the mill. The machines were thus linked to workers’ bodies and used to mark their 
status on the shop-floor. An attack on one worker’s skill was considered an attack on the collective 
knowledge they had gathered over the years, which was transmitted implicitly and symbolically.  
By the time the whole incident was resolved I was trembling with fear, lest the workers of my shift 
be penalised for the production down-time. Although the problem was clearly caused by the inability 
of the mill to cope with a variety of slab sizes due to the limited technology available, it was 
experienced more as a threat on one’s own personal capacities. ʿamm ʿUmar handled the situation 
generously, in turn, by joking about it and making fun of my anxiety. He  jokingly told me that Engineer 
Sherif was saying  no ‘stranger’ should drive the machine, before repeating more seriously what the 
others were saying about the machine not being equipped for the smaller-sized slabs. When half an 
hour later, the same incident occurred while ʿ amm ʿ Abd al-Moneim was operating the joystick instead 
of me and it took a further thirty minutes to fix, I began to relax and see how the increasing 
deterioration of the machinery with the spending cuts was transposing the structural problems of 
capital into the responsibility of workers.  The repeated breakdowns and work interruptions due to the 
lack of investment in capital thus engendered fear, tension and constant accusations among people on 
the shop-floor. A wire cord gets cut while lifting some weights and threatens somebody’s life, so the 
crane operator or Shaʿban’s evil eye gets blamed for it; the machine stops, and ʿAlaa is blamed for 
rolling cold steel and in turn blames maintenance for not fixing the hydraulic problem; maintenance’s 
failure to estimate how long fixing a breakdown will take leads to furnace workers reducing  the  
temperature inside the furnace to the wrong level and then wasting even more time waiting to elevate 
the temperature again. Production at EISCO was terribly consuming and required a lot of personal 
investment. It does not, however, follow that work relations on the shop-floor were competitive or 
‘bad’. Rather, the difficult working conditions brought workers closer together despite the apparent 
tensions on the surface.  
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VII. Machine Breakdowns and Workers’ Solidarity 
 
 
The work environment at the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill was definitely tense, if only because the 
old technology and the repeated interruptions of production increased workers’ personal 
responsibilities. However, this very technology and the work arrangement on the shop-floor enabled 
the negotiation of work obligations and work relations in a way that also created wider solidarities 
among workers. Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in the accounting and reporting of  ʿ uṭl 
(‘a breakdown’).  
Near the end of the morning shift, at about 1.30 p.m., production workers on the 3-high mill 
realised that they had not reached the expected production rates for the shift despite very few 
breakdowns that day.  To handle the situation, ʿ amm ʿ Abd al-Moneim told ʿ amm ʿ Umar to add an extra 
hour of stops to the shift report. ʿUmar gave it a thought and responded that it was a bit late now 
because he had just given the mid-shift report to the operations control office. Both of them then 
became aware that I was around in the control room, so ʿamm ʿ Umar turned towards me, smiled and 
told ʿamm ʿAbd al-Moneim jokingly, “What ʿAbd al-Fattah, you want us to cheat?” The men then 
decided to keep working until 1.50-1.55, instead of leaving at about 1.35-1.40, which is the de-facto 
end of shift times that workers had imposed. ʿ amm ʿ Abd al-Moneim could only make the suggestion to 
ʿamm ʿ Umar to re-adjust the length of breakdowns because maintenance and production workers kept 
friendly relations and were able to negotiate breakdown times among them. “Making out” (Burawoy, 
1979) on the shop-floor, was often done subtlety in implicit agreement among workers.  Joking often 
helped normalise these negotiations and transgressions when they were explicit. “Just write what I tell 
you” one production worker thus told another maintenance worker another day, while jokingly putting 
on an air of authority as he told him on the phone to change what he had previously written in the 
shift report. These exchanges between both groups could only be observed in the hidden cracks, so to 
speak, by contrast with the overtly visible tensions and arguments on the shop-floor.  
 These friendly relations, especially among maintenance and production workers, were not 
unrelated to the nature of production in the mill and the regulations around it. In March 2007, a year 
prior to the start of my fieldwork at EISCO, the CEO had ordered the cancellation of the monthly bonus 
payments, which engineers had previously allocated to workers based on their productivity every 
month. This was justified as an attempt to limit the widespread corruption in the distribution of such 
bonuses, although the decision also manifested itself as a further means of cutting spending in the 
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plant. So while some workers welcomed the decision for its impact in limiting patronage networks, 
others found the loss of bonus pay de-motivating for work especially as meeting production targets or 
not did not now affect their pay packets. At any rate, the cancellation of bonuses eased negotiations 
between workers over productivity reports, because they no longer impacted on increased or reduced 
income. The evaluation of workers now affected only their end of year evaluation, which for most 
workers, having already reached the highest rank, and especially for shift supervisors and shift heads, 
made little difference in practice.   
But other factors related to the nature of the production processes in the plant also facilitated 
these negotiations. For example, the type of steel being rolled (based on the density of steel in the 
slab) was important in determining daily production rates. The variations in the type of steel that was 
rolled during the same shift, thus lead to some laxity in calculating the production rates. It was in fact, 
the production engineer who once told me, to my astonishment, that “the rate is not important”. The 
official production rates were 22 to 25 slabs/hour and 15 to 18 slabs/hour depending on which of the 
two re-heating furnaces on the shop-floor was being used. However, these rates were not strictly 
abided by when workers were rolling the harder and more dense steel slabs, which required a longer 
time to roll, or if the slab size was larger or thinner than the standard. The production engineer 
explained that in setting up the daily production plan, he thus tries to include a mix of slabs so workers 
could reach the expected production rate easily. The breakdown in the machinery enabled solidarities 
to build not only between workers but also at times between workers and middle management.  
In addition, as mentioned earlier, because machines are subject to short breakdowns that are not 
accounted for in reports, it is hard to work with very precise production rates. Unlike at the semi-
automated coil rolling mill, where the stops and breakdowns were calculated through a computerised 
system, the precise source, time and length estimation of breakdown on our shop-floor was done by 
human beings rather than computers. This therefore, left ample room to negotiate the length and 
nature of each breakdown among workers. No wonder then that when I was first allocated the task of 
writing the exact production per hour on the blackboard next to the 3-High Mill, workers were tense 
about it and constantly asked me whether I wanted to just get some rest away from the hot slab. I 
quickly learnt to pretend that I was confused about the exact numbers I wrote when the shift 
supervisors were adjusting the rates. The situation was also not so different for maintenance workers. 
Maintenance workers worked according to pre-estimated periods for handling different breakdowns. 
However, in many cases the spare parts and tools needed to fix certain breakdowns were not available. 
This allowed workers to negotiate the length of time for fixing a breakdown. Hence, precise production 
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rates and precise hours of maintenance were hard to estimate and there was always room for workers 
to negotiate them together.  
 The very stochastic nature of the production process at the mill and the relaxation of managerial 
control specifications with the spending cuts thus facilitated work negotiations. This is easily identified 
as a case of workers ‘making out’, but beyond this, the age and extent of worn-out machinery did not 
just allow workers some transgressions here and there, but also gave them de-facto control over the 
workload. The workers’ ability to organise work did indeed make them consent to supplying labour 
power and time that generated a surplus for capital- although even the latter was not always a 
guarantee, since the plant had been operating at loss for years, until its debts were restructured by the 
state. But there was more than just consent going on. In a sense, with their skill, the ability to 
negotiate the workload and the security of their employment protecting them from being laid off and 
the maintenance of their skill, workers in the EISCO mill were more than just proletariat supplying 
labour power for capital, but actually shared a part of the capital invested in the mill. Even workers on 
more advanced shop-floors, such as the coil mill, still managed to negotiate work relations and subvert 
some production regulations despite the advanced technology. This is not unlike the situation 
explained by Shehata (2009) who, in comparing the shop-floors of a public company and that of a 
private company in Egypt, demonstrates workers’ ability to make out even under the most advanced 
technology in the private sector. But the extent to which the machinery had actually deteriorated 
across the plant and the protection that the permanent employment at a ‘strategic’ plant like EISCO 
had guaranteed workers, increased their control further. This requires us to think of them in terms that 
are wider than just proletariat or even as a labour aristocracy.  The property of their skill, which acted 
here as a type of property legally protected by long term employment, made permanent workers akin 
to a bourgeoisie. 
  
VIII. ʿIshra, Baladiyyāt, Evil Eye and the Value of Relationality on the Shop-floor 
 
The solidarity among workers was further nurtured by other aspects related to the production 
process, work arrangements as well as the very ‘cultural’ background which workers brought to the 
shop-floor. Management, for example, had never specified a lunch break hour, thus workers were 
expected to cover for each other for rest times. This was usually negotiated and agreed upon internally 
among workers. In addition, workers negotiated among themselves different aspects of the division of 
labour. For example, at the 3-High Mill, three out four teams allowed the three young contract workers 
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in the shift to divide the work between them in a manner that guaranteed that each of them had one 
day doing the easier part of the work and two days on the more difficult elements. Some shifts often 
also managed to work faster than the set production rates during the early part of the day so they 
could slow down later or manage to leave the shop-floor a little earlier. However, this last option was 
more difficult to negotiate around the production engineer, who discouraged the practices because of 
its negative effect on the machinery. These internal work arrangements managed to make the work 
regime less rigid and to bring workers together by collectively negotiating work, often through a 
consensus-based process.  This particular aspect of work at EISCO seemed one of the many reasons 
why young temporary workers were keen on working in this plant. For example, it made Gasser, a new 
temporary worker feel more mirtāḥ (‘comfortable’) at work here, because there was more room to 
negotiate work among colleagues, as opposed to his earlier experiences in the private sector, where 
work rules were rigid and entirely regulated by management. 
But other types of relations, unrelated to the work process, also created solidarities among workers 
and helped them increase their control of the shop-floor. Workers often spoke of being ʿishra, the 
closest translation of which is friends/intimate- and even of developing ʿishra (‘friendship/intimacy’) 
with the machinery. ʿ ishra originates from the word ʿ ashra, which means number ten. From the same 
root, ʿashir in classical Arabic, refers to a man related to another by blood ties or friendship, whereas 
Muʿāshara, the verb from the same root, means to have sex. ʿ Ishra is often used in Egypt in relation to 
time. People thus speak of being ʿishrit ʿumr. ʿumr means both ‘age’ and ‘lifetime’; thus, ‘life-time 
friends’.  ʿishrit ʿumr implies a kind of ʿishra that develops through sharing blood, sex or closeness to 
the heart, or, as is the case here, time. When I commented to Mr. Saleh, the head of industrial 
relations, that I found the banter between himself as a boss and the workers in the administration very 
unusual, he responded: “we were all hired here at the same time together in the 1980s and [he used 
the word ʿāshirnā the verb form of which is ʿishra - which means to come in close contact with each 
other]. Some are even a few years older than I. But we used to go on plant holidays together as 
unmarried single men and share one room and stuff. Now we are old and each has a family but we 
remain comfortable with each other. It is ʿumr.” ʿumr here is short for ʿishrit ʿumr and also means a 
lifetime. The concept of ʿ ishra suggests that workers were intimates, but this is a very particular type of 
intimacy, which when developed between people over time, becomes like the kind of relation where 
people share bodily substances by having ʿishra through blood and through sex.  Workers thus 
explained how it was because ʿishra that they often shared their personal stories together and took 
advice from one another on how to run day to day affairs outside work. It was ʿishra too that made 
them know each other’s characters easily, appreciate each other’s quirks, not be offended by joking 
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and be able to negotiate work relations. Because of ʿishra some Christian and Muslim workers for 
example, transcend their religious differences and build lasting friendships which were comparatively 
more difficult to find elsewhere in Egypt in this period. A prominent example was the friendship 
between Riad, Mina and Nabil, three heads of shifts, who, at the time of my fieldwork, remembered 
being friends since they joined the shop-floor together, exactly thirty nine years earlier.  
Workers also spoke of developing ʿishra with the machines. In a sense, the machine itself, with its 
grease and steams, sometimes became a part of the common substance shared between people over 
time. To explain how working in the plant for so long produced a special relation between man and 
machinery, a production worker said: “il makan dah ʿishra. il makan guzʾ min il banī ʾadam” -“These 
machines are ʿ ishra. The machines are part of the human beings”. On our shop-floor, Hassan al-Masry, 
used to joke that he had two wives, one at home and the other one being the 3-High Mill.31 More than 
just speaking of ʿishra with machinery, workers’ bodily practices around the machine further reflect 
this relationship of ʿ ishra with machinery: when they were jumping up on the bars of the machine, to 
moving the slabs with crowbars and levers, to using one’s own voice to direct the crane operator, to 
using hand signals to communicate production with the control room, to becoming entirely covered 
with grease and stains. This relation that developed with time enabled workers to become one group 
and to make their labour feel rather un-aliented.  
Yet, the negotiation of breakdowns and work in general also depended on workers’ characters and 
their personal relations. Maintenance and production workers for example, did not always agree to 
cover for each other. But those who broke the implicit code of work were largely ostracised from the 
community. This clarified the type of relations valued on the shop-floor. In one instance Shaʿban, 
perhaps in order to demonstrate his authority as a new head of production shift, had reported to 
upper management that during one of the night shifts maintenance workers had forgotten a slab by 
the shipping area, thus putting the mill at risk of an accident. Shaʿban had also been reporting the 
exact length of breakdowns without negotiating them with maintenance workers. According to 
Engineer Hamza, Shaʿban had created a lot of enemies among maintenance because “ma- bi-yisāyis-
sh” “he does not negotiate”.32 A few weeks later, in return, maintenance workers complained to upper 
management that Shaʿban’s production shift was reckless at work during the night shifts. The 
accusations reported to management resulted in the latter’s direct involvement in production. This 
                                               
31
 Al-thulāthia, the name of the mill in Arabic, is feminine. 
32
 The word yisāyis- to negotiate -comes from the root word, political, siyāsa meaning that he does not negotiate 
politically. The Arabic language thus makes direct links between everyday negotiations and everyday politics. 
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annoyed the rest of the workers. Engineer Bahaa and Engineer Sherif (the head of section and head of 
mill) spent the following weeks calling the control room operators at every interval to check on the 
work flow. This made workers irritated with Shaʿban, who had involved management in production in 
an attempt to advance his own interests and broke the workers’ unwritten consensus that whatever 
happened in the night shift, stayed in the night shift. 33  
 
Two heads of shifts, Shaʿban and Masry, however remained inflexible in negotiating work and 
stricter regarding transgressions. They were both, though Masry more so than Shaʿban, infamous for 
their authoritarian way of running the shift and their big egos. Their managerial style generated much 
fury, gossip, jokes and mockery from workers. Shaʿban’s evil eye was constantly brought up as a source 
of joking among his shift members and from other shifts in response to his attempts to distinguish 
himself from the rest of workers. Shaʿban had been infamous for selfish practices, and for his evil eye, 
even before becoming head of shift. For example, he had attempted to secure a closet in the changing 
room of permanent workers for his son, who had just been employed as a temporary worker on our 
shop-floor. He also invited his son to a small retirement party in the company of engineers, which only 
permanent workers and management attended, and when I offered workers a watch from London as a 
gift to put in the control room, Shaʿban took it home.   Most of the breakdowns during Shaʿban’s shift 
thus were attributed to his evil eye. Endless mocking stories circulated about how his evil eye caused 
electricity blackouts when he was invited to weddings,  radio cassettes exploding after he praised them 
or even the loss of his colleague's bag of meat they bought together from the market.  Masry on the 
other hand was repeatedly ridiculed, with Waleed, an older worker in his shift, once making fun of the 
way he gave orders here and there “as if he was regulating traffic” and “taking himself for a 
policeman.”  
 
I find these relations strikingly similar to those Elyachar (2005) describes in her ethnography of 
workshop-life in Cairo. Elyachar distinguishes exchanges taking place in the workshop “with Biznis (bil-
biznis)”- that is the pursuit of short term gains and attempts to extract relations- and with exchange of 
favour “(bil-mugāmla)” or “(bil-gadaʿana)” from (gadaʿ) which includes attempts “to cultivate more 
                                               
33
 The night shifts were, on this shop-floor manned by workers only without the presence of engineers, who left with 
the normal administrative shift at 4.p.m. The absence of a shift engineer in this mill, in contrast to the coil mill for 
example, gave further power to workers to manage production beyond managerial interference. 
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relationships with neighbours and associates"(Elyachar, 2005, p. 138). 34 Elyachar turns to combine the 
work of (Munn, 1986) on the anthropology of value with that of Actor Network Theory to explain how 
“popular culture classes in Egypt in general, and workshop masters in particular, seek 'to create the 
value *they+ regard as essential to *their+ community viability'”( Munn, 1986, p. 3 in Elyachar, 2005 
p.7). She traces the “relational value” which “is produced in workshop exchanges” as “it expresses the 
positive value attached to the creation, reproduction and extension of relationships in communities of 
Cairo” (Elyachar, 2005, p. 7). Elyachar’s emphasis on this relational value stems from the fairly wide 
anthropological work that stresses the centrality of relationships to Egyptian culture and especially to 
urban popular culture and the large amount of time and effort that people spend in the creation, 
reproduction, and extension of relations (Elyachar, 2005). 
 
People’s investment in relations takes place even in workshops, i.e. places where interests are 
often pursued within some boundaries. Some of these boundaries are emphasised by Parry and Bloch 
(1989) where, short term exchanges are legitimised if they are balanced with the pursuit of long term 
exchanges which are “concerned with the reproduction of social and cosmic order”( Parry & Bloch, 
1989, p. 2 in Elyachar, 2005, p. 7). This balance between short and long term exchanges is apparent in 
the distinction between exchanges “with Biznis (bil-biznis)”- and “(bil-mugamla)” or “(bil-gada'ana)”. 
Instead of seeing the introduction of new economic practices instrumentally, Elyachar looks at how the 
values that people hold influence the meaning and outcome of these practices. For example, she 
highlights “the production of *the+ positive *relational+ value in tandem with the creation of negative 
value in workshop life, as embodied in the notion of evil eye" (Elyachar, 2005, p. 7). In her 
ethnography, the concept of the evil eye is often used to distinguish between short-term gains that 
focus on interests and long term social consciousness.   
 
With the introduction of the neo-liberal concepts that encourage the pursuit of short term 
interests in Hirafyeen, the workshop area in Cairo where Elyachar conducted fieldwork, workshop 
masters often invoked the notion of evil eye. The maximisation of those interests while disregarding 
                                               
34
 gadaʿ according to the Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic is defined as: “one possessed of one or more of the following 
groups of characteristics: nobility of character and integrity; intelligence and application; manly toughness and 
courage” (Hinds and Badawi, 1987). Elyachar explains the character of a gadaʿ as “a man who does not swindle or 
cheat, isn’t treacherous, and generally acts within the moral universe of the Egyptian popular masses. He has the 
qualities of decency and gallantry (shahama). To say that someone interacts with gadaʿna is to say that he watches 
out for others in his community” (Elyachar, 2005, pp. 137–138) 
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other long term relationships “makes the agent one with the evil eye” (Elyachar, 2005, p. 149). This 
understanding of the evil eye and bad omens is similarly interpreted by Pocock (1973) where they 
were “not to be feared between equals, nor between people whose status is clearly different, but were 
to be feared most, when those who should be equal were not” (Pocock, 1973, p. 44). In Al-Hirafeyeen 
“he who ignores the internalised eye of the conscious and pursues, short term individual interests 
without constraints, invites the attack of another eye, the evil eye. An attack of the evil eye can wipe 
out all the gains made by a master over a lifetime of work”(Elyachar, 2012, p. 149).  
The emphasis on Shaʿban’s evil eye on our shop-floor is thus in line with his attempts to pursue his 
self-interest at the expense of others. Shaʿban was ostracised for not expanding the relations of trust, 
the values of collectivity and the investment in the well-being of others. These practices were largely 
valued on the shop-floor and were practiced everyday through the collective negotiation of work. 
Relations among workers were thus not just a product of the division of labour or of the production 
process, but their power and ability to influence everyday politics comes from their entanglement with 
the values that people hold and their ability to reproduce the moral and cosmic logic that guides the 
community. These relations produced workers’ solidarity and control of the shop-floor.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
The spending cuts at EISCO capitalised on what permanent workers took great pride in and valued 
the most, their skills and relations. The lack of investment in capital and the break-down of machinery 
did not lead to the de-skilling of the total workforce with neo-liberalism; rather it increased the need 
for skill in everyday operations. It also made work increasingly personalised and dependent on 
relations on the shop-floor. The structural problems of capital were transposed onto workers who, by 
thinking of their labour as an extension of the machinery, were then blamed for the machine 
breakdowns. Although workers’ skills gave them increasing control of the shop-floor, they also 
obfuscated the larger structural problems attached to the lack of spending on machine renewals.  
On an everyday basis, permanent workers experienced their labour as inalienable. I use alienation 
here with reference to Carrier’s description that “people who have little control over a thing or activity 
are likely to be more alienated from it than are people with more control; people obliged to co-operate 
with strangers are likely to be more alienated from their activities than are people who interact with 
family and friends” (Carrier, 2009, p. 198). I argued in this chapter that the labour of permanent 
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workers was inalienable due to the protection of permanent contracts- which, unlike permanent 
contracts in other public sector enterprises in Egypt, are less threatened by layoffs and phasing out 
because of the EISCO's strategic interest to the regime. This protection gave their skill more weight.  
Permanent contracts thus act as a form of legal protection for what can be called the ‘property of skill’. 
In a sense, permanent contracts at EISCO guaranteed permanent workers the security of livelihoods 
and upheld the collective property of their skill. This, I have suggested, is similar to the legal protection 
of artisans’ skills at the times of craft trades.  
 
At EISCO, the employment protection that the state granted permanent workers increased their 
control of the shop-floor rather than their vulnerability to market trends. Their work trajectories are 
better understood through the prism of artisans who work on a ‘modern’ industrial shop-floor.  I end 
the chapter here with a reminder from Mollona (2009a, p.9) that looking at the varied forms of labour 
that developed with capitalism highlight how “historical perspective of the working class 
consciousness did not follow a linear trajectory of progressive alienation and objectification of the 
proletariat, but underwent a circular involution leading to the paradoxical return of indentured labour, 
patriarchal capitalism and the cottage industry in the age of postmodernity”.  “the 'proletarian' and the 
'artisans'” as Mollona eloquently puts it, “are two concurrent forms of class relations which reflect the 
uneven form of capitalist development.” In the same way, the coming chapters will demonstrate how 
the worlds of both types of labour, the precariat and the stable, exist at EISCO and its vicinity, and 
interact with one another in a way that profits the capitalist state. 
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Chapter Two: Subverting Shop-floor Hierarchies: Workers, Engineers and Joking 
Relationships  
 
I. Introduction 
 
It is 1.20 p.m., almost half an hour before the end of the morning shift. The 3-High Rolling Mill just 
broke down. What timing! Workers are often restless around this time as they wrap up work and 
prepare to leave the shop-floor. The rollers linking the furnace to the mill have stopped rolling. A siren 
goes off from the control room to alert the maintenance workers and the crane operator of the 
breakdown. Hassan, the crane operator, puts down his mobile phone-cum-music player and travels 
with his crane along the shop-floor. He has made a makeshift hammer by tying the wire rope hanging 
from the crane to the sheaves attached to the steel slab. He lands a few blows on the sides of the bars. 
Hassan is assisted by the production shift members, who time his blows with a series of ‘Heyyy Hooo’s’ 
called from below. But the rolls don’t roll.  
 
Shaʿban, who has just been made head of shift, takes charge and attempts to assert his authority. 
He jumps on the rolling bars and, with a proper hammer, knocks on the sides of the bars, while 
struggling to stand still. His antics generate hissing and jeering on the shop-floor.  I count fifteen men 
standing around the rolling mill to watch the theatrics staged by Shaʿban. A young fixed-term 
temporary worker tells me quietly that everybody is pretending they are interested only because 
engineer Sherif, the head of the shop-floor, and engineer Bahaa, the head of this and two other shop-
floors, are standing by the machine. “Of course had they not been here, it would be Hussein, ʿAbd al-
Rahman and I [the three young temporary workers in this production shift] only here” he adds. I nod 
and smile in approval; these are shop-floor classics I have come to learn over time. Round the machine, 
the mood is lively: cigarettes, chitchat, jokes and gossip are circulating among the mob of people 
watching in suspense.  
 
Engineer Sherif and Engineer Bahaa are both standing with shop-floor engineers and a few 
senior workers towards the front. The rest of the workers and I congregate behind them. Two workers 
standing next to me are gossiping about Engineer Hamza, the production engineer: “Dah mā-b-
yfhamshi ayy ḥāga w baʿd mā mishy Tawfik maḥadish fihum fāhim ḥāga” - (“He doesn’t understand 
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anything and ever since Tawfik left, none of them understand anything”).35 Karim, a temporary worker 
standing on the other side, shouts hesitatingly to the engineers: “ʾil makana miḥtāga titzaffar” - “the 
machine needs to be greased” he says. Everybody at the back cracks up laughing.  Karim means that 
management ought to sacrifice an animal and distribute the meat, as used to be practiced in the past 
following every annual repair. This was said to bring good omen. The practice has been stopped 
recently, thus creating another opportunity for workers to joke that it was the management’s 
stinginess that was responsible for the bad luck that stopped the machine. A few minutes later 
Engineer Mohy, the production engineer of the heating furnace, tells me in a half-joking manner: “I 
know what the problem is. It’s Shaʿban’s *evil+ eye”. Karim overhears him and smiles slyly. The 
promotion of Shaʿban to head of shift had resulted in an increasing number of jokes by those who 
thought him unfit for the position. Another worker, unhappy with how long fixing this breakdown was 
dragging on and how the engineers, who left work at 4 pm, were keeping the morning shift workers 
from catching the 2 p.m buses home, shouts from the back: “We’ll leave at 4 p.m. like the engineers or 
what? Give us over-time pay then”. Another burst of laughs ensues.  
 
This chapter considers the changes in the hierarchical relationship between the shop-floor 
managers (i.e. the engineers) and workers in recent years.  Engineers and workers have, for most of 
the plant’s history, been bound by a hierarchical relationship that is akin to what Radcliffe-Brown 
describes as a ‘relationship of avoidance’, which is characterised by extreme respect. For Radcliffe-
Brown, an avoidance relation is a contractual one based on the two parties being “conjoined by a 
definite common interest in reference to which each of them accepts specific obligations” (Radcliffe-
Brown, 1952, p. 103). The continuation of production could in many ways be considered a common 
interest, leading both workers and engineers to accept, willingly or unwillingly, their separate roles 
and obligations over the years.  In this chapter, however, I argue that the reforms that took place 
under Mubarak’s authoritarian regime made it hard for both workers and engineers to continue 
seeing production as a common interest. In fact, the very configuration of the new conditions of work 
and life have pushed the majority of engineers – from the small managers to the heads of mills – to 
resist the neo-liberal and police state project and to become complicit with workers in plotting against 
the spending cuts and the tyranny of the regime, which was embodied by the CEO. Engineers thus lost 
authority in the plant, which allowed workers to feel able to attack, through teasing, mockery and 
open gossip, the hierarchy that the engineers represented. The engineers, in turn, began to take the 
disrespect with less offence and often retaliated with more joking, teasing and mockery. I suggest that 
                                               
35
 Tawfik is a foreman, who had just retired. 
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the joking on the shop-floor was not simply an attempt by workers to resist the power of engineers in 
a “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985) manner, or to let off some steam. Rather, these practices 
contributed to the subversion, albeit slowly and gradually, of the work hierarchy at EISCO. The 
uncertain relationship of white collar employees, such as engineers, to capital and labour in public 
enterprises and the way in which “neo-liberalism as exception” (Ong, 2006) was spatialised under 
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, have opened the possibility for the industrial hierarchy to be 
subverted at EISCO in recent years. 
 
I propose here that we need to understand how neo-liberal reforms are translated by white 
collar employees in industrial settings. Questions about neo-liberalism have often been framed in 
terms of the dialectics of fragmentation, creolisation and de-territorialisation of  the working class, or 
their collective action and resistance to management. At the heart of this dialectic lies an 
unquestioned assumption that management and workers always represent capital and labour. 
However,  Parkin (2006) argues that the division between capital and labour is not as straightforward 
in public enterprises as it is in capitalist enterprises. He suggests that the white collar, or, more 
broadly, ‘intermediate’  groups, are often assumed to be of the dominant class because they identify 
with capital and with management over labour. In the public sector, however, he adds the chain of 
command stretches upwards and out of sight into the very body of the state.  In addition, white collar 
workers are not free to transfer their services and skills to other employers and are tied to the state as 
a monopoly employer. Parkin (2006) thus contends that the division between manual and non-manual 
work as the basis of class struggle in the public sector is not totally justified.  Although both groups 
remain socially differentiated, with different life chances and opportunities, they are not interrelated 
simply as exploiter and exploited.  
 
The complex relation between management and labour is also echoed in research on state-
owned enterprises in the Middle East. Waterbury (1991; 1993) for example, argues against the notion 
of a ‘state bourgeoisie’ or a ‘petty bourgeoisie in the public sector’ whose interests lie in the 
appropriation of private gains while serving in the public sector through their relations with the 
private sector. Rather, he finds that the history of public enterprises in Egypt, although it reflects 
individual corruption, is not a case of systematic use of  the public sector for private gains. In contrast, 
he finds public-private relations to have been less antagonistic at times. The work of Longuenesse 
(1979) on the other hand, distinguishes between a petty bourgeoisie in the state sector made up of 
top managers, and the rest of the white collar workforce whom she considers part of “an intermedium 
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stratum” which encompasses white collar workers in the public sector, engineers, teachers, 
administrators in the industrial and agriculture sector and employees of the tertiary sector, such as 
banks, etc. The position of these strata in the social relations of production (selling their labour power 
without owning the means of production) “brings them close to the working class, from whom they 
are set apart by non-productive roles, while their way of life, their aspirations and ideology relates 
them to the petty bourgeoisie”  (Longuenesse, 1979, p. 3). These strata are hence “a product of 
capitalist development, extension of the market, the multiplication of banks, the development of 
schooling, and the intensified involvement of government in social and economic life” (Longuenesse, 
1979, p. 3). Similarly Nellis (1980) sees them as “a chameleon group able to shift its policy position 
quickly from proletariat to bourgeois” (Nellis, 1980, in Waterbury, 199 p. 9). The uncertain position of 
engineers in relation to capital and labour raises a number of questions, for example: how and why 
they take different sides at different times?  And how do engineers position themselves within the 
technologies of neo-liberalism and the logics of an authoritarian state? 
 
In studying Mubarak’s regime, Soliman (2011) argues that authoritarian states that embark on 
neo-liberal reforms have to engage in two contradictory projects. They must cut public expenditure, as 
stipulated by the neo-liberal doctrine, yet they must also increase spending to uphold the stability of 
the regime, which maintains power not only by offering welfare provisions and various entitlements to 
citizens, but also by increasing expenditure on policing and state media to control public opinion and 
contain rebellion. These two contradictory trajectories that must be followed by authoritarian states 
undertaking neo-liberal reforms thus end up creating unexpected outcomes and a range of 
possibilities.36  Ong (2006, p.17)  suggests that the two logics are kept in parallel in repressive regimes 
through the very spatialisation of the neo-liberal technologies, hence creating  “neo-liberal 
exceptions” in the midst of “exceptions to neo-liberalism”. She points to Specialized Economic Zones 
in China as a way the regime has kept both its repressive and centralised character and yet enabled 
the technologies of neo-liberalism to engage subjects into becoming self-enterprising citizens. Ong’s 
argument however has been criticised for the generalisation of ‘states of expectations’ in places 
                                               
36
 This is not to say that non-authoritarian regimes, which embark on neo-liberal programs, are not subject to the 
same contradiction. Neo-liberalism, regardless in authoritarian states or not, does not lead to the retrenchment of the 
state from regulating the market, rather it reconfigures where and how it invests its resources, and whose interests in 
protects (Mitchell, 2002; Gledhill, 2004; Kingfisher and Marovsky 2008). Neo-liberal capitalism is thus based primarily 
on ‘accumulation by dispossession’ through the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few (Harvey, 
2003). In addition, the state, and not only authoritarian states, is by its very definition one that monopolises and 
legitimates the use of force and violence (Weber, 1991). In authoritarian regimes however, these tendencies are more 
articulate and perhaps more intense. 
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where law was never abolished and for the assumption that the zones are wholly realised on the 
ground (Stivens, 2007; Castree, 2007).  In addition, ethnographic research reveals that economic zones 
are unexceptional and tend to have structural continuities with what is often referred to as the 
informal economy (Cross, 2010).  
 
While all the above critiques hold out, Ong’s thesis nonetheless, illuminates why the 
spatialisation of neo-liberal and authoritarian policies and discourses should be a central focus for 
researchers. The case of SEZ’s should take into account the contradictions and, perhaps moral crises, 
that occur where the spatialisation of governing practices occur in a way that the “exceptions to neo-
liberalism” exist in the same spatiotemporal sphere as “neo-liberal exceptions”.37 In this chapter I look 
at what happens when the logics of authoritarianism and neo-liberalism exist in the same space, such 
as state-owned enterprises in Egypt.  I look at the contradiction between on the one hand, cutting 
expenditures on public plants as part of the classic doctrine of the post-Washington consensus, and on 
the other hand, the virtual non-existence of discourses and practices around efficiency, meritocracy 
nor a concern over the losses EISCO was systematically making. Enterprises like EISCO with their 
political importance to the state, both as symbol of the nation and because of the regime’s fear of 
their ability to destabilise it, reflect what Kingfisher and Marovsky (2008) have called neoliberalism’s 
“limits” manifested in its “contradictions, fractures, partialities and contingencies and both its 
dialectics with and determination by other social forces” (2008, p. 119). The main question is then 
how do engineers take sides between capital and labour given the contradictions and partialities of 
governing practices? And when do they shift allegiances?  
 
To understand how engineers shift allegiances in complex situations like this, one has to go 
back to the shop-floor and examine the details of their forms of communication and behaviours that 
take place on an everyday basis. Here, I start by looking at the fabric of everyday sociality on the shop-
floor: both the joking, teasing and gossip, and the formalities and manners of respect. I suggest, 
following Bakthin and Voloshinov in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Volosinov, 1986), that 
forms of utterances and their semiotic manifestations, accompanied by mimicking, gesturing and 
acting out – or what Bakthin and Voloshinov call  signs – are “the most sensitive index of social 
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 I am grateful to Professor Stephan Feuchtwang at the LSE, who, in a comment on an earlier version of this chapter 
that was presented at the LSE, pointed out that Ong’s work has been critiqued for the reliance on Agamben’s thesis 
‘on the state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005), which assumes the total suspension of the law, but which is not very 
accurate for the case of China. The critique however, does not hold for Egypt, he astutely pointed out, partly because 
Egypt has been under Emergency Law, which suspended normal legal proceedings, since 1967, except for an 18-
month break in 1980/81, until it was suspended following the 2011 Revolution, on the 31
st
 of May 2012. 
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changes”   (Morris, 1995, p. 61) because they register “delicate, transitory, and momentary phases of 
social change” (Morris, 1995, p. 61); the changes in the making that have not yet taken a definite 
shape or developed into an ideological system.  This, they argue, has to do with the very nature of the 
sign that “reflects and refracts another reality” (Morris, 1995, p. 61) (emphasis mine). Put simply, a 
sign is not merely a symbolic representation of reality, but is constitutive of it.  Bakhtin and Voloshinov 
thus argue that a sign is “a two sided-act” which is determined “equally by whose word it is and for 
whom it is meant” (Morris, 1995, p. 55).  This  is where the agency of the speaker and the interlocutor 
exists; it is in the ability to appropriate “the two sided-act” and make it one’s own. Looking at these 
utterances and their semiotic manifestations allows us to see how the subjects are actively engaged in 
creating new realities while being equally affected by these realities. In what follows, I analyse joking 
and avoidance on the shop-floor as signs. 
 
Although joking, teasing and mockery between workers and engineers were becoming 
common, they were especially prevalent among permanent workers on the shop-floor. They took 
place mainly between maintenance and production workers or shift heads and shift workers, all of 
whom have similar status and often cooperate together, but have different roles. These groups of 
workers were in fact bound by what Radcliffe-Brown had described as a “joking relationship”, in which 
it is permitted, and in some instances required, to tease or make fun of the other, who in turn is 
required to take no offence (Radcliffe-Brown 1952, p.90). Joking relations are thus a “peculiar 
combination of friendliness and antagonism” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, p. 91). The interaction between 
engineers and workers in contrast, was largely formal. Workers were required to show respect to 
engineers, by standing up when they came, addressing them only by their title muhandis (‘engineer’), 
or even the more formal bashmuhandis, or alternatively rayyis (‘president’).  Engineers in turn 
addressed workers by their names, sometimes using titles such as Sheikh, if a man has a beard as an 
expression of piety, ʿamm (‘uncle’) if he was an older man, or ḥagg if had performed the hajj. 
Engineers did not share food with workers except on rare occasions, and were careful never to put 
their hands to the work of the latter. The interrelationship of workers and engineers is, in a sense, akin 
to an avoidance relationship. This  was eloquently expressed by one worker who said: “a worker is a 
worker and an engineer is an engineer”. 
 
Today, however, this formality is slowly being contested and engineers are gradually showing 
signs of a burgeoning joking relationship with workers, similar to that which exists among the workers 
themselves. As David Graeber suggests in Possibilities (2007), “joking relations tend to be mutual, an 
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exchange of abuse emphasising an equality of status”; in contrast, “avoidance is generally hierarchical, 
with one party inferior and obliged to pay respect” (Graeber, 2007, p. 21). He thus attempts to posit a 
“rudimentary theory of manners and a rudimentary theory of hierarchy” (Graeber, 2007, p. 14).  
Joking bodies, Graeber argues, are essentially made “out of a common substance” and “stuff flowing 
in and out” (Graeber, 2007, p. 17). In contrast, he posits, in avoidance relations “the physical body is 
itself negated and the person translated into some higher or more abstract level” (Graeber, 2007, p. 
17). Unlike the joking body, the body in avoidance is thus, he suggests, “constructed of something 
different. It is constructed out of property” (Graeber, 2007, p. 21). Graeber  follows Radcliffe- Brown in 
showing how, in avoidance, people do not share food, do not address each other by personal names, 
do not speak of sex, excretion and personal quirks, i.e. things that evoke the very person and his body. 
In this chapter I link the manners of avoidance and joking to the development of education as a type 
of property that allowed engineers to distinguish themselves from workers. I trace the implication of 
the gradual degradation of education as property over the years on everyday sociality. I compare this 
to other ways, property or social entitlements were distributed on the shop-floor and were affected 
by economic and political transformations in the plant. 
 
The power and status of engineers on the shop-floor I suggest have been gradually undermined by 
joking practices, the arrangement of time-space in the mill, the combination of spatialised neo-liberal 
and police state policies and the changes to the type of ‘property’ at the heart of the avoidance 
relation between workers and engineers. The first section in this chapter looks at joking relationships 
among permanent workers, the second traces how these joking relationships are extending to 
managers, the third revaluates managers’ position in the relations of production and the final section 
looks at engineers’ loss of status given the developments of state politics in Egypt.  
 
II. Friendship and Joking Relationships among Workers 
 
In previous chapters, I have demonstrated that although at face value the fights between 
maintenance and production represent an archetypical case of neo-liberal fragmentation of the labour 
force, workers do in fact cooperate together more than appearances would suggest; as seen in 
Shaʿban’s shift for instance, where him and maintenance adjusted the overall numbers they were 
reporting to management. I argued that this could be read also as a typical “making out” (Michael 
Burawoy, 1979) practice, which in Burawoy’s analysis helps manufacture consent on the shop-floor 
92 
 
and blinds workers to capitalist exploitation. Although I have suggested that the latter is partially true, 
chapter one has demonstrated that permanent workers’ skills and relations give them control over the 
work, which makes them more than just proletariat selling their labour power. In this chapter, I take 
the analysis a step further and explore the changing meanings and relations of work that inform the 
work experience. The antagonism followed by mutual aid that was described in chapter one- mainly 
between permanent production and maintenance workers- seems close to what Radcliffe-Brown 
called a joking relationship, which is based on a pretence of hostility within true friendship and is 
between people who are equal.  
 
The joking, for example when maintenance workers teasingly called production workers “wardiyya 
naḥs” (“an ill-omened shift”), helps fosters these friendly yet antagonistic relationships. Moreover, 
Graeber argues that the body in the domain of joking is made of a “common substance” (Graeber, 
2007, p. 21) and “bodies are apiece with the world” (Graeber, 2007, p. 21). The concept of ʿ ishra that 
workers find important to their sociality, suggests that workers were intimates. This is a very particular 
type of intimacy, which develops between people over time and becomes like the kind of relation 
where people share bodily substances by having ʿishra through blood and through sex. What the 
concept of ʿishra conveys is the element of equality and solidarity that tie primarily permanent 
workers together. Sharing the very medium of the machine, sharing of food, or simply sharing time 
allows them to deepen their ʿ ishra and friendships. Workers’ interactions were then often structured 
as joking relationships. Such relationships and the emphasis on equality they invoke were gradually 
being appropriated in the workers-engineers relations. 
 
Joking relationships are also customary among heads of shifts and the rest of the shift workers- 
most of both groups are permanent workers. Workers’ mocking of Shaʿban, the head of shift in the 
anecdote at the beginning of the chapter, was in response to his attempt to assert superiority. That 
the joking involved accusations of bringing ‘bad omen’ or focusing on Shaʿban’s evil eye is quite telling. 
As explained in chapter one, accusations of evil eye and bad omen usually arise in conditions when 
those who ought to be equal are not (Pocock, 1973) and when people appropriate personal gains at 
the expense of their community (Elyachar, 2005). Also, the joking around Shaʿban, and generally on 
the shop-floor, was very particular; it invoked the true idiosyncratic quirks of the person and was 
meant to humiliate and embarrass. It often invoked the body itself as highlighted in Radcliffe-Brown’s 
understanding of joking relationships. So, both the structure and content of the joking relationships 
constituted an attack on personal attempts to distinguish oneself from others, or in the case of 
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Shaʿban, an attack on the patronising way he ran the shift. They are, in some respect, also an attack on 
the hierarchal arrangement of the overall work structure, especially when it makes some the bosses of 
others without any material or technical differences to distinguish them. I see this attack on the 
hierarchy among workers stressing the value they accord to their equality and solidarity.  
 
During the shift mentioned in chapter one, when the steel slab kept getting tilted by ʿAbd al-
Moneim and myself, ʿUmar, the shift supervisor, said jokingly “it’s all *happening+ because people 
from Shubak are stupid”. ʿ Abd al-Moneim was from the village of Shubak near the plant and so was a 
visitor from maintenance who sat with us in the control room. “Half of this mill is from shubak, I’ll get 
them to come beat you” replied the visitor to ʿUmar. A few minutes later, ʿAbd al-Moneim  
complained that he was tired of driving (being the main operator) all day. ʿUmar then replied by 
overplaying the authoritarian tone: “well Riad [the head of shift] is sick and I have a stomach ache, I 
can’t drive because I keep going to the toilet. And then they hired you here as a driver. So you drive all 
day”. He then turned to the young workers of the shift who were also in the control room and said “if 
any of you had shown me some potential, I would have taught you to drive but you are all worthless”. 
While doing this, he hit Gasser, a young worker, with a stick. Then ʿUmar took over from ʿAbd al- 
Fattah, drove a little himself and boasted about how, compared to ʿ Abd al-Moneim(and probably me), 
he did not get any slab stuck or tilted. The rest of us quickly told him that he drove well because of 
using the brick instead of his hands. A burst of laughter ensued when we finally all agreed that the 
brick was the most skilled of all of us. ʿ Abd al-Moneim then interrupted our laughter by saying that he 
was at the end the best driver, even better than ʿUmar, because he produced no scrap and rolled all 
the slabs.  The joking that ʿUmar initiated stressed his superiority and ridiculed their lack of skills or 
character. By exaggerating the basic element of their relation - namely that he was of a better status 
because he was the shift supervisor - ʿ Umar ridiculed this very hierarchy. In turn, the responses from 
the maintenance worker, from the young workers and from Abd al-Fattah, all challenged the hierarchy 
of their relationship with ʿUmar. Invoking personal attributes, such as stupidity, using beating and 
hitting, or simply making reference to excretion and bodily fluids shows workers at peace with their 
surrounding and each other. The banter with ʿ Umar reflects both the pretence of antagonism and yet 
the true friendship that are central to joking relationships. 
 
The exchanges between ʿUmar and his shift speak to Graeber's (2007) argument that joking 
relationships are different from jokes; for example, the ones described by Douglas (1968), which 
Graeber argues are more about humour and are not structured in a way that reflects the divergent 
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and yet convergent relations nor the bodies that are sharing a common substance which characterise 
joking relationships.38 Like Graeber (2007), De Neve (2005) is also interested in how joking 
relationships are not only about humour but contribute to the production of meaning and agency in 
the workplace.39 De Neve describes how sociality in a handloom workshop in Tamilnadu is largely 
organised around friendships and solidarities, which are fostered through joking that transgresses 
castes but is largely gendered - often taking place between female and male workers and mostly 
initiated by the female workers against the male workers. The ambiguity in the analysis of these 
practices, De Neve suggests, lay in that joking does not manage to subvert dominant hierarchal and 
patriarchal values, yet is meaningful because women are able to create transgressive and critical 
spaces on the shop-floor. Inspired by De Neve, I analyse how joking and avoidance practices structure 
the workplace and give meaning to the relations between engineers and workers. 
 
III. Workers and Engineers: Joking and Avoidance  
 
When Engineer Sherif, the head of mill, arrived on the shop-floor one afternoon, his manner was a 
mixture of genuine chastisement of the workers and a more joking mocking tone, in which he told 
them they were useless and were doing ʿakk (‘a slang way to say making a mess’). ʿamm Mina, the 
head of production shift, then turned to the young temporary workers and said in a joking manner, 
“just do anything, move around and pretend that you are doing any work”. The shift became animated 
as Sheikh Fathi, the shift supervisor, and the young men went underground to clear the oxides and 
moved frantically to pretend they were working.  But ʿ Abd al-Rahman, who was known to be lazy, was 
not doing his share.  Fathi addressed the engineer from the underground area, in a clear break of 
formal manners in addressing somebody of higher status by shouting from beneath them. He told the 
engineer jokingly “please take ʿAbd al-Rahman away from this shift, he keeps saying I am related to 
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 Mary Douglas’ interest in jokes, on the other hand, derives from a focus on “the subjective character of the 
categories in which the experience is structured”(Douglas, 1968, p. 362). Instead of the focus on the form of joking like 
Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Douglas reverts to the literature by Bergson (1950)  and Freud (1916) on jokes, which see 
jokes respectively as the triumph of intuition and of spontaneity over the mechanical and encrusted, or as the triumph 
of lack of control over control (Douglas, 1968). She comes up with a hypothesis that “a joke is seen and allowed when 
it offers a symbolic pattern of a social patterning occurring at the same time” and as such argues that “all jokes are 
expressive of the social situations in which they occur”  (Douglas, 1968, p. 366). 
 
39
 De Neve (2005) writes in response to literature highlighting, like Douglas’ (1968), the subjective experience of the 
joking, teasing and flirting in ethnographies of the workplace which focus on the ‘cultural’ interpretations of flirting 
and the indeterminacy and the hesitancy of it in a given space  (Osella and Osella, 1998), or the use of joking from the 
lens of power and resistance (Fernandes, 1997; Yelvington, 1996). De Neve, (2005) however takes more seriously the 
ambiguity and ambivalence that lies at the level of production of meaning and is interested in “what joking does and 
can do, and can mean” (De Neve, 2005, p. 119) 
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Sherif and I can’t make him work”. The very use of the word ‘Sherif’, as opposed to bashmuhandis 
Sherif or rayis in addressing the engineer was a challenge to the established codes of behaviour with 
somebody of higher status, especially the highest authority in the mill. Engineer Sherif replied jokingly: 
“he’s not my relative and even if he were, I would do nothing for him”.  He then told Fathi: “I told you 
to train him as a driver on the machine to get rid of him.” Fathi then responded again teasingly “I can’t 
get him to work and you want me to train him as a driver!”  
 
In another instance, a conversation about politics in Egypt encouraged one of the workers to tell 
Engineer Sherif mockingly: “Why don’t you run for President? You’d make a great President”,  covertly 
making reference to the Engineer’s lousy managerial style.  Engineer Sherif, who was aware of the 
attempts to ridicule him, then responded jokingly: “I am clearly unable to run the shop-floor, how will 
I be able to run an entire country?!” The joking with engineers often ridiculed the fact that they had 
more status and control, while slyly alluded to their loss of competence, resourcefulness or authority. 
By addressing the engineer directly while jokingly referring to his corrupt practices in hiring people, 
workers were effectively bringing down the engineer in the eyes of everybody witnessing the 
exchange.  Although usually workers were the ‘attackers’ and engineers the ‘respondents’ in this 
relationship, the engineers sometimes also initiated these friendly attacks, for instance by calling the 
work produced ʿ akk, contributing their own stories about Shaʿban’s eye and beating workers jokingly- 
such as when Engineer Sherif teased a worker with a stick in his office40.  
 
The relationship between workers and engineers has not, however, been completely altered from 
an avoidance relationship into a joking one, nor was the hierarchy entirely subverted. Workers still 
have to address engineers by their titles and engineers still refrain from working with their hands. 
There is some resistance, especially from engineers, to these new, more informal kinds of interactions. 
For instance, Engineer ʾIbrahim Hussein’s stern reply to an attempted friendly mocking by some 
workers was: “il hizār hizār w-il gad gad” – “there is a time for humour and a time for serious work”. 
However, the minute Engineer ʾIbrahim Hussein turned his back, another worker made fun of the 
engineer’s air of seriousness by sticking his tong out at Engineer ʾ Ibrahim!  These interactions suggest 
that the hierarchal relationship, which workers argue existed in the past between workers and 
engineers, is being challenged and gradually subverted. The practices of joking, teasing and mocking 
delicately capture these incremental changes. Put differently, one could say that the joking utterances 
                                               
40
 Engineers and workers also made references to their ʿishra over the years, though not as often as workers did 
among themselves. 
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and gimmicks “reflect and refract” (Bakhtin and Volosinov, 1986  in  Morris 1995, p.61) the structural 
position of engineers in the labour hierarchy.  
 
To illustrate the changes in the engineers’ positionality, I revert to Graeber's (2007) argument that 
avoidance relations are made essentially out of property. Graeber, like most jurists and social 
scientists, sees property as a bundle of rights that enable exclusions to take place. Educational 
qualifications at EISCO, especially engineering degrees, which are considered from kuliyyāt al-qimma 
(‘the top universities’), have been such important markers of distinction that one could almost speak 
of them as a type of property. I was particularly struck during my research by the way people often 
introduced their children to me by saying: “I have engineering, literature and commerce” instead of 
introducing them by names, ages, gender or even hobbies. How marriage arrangements were highly 
organised around on one’s qualifications was also quite intriguing. Valuing educational qualifications 
was so prevalent at EISCO. Engineers’ educational qualifications were, I argue, central to the 
avoidance relation between engineers and workers. The changing social status of engineering 
education enabled workers to transgress and subvert the hierarchy of avoidance through joking with 
and teasing engineers.  
 
In thinking of educational credentials as a form of property, I follow the analytical tradition that 
defines property not only as what people own but primarily the relations of exclusions among people 
that form society itself (Sabean, 1991). I am equally influenced by Parkin (1979) who is interested in 
how credentialism enables social exclusion between groups. Parkin stresses that “it is necessary to 
regard credentialism as a form of social closure comparable in its importance for class formation to 
the institution of property” (1979, p. 58).  His claim: “both entail the use of exclusionary rules that 
confer benefits and privileges on the few through denying access to the many, rules that are 
enshrined by law and upheld by the coercive authority of the state” (Parkin, 1979, p. 58).  Weber's 
(1964) classical work then links how educational qualifications establish social classes. Weber looks at 
the different forms of classes shared by people who occupy the same class status based on property, 
acquisitions, or what he calls social classes. Among the different groups constituting the latter, Weber  
includes “the intelligentsia without independent property and the persons whose social position is 
dependent primarily on the technical training, such as engineers, commercial and other officials and 
civil servants” in addition to “the classes occupying a privileged position through property or 
education” (Weber, 1964, p. 427).  
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Thus, inspired by Weber’s focus on social classes, Parkin (1979) examines the development of 
professionalism in relation to credentialism. Parkin argues that the development of credentialism is a 
way for professionals to limit the supply side of labour by raising the standard level of entry, thus 
restricting the positions to and monopolising them by owners of educational certificates.  The greater 
dependence on credentials as a precondition of professional candidature is often justified by the 
growing complexity of the tasks to be performed and thus the need for stricter tests to assess 
individual capacities. This justification however, is deceitful. The seminal study by Berg Education and 
Jobs: The great training robbery (1973) leads Parkin to argue that Berg “was able to turn up no 
evidence to show that variations in the level of formal education were matched by variations in the 
quality of work performance”. Berg’s conclusion, in line with Weber’s, is that credentials are accorded 
their present importance largely because they simplify and legitimate the exclusionary process 
(Parkin, 1979).  
 
Credentials are hence often given on the basis of tests that measure qualities and attributes 
related to one’s class rather than practical skills and capacities that may not easily be transferred 
through the family line. Bourdieu and Passeron in The Inheritors (1979) have reached a similar 
conclusion when they examined educational qualifications from the perspective of private property 
that the French bourgeoisie restricts to its offspring, often through tests and examinations that 
depend highly on one’s upbringing and class background.  Bourdieu and Passeron analyse how these 
examinations create educational inequalities that are often less visible, for example,  in “the 
relegation of the working class or lower-middle-class students to certain disciplines, or the fact that 
they fall behind and mark time in their progress through school” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979, p. 2).41  
Accordingly, Parkin (1979) finds that those who stretch property ownership to include both cultural 
capital and productive capital, like Berg (1973) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1979), refer to education 
as property.  Berg, for example asserts that “educational credentials have become the new property in 
America” (Berg, 1973, p. 183). While the  theoretical discussion on the relation between cultural and 
productive capital to conceptions of property is beyond the scope of this thesis, and deserves further 
research in the future, these considerations highlight the centrality of educational credentials to 
hierarchal and class  positions, in a way that makes it function ‘almost like a property’.  
                                               
41
 Credentialism as an occupational closure functions through those in possession of a specific qualification, who are 
then considered fit to provide the relevant skills and services for the remaining of their professional lives.  Parkin 
concludes that occupational closure based on qualifications, unlike for example closure by skilled workers against 
exploitation by an employer - which is not necessarily aimed at reducing the material opportunities of other members 
of the labour force - is based on establishing “monopoly over specific forms of knowledge and practice, in order to win 
legal protection from lay interference”- and  is thus most importantly a “conflict concealed from the lay public”(Parkin, 
1979, p. 57). 
98 
 
The managerial hierarchy at EISCO mills was organised around educational credentials.  While 
engineers standardly hold five year engineering degrees from universities, workers hold at most a 
three year diploma from a technical secondary school. Engineers were therefore made managers on 
the assumption that they had the technical education needed to run the plant. I suggest that the 
educational qualifications informing the managerial hierarchy became such salient means of exclusion 
between both groups at EISCO because- unlike other ethnographic locales, for example Sanchez 
(2011) where managers are from different regions, or in the case of De Neve (2005), where managers 
are largely males and workers largely females- at EISCO there was general homogeneity among 
workers and engineers.  This cultural homogeneity reduces the claims that people can use to 
distinguish themselves and exclude others. Workers and engineers at EISCO shared largely the same 
ethnicity, gender, age, and importantly, family background. In fact four engineers on our shop-floor 
had been workers themselves, and studied further while at EISCO to become engineers.42  Engineer 
Hamza and Engineer Wael, like many in the plant were both sons of workers. This was prevalent 
across the plant, where an engineer would actually have a brother, father or uncle who is a worker. 
Likewise in Syria the ‘intermedium strata’ often had origins in either the ‘peasantry’ or ‘petty 
bourgeoisie’, which brought them closer to workers, especially those who share the same peasant 
background (Longuenesse 1979). This was also common at EISCO, where, for instance, an influential 
head of mill I interviewed had originally been the son of a peasant who had received a small piece of 
land through the land reforms initiated by Nasser. Strikingly, engineers at EISCO also did not earn 
more than workers. In fact, senior workers sometimes earned double an engineer’s salary. So, the 
social and economic background of engineers has given them very few claims for distinction between 
them and workers. In this context, educational qualifications became a major source of differentiation 
at EISCO. 
 
Until 1984 in Egypt, the state was responsible for hiring all graduates, thus creating what 
Moore termed “a price list for school certificates and diplomas” (Moore, 1980, p. 40), where “the 
particular certificates entitled a person to a certain salary and grade in government service 
irrespective of the nature of the work or his ability to perform the tasks assigned” (Harbinson and 
Ibrahim, 1958 p. 106 in Moore, 1980 p. 40). Education enabled engineers to secure a permanent 
contract at EISCO and promised the possibility of moving upward in the managerial strata to join the 
vanguard group of engineers that had run the state for a good part of Egypt’s history. Engineer Sherif, 
                                               
42
 The possibility that workers further their studies in order to become engineers came to a halt in the plant in the 
early 1990’s. 
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our head of mill, remembers receiving three different taklīf (‘job appointments from the state’) at the 
time of his graduation; two were in the prestigious petroleum and steel sectors and he had the chance 
to try both before choosing the steel plant. But even when the practice of state allocation of jobs was 
abolished, engineering education continued being attractive to students (Moore, 1980). In fact, Moore 
(1980) found that although many engineers in Egypt were of working class origins, the majority were 
originally from bourgeois families, and engineering became a preferred occupation of the upper 
classes, especially when it appeared as a way of securing top positions in the regime. This trend, 
Moore argues, has helped sustain the attraction of engineering universities among Egyptians, even 
when they were producing more graduates than were needed for industrialisation. Until today then, 
people in Egypt distinguish between kuliyyāt al-qimma (‘the top schools’) - which encompass 
engineering, medicine, pharmacy and computer science, and demand the highest results in placement 
exams - and the rest of universities, which a worker eloquently described as kuliyyāt al-shaʿb (‘the 
peoples’ schools’).  
 
Moore warned, however, that with the increase of engineering graduates over the years “the 
downward mobile may become as numerous as those who are fortunate enough to keep their 
families’ bourgeois status” (Moore, 1980, p. 15). I read Nasser’s policies as offering a brief opportunity 
for ‘education as property’ to be expanded to a wider pool than the bourgeois group it used to be 
restricted to until 1952. But as graduates increased and jobs dwindled, the distinction between those 
who are able to go to top schools and those who went to ‘the people’s schools’ prevailed again. 
Engineers of poorer background aspiring to become bourgeois thus could not capitalise on their 
education as a form of property. The dreams and aspirations that this education had fostered became 
inaccessible. Most notably, transmitting the property of their education to future generations turned 
to be almost impossible.  
 
In the coil rolling mill, out of the five engineers I surveyed, all had children in universities, but 
only two had made it into the ‘top universities’ while the other three had children in ‘kuliyyāt al-
shaʿab’. Interestingly, the earlier two were also land-owning engineers, one of whom indicated clearly 
selling the land to finance his children’s education. On the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, of the seven 
engineers I surveyed, only three had children of university age; one of whom only had a son that 
graduated from military school, which is considered of equal prestige like the top universities. Again, 
this engineer also indicated that he owned land. The other two engineers sent their children to 
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kuliyyāt’ al-shaʿab, even when one of them was land-owning.43 The final engineer had an unemployed 
son. This anecdotal evidence illustrates how engineers of poorer background struggled to continue 
transmitting their property to their children. Other types of property, for example,  workers’ skills, 
which were protected by permanent contracts, became more relevant and important for distinctions 
on the shop-floor. Most importantly, for the engineers at EISCO, education had lost its status for two 
reasons: the first had to do with the change of technology in the plant and the second, to be discussed 
in the next section, due to the inability of qualifications to guarantee upward mobility in the plant. 
 
  ‘amm Mina, a head of shift, once said to me “back in the old days, engineers used to give us 
training in their specialisation as well as general training”. He then added “there is nobody to give us 
training today because we understand the machinery better than the engineers”.  With the plant’s old 
and worn-out machinery, knowledge acquired through technical engineering education was no longer 
needed to run the shop-floor, rather a very sophisticated type of skill that develops through working 
manually on makeshift alternatives over the years was more in demand.   In other words, we are 
seeing almost the reverse of the static, import-substituted technology that helped consolidate 
engineers’ status in the 1950’s-1970’s to a rapidly changing one that requires ingenuity in production. 
This rapidly changing technological climate is not due to advances in technological innovations but 
rather emerges with the deterioration of the old machinery, which does not allow engineers to 
consolidate their status in relation to a body of knowledge they have mastered.  Engineers have thus 
lost the tangible claims for their managerial positions. In contrast, most workers had worked for 
twenty to forty years on the same shop-floor. They had mastered skills or expertise (‘khibra’) that they 
took great pride in and which allowed them to control most technical matters related to work. 
 
Engineers and workers were also becoming social equals given the time they had spent at the 
plant over the years. Having worked at EISCO for sometimes up to fourty years, some workers were 
more senior than the engineers, and earned more than the letter (sometimes even more than general 
managers). In addition, workers recalled how they feared the “engineers of the past”. A couple had 
exaggerated stories of how, in order to make a complaint, they had to write it down on a piece of 
paper and give it to the engineers.  The logic used by Sheikh Islam, a foreman in the furnace area, to 
explain why he couldn’t boss workers any longer, could be extended to engineers and workers. Sheikh 
                                               
43
 As for workers, out of the 30 workers surveyed on the coil mill, 3 had children, who made it to the top universities 
and, similarly, of the 74 workers surveyed on Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill only 3 had children who were at the top 
universities. This testifies, even if anecdotally, to the difficulty of those who are not already of bourgeois background 
to acquire credentials, which enable class exclusions.  
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Islam, put it most eloquently when he said “zamān Raʾīs el wardiya kān līh kilma, lakin lamā el 
kawānīn itghayarit sāwit kuluh bibaʿduh”- “Back in those days, the head of shift had a say in things. 
But when the laws changed, it made everybody equal.” This however, he added, also happened 
“automatically”. “I was the boss of a man who was 18 years old and used to tell me the story of his life 
in order for me to approve his holiday. Now he is 45 and knows me and knows the work, so it is hard 
for me to be his boss”.  The hierarchy that Sheikh Islam spoke of was related to age and generation. 
The halt of recruitment of new employees between 1991 and 2007, in order to reduce EISCO’s labour 
force, meant that most workers and engineers were in the same age bracket, between 40 to 60 years 
old- apart from the temporary group that had just joined EISCO in 2007. Age and generational 
struggles, or more accurately their absence, in the case of EISCO, have contributed to the way material 
gains and managerial hierarchies are experienced and expressed on the shop-floor. At EISCO this 
brought engineers and workers together.  
 
Furthermore, with the decentralisation of management following the change to the public 
enterprises laws in 1991, engineers became directly involved in managing everyday affairs such as 
authorising vacations, holidays and sick leave in addition to the strictly technical aspects of the plant. 
These tasks were previously undertaken by the central administration in the plant with the help of 
senior workers, particularly the foremen.  With the cancellation of bonus pay in 2008 to cut spending, 
none of the senior workers wanted to be a foreman. Engineers had to plead workers to take up the 
position. The position entailed more responsibility without an increase in pay; in fact the ‘promotion’ 
entailed a reduction in pay because a worker would forego the incentive pay for rotating shifts to join 
the managerial group, who worked on a normal day shift. This left engineers with more 
responsibilities to run the everyday affairs of the shop-floor but with nobody to mediate their 
relations when confrontations occurred.  Engineer Hamza told me that since Tawfik, the foreman, 
retired, he had found managing the work very difficult.  When conflicts occurred he said, “Kunt 
baṣadarluhum Tawfik” - (“I used to put Tawfik to the forefront to face them”). Now, he says, he has to 
face them himself.  
 
The cancellation of the monthly bonus pay, which engineers used to allocate to workers based 
on their production every month, left engineers with no alternative but to administer pay cuts to 
manage workers. The latter inevitably viewed these unfavourably as an attempt to cut off their 
livelihood.  Most often workers referred to this as a cut to a worker’s rizq (‘sustenance given by God’), 
and that of his children, and thus exerted a moral pressure on engineers to not administer these pay 
102 
 
cuts, because “nobody should cut out what God has given man”. The engineers themselves were very 
reluctant to make these pay cuts. Engineer ʾ Ibrahim, for example, explained how the entire shop-floor 
would come begging him not to give the pay cut and everybody from the baladiyyāt (‘those who share 
same neighbourhood or come from the same home village’) of that worker would plead him, or send a 
union representative who is also their baladiyyāt to ask the engineer to change his position. Engineer 
Hamza, who was more sympathetic to a general theory about rizq, gave in to the pressure.  
 
Similarly some ethnographers of Muslim countries have suggested that Islamic discourses and 
practices of piety shape industrial regimes. Rudnyckyj (2005) argues that problems of development in 
a public Indonesian steel factory, which were cast in the past in technical and infrastructural 
knowledge terms, are today “increasingly being posed as an ethical problem and religious reform as its 
solution” (Rudnyckyj, 2005, p. 4). Rudnyckyj highlights the use of the proverb, al ʿ amal ʿ ibāda, (‘work is 
worship’), which is recurrently employed in Egypt too. He explains that the proverb is increasingly 
used by managers and workers in the plant in order to link efficiency to economic development by 
introducing a combination of entrepreneurial and religious arguments. In contrast, in Turkey, Sugur 
and Nicholas (2004) show that the same expression was used by workers in car factories, who were 
well aware of their managers' secular orientation and their reluctance to allocate prayer breaks to 
workers. Shehata (2009) however, cites prayer breaks as one of the ways workers made out (Burawoy, 
1979) by attempting to accrue more time to rest before praying. Shehata compares the increased 
religiosity on the shop-floor to white collars' secular and rational approaches to religion, and suggests 
that the proliferation in the use of religion by blue collar workers was often in reaction to managers' 
attitudes. But local and regional religious beliefs structure workers' lives beyond the dichotomy of 
resistance and consent to managers. They should therefore be analysed in the context of other 
aspects of workers' lives, as I have attempted to demonstrate with the use of the idiom of rizq, before 
jumping to the conclusion that they represent either workers' resistance or consent to working.  
 
The loss of authority of the engineers was also expressed in a nuanced manner with a 
gendered distinction. Workers often said the managers were ḍuʿāf (‘weak’) – a term that  plays on the 
reference made to someone who is sexual impotent , as ‘da’if (‘weak in singular form’);  thus 
expressing their sense of superiority to engineers, whom they viewed as not masculine enough, in a 
gendered language. The very fact that engineers never worked with their hands, perhaps as a sign of 
avoidance relation, was often alluded to slyly as a sign of engineers’ resemblance to women. This 
103 
 
became more overtly stated when I was on the shop-floor, as it was always me (a female) and the 
engineers who were standing there without putting their hands to work. 
 
Left with no pay cuts, no bonus pay and nobody to mediate their relations with workers, engineers 
at EISCO had lost more managerial powers on the shop-floor in the face of the workers’ growing 
power. The increase in workers’ power, it should be noted, was also related to the nature of their 
contracts in the plant. Not only were these contracts permanent, making it difficult to dismiss 
workers, but the contracts were almost made to bequeath to workers’ children. In addition, they also 
enabled the protection of workers’ skill and their growing control over the shop-floor. In many 
protests by public employees in Egypt today, giving priority to workers’ children in employment comes 
up as one of the formal protest demands. A similar trend is observed by (Parry, n.d.) at the Bihlai Steel 
Plant in India. He finds contracts to be exchangeable on the market and argues that they are also 
developing into a quasi-property right.  While the coming chapters discuss how contracts developed 
into a form a property among EISCO permanent workers, it is enough to highlight here how 
permanent contracts are important to the balance of power on the shop-floor between workers and 
engineers. 
 
IV. Mushkilat ʾidāra (‘A Management Problem’) 
 
In a formal interview with Engineer Sherif, he told me how the CEO was utterly tyrannical. His 
argument was that work “depended on the man, not on targets”. Engineer Sherif said the CEO only 
listened to and took advice from people who were his allies- but who were not necessarily competent-
, that he sent around spies to check on work in different mills, allowed no room for disagreements, 
and depended largely on ḥilūl ʾirtigāliya (‘improvised solutions’) in work. From what I could see this 
was largely true.  Engineer Sherif had reached the conclusion that “il mushkila mushkilet ʾ idāra” (“the 
problem was a management problem”). This very same sentence was then repeated when Engineer 
Sherif accused ʿAlaa, a permanent production worker, of rolling the steel with the wrong cold 
temperature. ʿAlaa was furious, and added that the problem was that “il ʾidāra bitsmaʿ” -
“management here listens”. He believed management listened to people’s claims instead of checking 
the facts.  
 
In most conversations both workers and engineers related the problem of management to some 
unidentifiable hummā (‘they’), or sometimes huwa (‘he’). With time I realised that neither I nor my 
104 
 
interlocutors really knew who these “he” and “they” really meant. The very vague category 
‘management’, which people in management themselves seemed to blame, was the closest 
approximation to this tyrannical and unidentifiable force, representative perhaps of the state or even 
Mubarak himself, that the CEO seemed to personify at times. 
 
The arrogant and authoritarian character of the CEO, who ran the plant from 2005-2010, indeed 
contributed to the repression and tightening of control on workers. But it was not only the CEO’s 
temperament that made everybody in the plant turn against him and the vague category of hummā 
that he represented.  By leaving many managerial positions deliberately empty and re-hiring retired 
managers that he personally favoured as  ‘consultants’, the CEO had restricted the promotions of 
engineers to higher ranks. By doing so, he could no longer sustain the engineers’ and overall 
management’s support for the neo-liberal project. The engineers favoured by the CEO were also given 
additional perks and pay by heading useless ‘committees’ he had created to run side projects.  So, in 
2009, seven out of nine positions of heads of mills were left un-filled and were instead occupied by 
consultants. Across the plant, many general management positions were left similarly unallocated. 
This seemed the single most tyrannical aspect of Egyptian employment strategy: when people were 
struggling for jobs at the bottom, the ones at the top kept theirs indefinitely. No wonder then that 
most post January 25th 2011 labour protests Egypt-wide demand to rid plants of consultants.  
 
The promotion to managerial positions was decided upon by the CEO, the board members and the 
Administrative Supervisory Authority in Cairo. In addition, the CEO of the plant was required to 
become the head of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party in al-Tibbin before he could assume his 
responsibilities. This meant that many who deserved upgrades did not get them simply because they 
were not in the good books of the CEO, and others for political or personal reasons. Even worse, some 
engineers, like engineer Wael on the shop-floor, were left on probation for two years. Their incentive 
pay was then reduced because one’s incentive pay decreases as the person moves from a shop-floor 
position to an office one. Until the new post was ratified, one did not get the pay rise appropriate for 
the new job. Many thus suffered prolonged pay cuts with the ‘promotions’. 
 
In some respect, the engineers’ failure to fulfil their expectations of upward social mobility, which 
was a major reason for getting an engineering education and becoming employed at EISCO, largely 
contributed to turning engineers against the CEO. To use Weberian terms, in terms of class status, 
engineers were not fulfilling one important element; that is they did not achieve “subjective 
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satisfaction”. Rather they were “frustrated” as individuals and as a group (Weber, 1964, p. 424).  If 
workers’ ultimate goal in joining the plant was attaining permanent employment, engineers’ ultimate 
goal was not only the permanent employment, but the aspiration to become a bourgeois by holding 
top-ranking positions in the state owned plant. This however was not materialising under the current 
configuration of power at EISCO. 
 
This power structure rendered engineers and managers largely sympathetic to their supervisees’ 
demands. The head of the industrial relations department, for example, seemed to invent new ways 
to compensate workers and still work under the CEO’s austerity regulations; for example, by giving his 
supervisees their overtime pay under the guise of other items because the CEO had stopped 
approving overtime, or by inventing new titles for office workers to compensate them for their 
overwork when the CEO refused to hire new ones. On the shop-floor, the head of sections told a 
worker to whom the CEO had administered a pay cut that he knew it was not the workers’ fault, but 
that there was little he could do to prevent the CEO’s arbitrary decision. Instead, he blamed Shaʿban 
for involving ‘outsiders’ in the situation when the engineers of the mill were prepared to cover up for 
it internally. The solidarities in the plant between engineers and workers were, in a sense, an attempt 
to cope with both pervasive neo-liberal cuts and an overbearing repressive police state that not only 
dispossessed workers, as the standard literature on neoliberalism has it, but also disfranchised large 
categories of management.  One day, Engineer Jospeh said, rather prophetically: “I’ll tell you one 
single thing for your research. The biggest problem here is bad management. In the whole country, 
management does not exist…” and then, pointing his finger towards the ceiling, he continued, “and it 
needs to be blown, from the very top up there!” 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter started with utterances and behaviours that communicate delicate social changes at 
EISCO. These gestures, viewed as signs (Bakhtin and Volishinov, 1986 in Morris, 1995) help us see the 
changing work relations, especially the hierarchical relations between shop-floor managers and 
workers during the neo-liberal years. I have shown that while engineers and workers were, for most of 
the plant’s history, bound by a hierarchical relationship of avoidance and of extreme respect, today 
this is largely contested by practices of joking, mockery, teasing and open gossip, and is in fact slowly 
being subverted. 
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  I have proposed that this change is related to the trajectory of neo-liberal developments in 
Egypt’s public industry under an authoritarian regime.  EISCO was not an ‘exception to neoliberalism’ 
in the midst of ‘neo-liberal exceptions’. Rather, both logics were at work within the same time-space. 
State politics and logics are therefore central to the configurations of capitalism, which suggests that 
we need to go beyond the thesis of ‘neo-liberalism as exception’ to learn more how neo-liberal 
ideologies are upheld in authoritarian contexts.  
 
  At EISCO, I have argued, engineers lost their power and prestige and became complicit with 
workers in plotting against the spending cuts and the tyranny of the state represented by the plant’s 
CEO. How the logics of both neo-liberalism and the state were appropriated and how people 
experienced time and space on the shop-floor were largely behind these new structures of power. In 
public enterprises, management in particular is a difficult category to situate in terms of social class; 
this chapter suggests an exploration into how and why it shifts sides. Starting from a thesis on joking, 
avoidance and property, I have shown that at EISCO, an engineering education that once enabled its 
possessors to position themselves at the top of a social hierarchy, and was thus, in effect, a form of 
property relation, has lost status due to the deterioration of technology and the limits to engineers’ 
social mobility imposed by Mubarak’s repressive state. Engineering education was thus in turn 
contested a source of distinction.  I have also suggested that permanent contracts are developing into 
something similar to a property right. A rigorous exploration into forms of property that exist and 
compete on the shop-floor helps us explore, from the bottom up, how the class struggle at EISCO is 
informed by different, and perhaps, competing claims to property that lie in the control of work 
through skills, tacit knowledge and education.  
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Chapter Three: "We Are Like Father and Son”: Kinship on the Shop-floor 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It is Saturday morning, the start of the working week at EISCO. At 7:10 a.m. sharp the company bus 
picks me up from round the corner of my house. The journey to the plant takes an hour and twenty five 
minutes exactly. The journey’s rituals, which will be repeated with precision over the year I spent inside 
EISCO, now begin. I get on the fourteen seater bus making sure to remember to balance the number of 
times this week I use the more secular salutation, ṣabāḥ al-khayr (‘good morning’), which the two 
Christian engineers at the back of the bus always reply to whole-heartedly, and the more commonly 
used salutation these days, originating from the Islamic tradition, al-salām ʿalykum (‘peace be upon 
you’). My eyes quickly search for the seat allocated to me next to the female physician. Unlike workers’ 
buses, which are lively with conversations, chitchat and men reciting from the Quran, management’s 
buses are more quiet and reserved44. It takes ten more minutes for our collective morning nap to begin. 
 
At 8:35, we arrive at EISCO. We wake up one by one as the bus driver makes a brief tour of the plant 
dropping each person at their respective department. My eyes open to the plant’s streets animated 
with workers from the night shift walking towards bus stops and others from the morning shift getting 
off buses and advancing towards the mills and production shops. The mood is relaxed.  The crowds, 
mostly of men and carrying their meal, or what is left of it in a plastic bag, stroll, greet each other and 
chat. Some men are wearing their galābiyya, which are long traditional dresses worn by men especially 
in rural areas, and others wear shirts and pants. The diversity reflects EISCO’s location between rural 
and urban landscapes. But it is really the distinction between the younger generation of workers and 
the older one that captures my attention right away, again and again.  The striking contrast between 
dark hair and skinny bodies, and grey hair and large bellies is un-mistakable. The presence of islands of 
blue jeans and colourful red, pink, and purple T-shirts in the midst of the more classic kaki and pastel 
coloured strapped wide shirts, regular pants and galābiyyas is captivating, especially at a plant like 
EISCO, which comes across as old and neglected, if not haunted.  
  
Inaugurated by President Gamal Abdul Nasser in 1958 and later expanded with the help of Soviet 
expertise in the 1970’s, EISCO’s construction maintains a very distinct socialist realist architectural style 
                                               
44
  Buses are divided between larger, sixty seats ones for workers and young engineers and small fourteen seats ones 
are for middle management. Upper management travels with company cars, each three top managers in one car. 
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reflecting its historical origins. With little renovation taking place over the years, the plant feels 
sometimes frozen in time. The rusted fences, dusty buildings, white paint turned yellow, scrap and old 
spare-parts laying in open spaces between mills, old Lada cars and worn out buses roaming around 
producing fumes and noise, analogue phones, piling paperwork and endless archiving folders- 
sometimes dating from 1980s- occupying desk spaces, manual tools on shop-floors, worn-out furniture 
and old fonts used in motivational billboard signs across the plant all too often speak to how old this 
place appears. It is with this background in mind that the presence of young workers, with their not-so-
grim facial expressions and quick walking pace, cannot go unnoticed amidst the majority of older 
workers in an old plant. The contrast between old and new generations of workers raises the question 
of how the new generations of young workers come to inhabit the plant and make of it their 
workplace; how their presence alters the way work is run every day in the different departments, mills 
and shop-floors, and what kind of relations ensue between both young and old generations.   
 
The political background behind the recruitment of young workers at EISCO makes their story even 
more compelling. New workers are at the heart of the neo-liberal reform program, which the Egyptian 
state officially embarked upon since the early 1990’s. The enactment of a new labour law in April 2003 
enabled public sector enterprises to recruit temporary workers (ʿimāla muʾaqatta) on fixed-term 
contracts, usually ranging between six months to one year. This is a break from the way public 
companies operated since their inception in the mid 1950’s. By offering lifetime work contracts, public 
sector companies guaranteed their employees stability in economic and life conditions and earned the 
public sector its widespread appeal among Egyptians. The new labour law hence marks a shift in state 
policy towards more flexible work relations and cheaper labour in manning the state enterprises. 
Added to the ‘official’ generation of young workers, I hasten to add, is an unaccounted for army of 
reserve labour of daily contract workers, mostly of young men, who started working at the plant 
following the introduction of fixed-term temporary contracts. The young men, who found getting a 
fixed-term temporary contract at EISCO increasingly difficult as the competition for jobs increased and 
the need for strong wāsta (‘connections’) became inevitable, were encouraged to work on a daily wage 
as an unofficial entry point to the plant. 45  Daily workers are expected to prove themselves at work 
and within ‘a few’ months- which often last between three to four months up to two years- secure a 
temporary fixed term-contract, without having to go through the tedious and hopeless process of 
                                               
45
  The Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic defines wāsta as ‘one who deploys influence on another’s behalf and acts as an 
intermediary’(Hinds and Badawi 1987) . It is also used in the common sense of ‘connections’, which, for ease of 
translation, I will use throughout the text. 
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officially applying for a job at EISCO. Chapter four in this thesis elaborates on the work and life 
situation of daily workers at EISCO. Daily workers aspire to secure a temporary contract, which would 
eventually be turned into a permanent contract one day. Temporary workers hope to secure the same 
end but a lot faster. Permanent work contracts were the ultimate desire of both groups. A ministerial 
decree annexed to the new labour law stipulating that temporary contract be turned into permanent 
ones following three years of consecutive work in the same enterprise helped channel these hopes and 
the desires for work stability. 
 
But EISCO only opened its doors for new workers in 2007. New workers, according to official plant 
recruitment regulations, cannot be older than twenty six years old. The presence of new blood in the 
plant was largely welcomed by workers and management given that for sixteen years, from 1991 to 
2007, EISCO, like most of the public sector in Egypt, stopped recruiting new workers and introduced an 
early-retirement package to facilitate the laying off of the old, and more expensive, generations of 
workers. The state’s attempt to reduce the size of the plant over the years left it, according to the 
narrative of workers and engineers, with dire labour shortages by 2006. One of the engineers even 
described workers and management at this stage as being Sharqānīn (‘parched for’) new workers. 
EISCO's labour force, which in 1990 had totalled 25,062 and by end of 2006, prior to the recruitment of 
new workers, had been slimmed down to 12,759 workers- largely through a halt of new recruitment, 
normal retirements, sick leaves and a limited group of 'voluntary' early retirement- had lost almost half 
of its labour force in sixteen years. This sixteen years gap between permanent workers and new 
temporary workers, as the chapter highlights, largely affected the labour process at EISCO and the 
relation between what became divided as old and young groups of workers. 
 
In this chapter, I suggest that one way to understand how young and old workers live the changes 
brought with the new labour law is to start from the relation between both groups, which workers on 
both sides, represent as a ‘father and son relationship’. The different ways in which this father and son 
relationship manifests itself on the shop-floors of EISCO helps to clarify how neo-liberal policies, which 
are devised on the macro-level, are experienced, translated and made meaning of in everyday life. It 
thus illuminates how the interaction between specific policies and life conditions and personal and 
family aspirations, produce new ways of organising work and a constant re-fashioning of the values 
that people hold.  Looking at the idioms of relatedness, which workers deploy in their everyday 
interactions, is expressive of the specific moral obligations, exchanges and work relations into which 
such idioms compel workers. In his study of a small urban industry in Tamilnadu in India, De Neve 
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(2008) examines management’s use of kinship idioms – the “we are all relatives” discourse- to 
generate workers’ cooperation. De Neve (2008) looks at why such a project fails in the light of an 
unstable work structure and the collapse of employer and managers’ relations in a small scale industry. 
His argument builds on the delineation by Bloch (1971) of the moral and tactical meanings of kinship 
terms and his suggestion that we first look at the moral aspect of kinship, with the values and 
expectations it implies, and then observe the way it is used strategically by different actors.  
 
As different groups of workers explained to me at various points, a father and son relation is meant 
to project respect and physical support from the sons to their fathers and mentoring and care from 
fathers to sons. Based on these moral assumptions, workers highlight how older workers’ exchange of 
their khibra (‘technical expertise’) in return for young workers’ manual work is a core component of 
their father and son relation on the shop-floor. However, the idolisation of this relationship by both 
young and old workers and the use of explanations that imply the equal exchange of expertise for 
manual work ought to be taken with a grain of salt, given the complex interactions real fathers and 
sons experience on the shop-floors and the unequal exchange of manual work and expertise between 
both groups. A closer look at the recruitment methods of young workers and the kind of everyday 
politics that the claims to a 'father and son relationship' enable at the plant today, could explain why 
this idiom of relatedness nevertheless has such widespread appeal among workers across the plant. 
 
II. Kinship and Work on the Shop-floor 
 
 The use of kinship idioms on the shop-floor to control the workforces is widespread in many 
work places across the world.  Kondo (1990) for example, looks at the idiom of ‘the company as family’ 
in a small family-owned Japanese factory. Kondo investigates how this idiom is practiced in a variety of 
ways on the shop-floor by different actors.  She highlights “the strategic appropriations, political 
deployments, ironic twists, and subtle nuances in the peregrinations of an idiom, as it creates and 
constrains people’s lives within the Sato factory and without” (1990, p. 161). Kondo shows how the 
use of familism in large enterprises of heavy industries originated with ideologies of paternalism that 
used notions of the “beautiful customs” of “traditional” Japan in response to labour unrest. The overt 
use of kinship references helped portray labour unions as unnecessary given the paternalistic care of 
the employer for the employee. The metaphor of company as family was also used, she highlights, by 
managers to assert more direct control over their workforce and to take power away from the labour 
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boss contractors, who had been intermediaries between both groups. 
 
In the case of EISCO idioms of relatedness are used by the intermediaries, i.e. the permanent 
workers, in order to maintain their control over work on the shop-floor. By using references to a 
paternal relationship with temporary workers, permanent workers, who were often acting as the 
representatives of capital on the shop-floor, however, helped satisfy senior management's ambition of 
buying the support of the workforce for the increased repression of political freedoms and neoliberal 
reforms. But 'company as family' Kondo explains, is not just a discourse of managers. Kondo highlights 
how “workers stressed their claims to full membership and belonging to the firm in an idiom of 
familisim” and argues that “T.C smith also demonstrates workers’ appropriations of the familial idiom, 
which emphasises their ‘right to benevolence’ (1988)” (1990, p. 161).  What later became known as 
the “Japanese employment system” was forged, she argues, through complex negotiations among 
managers, the government, and workers. Similarly throughout her ethnography of the small factory 
she highlights not only how different actors appropriate 'factory as family' differently, but also how 
they do it differently in various contexts and for a variety of political ends.  She looks at how for 
example permanent workers and temporary workers made sense of this idiom differently, for  
instance, the latter, claimed company trips as a right given their membership in 'the family'. At EISCO, 
temporary workers' willingness to adopt the idiom of 'fathers and sons', despite it enabling their 
ongoing exploitation, was also often used strategically in order to advance their position by 
management by being the protégés of permanent workers. 
 
 The moral claims, which different workers both stress and discount in emphasising group 
membership and conceptions of workers' statuses are thus important to the way work is structured. In 
the Sheffield steel factory studied by Mollona (2005a) younger casual and older organised workers 
judge each other differently. The younger ones see the old ones as capitalists' yes men, who advocate 
management's interest and care primarily about the machines. The older workers however, see the 
machines as an extension of their bodies, and consider younger labourers' lack of affection with their 
machines and their jobs as a sign of their greed and moral and physical incompetence. In Mollona's 
ethnographic context, the material differences among workers are discussed in terms of attitudes to 
machinery and generational struggles. Similarly, I analyse how the differences in life opportunities and 
status on the shop-floor between permanent and temporary workers is discussed in terms of a 
generational relation that highlight their actual connections as people related by ties of kinship and yet 
their disconnections as workers of different status.  
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Haynes (2000)  looks at how the kinship idiom of the industry being like a family in the past was 
ubiquitous in two centres of the textile industry in India- Surat and Bihwandi. He finds the views of 
history of the industry as a family to affect workers and managers' perception of the present 
conditions of the industry, the way work relations were conceived of collectively, and the very 
expectations for the future. He takes interest in how such nostalgic memories enable workers to 
contest the present and undertake small tasks of resistance. Like Kondo (1990), Haynes shows how the 
concept itself of ghar, ('family'), proved to be “a malleable one re-interpreted in a wide variety of ways 
by persons in different social situations, each way with significant ramifications for their views of the 
past”(Haynes, 2000, p. 143). At EISCO, the 'father and son' idiom was deployed and interpreted in 
multiple ways in order to suggest, at times, the authority of older workers over the younger workers, 
but at other times the element of care and trust. The many facets of the idiom of 'fathers and sons' 
thus enabled workers to interpret it differently and to channel it towards advancing their interests and 
meeting their desires for recognition, social mobility and control over work. 
 
The prevalence of the idiom of 'father and son' in a place where patriarchy is often considered a 
'cultural trait' risks obfuscating how specific factory policies and wider economic and social conditions, 
re-produce patriarchal norms. It is thus important to contextualise factory policies here in order not to 
revert to ahistorical and acultural explanations that assume that the patriarchal family form is a given 
in Middle East societies and reproduces itself in a vacuum separate from the economic and political 
situations that surround it (Doumani, 2003). In India, a place where patriarchy is also pervasive, 
Fernandes (1997) shows how employment and positioning on the shop-floor is contingent on 
patronage relations with male kin in the Jute Mills in Calcutta. The conclusion she makes is that the 
labour market is therefore, shaped by this patriarchal route to employment, which implicitly restricts 
women's access to factory work. De Neve's ethnography (2008) also shows how patriarchy does not 
take a single form and is not static, but could itself become a discourse that arranges workers into 
different relations.  The chapter similarly focuses on factory recruitment and employment policies and 
how, in their interaction with the locality, they re-produce patriarchal behaviours inside and outside 
the factory.  
 
The focus on kinship in the idiom that permanent and temporary workers chose to speak of their 
relationship with one another, also highlights the interconnections between different aspects of social 
life and their interplay on the shop-floor. For example, Fernandes finds (1997) that fights that originate 
in the neighbourhood between workers are played out on the shop-floor between union and 
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management, while Holmström (1976) argues that the relations of kinship between organised Indian 
industrial workers and casual workers enables the solidarities between them to withstand capitalist 
attempts to fragment the working class.  
 
In contrast, Engelshoven (2000) looks at the diamond industry in Surat, India, and explains why hira 
karigars, diamond cutters, did not revolt or take part of large protests despite the exploitative work 
conditions. She argues that the differences within the group of hira karigars in terms of status, skill, 
wages and living conditions do not enable them to come together. A world of difference separates the 
inexperienced ‘table’ karigar, who works and lives in his uncle’s small workshop and earns 1,500 Rs 
month and the superkarigar, who works on in the bigger diamond factories and earns 8,000 Rs 
monthly. But it is mostly the kinship relations between owners of workshops and karigars that prevent 
mass protests of organising. Engelshoven finds that practically all owners were karigars in the past. In 
addition, being kin implied shared common caste membership. Karigars would say they felt that 
owners knew what it meant for them to be working in the trade. Owners gave loans to karigars 
because they would say that ‘we’re all brothers’. Engelshoven argues that: “one important aspect of 
this kinship between owners and workers is that it gives many karigars hope that it is conceivable for 
them to one day become owners themselves” (Engelshoven, 2000, p. 373). This is also similar to the 
ethnography recounted by De Neve (2008) who finds that owners secured workers' consent because 
they were all from the same upwardly mobile caste, which gave workers hope of one day becoming 
like them.   
 
The fact that the majority of the new fixed term temporary workers were sons of permanent 
workers at EISCO is integral to the way the structural division of labour between them was manifested 
on the shop-floor and in terms of job security. Kalb (1997) focuses not on the kin relations between 
management and workers, but between workers themselves. At the Philips plant in Eindhoven in the 
Netherlands, management took advantage of the abundance of unskilled female labour among the 
peasantry, which enabled it to be competitive through its cheap labour. The families of the female 
workers, who were short for cash, encouraged their daughters to be more efficient at work. 
Management capitalised on this familial relation, and found jobs for the girls’ fathers. Daughters’ 
devotion to their fathers was used by management to increase their commitment to their jobs and 
thus strengthen its grip on them.  
 
Similarly at EISCO the kinship networks between permanent and temporary workers do not enable 
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the latter to resist the exploitation they are often subjected to at the hands of management and 
permanent workers. Rather, temporary workers attempt to secure permanent workers' support, in the 
hope of one day, securing the luxuries of a permanent contract, skills and relations that the old 
permanent workers own. Permanent workers in turn, who are happy securing temporary jobs for their 
sons and relatives- in the hope that one day they will be turned into permanent contracts-, do not 
object to the individualisation and privatisation of their skill through the introduction of fixed-term 
workers, whom they are meant to share with the collective expertise they cultivated over the years . 
Although the latter risk destabilising the old workforce, by slowly replacing them, permanent workers 
do not show much resistance to the practice of recruitment of temporary workers because 
management exploited their aspirations for social mobility and social reproduction by offering the new 
jobs to their children.  
 
 Engelshoven (2000) explains further that the castes of owners and diamond cutters in Surat 
originated in the same areas. Money by big factory owners was invested in the castes homelands in 
building schools and facilities that served the community. In a sense, it helped localise the relations 
between owners and managers that further strengthened the consent of the latter to their 
exploitation. Similarly, Lee (2009) demonstrates how 'localism' at the factory in Shenzhen, China where 
she conducted fieldwork, was used as more than simple preferential treatment given to people of the 
same localistic origin but also implied “the reconstitution within the factory of communal gender 
hierarchies embedded in localistic networks” (Lee, 2009, p. 244).  
 
Baladiyyāt (‘people who share the same local origin’) plays an important role in the recruitment of 
temporary workers at EISCO. It helps localise the networks of relations that permanent workers 
attempt to expand inspired by the 'relational value' (Elyachar, 2005) that guides their community. 
Although, Baladiyyāt did not systematically interfere in the allocation of tasks on the shop-floor, it was 
strategically manipulated by different actors when need be. These networks helped re-enforce the 
belief that EISCO was a self-enclosed place, where only those already part of the wider networks of 
permanent workers and managers could get into the plant. These politics of localism in turn made an 
idiom based on the ideology of an enclosed society, like a father and son one, more salient and 
accepted at EISCO.  
 
On the shop-floor of the Morris plant in Sheffield, the organised labourers are the de facto leaders, 
not only because of their skill, but also because the networks they share with other steel customers, 
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producers, scrap traders, and second-hand machine dealers (Mollona, 2005a). In addition, organised 
labourers arrange housing for casual labourers, thus becoming both work leaders and landlords. At 
EISCO, local relations enabled permanent workers to exploit temporary workers, who acquiesced to 
their own exploitation, while at the same time as it made permanent workers consent to their own 
long term destitution.  
 
III. Why Fathers and Sons at EISCO? 
 
 The reference to father and son relationships between permanent and temporary workers is 
salient at EISCO for a variety of reasons. In a conversation with Mr. Saleh, the head of Industrial 
Relations department, he volunteered to show me one of the standard calls for applicants for 
temporary production workers. Mr. Saleh explained the selection criteria that management used in 
filtering applications. The job advertisement requires applicants to be no older than twenty six, to 
provide proof of industrial middle qualification and medical and military duty clearance. Applicants, 
who are eligible are then asked to come for interviews. In the final evaluation of an application twenty 
points out of one hundred are given to applicants, whose fathers or mothers are EISCO employees. 
Preference for employee's sons and daughters however, was never disclosed in company job 
announcements but became part of a de-facto company recruitment policy. 
 
At the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, out of thirty fixed-term temporary workers I surveyed, sixteen 
said they were recruited through their fathers, who were working in the plant (of which seven were 
working with them on the same shop-floor); eight had a relative in the plant (usually uncle, brother, or 
grandfather), five were recruited through their baladiyyāt and only one person was recruited without 
any connections. He was very qualified, having a five year industrial diploma from the labour university 
(as opposed to the standard three years). At the Coil Rolling Mill, out of thirteen new fixed-term 
temporary workers, six said they were recruited through their fathers, five had relatives in the plant, 
and two were recruited through a contractor, although one of them had a father who had retired from 
the plant before his son joined in. Among the sixteen daily workers at the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling 
Mill, ten had fathers working in the plant, two had relatives in the plant, three had baladiyyāt relations 
that got them in and three abstained from answering. In turn, out of seventy four permanent workers 
surveyed in the steel plates and sheets mill, seven had children working in the plant, while four had 
children of working age and said that they tried securing contracts for their children but failed.   
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The presence of fathers and sons on shop-floors was not therefore uncommon and was for most of 
the workers the single most important way of guaranteeing a temporary contract in the plant. 
Workers’ pressure to employ workers’ children explain, albeit partially, why the analogy of a ‘father 
and son relation’ between old and young groups was rather naturally deployed at EISCO. In addition, 
with the very existence of fathers and sons working together since the plant’s inception- often with the 
first generation of workers, which was employed in the 1950s, securing employment for up to four 
children in the plant- the deployment of an idiom of relationality structured around the belief that the 
plant was a place that nurtured relations between fathers and sons was easily accepted.   
 
The very tactics of plant management and state officials to represent EISCO, since its inception, in 
familial terms also spread widely the idiom of a father and son. At EISCO, the proximity between the 
plant and the company town enabled such imaginary reconstruction of the plant as locus of familial 
relations. In addition, other celebrations and practicalities facilitated that- for example competitions 
and parties the plant organised for the mother of the year and plant buses transporting workers' 
children, who live in the company town, to their schools and universities until the late 1970's. It was 
also not uncommon that plant notices and union pamphlets to wish “the family of EISCO” a happy 
Ramadan or ʿīd ('Muslim feast') and references to the company as the 'mother of the workers' who 
gives endlessly to be used by some workers.  
 
Continuing his conversation, to justifying the recruitment of workers’ children, Mr Saleh said that 
growing up with a father, who works at the plant acquaints the children from an early age with the 
kind of work structure and work load the plant requires. Mr. Saleh was capitalising on the ability of 
permanent employment policy to establish close ties between the plant and workers' households 
(Dore,1973; Parry, 2001; Parry, 2005). For instance through annual summer trips, where workers’ 
families spend time together and household members are introduced to a worker's managers and co-
workers, the ties between both spheres are forged. Many members of the workers’ households that  I 
visited could in fact easily list the names of managers and co-workers of their fathers or mothers. It 
was not difficult to imagine permanent workers as fathers and temporary workers as sons then. 
 
But actual hiring of workers' sons is also attractive for the plant, Mr. Saleh explained, because new 
workers will take the same buses from the villages and towns, where their fathers are usually picked 
up, and hence will not incur any further transportation nor housing costs to the plant. Instead of 
having to offer the new workers housing and transportation like the first and second generation of 
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workers, the responsibility of housing new workers was thus transposed to fathers, who recruited their 
children to the plant and continued to support them in paying apartment rents, as chapter five 
elaborates. Management was guided by the need to cut expenditures in the public sector, but was also 
attempting to appease workers and buy their support for neo-liberal policies and the on-going clamp 
down on freedoms of association and protest in the plant.  By meeting workers' demand that their 
children be given temporary and then eventually permanent work in the plant, management cut 
expenditure and generated consent for the state's policies of flexibilisation and repression.   Workers, 
in turn, were exerting pressure on management to continue meeting the expectations that the welfare 
state itself had set when it hired generations of workers' children over the years. In a sense, workers 
forced management to continue securing the upward mobility and future stability of households tied 
to EISCO.  These expectations, hopes and valuation of expanding their relations at work were 
capitalised upon by the state to silence workers. 
 
Workers represented this need for the state to continue meeting the expectations of upward 
mobility it set by expressing the need to hire their children as a 'right' in return for the labour they 
have put in over the years.  Throughout my conversations with permanent workers, I was repeatedly 
told that giving their children jobs at the plant was the least the company can do to pay them back. 
“We have sacrificed our lives and our health for this plant, the least they *management+ can do is to 
give our sons a job” – “ihnā dahinā b ʿumrinā, w bi ṣiḥitna, ʾaqal hāga yishaghalu ʿiyālna” tells me 
ʿamm Gumʿa one of the old workers at the Plate- and Sheet Mill. EISCO was known to recruit workers’ 
children for most of its history. However, as opportunities outside the plant dwindled during the neo-
liberal years, working for EISCO became even more appealing and was deemed by workers as an 
uncontested right.   
 
Although many workers preferred to give their children a higher education that would secure them 
a clerical job, manual work at the plant continued to provide decent life conditions to new recruits. 
Workers liked to repeat the number of children they have at higher education institutions, the doctors, 
the engineers and the law and commerce graduates. Education was sine qua non of upward mobility.  
In justifying the pride that workers’ have in their children’s education, ʿ amm ʿ Umar uses an explanation 
I heard repeatedly in the plant: “Everyone wants to see their children better than themselves. 
Everybody tries to compensate in their kids.” ʿ amm ʿ Umar, for instance, has two sons, the eldest went 
to university and the younger went to the 5-year technical school (a little more advanced than the 
plant’s 3-year technical school). ʿamm ʿUmar always complained about what that the first child was 
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costing him and the money he always demands. His youngest son, he says, got high grades that could 
have taken him to high school and university. But given that today most of the university graduates are 
not employed and ʿ amm ʿ Umar always finds them sitting on the coffee shops, he decided that his son 
better get a technical education. Many workers would actually prefer a higher education for their 
children, but many also reason in the same way that ʿamm Ali does given the changing nature of the 
labour market.   
 
On our mill for example, there were eight fathers who had sons of working age who were 
unemployed. Three out of those eight are university graduates, while on the coil mill five sons had a 
university education and were unemployed. These unemployment numbers that workers reported do 
not reflect the precarity of working conditions that those who are employed often are subjected to, 
which makes them not much better off than those unemployed. Only three out of the seventy four 
surveys of permanent workers show that their sons made it to the 'top schools' (engineering, 
computer science, medicine and pharmacies) which guarantee better living conditions than the rest of 
the university graduates. Only three on the coil mill had children at 'top universities'.  
 
Making it to top universities requires a lot of capital investments in children's education (especially 
with the increased privatisation of education with private tutoring lessons) that were not affordable by 
most workers. The limited openings in these top schools also demanded that those who join the plant 
be unequivocally competitive.  It should not be surprising then that near the end of my research, the 
plant’s CEO requested every worker in each mill to submit a record with the names of his children 
whom he would want to employ at the plant so that management can design a strategy for recruiting 
them. The attempts to formalise the recruitment of workers’ children also spares particularly upper 
management  from the pressure workers put on them through the connections they mobilise directly 
or through the unions, and makes it easier to regulate the distribution of bribes across their 
departments. 
 
The presence of so many fathers and sons at the plant, and the increased emphasis on 
employing one’s offspring thus explain why permanent and temporary workers could choose a kinship 
idiom such as that of a father and son to represent their relation. In fact, demographically the halt of 
recruitment for sixteen years at the plant resulted in many of the young workers being of the same age 
of the old permanent workers' children. The fact that job postings, according to Mr. Saleh, were 
initially not made public in newspapers but announcements were only posted inside the plant and on 
119 
 
its doors meant that many of the old workers are responsible for spreading the word about the jobs in 
their respective neighbourhoods and their villages, which made them the primary recruiter of 
temporary workers and turned them into the benevolent patrons of the young ones. The presence of, 
and preference for, the real kinship relationships of fathers and sons in the plant, the age and 
generational difference between the groups and the fact that young workers come from the same 
areas as the older workers thus serves to ingrain the fictive kinship relation of fathers and sons that 
most young men and old workers deploy on the shop-floors. 
 
IV. Respect and Care between the Old and Young  
 
During one of the conversations I had with engineer ʿ Adel, a production engineer, he explained 
how he thinks the young temporary contract workers have the same rights at the plant: "the young 
and old workforces share the same benefits of working in the public sector". "Maybe on the company 
bus a young worker will find an old worker standing up and so he will leave him his seat. But this is out 
of respect, only out of respect.” Drinking tea is the most common activity at the plant and during a 
single 7 hours shift one would drink at least three to four cups of tea. Early on in my fieldwork, I asked 
a group of young workers working on the Section- Rolling Mill, whether they were expected to prepare 
tea for the rest of their shift because they are the youngest. One explained that this is often the case 
and that the practice was quite natural. They were astonished that I found the practice rather 
disturbing. My interlocutor thus continued to highlight that this is common practice, which they were 
okay with because “it was out of respect that young people ought to be serving the old ones”- “al-
ṣughayar yikhdim al-kabīr min bāb al-ʾiḥtirām”.   
 
Respect for older people is one moral dynamic that is at the heart of fathers’ and sons’ 
relations and which compels young workers to undertake many of the manual and services job that 
they are technically not supposed to be doing under their contracts. Old workers, on the other hand, 
do not shy away from claiming their right to this respect. "Fin al-shāy ya wilād"- "Where is the tea 
boys?" was often repeated on the shop-floor of the Plate and Sheet Mill, always half-jokingly but with 
a clear message that the tea needs to be made. Addressing one of the young workers, an older worker, 
again half-jokingly would say “Is this possible that you leave us till now with no tea?” and most often 
the young man, depending on his character, would either apologise or make a joke about having 
already fixed them tea earlier and then fixes the tea himself or tell one of his mates to do it or just do it 
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a couple of hours later.  
 
Some engineers are aware that old workers tend to abuse of young workers’ respect for them. 
Engineers, who see themselves being ‘fair’ managers, attempt to redress this. Engineer ʾUsama, the 
head of the blast furnaces departments, recounted to me in an interview his experience in trying to 
empower the new workers. “I remind them that they are as good as the old ones” he continues “and 
should not let them [the old workers,+ provoke them”. He adds, I also tell them: “don’t let them *the 
old workers] get used to you preparing the tea.” As the coming sections highlight, young workers often 
accept their subordination to old workers for a variety of different reasons that the engineer’s 
attempts to ‘empower’ them fails to grasp. 
 
On the other hand, some of the old men would explain that they would not let the young ones 
do hazardous jobs because they “fear for them like their children”-“binkhāf ʿalihum zay wilādnā”.  
Mentoring and caring for young people, and receiving care in return, is the second moral component 
that is emphasised in the ‘father and son relation’.  Fadi a young Christian worker, who had lost his 
father at a young age became very close to Mina, an old Christian worker, who was almost like a 
mentor to him and would repeatedly give him advice regarding his relation with his fiancée and the 
way he arranges his life.ʿAlaa, an old pious worker, encouraged ʿ Amr in his quest to get closer to God. 
The two developed an affinity and every morning Hussein would call ʿAlaa to wake him up for the 
dawn prayers. ʿAbd al-Rahman, who was technologically savvy, would help ʿAbd al-Fattah, an older 
worker fixing his computer at home or downloading things on his mobile phone. 
 
Although respect for elders and care and mentoring for young ones are core moral expectations 
in the ‘father and son relation’, these expectations do not however exist in a vacuum. Bloch (1971) 
distinguishes between the moral expectations embedded in kinship terms and their strategic use. That 
said, one could possibly also explain a little where the moral claims themselves come from and what 
strengthens them over time.  Goldberg (1992) suggests that the two most important attributes in the 
Egyptian public sector that distinguish its permanent labour from their colleagues in the private sector 
are the security of employment and seniority created by a union structure that gives all pay, perks and 
benefits to senior workers. Seniority at EISCO is indeed the most important aspect in almost all matters 
from job appraisals to bus seating46. The fact that at an institution like EISCO, seniority, more than 
                                               
46
 Bus seating arrangements are organised based on seniority with the most senior workers in front and the least at 
the back. 
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efficiency for example, is the most important mode of evaluating workers and arranging work could 
explain, albeit partially, why we see such emphasis on respect for elders common in kinship moralities 
here. 
 
During my fieldwork outside the plant, both young and old people spoke of the increased 
dependence of sons on their fathers in many aspects of their lives. Fathers in Egypt have in general 
been expected to contribute to their children’s education, wedding expenses and marriage set-up 
costs. In addition, in rural areas, the common practice remains that young men live in their fathers’ 
houses, in what becomes the family house after marriage (usually building an extra floor on top of the 
house).  However, given the limited job opportunities for young people today, the rising costs of 
consumer goods and the relatively high living standards, which upwardly mobile EISCO families expect 
to maintain, young people, and especially EISCO children, have become increasingly dependent on 
their fathers financially. Unlike permanent workers, who boast about being self-made men, who had 
few possessions early on in their lives, young men in EISCO’s community are forced to depend on 
fathers to survive and maintain their social positioning. The statistics reflect how permanent workers’ 
conditions at the start of their lives were different from those of temporary workers. Of the seventy 
four permanent worker surveyed on the plates and sheets rolling mill, 28 declared that they had no 
personal connections to the plant during their recruitment (15 learnt about the opportunity in a job 
advertisement and 10 were 'required' by law to work in the plant for a minimum of 5 years after 
completing their education in the plant's technical school), 14 had fathers in the plant already (of 
which 6 were also trainees a the technical school of the plant and required to join the plant by law), 15 
had relatives in the plant (of which 5 were also trainees at the technical school of the plant)  and 6 
were recruited through their  baladiyyāt, while 8 abstained from answering.  
 
To accommodate the precarious life conditions, many permanent workers in the company town 
or in other urban areas, have for example, moved to the rural areas- either by returning to their home 
village or by moving to rural area near the plant in al-malaʾa in order to build family houses, where 
they can co-house their children's families. These trends became salient following the increase in 
tenancy costs in urban areas and the privatisation of the housing in the company town. 47  A few EISCO 
fathers also pay rental costs for their children’s houses for a few years. To reiterate, respect for elders 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
47
 Rental prices had increased in the late 1990’s after a new tenancy law was introduced that liberalised the housing 
market and set prices according to market rates. Further discussion about housing situation is found in chapter 
five. 
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and elders’ care for and mentoring of younger men are moral components that make up the meanings 
of the father and son relation. However, emphasis on respecting elders and caring for young people 
does not exist simply because of a morality that develops in ‘patriarchal societies’ independently from 
other social and political developments. Rather the latter always informs and re-enforces the moral 
beliefs and practices that structure the communities.  The emphasis EISCO puts on seniority in work 
relations and the increased dependence on fathers among young people could partially explain why 
the dynamics of respect, care and mentoring are at the core of the so-called father and son relation 
that tie permanent and temporary workers in the plant. 
 
In one of the shifts on the 3-High Rolling Mill, I found older workers always the ones preparing 
the tea. I enquired about this from ʿAbd al-Rahman, one of the young temporary workers, who is the 
most skilled -having been trained before on a rolling machine in a military factory- and who was part of 
a production shift that included two other outspoken temporary workers, who grew up and lived in 
urban areas, in contrast to the rest of the temporary workers in other shifts, who came from the more 
morally conservative villages around the plant. I asked ʿAbd al-Rahman how come it is not their 
responsibility to fix the tea. ʿAbd al-Rahman told me, "laʾa iḥnā ʿawidnāhum min al-ʿawil" –“No, we 
made them get used to this [not making tea] from the beginning.” The answer was of striking similarity 
to what a young man or woman would say if they were speaking about transgressing social norms 
about familial obligations. Rami for example, the older son in my host family would say “ʾanā 
miʿawidhum ʿ ala kida fi al-bayt”- “I made them get used to this at home” when he would speak about 
spending the whole days out of the house.  I invoke this example here to emphasise that the discourse 
of ‘father and son’ is not always deployed in a teleological fashion and that different actors deploy it 
and interpret it differently given their respective backgrounds, preferences, political ends and personal 
quirks. ʿAbd al-Rahman’s temporary co-workers, being a bit more outspoken, were able to put the 
boundaries to where they think respect and care obligations ended.  
 
During my presence at the administration building to change my overalls one day, I heard 
gossip about the plant bus that did not leave yesterday on time because a fight had erupted between 
commuters on the bus.  Friends, who were on the bus, explained to me that a new young female 
engineer had been appointed at the plant on a fixed-term temporary contract. She was also the 
relative of one of the big-shots in the administration and one of only three females employed on 
temporary work contracts across the plant. Although she was less senior than other workers, as a 
female she was expected, by plant practices, to be given priority in the seating arrangement, usually in 
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the front rows of the bus. This however, meant that the last person seated had to give up his place and 
stand during the bus journey. With time the men at the back seats rotated in standing during the bus 
journey, but then a fight erupted over which of them will stand up that day, especially when one 
suggested to the other that he was just telling others to stand up because he was ingratiating himself 
with the high profile relative of the female engineer. The dynamics between old and young people is 
meant to be based on respect and care. But as this incident suggests this is not set in stone.  Gender 
and status differences also disrupt the ‘official’ ways in which hierarchal relations are morally arranged 
in society.  They thus re-configure both the moral claims and the hierarchal structures that are 
prevalent in different spaces. 
  
V. Exchanging Khibra for Manual Work 
 
In one of the early conversations I had with Hassan, a permanent worker in the dolomite 
production mill, he explained how he viewed the relation between the old and young workers at 
EISCO: “The youth help out *b-yishῑl] the old-aged and the old give them their expertise [khibra+.” 48  
Hassan explained that a man who is approaching sixty “has already given the plant a lot”- “ʾida li al-
sharika kitῑr”. In contrast, the load, he says, is now on the younger workers who enjoy more health. 
“The young one gives some rest to the old one from the muscular work”, he added. Such explanations 
were repeated to me so many times both when I spent a month visiting different mills of the plant, and 
later when I settled on the steel Plate- and Sheet-Rolling Mill. The exchange of expertise in return for 
manual work seemed at the core of the work relation between old and young workers.  Exchange of 
expertise for manual work invokes elements of the mentoring, care and respect that the moral setting 
of 'the fathers and sons' idiom constructs. 
 
Expertise, both in the technical and relational sense, and the ability to undertake manual work, 
are the most needed elements of work at EISCO following the neo-liberal restructuring. The father and 
son idiom that workers express in terms of an exchange of expertise and manual work captures the 
pre-requisites of work at the plant today. As mentioned in chapter one, many of the plants’ mills 
continue to operate with the same machinery that started with the plant in 1958. The old machinery, 
                                               
48
 Khibra implies expertise in general that is acquired with time. It is deployed largely at EISCO to reflect technical 
expertise that permanent workers acquired through long-term employment. But sometimes it expresses allusions to 
expertise about how to negotiate situations in life and handle relations, since Khibra fi al-ḥayāa “expertise in life” is 
the most common context, in which the word Khibra is used in Egyptian everyday discourse. 
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which constantly breaks down renders the work, on the one hand, personalised and skilled and, on the 
other hand, largely manual.  Chapter one has demonstrated how the work of permanent workers 
capitalises on their skills and relations. The second load of the work, the largely manual one- though 
one should add not necessarily totally unskilled- is primarily becoming the responsibility of the 
temporary workers and the casual daily workers.  
 
However, the exchange of technical expertise for manual work does not happen on equal 
terms. In many cases the division between the areas that old workers are responsible for and the ones 
young workers are responsible for lead to a strict division between technical work and manual work 
and thus little exchange takes place. It is difficult to compare two different things like manual and 
skilled work, especially when the latter is difficult to quantify, because most of it is implicit and 
transmitted in semiotic terms. But the arrangement of work at EISCO does hint at the fact that the load 
of manual work is larger than what is exchanged in terms of skill. At the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill 
this division was fairly clear. On the 3-high rolling mill, each production shifts included two to three 
new temporary workers, who were responsible for the manual work to substitute the run down 
technology. For example, as explained in chapter one, young workers throw the palm tree chaff on the 
hot slab and direct the water hose to clear off the oxide on its surface. When a slab is stuck, they push 
with levers and crowbars. They also alternate in writing the slab production and breakdowns on the 
board next to the machine. In addition, at the end of every shift, they also clean underground the 
oxides that fall under the machine. Most often older workers would help a little in the throwing of the 
chaff, using the water hose, pushing with levers or crowbars and writing on the board, which require 
workers to be very close to the hot (1830 degrees) slab, but very little when it comes to clearing the 
oxides underground at the end of the shift. All these tasks however were understood to be the young 
men’s responsibility.  
 
The older workers for example, will never bring the chaff themselves from the trucks that 
deliver it- to lift anything is generally the lowest ranked job, often given the name ʿitāla. ʿitāla is 
defined by the Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic as “carrying a number of things and a number of times” 
(Hinds & Badawi, 1987).  ʿattāl the person, who performs the ʿitāla, is defined “as the one who loads 
and unloads trucks, a porter, or a carrier” (Hinds & Badawi, 1987). It is also derived from the word 
ʿatala, i.e. the manual tools used in production. In everyday discourse, ʿitāla has a negative 
connotation of representing both manual work that requires no capacity for imagination or invention, 
in addition to being the type of manual work needed for tasks considered of low status, such as 
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carrying other people’s things, loading and unloading objects and so forth. When maintenance repairs 
take place (usually once a week), the machine is turned off and the entire shift, including permanent 
workers, goes underground to clean off the large quantities of oxides. But it is mainly the young ones 
who will do the clearing, lifting and most of the cleaning. 
 
 ʿamm ʿUmar, for instance, used to joke with temporary workers saying “go play away, you 
ʿattāl” or "Clear your chaff from the area", because temporary workers often brought and unloaded 
the chaff that was used in production. Fadi, one of the most outspoken young workers, tells me when I 
first start coming to the shop-floor, “now document this, I came here to work as a ʿattāl”. Fadi wanted 
me to document the manual work he was doing, which he found degrading. When, in the underground 
tunnels, I once joined Mina’s production shift, who were more relaxed than the others about my 
contribution to production, and helped in clearing a little, the production engineer scolded me later for 
‘putting myself at risk’ and asked that I never go underground again without his permission. He 
formulated the critique in a language of both gender and class that made reference to the low status 
of manual work. According to him, as a woman, I was not supposed to do work that was below my 
status, which was only for the workers to do. Besides, he said, being in closed areas with men, 
including resting and eating with the workers’ shift in their make-shift room at the side of the shop-
floor- which he also disapproved of and required me not to continue doing- could put me at ‘risk’, he 
said, because workers are not as educated or open minded about mixing with women. Anything, it 
seemed, that involves sharing bodily movements and activities, including eating, is considered of 
‘lower status’, especially by the engineers. 
 
In contrast, the responsibilities of the older workers include rotating between the control 
room- which is slightly elevated from the shop-floor and is air-conditioned- and standing next to the 
machine to help with the above-mentioned tasks, or to take slab measurements while they were 
rolled. Most of the young workers were not trained to operate (they call it drive) the machine from the 
control room.  Driving the machine needed more than just experience in knowing the different buttons 
and joysticks. It also required a great deal of skill in order to know how to deal with the problems that 
erupt, such as two slabs getting out of the furnace at the same time, the low quality or low 
temperature of a slab that makes it roll faster, or the tricks to release a slab that is about to be stuck 
(like pushing forward and backward very quickly the joystick).   Young workers, who were resting from 
throwing the chaff next to the machine, would often come up in the control room to just learn from 
watching the old man operating the machine, while enjoying the air conditioning. When standing next 
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to the machine on the shop-floor, temporary workers would also direct the driver in the control room 
through signs and hand gestures in order to alter the slab direction. The more skilled of the temporary 
workers took slab measurements and conveyed the numbers to the control room operator by hand 
signs. But that was the extent to which the Khibra and manual work were mixed. In the maintenance 
workshops on the shop-floor, the situation was different. Permanent workers and temporary workers 
work together on similar tasks and the arrangement of work is typical of a blacksmith workshop, 
where young workers were the apprentices par excellence. Maintenance temporary workers thus 
spoke more often of acquiring Khibra from permanent workers, than did temporary production 
workers. But they were the exception rather than the rule on the shop-floor. 
 
Midway through my research the production engineer began flirting with the idea that the 
young workers should soon be learning to ‘drive’ the 3-high machine too. This did not happened by the 
time I left the mill in late 2009. However, in the midst of my fieldwork another event occurred that was 
very informative about the limit of the exchange relation between manual and skilled work. ʿamm 
Shaʿban, an old shift supervisor and ʿamm Hakim, the driver of the machine in his shift, were both 
subjected to an internal legal investigation, when a very expensive clog wheel was found broken 
following their night shift. The investigators decided to cut an enormous part of their salaries for 
putting the wrong pressure on the slab while rolling. The gossip went around the mill that it was not 
the mistake of the driver but that a specific safety valve in the machine did not operate properly 
because it was of lesser quality and therefore really a question of supplying spare-parts. A few months 
later, the verdict of the legal questioning was reversed and ʿamm Shaʿban and ʿamm Hakim were 
cleared. It was proven to be indeed a problem with the safety valve.  
 
However, after the incident most of the young men, who previously said they wanted to learn 
to drive the machine, were now reluctant to do so. Shaheen one of the young workers said that had it 
been one of them driving the machine, they would be fired instantly because their contracts were not 
permanent. The incident was so traumatising that the driver also wanted to distance himself from that 
type of skilled work and requested to be moved to another part of the mill where he would have less 
responsibilities. The division of labour on the steel rolling machine gives some idea to how manual and 
technical skills are separated by the very nature of production, which results in an unequal exchange of 
manual labour for technical skills. In addition, the reluctance of young workers to take up more skilled 
work, and thus responsibilities, given their unstable work conditions limits the work they can do on the 
shop-floor to the more manual work.  
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The equal exchange of technical expertise for manual work also does not take place equally in 
some of the shifts due to the shift supervisor’s management style and the threat temporary workers 
seem to pose to some permanent workers, should they acquire all the tacit knowledge and replace 
their work gradually. In one of the four shifts at the 3-high mill, the young workers were complaining 
about the management style of their head of shift. “The person we are talking about”, Shaheen says 
not wanting to tell names, but knowing that I was aware he was talking about authoritarian Masry, 
“doesn’t even let us do the measuring of the slab thickness ourselves. He has to come down *from the 
control room+ and do it himself”, he continues. “Even Allah Yinawwar [well done], he doesn’t say it”49.  
This behaviour, Shaheen continued, was also prevalent among the middle aged workers, who had at 
least ten to twenty years more to spend in the plant before retirement. According to Shaheen, the 
latter saw them (young workers) as a threat to the gains they could make in the coming years and to 
their job security overall, should management decide to become fiercer about imposing early 
retirement packages.  
 
In a sense, one could argue, following Elyachar (2012), that permanent workers were aware that 
the introduction of temporary work in the plant was an attempt to break the collective implicit 
knowledge, which they shared in their skills, by making it explicit when transmitted to ‘cheaper’ 
temporary workers, who could one day replace the first, and thus be more profitable for management. 
This indeed contributed to some old workers’ reluctance to share their skills with young workers at 
times. Although in this structural position, permanent workers did not have so much of a choice and I 
imagine that should temporary workers spend a few more years in the plant, permanent workers 
would lose out eventually and temporary workers would become equally skilled.  
 
But temporary workers did not seem to present a direct threat to workers because of the security 
that EISCO enjoyed. For example, when the government announced in 2009 that it was contemplating 
selling all public plants under Ṣuqūq, individual shares to every citizen, they announced that EISCO 
would be an exception because it was ‘strategic’ industry. The confidence that EISCO was different, 
because it was strategic, reduced permanent workers’ anxieties about the possibility of layoffs at 
EISCO. In addition, although not every new worker was a son of an old one, yet the prevalence of such 
cases- for example we had seven real fathers and sons on the shop-floor- made most workers consent 
to sharing their skill with temporary workers. This was also facilitated by the ties of Baladiyyāt- which 
gave the impression that workers were sharing their skills among an internal network of extended kin. 
                                               
49
 For further elaboration on the origins and meanings of Allah Yinawwar see chapter one. 
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In addition, towards the end of my fieldwork, in July 2010, most temporary workers were also given 
permanent contracts at EISCO, which makes the theory that the first are a viable alternative to 
permanent workers hard to maintain as an explanation to why permanent workers would not share 
skills with younger workers.  
 
Nevertheless, one should add that permanent workers were often happy to share their knowledge 
with young workers for a variety other reasons that Shaheen’s rationalisation does not fully take into 
account. In at least two of the four shifts I was working along, the older men, including the middle-
aged ones, were very encouraging of young workers and would spend time explaining how to do a 
certain task. But one occasion made me wonder if sharing their technical expertise, even among the 
keener shift members, had anything to do with an exchange for young workers’ manual work.  One 
day, when I came to the mill and fathi, one of the shift supervisors, was really angry, shouting at Tamer 
one of the young workers in the shift for having made a mistake when fixing some parts of the 
machine. This was uncommon, Fathi was one of the most cool and cooperative old men, who 
maintained good and friendly relations with the young men in his shift. I asked Fathi a bit later when 
he calmed down what had happened. He said Tamer made a mistake while replacing the rolls during a 
maintenance repair, but it was his (Fathi’s) fault for leaving him alone to do the task and assuming he 
can do it alone. Now, until the new spare part comes, the mistake will be seen by everybody around 
the shop-floor and it will be such an embarrassment for him (Fathi) that his shift can be responsible for 
such a silly mistake. 
 
 The collective nature of the work at EISCO makes it particularly difficult at times to identify what is 
permanent workers’ responsibility and what is temporary workers’. The pride with which permanent 
workers deal with their skill and the personal association they have with the machinery makes their 
labour fluid in a way that it can easily be associated with that of temporary workers. This way of 
thinking of their labour as a ‘gift’ (Mollona, 2005b) to temporary workers, which flows on the shop-
floor, helps permanent workers to establish themselves as mentors and men of skill and knowledge 
which increases their status at work. In a sense, temporary workers’ labour could become, at times, 
encompassed within the first.  
 
I have argued in this section that the wide-spread references to the exchange of Khibra for manual 
work among workers, when justifying their father and son relation, obscures the current exploitation 
of young workers, who do more manual work than acquire Khibra.  The excessive load of manual work 
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that falls on the young workers, which comes with the lack of spending on machinery and the old age 
of the permanent workers which limits their mobility and enables them to capitalise on moral claims 
to respect for elders that guide the community, makes the latter comparatively disadvantaged at work.  
The claim to the exchange of Khibra for manual work does not reflect the many situations where 
transfer of expertise does not happen at all because of the division of labour structured by the 
production process, or out of fear of the young workers who would replace the old ones; or takes place 
in only a limited way not necessarily in return for young workers’ manual work, but rather because of 
the way permanent workers value their own labour as part of their very persona, or because of the 
prevalence of blood and baladiyyāt relations among both groups.  
 
VI. Actual Fathers and Sons on the Shop-floor 
 
The presence of some actual workers' sons on the shop-floors with their fathers was strongly 
criticised by many old and young workers in our mill, who although they thought hiring workers' sons 
in the plant was their undisputed right, found their presence on the very same shop-floor 
unacceptable and a source of much trouble. The presence of these real fathers and sons discounts the 
idealistic claims that the fictive kinship idiom of ‘being like father and son’ on the shop-floor try to 
construct and exposes how it functions primarily as a disciplining and controlling measure by the old 
workers towards the young ones. ʿ Alaa, one of the shift supervisors in my mill argues that it is difficult 
to discipline a worker’s son because of the presence of the father, whom they “try to respect” 
“yiʿmiluh ʾiʿtibār”. Similarly, a few of the sons hired on their fathers’ shop-floors, seem unhappy with 
the politics this creates. I looked closely into three of such cases (of fathers and sons working together 
in our mill). Two pairs were working together on the steel rolling machine and the other in a different 
part of the mill. In the first two cases of workers on our machine, both young men wanted to be moved 
into another part of the mill away from their fathers after too many problems had resulted, but were 
advised by engineers that their work on the machine was better for them in the long term. 
 
 ʿamm Shaʿban's son, Nadir, complained that he can never know if people are nice to him because 
of his father or because he is nice. He said the preferential treatment he gets from the head of shift, 
who is his father's colleague, also embarrasses him among the rest of the young ones. Nadir also had 
to be moved from one shift to another, when his father was made head of his earlier shift, and thus 
lost the group of friends he had already started to get close to. ʿamm Shaʿban, Nadir’s father was 
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believed to have the evil eye that jinxed everything and many of the jokes made around Nadir, and 
which seemed to upset him a lot, suggested that he had inherited the same evil eye from his father. 
ʿamm Shaʿban attempted a few times, according to one of the engineers, to get his son’s salary on his 
behalf  (but the administration refused) and Shaʿban's son is said to have also wanted the pay slip of 
his father to show his mother (Shaʿban's wife) the real salary he gets.  
 
The second case is of Sheikh Waleed and his son Hassan. Their dynamics were different from ‘Am 
Shaʿban and Nadir, possibly because they had a less antagonistic relationship at home and Waleed was 
more popular on the shop-floor than Shaʿban. Hassan seemed to enjoy the privilege of working with 
his father more than the rest of the men (although he complained that he can't pretend to go home 
tired and be pampered because his father would say don’t pretend that he was overworked we know 
the load is not so much). But this time it was Waleed, the father who was not happy about his son’s 
presence on the machine, and asked that his son be moved to the other end of the shop-floor. Waleed 
was unhappy that he was blamed for his son's recklessness at work (Ismael was a poor crane operator) 
and that heads of shifts and engineers kept coming to him to say “look what your son has done”. 
 
The third case was of ʿAbd-Allah and his father ʿamm Yehia, who worked on the trimming 
machine but different shifts. ʿAbd-Allah and his father had a turbulent relationship at home already 
and it soon became gossip material for the entire shop-floor. ʿAbd-Allah's father was known to beat 
him and to interfere in ʿAbd-Allah's marriage. His attitude continued on the shop-floor, where he 
would ask around his bosses how he was doing and ridicule his son. ʿAbd-Allah revealed to me later 
that he felt that he was unable to establish friendships on the shop-floor because everybody knew his 
story with his father (although ʿAbd-Allah seemed equally involved in spreading it). ʿAbd-Allah was 
always accused of being lazy at work, and once insulted his boss causing a big upheaval in the mill. 
Many of the men complained to his father about his behaviour, which put their relationship under 
more strain. The entire shop-floor turned against ʿAbd-Allah. Everybody often repeated that if his 
father was not on the shop-floor, ʿAbd-Allah would have been fired instantly for his poor work ethic 
and for insulting his boss. 
 
The presence of real fathers and sons on the shop-floor is not only annoying to the men in 
question but to others who work with them as well.  One day, I heard workers talking about "the 
closet", "the room" etc… Some were arguing loudly over the "closet". When I enquired, some workers 
explained that there are two changing rooms for the workers in our mill. The first is a large room on 
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the ground floor for everybody. The closets there are made of wood and have no locks. The other is a 
room on the first floor that takes only twenty people, and has steel-made closets with locks and 
drawers, to which workers also added a collectively bought ceiling fan. The closets in the second room, 
used to previously be allocated to the heads of shifts. But with time, the heads of shifts, who were 
retiring used to give the keys of their closets to their friends and the room became widely accessed by 
permanent workers, regardless of their position. Three workers had recently retired. They gave their 
closets in the upper room to some of their co-workers, who in turn, did not use the closets. Shaʿban 
began persuading Mazen, who had just got a closet from a retiring worker but was not using it, to leave 
him the closet for Shaʿban's son. ʿAlaa, was one of the workers who got really annoyed by Shaʿban’s 
suggestion to Mazen. He told me: “Shaʿban should not be allowed to give a closet to his son. This 
whole hiring of sons to work in the same mill is just wrong. It's a problem of management. It's a 
problem of engineers too, like Engineer Hamza, who is too weak to stand up for Shaʿban's practices.”  
The production engineer had also given some young workers the permission to change in the upper 
room and a key to one closet of a retired worker to share among them. This made other permanent 
workers even angrier. Mazen said he worked 13 years here to get a closet up there. Similarly Hesham, 
another maintenance worker arguing loudly with the engineer, said he spent some 25 years in the mill 
and was never given a closet up there, while now the young ones come in and get to change in it 
directly.  
 
No one suggested that the keys should be returned to the production engineer/management 
upon retirement, but they simply opposed the idea that the young ones be given closets in the upper 
room, and mostly if they were the sons of permanent workers. To defend himself, the production 
engineer said that when a whole shift changes in one space, they will start the shift on time. He also 
said young workers should be dealt with as equals or as colleagues. I found this ironic because the 
engineer was always of the opinion that young workers are never colleagues of the old ones, but have 
to do whatever extra work there is out of respect for elders. 
 
Although the deployment of a fictive ‘father and son’ relation seems to imply good working 
relations based on respect, care, mentoring and exchange of skills for manual work, the closet 
arguments and the relations that real fathers and sons have on the shop-floor suggest that this fictive 
relation does not, in real life, deliver what it promises. The arguments over the closet highlight the 
dissatisfaction of some workers with the hiring of sons on the same shop-floor. They also relay the 
general confusion that the hiring of temporary workers, after 16 years of no new recruitment, caused 
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in the plant. The generational difference did not help in making clear whether temporary workers were 
meant to be ‘peers’ or ‘subordinates’. The consistent lack of clarity in many plant policies, including 
what happens to a locker when a worker retires, makes the relation between old and young workers 
confusing, difficult to negotiate and dependent largely on the networks of permanent workers. The 
fact that management did not plan properly for the integration of new workers- no extra closets for 
them, no extra bus seats, not even overalls to wear at work- made the relation between both groups 
more strained and largely nepotistic.   
 
VII. Welcoming Exploitation 
 
The way the 'father and son' relation is deployed by workers as a mutual exchange of technical 
expertise for manual work, which is essentially based on care and respect is, as we have seen in this 
chapter, not a very accurate description of the realities in which old and young workers are entangled. 
In fact, the presence of real fathers and sons on the shop-floors neither made the people in question 
nor the rest of the workers very comfortable. In addition, the manual work and the services, which 
young workers assisted the old generation with, exceed the old workers’ transfers of expertise to them. 
However, the question remains: why then does the idiom of ‘just like a father and son’ still hold and is 
still deployed by both groups, including temporary workers, when it seems unfavourable to the young 
ones? 
 
To answer this question we have to look in detail, as Bloch (1971) suggests, at the strategic and 
tactical use of the kinship term ‘father and son’.  The production engineer on the shop-floor always has 
stories to tell about how old permanent workers’ use of wāsta- connections- to ask that their children, 
relatives, or baladiyyāt, be moved from one hard place on the shop-floor to another easier one. 
Engineer ʾIbrahim, ending one of the conversations with two young men over something I had not 
heard, said (and I overheard): “Listen I’ll be honest, I’ll take whoever’s wāsta is stronger”. Requesting a 
holiday, a sick leave or a visit to the doctor had to be approved by engineers, who would often take it 
back to the shift supervisor and consult with him. Simply put, having support from older workers in the 
plant- even more so from fathers- helps to facilitate the everyday matters and the ‘big’ matters. It is 
therefore important to have someone who can back up your claims and advance your position on the 
shop-floor. The permanent workers, who have connections, relations and information about the 
running of the plant, are therefore best to appease and embrace.  
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Permanent workers’ growing control of the work, through their skill and relations, as chapter 
one has demonstrated, makes them particularly powerful as a group and not just as mediators with 
management. It is by making themselves part of the existing and expanding social networks of 
permanent workers, that temporary workers could advance therefore on the shop-floor. As chapter 
one has emphasised, with the neo-liberal restructuring of the plant, the work at EISCO increasingly 
depends on permanent workers’ networks and relations. In addition, expanding relations was 
important to the way labour was valued overall in this plant. Acquiescing to the ‘we are like father and 
son’ idiom, thus, enables temporary workers to live by the values of the society that they are part of 
and to advance their interests. Yet, adopting this idiom meant the continuation of their exploitation at 
the hand of permanent workers.  Similarly Kondo shows that workers could use ‘the company as 
family’ subversively against management in order to claim new rights, but in so doing, they also 
reproduced and legitimised management’s control (Kondo, 1990).  
 
Young workers on fixed-term temporary contracts did not, for a long time, have access to union 
membership and were largely unaware that they had no right to union membership. This is not 
surprising given how the union in the plant is known to be co-opted by management and thought to 
represent the latter's agenda. Young workers’ need for older workers’ support in acting as middle men 
when dealing with management is especially significant today, given the change in the politics of the 
plant from confrontation between workers and management, for example as in the case of the 1989 
strikes and the ones that preceded it, to more individualistic type of direct negotiations between 
workers and engineers on the shop-floors as chapter six will demonstrate. This became especially 
apparent after the decentralisation of management that brought the engineers down on the shop-
floor to manage everyday affairs and also with the overall reduction of the labour force that brought 
workers closer to management as chapter two demonstrates. In fact old workers seem to reminisce a 
lot about two things from the past, the mulāḥizīn ʾakifāʾ (‘efficient supervisors’), who were able to 
negotiate with management and al- muhandissīn bituʿ zamān (‘the engineers of the past’), who 
combined ḥazim (‘firmness’) with ʿadl (‘fairness’) and igtimāʿiyya (‘sociability’). Older workers today 
take on the role played by unions, efficient shift supervisors and good managers that were known, or 
imagined to be known, to the plant in the past. They mediate between both management and the 
young groups of workers- whether directly or indirectly by giving the latter advice on how to go about 
doing things when asking for vacations, negotiating a pay cut and in general negotiating their rights 
and duties on the shop-floor.  
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Perhaps the reference to the exchange of Khibra for manual work is better understood by using 
the wider meanings of Khibra- i.e. Khibra of life, rather than Khibra of work in terms of technical skill.  
Shaʿban, the shrewd old worker, whose son is on the same shop-floor, asks the head of the mill if he 
could bring his son ‘to take pictures' during a retirement party attended by engineers and senior 
workers only. To allow the son to expand on his relations with those in power is one way to make sure 
that his son will be able to capitalise on these relationships when he needs them.  With the young 
men's prospect of contract renewal, or acquiring a contract altogether, still uncertain during my 
fieldwork and the ‘hope for stability’ that temporary workers expressed always there, good relations 
with the father figures on the shop-floor are deemed important. For many of the young workers, the 
job is a mustaqbal ('future') as they have repeatedly told me. Maintaining good relations with the old 
guard who could help them secure 'their future' in such uncertain times is definitely worth the price of 
preparing a cup of tea every day.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
With the recruitment of temporary workers, permanent workers’ skills are individualised and 
their collective knowledge is turned from implicit to explicit.  The latter are consenting to the gradual 
and long-term phasing out of their work because the new workers are their sons, relatives and 
baladiyyāt. These familial relations allow the plant to exploit workers’ skills and social relations and 
generate surplus without investing in capital and machine renewal. Yet the security of permanent 
employment, given the strategic interest of the plant to the regime and that temporary workers 
eventually gained permanent contracts, suggest that permanent and temporary workers cannot be 
seen as two distinct classes. Unlike, the case described by Sanchez (2011) where, familial relationships 
obscure the casualisation of the labour force in the Tata factory, here the familial relationships 
successfully reproduce the labour aristocracy. The most important distinction between the labour 
aristocracy and proletariat remains, not between permanent and temporary workers at EISCO, but 
between those inside the citadel and those who are the sons of the soils who cannot secure work 
inside EISCO.  
 
 However, the distinction between those inside and outside the plant is only ephemeral. As 
chapter four and five will demonstrate, the number of jobs offered to workers’ children does not meet 
their huge demand for jobs. EISCO’s labour aristocracy is therefore likely to be fragmented on the long 
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term between those who are successfully reproducing their material gains and those not. The 
widespread family idiom of ‘fathers and sons’ deployed in EISCO obscures the inequalities in the loads 
of work allocated to permanent and temporary workers. By contributing to the politics of kinship 
relations between both groups, the ‘fathers and sons’ idiom in turn conceals the differences between 
the permanent workers who reproduce their class positioning and those who fail to do so.  
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Chapter Four: Daily-Waged Workers, ʾistqrār ('Stability') and the Politics of Hope 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Ghubar al-ʿamal khayr min zaʿfarān al-baṭāla  
('The dust of work is better than the saffron of unemployment') 
 
 Most people working at EISCO would probably find the above-mentioned management 
message, which is placed on a large sign by the entrance of the Industrial Relations building, rather 
propagandist and silly. However, to those who man al-kilar – a section of the blast furnace whose 
Arabic name derives from the English word 'killer' –   it is an accurate reflection of work and life 
conditions.  
 
 The experience of being on such a gigantic blast furnace, the landmark structure of steel plants 
around the world, is humbling and awe-inducing to say the least. Witnessing the orange pig iron 
bursting out of the blast furnace like fire from a dragon’s mouth can give those nearby a prolonged 
adrenaline rush.  Yet, surprisingly, it wasn't the size and power of the furnace that left a major 
impression on me when I visited it. Instead, it was al-kilar that haunted me for the rest of the day, and 
perhaps the rest of my research.  al-Kilar is the underground area twenty meters beneath the blast 
furnace, where the reddish crushed raw materials (iron ore, coke and limestone sinter) are delivered 
from the sintering department. From there they are pumped upwards into the very top of the blast 
furnace. The underground area is filled with piles of red dust, making breathing and visibility difficult. 
Red dust is an integral part of the persona of al-kilar workers at EISCO. Underground, it mutes their 
identities by making them indistinguishable from one another. Above ground, their red overalls make 
them highly conspicuous as those at the very bottom of the ‘blue collar’ hierarchy.  
 
The head engineer of the blast furnace explained that a large fan was used to clear the 
accumulated dust by blowing it into sewage pumps, which took it outside the plant. But the fan broke 
down many years ago and was never repaired, despite repeated calls on management to invest capital 
in renovating it. Daily-waged workers today undertake the work done previously by the fan: sweeping 
the dust, inhaling it in the process; a job that permanent workers gladly relinquished when daily 
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workers joined the plant. It was at al-kilar that the working lives of daily-waged workers first presented 
themselves as distinct from the rest of the workforce. It was also perhaps al-kilar that inspired 
management to formulate the value of work in such devious and silly terms that appear on a large sign 
at the centre of the plant.  
 
“Why would anyone accept such a job?” I asked myself, rather naïvely.  At 11 Egyptian pounds 
a day (1.1 GBP; at time of writing 10 EGP= 1 GBP) daily wages at EISCO were significantly less than 
those in a wide array of jobs outside the plant. During my fieldwork, from November 2008 to August 
2010, an agricultural labourer could earn 35 Egyptian pounds a day; working in a workshop or on a 
construction site paid about 50 Egyptian pounds a day, and those doing more technical work, such as 
electrical fitters, were paid up to 80 Egyptian pounds a day. The strikingly low daily wages at EISCO 
could not have motivated daily workers to work under such rough conditions. “Shaghālīn ʿ ala ʾ amal al- 
ʿaqd” – “we are working *here+ in the hope of *getting+ a contract,” was the explanation that Tarek, a 
daily-waged worker at al-kilar, gave me as to why he was toiling at EISCO; an explanation that others 
repeated over and over throughout the research. Daily workers also repeatedly used the words 
ʾistqrār ('stability') and mustqbal ('a future') in describing what securing a temporary fixed-term 
contract, which they hoped would eventually be turned into a permanent contract, meant for them. 
Understanding what work at EISCO means to those trying to enter this citadel helps explain what it 
means to the stable workforce already inside its gates. Furthermore, the plant's steep hierarchy of 
labour sheds light on the state's multi-layered attempts to control the workforce.  
 
II. Aspirations, the Value of Work and Stability 
 
Daily workers are at the very bottom of the labour hierarchy at EISCO, below both permanent-
contract workers and temporary fixed-term contract workers. The lack of security in their work, the 
nature of the tasks they are allocated and their isolation from everyday social contact on the shop-
floors speak of their unfavourable position in the production and labour process. Daily workers often 
convey their resulting sense of humiliation and frustration. Beyond their status in the labour 
hierarchy, this chapter argues that the backgrounds of daily workers, along with their hopes, desires 
and aspirations, are integral to their experience of work. As various ethnographers of work and labour 
have emphasised, the experience of work cannot be fully understood only by examining interactions 
within the workplace. The manner in which the sphere of labour is related with spheres of the 
138 
 
neighbourhood and family are integral to how work is both organised and experienced (De Neve, 
2004, 2008; Engelshoven, 2000; T. K. Hareven, 1982; Haynes, 2000; Kalb, 1997; Dorienne K. Kondo, 
1990; Mollona, 2005b, 2005b; Ong, 1987; Jonathan Parry, 2001, 2005). Factory work is thus best 
conceived of “as a ‘total fact’, part of the broader labour of the self valorisation and reproduction of 
society”(Mollona, 2009a, p. 2). Recognition of the importance of workers’ aspirations, hopes and 
desires enables us to focus on the experiential aspects of work rather than the material division of 
labour only. This emphasis on the experiential, in turn, captures the ways in which labour is valorised 
and the priorities of social reproduction are arranged. I investigate how the capitalist state 
manipulates the resulting values by entangling workers within dispossessing economic policies. 
Through exploring this entanglement of economy and economics, society and the market, base and 
capital (Gudeman, 2008), this chapter examines the vexing and traumatising experiences of many 
daily workers at EISCO.  
 
In the third chapter of this thesis, I examined the ‘father and son’ relation that permanent-
contract workers and temporary-contract workers claim has developed between them. Permanent 
workers use this fictive kinship relation to compel young temporary workers to do the manual work, 
which is increasing due to the decay of machinery under the neo-liberal spending cuts. However, 
temporary-contract workers also adopt and reproduce the discourse of 'father and son' because they 
rely on permanent workers to mediate negotiations with managers and for the allocation of everyday 
work. Similarly, one could argue here that daily workers accept working under rough conditions and 
being ostracised from social integration in the plant because they aspire to become part of that very 
group of temporary and permanent workers that currently excludes them.  Yet, if the analysis were to 
stop there, it would miss a large part of the experiential aspect of work, which structures and gives 
wider meaning to a worker’s life. Instead of taking for granted that social mobility is necessarily 
desired by all workers and is an inevitable product of the need for ‘things’ produced by capitalism, it 
can be unpacked and seen in the light of the complex hierarchal and class relations in the community. 
In fact, studies such as that of Willis (1977) remind us that not all working class children want to move 
upward, socially speaking. As Sennett and Cobb (1972) have argued, it is not enough to assume that 
upward mobility is self-explanatory. On the contrary, potential anxieties associated with upward 
mobility suggest that we need to better understand what is at stake, beyond material wellbeing, when 
moving upward in the social hierarchy – including how people earn respect and admiration in society 
(Sennett and Cobb, 1972).   
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  Hopes and desires for ʾistqrār ('stability'), which workers describe as the main goal of their 
work, are related to broader ways in which work is valued and people earn respect in Egyptian 
working class communities.  I argue that ʾistqrār enables workers to expand on their relations in the 
community, whether by marrying and reproducing or by earning respect from fulfilling their 
obligations to the household and community. ʾistqrār is  one way to express the value of ‘relationality’ 
that Elyachar (2005) argues is essential to the community of popular classes.  By being mustaqir (the 
agent from the noun ʾistqrār), workers, especially permanent workers, speak of having a makāna 
(‘status’) and qīma (‘value’) in the community. Working at EISCO and being mustaqir is best 
represented by ʿAlaa’s comment that he first came to the plant in slippers (shibshib zanuba) and by 
working there had become a bey (‘a person of high rank’).  Stability, however, is also manipulated by 
the capitalist state, in its attempts to govern populations. EISCO capitalises on workers’ valuation of 
ʾistqrār by dividing the current permanent workforce into those who can secure contracts for their 
children and those who cannot. The very existence of daily workers at EISCO, most of whose fathers 
work in the plant and yet were unable to secure even temporary contracts for them, highlights how 
this process of labour fragmentation follows lines valued most by the workers.  
 
Understanding the work experience of daily workers from the perspective of their hopes and 
aspirations, and not only their present conditions, is particularly helpful for two reasons. Firstly, 
aspirations enable us to link different aspects of a person’s life into an encompassing experience 
without struggling with reified spatial delineations of concepts such as the productive and 
reproductive, production and consumption, material and affective, and so forth. Secondly, and most 
importantly, it enables us to pose larger “Zafimaniry” type questions (Astuti, Parry, & Stafford, 2007) 
about how workers value their own work and why they work at all. Drawing on the work of Graeber 
(2001), Harris (2007) argues that “a satisfactory understanding of the nature of work requires a 
broader understanding of value” (Harris, 2007, p. 137). In what follows, I look at the need for 
‘stability’, a goal which is pursued through labour at EISCO and is represented in work contracts that 
act as media or tokens of value, whose circulation enables the realisation of the value of stability. The 
value of stability, in turn, is one way to express the value of relations in the community. 
 
Research into value is particularly relevant to understanding work because it highlights the 
relation between how work acquires meaning in people's lives and the multi-faceted ways in which 
capitalism extracts surplus by manipulating these meanings. As Foster (2008, p.10) argues: “the 
problem that appeared so clear to Marx – the eternal need of capitalists to secure competitive 
140 
 
advantage through constant innovation – is solved not by changing the means of production but by 
changing how meaning is produced, or how the relationship between persons and things is construed 
and managed”. Anthropologists investigating value have followed Marx and Engels (1970) in the 
German Ideology  in conceiving production as “a self-transforming social praxis” (Turner, 2008, p. 44), 
which is based on four simultaneous 'moments' involving the production of goods, needs, people and 
social relations (Graeber, 2001, 2007; Mollona, 2005b; Turner, 2008). Turner elaborates on these 
moments and shows that they include: 
 
“The production of means of material subsistence, including tools and techniques; the 
production of new needs, which give rise to social relations; the production of human beings 
themselves  (to this they add parenthetically 'the relation between husband and wife, parents 
and children, the family', in other words, kinship); and the production of the different relations of 
social cooperation involved as a 'productive force' in their own right as part of each historical 
mode of production” (Turner, 2008, pp. 44–45). 
 
 These four moments in turn allow us to look at production as a 'total fact' and conceive of 
labour as a process and set of relations, and not only as labour power.  The literature on value focuses 
particularly on how needs are created in relation to the other facets of production. Thus Turner (2008) 
argues, what counts as production in any society, is inseparable from how it defines the need (or 
needs) that serve as the cornerstone of its productive activities. Needs, he suggests, are given the 
least attention within the four moments, although Marx looked at one “meta need”, which is the need 
for accumulation of capital. But Turner (2008) argues that most needs function in a similar way to the 
meta need identified by Marx; that is, needs are identified within a relationship of exploitation in 
which a category, group, or class which has control over important means of production uses its 
control to generate a surplus from the labour of those that are under its control. In a manner similar 
to Foster (2008), Turner (2008, p. 45) suggests that “in many, if not all societies, this surplus tends to 
be appropriated, not merely as a brute product, but in a form of value”.  
 
Thus, by returning to Marx's original conception of value, Turner argues that Marx did not 
conceive of value as a “positive, inherent property of labour invented in products” which was the 
essence of Marx's critique of classical political economy, but that he thought of it as a “relational 
aspect of a structure of interdependent productive activities” (Turner 2008, p. 46). Marx, Turner 
explains further, formulated the problem of value in structural terms, as the question of why, in 
capitalism, value is a form of representation of labour. Turner thus reminds us, following Elson (1979), 
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that Marx created not a “labour theory of value” but “a value theory of labour” (Elson 1979). Value is 
thus the “internal relation of quantitatively contrasting forms of appearance among entities sharing a 
qualitatively identical essence, where the essence, content is socially necessary labour time and the 
form consists of contrasts among different proportions of that content embodied by different 
products of the same system or social totality” (Turner 2008, p. 47). But leaving value as such, Turner 
argues, does not take into account how it relates to what Marx calls the ‘value relation’; and as 
constituting systems of social production consists “essentially of forms of representation, and 
therefore requires to be defined and analysed in each ethnographic case by taking account of the 
system of collective representations or media by means of which it is defined and circulated” (Turner 
2008:47).  Turner is exploring what makes value different from needs. Any need in any activity may 
then be considered part of the set of needs that determines the distribution of labour and is hence 
considered part of the ‘value relation’ of the system under research. All forms of labour in this case, 
including domestic labour and the otherwise unproductive labour of soldiers, would be considered as 
‘productive labour’ to the extent that it constitutes part of the ‘value relation’ of the capitalist system. 
Yet,  Turner suggests that what defines the activities that are ‘productive’, in the sense of producing 
value, from those that are not is the “the recognition of the indispensable role of representation and 
semiotic media defining what activities count as productive” (Turner 2008, p. 48). 
 
Graeber (2001) builds on Turner’s (1984) earlier work on value and the work of Munn (1986, p. 
3) in which  she considers people attempting to create value as seeking “to create the value *they+ 
regard as essential to community viability”. Graeber expands on the concept of labour to involve 
praxis, thus potentially including any type of action, and formulates value “as the importance of 
action”. Accordingly, value is then conceived of as “the way people represent their own actions to 
themselves…it can only happen through that importance being recognised by someone else” (Graeber 
2001, p.45). He finds that “value is realised in the public, communal spheres, in the form of concrete 
circulating media of value” adding that they are “refractions of the most basic forms of value created 
in the domestic sphere at the same time as they are realised within institutions that are modeled on 
key relations through which those forms of value are created” (Graeber, 2001 p.71). Following 
Graeber, I analyse labour in the broader sense of action or praxis, and highlight how daily workers 
value their own actions and realise it in the larger institutions they are part of, including EISCO. 
 Daily workers ascribe to their work a value they call ʾ Istiqrār (‘stability’). It is also a value shared by 
EISCO’s contracted labour force, including both permanent and temporary workers.  The value of 
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ʾIstiqrār is widely appreciated in Egyptian public enterprises, whose historical developments and work 
culture cannot be understood separately from the permanent contracts offered their inception in the 
1950s.  The discourse of work as stability is particularly common among permanent workers, who 
have benefited the most from the durability of their contracts in reproducing the conditions of a good 
life in the long term, especially in the context of the household. It is remarkable that stability is also 
the term that workers and most working class Egyptians use to refer to getting married and 
establishing one’s own household. Stability, in essence, is about being able to sustain relationships, 
including reproductive ones. Being mustaqir, stable and settled, enables one to invest in long-term 
relationships in the community and to invest, not in short-term gains but in longer-term ones50. It is 
thus interesting that reference to ‘a future’ is always used in tandem with reference to ‘stability’ by 
daily workers and temporary workers alike in describing what working at EISCO means to them.  
This value of ʾ Istiqrār and the meaning it gives to work is then used by capitalist and state forces in 
multiple ways to generate surplus. For example, HSBC bank in Egypt has created a Mutual Fund for 
owners of 10,000 EGP or more to invest in the biggest 20 Egyptian companies in the stock market, 
which they called ‘Estikrar’ (which is another way to transliterate ʾistiqrār). Although the previous 
example illustrates the point anecdotally, it does highlight how capitalism manages to continue 
extracting surplus from labour by re-deploying the meaning of labour and the values that people give 
to it. Similarly Elyachar (2005) explains how under neo-liberal rule there is an increased convergence 
between the capacities of the Egyptian popular classes and the aims of neo-liberal rule, which 
capitalises on these capacities. Her ethnography distinguishes exchanges made between workshop 
masters and customers based on money, referring to them as business relationships (b-il-bizniss) and 
relationships based on gadʿana, which “drew on and reproduced the value of neighbourly relations” 
(Elyachar 2005, p.137). 
 
Stability, is thus both a value and a mode of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1991) which enables 
the capitalist state to maintain power and extract surplus from labour. Foucault defines 
governmentality as “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, 
which has at its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy and as its 
                                               
50
  ʾistiqrār is defined, among other things, by the Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic as “stability”, “settled-
ness”, “remaining”, “constancy”, “continuance”, “permanency”, “stabilization”, “strengthening”, “consolidation” 
(Wehr and Cowan, 1979). The different meanings of ʾistiqrār all capture the focus on the long term.  
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essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 1980, p. 102). Foucault sees the modern 
state, then, as one type within the ongoing evolution of forms of governmentality over history. In 
Egypt, stability was an idiom that Mubarak appropriated for himself, when describing support for his 
rule as choosing stability over chaos. Mubarak’s legacy became this very stability (Chick, 2011; 
“Mubarak Had Been Egypt’s Symbol of Stability For Years,” n.d., “The bloody price of Mubarak 
‘stability’,” n.d.). His use of ‘stability’ expressed an ability to maintain production (i.e. prosperity), 
control over 'terrorist' activities both domestically and abroad, and the cessation of war and 
maintenance of ‘peace’ in the region.51  
 
In examining state invocations of stability, we need to bear in mind the limitations in analysing 
the state as a coherent project whose actors are imbued with intentionality. Rather, the state must be 
conceived of both as it is imagined, as it comes into being through the practice and production of 
everyday forms. Gupta and Ferguson (2002, p. 984) argue that “because state practices are 
complicated with spatial orders and metaphors, an analysis of the imaginary of the state must include 
not only explicit discursive representations of the state, but also implicit, un-marked, signifying 
practices”. These mundane practices, they remind us, “often slip below the threshold of discursivity 
but profoundly alter how bodies are oriented, how lives are lived and how subjects are formed” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 2002:984). Similarly, governmentality has been criticised for its totalising 
conception, leading some anthropologists to argue that “we need to start approaching 
“governmentality” itself as a practice rather than a concept” (Elyachar 2005, p.93) and to focus on the 
sites where practices of governmentality are deployed and the forms of power that emerge at 
intersections between the state and other institutions (Coronil, 1997 in Elyachar, 2005).  
 
 The practices that reproduce the image of the state as a protector of stability can be located 
across different institutions, including the workplace and the household. The latter is particularly 
interesting, because as Foucault suggests, the arts of government are multiple, including, “the art of 
self-government, which is connected to morality, the government of the family, which belongs to the 
economy, and finally the science of governing the state which concerns politics”; he adds that the art 
of government is “thus characterised by the continuity of one style of government with the other” 
                                               
51
 Stability became even further disputed following the January 2011 Revolution. In the March 2011 
referendum, the military council then in charge, promoted amending the old constitution, as opposed to drafting an 
altogether new one, in the name of a return to ‘stability’. This option was also supported by Islamist forces advocating 
to keep Article 2, which states that the principles of Sharia Law are a main source of legislation. Many secular forces 
instead demanded a completely new constitution. The referendum passed with 77% preferring to merely amend the 
old constitution, with a large number of people saying they voted for ‘stability’.  
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(Foucault 1991, p.90). Foucault conceives of most relations, including those within the family, as 
encompassed within the governmentality of the state.  The struggle for stability then links practices of 
the state, in governing populations, with the practices of EISCO households, who aspire to socially 
reproduce. Subjugation occurs when the hegemonic and the intimate are intertwined. Population 
then is the “ultimate end of government” and “the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the 
object in the hands of government, aware, vis a vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of 
what is being done to it” (Foucault, 1991 p.103). The spatialised practices of the bureaucratic state, 
the workplace and the household enable the intimate and relational politics of stability to constitute a 
form of governmentality that reproduces the state hegemony and its “vertical imaginations” (Gupta 
and Ferguson, 2002).  
 
Stability is thus a means by which the Egyptian state maintains government and continues to 
extract surplus from workers in public enterprises by indirectly manipulating their hopes and 
aspirations. Permanent EISCO workers, who hope to reproduce the conditions of a good life and 
achieve stability, reproduce the hegemonic discourse of the state as a provider of stability. This in turn 
happens at the expense of their ability to maintain themselves as a group of artisans with control over 
the shop-floor and a status in the community, and sets a long-term distinction between those able to 
become bourgoesified by securing permanent contracts for their offspring, and those who eventually 
lose out and face precarious proletarian conditions. 
 
 In popular culture, hope is often contrasted with despair. But the uncertainty inherent in hope 
as a source of major stress in many people’s lives is often overlooked. Hoping for the best but 
preparing for the worst, as the proverb suggests, is a difficult combination that strains people in 
general. For those who are ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of the EISCO citadel, hope is a source of 
anxiety. Vincent Carpanzano suggests that hope should be considered as a “category of social and 
psychological analysis” (Carpanzano, 2003 in Miyazaki, 2006 p.147). Carpanzano argues that unlike 
desire, hope is “rarely mentioned and certainly not in a systematic or analytical way” in social and 
psychological sciences (Carpanzano, 2003 in Miyazaki, 2006 p.147). He suggests that we ought to 
“destabilise and complicate the category of hope” by studying it in different cultural, historical and 
social locales, thus “defamiliarising” the term (Carpanzano, 2003 in Miyazaki, 2006 p.147). Similarly, 
Miyazaki argues that the most critical aspect of hope is its ability to reorient knowledge. He is 
interested in “how certain economic concepts and neo-liberal ideas may serve as sources of hope that 
is a reorientation of knowledge” (Miyazaki, 2006 p.151). Given the precarious neo-liberal living and 
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working conditions outside EISCO,  the ability of some daily workers to turn their contracts into 
temporary ones has channelled the hopes and aspirations of others to wait for their own contracts.  
 
At the Bihlai Steel Plant studied by Jonathan Parry, casual workers and permanent workers are 
two different classes, with distinct living and working conditions, aspirations and imaginations of time 
(Parry n.d.). In contrast, at the Tata factory studied by Sanchez (2011), the fact that most casual 
workers – who represent 70-80% of the workplace and have thus replaced the old permanent labour 
aristocracy –  are the sons of permanent workers disguises the ‘unmaking’ of the labour aristocracy. At 
EISCO, the fragmentation and phasing out of the workforce happens in a more complex manner. The 
arrangement of new workers in a hierarchy based on a queue leading to the possibility of a permanent 
contract disguises the fact that permanent labour is being slowly replaced by that of young, cheaper 
workers and is divided according to the ability to bequeath jobs to children. The few successful cases 
of workers bequeathing their contracts to children in turn discourages permanent workers from 
protesting against the long-term undermining of their solidarities and the individualisation and 
privatisation of their skills. The most salient class distinction that appears in the short term, however, 
is that between those already inside the citadel and the casual workers on the fringes of the city. 
 
The expression ʿ ala ʾ amal, which daily workers use when speaking of their hope for contracts, 
translates in English into “in the hope of”, and suggests an element of time and a process of waiting  
for one’s aspirations to materialise. It is different from the expression ʿ andi ʾ amal “I have hope”, which 
is associated with a rather shorter delineation of time.  ʿ ala ʾ amal is also always used to complement a 
verb denoting action in the sentence; for example, working in the hope of, calling in the hope of, 
having tried in the hope of. It suggests an element of effort required in order to make one’s 
aspirations come true. As daily workers remarked, exerting effort while waiting for one’s hope to 
materialise without being sure of the outcome is an agonising process. Patience seems to be the 
element that eases this process. Patience is one of the virtues highly praised in both Islamic texts and 
popular Egyptian culture. It was not uncommon to see writings by workers on the walls and the 
machinery of our shop-floor with expressions such as “God is with those who have patience”, or 
“Patience is (morally) beautiful”.  
 
 Different groups are thus engaged in maintaining what can be called the ‘politics of hope’, 
including, families using the virtues of ‘patience’ to compel young workers to keep working in the 
plant, and state and company management employing tactics that propel  workers to endure unstable 
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work conditions. This contributes to sustaining both daily workers’ hopes for a job and the suffering 
and vexation that come with those hopes. I therefore situate the changes in production relations that 
took place with neo-liberal reforms beyond the fixed dichotomies of neo-liberal fragmentation and 
the resulting collective action. This corresponds with the overall aim of this thesis to deconstruct 
essentialised notions of the homogenous working class, and to suggest that an examination of internal 
labour values and dynamics could give a nuanced account, beyond the dialectics of resistance and 
fragmentation, of how hegemonic governing practices take shape in everyday life.  
 
III. Daily Workers, Different but the Same 
 
As mentioned in chapter three, daily waged labour was introduced at EISCO in 2007, in addition to 
permanent and temporary work, in order to accommodate the overwhelming demand for jobs. Daily-
waged work thus became an entry route for those unable to secure temporary contracts because of 
the need for strong wāsta-connections. They were encouraged to join as daily workers and thereby to 
obtain temporary contracts within ‘a few months’ – which in practice ranged from two months to two 
years. During this undefined waiting period, many workers were repeatedly promised contracts by the 
end of the following month, but such promises were often broken. As the waiting period grew longer, 
many started doubting whether they would ever receive a contract.  This inability to predict on what 
basis contracts were allocated rendered the process of  hoping for a job increasingly frustrating, 
adding to the daily frustration of being at the bottom of the labour hierarchy and filling the most 
degrading and hazardous jobs.  
 
During fieldwork, I noted a certain awkward silence whenever I brought up the question of daily 
workers. Daily workers’ presence at EISCO seemed to make managers and workers throughout the 
hierarchy uncomfortable – either because they were self-conscious of their comparatively privileged 
position, or because some did not consider them an integral part of the plant, and thus not worthy of 
research.  Daily workers were also not accounted for in plant statistics, although in the new CEO's 
speech in February 2010, promising all daily workers temporary contracts, he estimated them at 800.  
I could not confirm this number, as given the sheer size of the plant and their distribution across 
different mills and shop-floors. Daily workers are not entitled to the health and social insurance, union 
membership or other  benefits (including a monthly meal costing nominally up to 95 pounds (9.5 GBP), 
company summer trips, and various loans and grants) received by both temporary and permanent 
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workers.  Coming from the same towns and villages as other workers, daily workers are allowed to 
take the company buses, but may only sit after all others are seated. Daily workers were EISCO’s 
hidden reserve army of labour, integral to its politics of work and reproduction and yet concealed 
from official discourses and organisation. 
 
 Daily workers were also difficult to identify on shop-floors since they often worked in 
underground areas, or were divided into groups of two or three among different shifts of temporary 
and permanent workers. They often rotated at work and did not do the same chores every day. 
Shams, a daily worker in the shipment area of the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill, explained that “they 
call for us in the area that needs work and we go”. They were also initially difficult to distinguish 
visually from temporary workers, who at the time of my research had not yet been given company 
overalls. However, unlike temporary workers, who are contracted on a six or twelve monthly basis, 
daily workers are contracted by the daily, though they receive their pay monthly. In contrast to other 
workers, they are not paid at the end of the month, but receive pay checks one or two weeks into the 
following month. They are also not contracted by the company directly, but by the plant’s social and 
sporting club, which plays the role of labour contractor, and subtracts one Egyptian pound from their 
daily wage. This limited type of outsourcing within EISCO attests to the interdependence between 
organised workplaces and paralegal labour, which often co-exist in the same time-space.  
 
During my fieldwork, daily workers’ wages in the plant varied between a standard 14 Egyptian 
pounds/day (approximately 1.4 GBP/day) and 22 Egyptian pounds for the more skilled (such as 
welders), although the former was an increase from the original standard wage of 11EGP/Day (1 
GBP/day) when I first came to the plant in February 2009. Daily workers were contracted for no more 
than 22 days a month, which made their total average expected salaries between 308 and 484 
Egyptian pounds. Temporary workers, however, earned almost twice as much as daily workers. Their 
salaries were between 650-800 EGP depending on their educational qualifications, which ranged from 
preparatory degrees to 3 or 5 years’ industrial training. The average salary of a permanent worker on 
the Plate- and Sheet-Rolling Mill ranged from 1500-4000 EGP.52  Many daily workers spoke of 
depending on their fathers, or on their mothers in the case of a deceased father, to cover their 
personal expenses, something they saw as making them unable to transition to adulthood. The hope 
                                               
52
  Many daily workers took on part-time jobs outside the plant, including running mobile-phone shops, working 
in a workshop or as carpenters, electricians and construction workers. However, as Hamdan, one of the daily workers 
in our mill, who also worked part-time with an electrician and in the construction sector, explained: “it’s hard to have 
a well-paid daily job outside EISCO, because the high-paid ones require a lot of effort, which makes us unable to keep 
up with both jobs”. 
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for job stability was thus also a hope for coming of age and a necessary measure of independence 
from parents. 
 
It is important to note however that those who came to work as daily labourers at EISCO were on 
average better off than daily workers across the rest of Egypt. ʾAmgad, a daily worker who had also 
assisted me with research outside the plant, explained that no one would venture to try their luck at 
EISCO unless they knew they had a connection that might get them in. The rest, he believed, did not 
think it was even worth attempting. Another old worker echoed ʾAmgad’s explanation when I was 
commenting on the precarious work conditions daily workers endured: “those who come here are the 
lucky ones who know somebody that brought them here and promised to help them. The rest of the 
kids are all outside. Look at the 6th of October [City -an area known for proliferation of private sector 
enterprises+ that is the real youth cemetery” he explained.  When interviewing casual workers outside 
EISCO, who were among the original ‘sons of the soil’ and  lived in informal housing called biyūt ahāli 
(family housing) surrounding the company town , I was told repeatedly that they do not even apply for 
daily work at EISCO,  as that would require strong connections inside the plant. Those who do get daily 
work, like Ali, a casual worker in a nearby painting workshop, are easily discouraged by the nepotistic 
calculations involved in securing a contract at EISCO, lose hope while waiting for it to materialise, and 
thus quit after a few months. In addition, casual workers, who often do not have a parent belonging to 
the labour aristocracy who could support them while on such low wages, end up exhausted from 
maintaining two parallel jobs. They instead prefer to maintain one daily job with longer hours and 
higher pay, without interrupting it with the low-paid work at EISCO. Daily workers at EISCO were thus 
frequently not daily workers in the usual sense. 
 
 One thing that was striking about daily workers at EISCO is that in general their backgrounds and 
qualifications were no different from those of the newly recruited temporary workers.  Most daily 
workers had an industrial middle qualification (often from the industrial training centre of EISCO), 
which is the minimum requirement for employment at a temporary job at EISCO. They are also below 
the age of 26, which is the maximum age for the plant puts for recruitment. They are often sons of 
permanent workers, or direct relatives, which is the undisclosed criterion for recruiting workers at 
EISCO. Out of 16 daily workers in the Plate- and Sheet-Rolling Mill, 11 had industrial diplomas. The rest 
had commerce and agriculture middle qualifications, and one was a university graduate. All of those 
who had degrees other than industrial diplomas, however, denied the necessity of any education 
beyond preparatory level to be considered for by EISCO.  14 out of 16 were below the age of 26.  10 
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(out of 15, because of one abstention) had fathers working in the plant, two had an uncle at the plant, 
and three were recruited through their baladiyyāt.  Similarly, at the Coil-Rolling Mill, out of 13 daily 
workers at the mill, six had fathers in the plant, five had direct relatives there (uncle, brother, in-law) 
and two were employed by a labour contractor (of whom one had a father who had retired from the 
plant).  
 
The fact that most daily workers had the same backgrounds and qualifications as temporary 
workers plays an important role in the analysis of their experience at EISCO. Daily workers could not 
secure a contract simply because their connections were not strong enough. There was no ‘made up’ 
criterion to cover up the unfair allocation of jobs at EISCO.  Many people across Egypt, and around the 
world, have recourse to family connections in the process of securing jobs. This was certainly the case 
at EISCO, where fathers in particular had always played a major role in recruiting their children at the 
plant. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, many permanent workers actually perceived 
the employment of their children in the plant as an unquestionable right, justified by the labour they 
had put in and part of their conception of their contracts as “a quasi-property right” (Parry, n.d.). If a 
father or a mother was a legitimate source of plant recruitment, daily workers were then being 
discriminated against by the very recruitment standards that the state had legitimised. This was, 
however, a particular kind of discrimination that was not based on any ‘objective’ criterion, but rather 
on one which commoditised the intimate, relational, emotional and social labour within structures of 
bureaucratic standards and practices.  This embeddedness of the social in the economic contributed 
to daily workers’ sense of personal hurt, insult and exasperation for working under unfair rules at the 
plant. 
 
As suggested above, the networks of relatedness that daily workers share with contracted EISCO 
workers have a wider significance beyond simply being available resource-pooling reservoirs. This is 
for instance, manifested through the pressure to maintain and reproduce the social positions their 
fathers and kinsmen have acquired by working in the plant. In chapter five, I argue that working at 
EISCO fuelled middle class aspirations that had emerged among many permanent EISCO workers. By 
virtue of their relations with permanent EISCO workers, many daily workers have become part of this 
larger project of producing ‘middle class workers’. Their own aspirations for a stable job at EISCO and 
a ‘future’ should be seen in the light of these ongoing pressures.  
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Hamdy’s story is an extreme case that may illustrate these tensions. Hamdy had a university 
degree in commerce. His father was a permanent worker at EISCO.  Hamdy was married with two 
children, and came to work at EISCO after failing to get a well-paid job elsewhere. He had worked 
previously in the university administration for 300 EGP a month, but quit that job because he found 
that even hanging out at the local coffee shop with neighbours was more promising than working for 
300 EGP/month because of the opportunities for moonlighting and for the expansion of relations that 
the social contact offered. Throughout, Hamdy’s father had given him and his family a monthly 
allowance to live by, including when doing daily work at EISCO. Hamdy also lived with his father, on 
the upper floor of the house his father had built for the family in Helwan. His sister had become a 
successful doctor and had married a pharmacist, and her father had opened a private clinic for her in 
the same building. Hamdy told me he was frustrated that he had to depend on his father at his age, 
having already established his own family. Not only was he unable to fulfil the widespread social 
expectation of masculinity by becoming a bread-winner, but his inability to keep up with the social 
mobility  of his family also added to his sense of inferiority.  
 
Securing a contract was very important for Hamdy’s sense of independence from his father and for 
his move into adulthood and manhood, but doing so was equally a question of being able to foster the 
network of relatedness and the webs of relations within which he was embedded, which in turn 
contributed to his ability to establish his ‘value’ (qima) within his family and his community. The 
awaited, yet so far unmet, ʾ istiqrār (‘stability’) to which Hamdy and other daily workers aspired should 
be understood in the light of their position relative to permanent workers. The process by which 
working under rough conditions and being unable to meet wider societal aspirations produced an 
intense sense of frustration and humiliation for daily workers is inseparable from the social networks 
they are part of and the way labour is valued in these structures and institutions.  
 
IV. Alienation and Dispossession on the Shop-floor 
 
A head of a mill explained to me in an interview the difference between the types of work done by 
temporary and daily workers:  “Temporary workers do the technical work, [ʾaʿmāl fanniyya], which is 
allocated according to the workers’ educational specialisation”. In contrast, the engineer continued, 
“daily workers are normal workers, not technical workers [ʿimāla ʿādiyya mush fanniyya]. They do 
work such as cleaning [nadāfa] and [ʿitāla]”.  In the first chapter, I showed how cuts in public spending 
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prescribed by the neo-liberal reform program inhibit the plant from investing in renewing its 
machinery, thus increasing the load of manual work in the plant, which is taken on by a younger 
generation of workers. The work requiring most technical expertise is generally done by members of 
the older generation at the top of the work hierarchy, while manual work done by temporary workers 
is conducted in exchange for technical expertise from the old. ʿitāla work is the more degrading type 
of manual work at the very bottom of the work hierarchy, which is seldom exchanged for technical 
expertise.  
 
Although there were no daily workers at the 3-high rolling mill where my research was focused, 
daily workers were present across our shop-floor doing jobs that ranged from largely ʿitāla work to 
occasionally more skilled work. Daily workers carried away the steel leftovers, managed trucks coming 
into the shipment area, cleaned underground water tunnels beneath the machinery, worked in the 
maintenance workshops, or, in the case of those with top-end industrial training specialisation, 
focused on welding. Although daily workers had the potential for doing work similar to that of 
temporary workers, some permanent workers nevertheless considered investing knowledge in daily 
workers futile because they were not sure if they would ever become stable workers.  Their 
ephemeral presence on the shop-floor thus excluded daily workers from the long-term exchanges and 
circulation of labour and skill.  
 
The alienation they experienced was perhaps most evident in the disdain with which ʿitāla 
work was treated on the shop-floor. Everybody wanted to escape ʿ itāla work. One of the daily-waged 
welders I spoke to on another occasion was from the general maintenance workshop of the plant. He 
explained to me that they were divided into three groups: welders, fitters and ʿ attālin (plural for ʿ atāl). 
“I don’t do ʿitāla work, I only do the work related to me (welding). Sometimes, I happen to carry a 
load, or when a ʿatāl is off I do his work. But I don’t do ʿitāla work” He told me. Although it could be 
negotiated, nobody escaped ʿitāla work completely. The three daily workers in one of the 
maintenance workshops on the shop-floor were called in when visiting engineers were asking for 
cleaning workers (ʿummāl  nadāfa), to which one of the engineers in our shop-floor replied, “get one 
of the children to carry this”.  Hamdy, when filling in the survey I distributed to workers across the 
mill, insisted on writing, under ‘job description’,’ ʿ atāl’ in large letters (not ‘daily worker’, as all the rest 
did). In the following question, under ‘education’, he wrote ‘university degree’. The contrast was ironic 
and sad. In a sense, ʿitāla is the very antithesis of skilled work, the latter giving workers control over 
their labour and, with the stability of permanent contracts, enabled them to expand on relations 
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inside and outside the plant. As the fieldwork of Mollona (2005, p. 186) in a Sheffield steel plant 
reminds us, “material differences among workers are sometimes discussed in terms of attitudes to 
machinery and generational struggles”. 
 
On another occasion, ʾAmgad told me, “here the old one acts as if he owns the company and 
the contractor *i.e. the daily worker+ is nothing”. The distinction between skilled work and ʿ itāla work, 
or between the owner of the work and the proletarian labour force, is thus a way to articulate the 
kind of differences in status between old permanent workers and young daily workers on the shop-
floor. These differences, framed in the distinction between the work of the first as “unalienable 
capital” and that of the second as “alienable labour” (Mollona, 2005), however, obscure the fact that 
both permanent and daily workers belong to the same social networks and that the destitution of the 
second is largely linked to the destitution of the first, who either continue to support their relatives 
when working in the plant, or else simply lose their solidarity due to the competition over priority in 
recruiting one’s offspring.  
 
Managers were complicit in enabling the politics of reproduction to take precedence on the 
shop-floor in their acquiescence to both workers’ demands that their relatives be hired, and the 
state’s attempts to control labour through the governmentality of stability.   Managers accounted for 
all daily workers’ labour by dividing the total number of available working days by the number of 
people. This is said by workers to allow management to bring in more people (including their own 
relatives) when there is internal news of a new batch of contract positions being offered soon. 
Management would then divide the total number of available days among a larger group of daily 
workers. This system also protected daily workers from being laid off when production was low. 
Instead, management simply reduced the number of days per month each worker could work, but 
kept them on the rota.  This implicit agreement between managers and daily workers in calculating 
daily wages in an aggregate form allowed daily workers to maintain second jobs outside the plant, 
while continuing to engage in the long-term project of striving for stability. Such negotiations were 
enabled by the shared background and cooperation that developed between workers and shop-floor 
managers, which was highlighted in chapter three.  
 
The repeated disruptions of work schedules due to breakdowns and production downtime at 
EISCO, were not, however always a source of freedom for daily workers.  It often affected the pace 
and quality of their lives outside the plant and rendered them more dependent on their parents for 
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subsistence. These periods, highlight their structural linkages to permanent workers, which the 
everyday division of labour obscures. I was doing my research with ʾAmgad outside in the company 
town when the Plate- and Sheet-Rolling Mill experienced decreased production due to a shortage of 
raw material. ʾAmgad would often call me, telling me they had been sent home again because there 
was no production. ʾ Amgad despised staying at home. His mother, who continued to provide for him 
and his younger sister after his father, also an EISCO worker, had died, often complained about being 
short of money and the fact that that ʾAmgad, almost 28 years old, was still not contributing to the 
household. ʾ Amgad in general felt quite embarrassed that his mother was the only working woman in 
his neighbourhood and that he could not provide her with the chance to be finally, properly ‘house-
wived’. In fact, ʾāʿid, short for ‘staying at home’, is the word that Egyptians use to speak about a 
person being unemployed. Being at home for several days, like an unemployed person, was an 
increasingly difficult experience for ʾ Amgad, who, between the lines, made it clear that he was having 
trouble sleeping more than a few hours a night.  
 
Over the following couple of months, daily workers in ʾAmgad’s mill worked  as little as 11 or 
12 days per month, which made ʾAmgad and his colleagues worry that they might be laid off 
altogether. Amgad took the initiative, along with a few other daily workers, to write to the head 
engineer of the mill complaining they were unable to make ends meet with such low daily count: the 
only daily workers’ attempt at collective action I witnessed at the mill.  This collective action was 
largely non-confrontational, and simply pleaded with the managers to consider their situation. The 
parents and relatives of daily workers, however, carried the larger load of their dispossession, since 
they had support them while work was short. 
 
V. Sociality and Social Reproduction on the Shop-floor 
 
On our shop-floor I saw most daily workers socialising together in groups of two or three people. 
These small groups would eat separately from the others because they could not afford to share food 
expenses with the rest, who all ate together. Only those who were alone with older workers in smaller 
shifts of 3 or 4 tended to eat and socialise with them.  A few daily workers, however, told me they 
liked to be together because they can relate better to people of their same age. From the outside, it 
often seemed daily workers and temporary workers got along fine, but socialised very little with each 
other. Shams, another daily worker on our shop-floor, explained that when he was around temporary 
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workers, “batdāyiq fi nafsiyyiti” – “I feel psychologically hurt”. “But this is just on the inside”, he 
added; “on the outside I get along with everybody”. The experience of being around temporary 
workers, who had managed to get temporary contracts when daily workers had not, seemed 
especially hurtful for the latter.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the work of daily labour was alienating because the workers 
had no control over it, it did not engage either their conceptual or imaginative capacities. Most 
importantly, such work was alienating because daily workers were ostracised from expanding 
relations on the shop-floor, particularly with those who were similar in age and background to them. 
The links that connect members of both groups outside work, for example being from the same 
neighbourhoods or the same company town and of the same age, often facilitates socialising between 
them. But the division of labour in the plant renders temporary workers closer to permanent workers, 
with whom they work in rotational shifts, and excludes daily workers from everyday social contact. 
Shams thus told me that by working together, temporary workers and permanent workers   “have tied 
together already”- “shabbiku maʿāhum khalās”.  
 
Following Carrier (2009) I consider the separation between their identities and relations inside and 
outside the plant as essential to daily workers’ alienation.  The ability to expand on relations both 
inside and outside, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, is integral to the way work is valued. 
Stability also means becoming part of larger social networks that enable workers to share their labour 
in different spheres and to establish their status in society. It is in this sense that daily work is 
alienating: it does not allow workers to expand on relationality. Yet, the exclusion of daily workers 
from sociality on the shop-floor is related to a wider process taking place, which reflects the growing 
contradiction within the project of bequeathing jobs to children. This is apparent in permanent 
worker’s attitude to daily ones. 
 
Permanent workers’ attitudes towards daily workers vary: some embrace them and some do not. 
Yet overall, their relation is rather problematic and reflects not only the precarity of daily workers, but 
also the increasingly precarious conditions of permanent workers in their roles as ‘fathers’ who 
evaluate work and relations in the plant from the point of view of its ability to fulfill their aspirations 
of family reproduction.  While speaking with a few permanent workers filling in my survey, the topic of 
daily workers came up. One worker expressed annoyance that when his colleagues did not want to do 
a particular task, they say ‘call the contractor *meaning the daily worker hired by the contractor+ to do 
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it’. He criticised this attitude, especially since they too were once like daily labourers. Another old 
worker joined in the conversation: “We ourselves were not educated and our children today go to 
university, why then not give the same chance to these workers?” Later that day, however, when 
asked if certain daily workers had filled in the survey, one of the old workers jokingly responded, “but 
do they even know how to read and write?” – a joke with rather perjorative undertones.   
 
Some daily workers I interviewed repeated that permanent workers were jealous of them because 
they had got into EISCO, whereas their sons of a similar age had failed so far. Shams explained that 
during the bus commute, they often stood with the rest of the new ones who joined the plant. He 
considered this normal an act of respect for those older. But sometimes he felt that permanent 
workers were rude out of jealousy, recounting examples where a permanent worker would pretend to 
sleep to keep an extra seat empty, leaving Shams standing, or would only let him sit on the sunny side, 
where it was very hot. “It’s as if he wants to tell you to get off the bus” he added. It was difficult to 
confirm Shams’s observations because I was only briefly on workers’ buses, and was always, as a 
female, seated in front, so unable to observe interactions. In addition, the 3-High Mill, where most of 
my fieldwork was conducted, did not have any daily workers. However, the silences, jokes, implicit 
messages and debates among permanent workers about the status of daily workers seemed to 
confirm the uncomfortable relations.  
 
The privatisation of permanent contracts into individual quasi-property rights has put the 
permanent workers’ interest in maintaining their family presence at the mill at the core of their work 
relations and set them against each other. Five permanent workers at the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling 
Mill had eight unemployed sons (three with degrees) of working age, and had failed to get their 
children inside EISCO.  The precarious life conditions outside the plant evidently impinged on sociality 
inside it53. Permanent workers’ feelings of ‘jealousy’ toward daily workers are thus one plausible 
explanation for why the latter were sometimes discriminated against by the first. After late 2010, 
when ʾ Amgad got a temporary contract, ʾ Umm ʾ Amgad, his mother, often told me how her neighbours 
were jealous of him. In 2011, when his temporary contract was made permanent, ʾ Umm ʾ Amgad told 
me that the neighbours were so jealous that the ‘evil eye’ was now chasing them, including sabotaging 
                                               
53
  There were at least 15 unemployed daughters of workers at the mill, four of whom had a university 
education. I do not include them here in the estimation of precariousness outside the plant because, unlike male 
unemployment, female unemployment was often voluntary. Many permanent workers believed that a girl should not 
work after getting her degrees, and considered higher education a way to increase one’s value by making a better wife 
and mother to the children in the future. Finding work was therefore not always the goal of education for females.  
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ʾAmgad’s wedding plans, which made her avoid her neighbours. The jealousy felt towards those who 
manage to secure work at EISCO reflects how the state’s attempts to sustain production in the plant, 
by putting reproductive politics at the heart of work and by capitalising on permanent, temporary and 
daily workers’ valuations of stability, fragment the community, while enabling the extraction of 
surplus from workers.  
 
VI.  Families and the Politics of Hope 
 
The burden of social reproduction often falls on fathers and mothers, who secure jobs for their 
children and sustain them while they work at low wages or are unemployed. But the labour that 
families invest in such social reproduction also involves creating subjects that are accommodating to 
the neo-liberal conditions.  Tarek, whom I first met at the Kilar, told me it was his father, an EISCO 
worker, who had insisted he should try to work at the plant. Shams's father was a farmer and not a 
plant worker, but his mother’s brother (uncle) was and encouraged him to join up. Prior to that, 
Shams had worked in the upscale area of Maadi as a salesman in a furniture store, and with all the tips 
etc, he had been making about 750 EGP per month. Shams told me he since regretted having left his 
Maadi job, and had tried but failed to get it back. Like Tarek and Shams, many daily workers are 
encouraged and sometimes pressured by their kinsmen already at EISCO to try their luck at the plant. 
The pressure that families exert on their children to keep waiting for a contract should not be 
discounted as a major source of stress. ʾAmgad’s mother for example, would become increasingly 
alarmed each time ʾ Amgad said that he was going to leave EISCO to take up another daily job in other 
cities such as Bani Sueif or Sharm El Sheikh. She would then repeat to him “khalli ʿandak sabr yā 
ʾAhmgad”, “have some patience ʾ Amgad,” suggesting that he lacked this quality.  If young people are 
despairing from working in alienating conditions, families who advocate remaining in such a 
predicament in hope of ‘stability’ became complicit with the state in encouraging them to 
accommodate to neo-liberal conditions and secure their consent and silence in the face of 
exploitation. 
 
As sons of permanent workers, many daily workers felt they had to justify the investments 
made in them by their parents and to continue the leap that their fathers had made in terms of social 
mobility.  EISCO workers' children’s social positioning was central to the reproduction of workers at 
EISCO as a class.  Many sons and daughters of the EISCO workers I spent time with were very 
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particular about the kind of jobs they would or would not do.  The case of ʾAmgad’s friend Shawky 
demonstrates the choice made. He had tried working as a daily worker at EISCO but despaired and left 
after a while. His mother told me she keeps going to the plant to talk to different managers about 
taking her son on, especially since his deceased father was an EISCO worker, and employing her son 
would be a token of gratitude to the deceased father. Shawky is currently unemployed, but refuses to 
work in many jobs. The nearby Shaq al-Tiʿban area, a marble production area, seemed to attract many 
young men from Helwan. But Shawky, like many EISCO sons, would not work at Shaq al-Tiʿban. ʾ Amgad 
explained to me that “it would look bad if Shawky came back on a truck all white with all the rest of 
the folks from the rural areas”. EISCO’s children, one could argue, and especially those in the company 
town, were used to being the best in their neighbourhoods and would not accept jobs that they 
considered below their status. I had never, for example, heard of any EISCO son working in the nearby 
brick factories, where many young people from across Helwan sought work.  
 
Furthermore, as chapter five will demonstrate, the distinction between the children of EISCO in 
the company town and those of other families nearby, many of whom were originally sons of the soil 
and are residing in informal houses (Bīyūt ʾahāli) around the company town is striking. The life 
conditions of each group and the resulting career choices they each make could not be more different. 
Whereas children who live in Bīyūt ʾahāli often have limited education and accept precarious work, 
EISCO children are more concerned with social mobility and find it difficult to work in jobs below their 
status. “My son is a university graduate with a degree in law,” one of the EISCO workers told me, “but 
he is currently unemployed. He gets many offers but refuses to work in many of them, saying this is 
too low, or not good enough.”  This story was not uncommon among EISCO workers, many of whom 
complained repeatedly that their children, especially those with university degrees other than the 
‘top’ employable subjects such as engineering or medicine were largely unemployed. However, my 
interlocutors added, this was very different from the older generation's experience: they would have 
just accepted work in anything available. The social mobility leaps that EISCO workers have made over 
the years have had an impact on the kind of jobs their children consider suitable today. The hopes and 
expectations that the welfare state had encouraged before liberalisation still continued to fuel the 
desire for social mobility in permanent workers’ households. At the same time, however, the reduced 
opportunities for achieving social mobility today in Egypt through education, place added pressure on 
daily workers to secure a contract at EISCO and to endure being at the bottom of the labour hierarchy. 
The desires of daily workers to work at EISCO cannot therefore be understood separately from their 
familial pressures and aspirations.  
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VII. Management, the State and the Politics of Hope 
 
EISCO management’s politics surrounding daily, temporary and permanent workers’ 
aspirations for stability, represented by the permanent contract as a token of value, could explain 
further how they managed to re-orient workers’ understanding of work in a way that generates hope 
and simultaneously manipulates it, thus turning it into a source of constant agony and frustration.  “I 
am fed up of this business of stability and have put many lines under it,” Shams, who had at that time 
been a daily worker for four months, told me. “They keep telling us at the end of every month that 
we’ll get a contract, but nothing happens. I will wait until the end of October and then if not, I’ll 
leave”. Mustafa, who had worked as a daily labourer for over a year, said:  “Once, I saw my name on 
the list of people who were going to be given contracts, but at the end of the month I was not given a 
contract and the engineer told me to wait for the next round”. In my first meeting with ʾAmgad, he 
told me what made him most bitter while working as a daily labourer was that management was 
giving new temporary contracts to workers who didn’t work as daily labourers and who took up jobs 
directly using wāsta. I witnessed this practice at least once, with a group of five new workers on our 
shop-floor. During my interviews, many daily workers told me they were fed up with waiting and being 
deceived and would wait for a last few months and then leave.  However, most of them continued 
working beyond the period they specified (ʾAmgad for almost another year, having already waited a 
year at the time when I first met him). However, promises and deception were integral to the politics 
of hope at the plant.  Management, who were aware of the plant’s need for new workers, and yet also 
constrained by state policies capping stable workers’ numbers in the public sector, seemed to employ 
a strategy that manipulated workers’ hopes in order to prevent them from despairing altogether.   
 
Halfway through my fieldwork, 17 bus drivers on temporary contracts were given permanent 
contracts. When I asked one of the senior figures in management, being astonished given the 
contradiction with state policies averse to permanent contracts, he said that this was actually done 
more as “farqaʿa” as (propaganda) so that the news would spread around the plant and the rest of the 
workers would remain working in the hope of being given permanent contracts. This kind of politics 
was instrumental in EISCO management’s attempts to coerce labourers into working under 
unfavorable conditions. Despair could, after all, lead to revolt, which, given management’s earlier 
experience with militant revolt at EISCO in 1989, had to be avoided by any means. 
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In a similar incident, an advertisement was placed in the newspapers announcing that 350 job 
openings were available at EISCO. The advertisement was made by the Ministry of Investment, under 
whose jurisdiction all public companies lie.  A senior member of the EISCO administration seemed 
frustrated with the advertisement. He had not been informed that jobs were going to be made 
available at EISCO, and applications were now raining down on him.  During that period I saw 
application after application arriving at his office every day. He was not even sure, he told me, 
whether these jobs were real or not. His explanation was that the government was trying to show that 
it was implementing Mubarak’s electoral program, which included increasing job opportunities for 
Egyptians. As parliamentary elections were to take place in late 2010 and presidential elections in 
2011, Mubarak’s state was preparing to secure the support of the workers. These types of 
advertisements were thus helping, in theory at least, to create the perception that jobs were being 
created and to sustain workers’ hopes for contracts at EISCO. This was a wider practice adopted by the 
Egyptian state, especially in the late stage of Mubarak’s era, where jobs would be repeatedly 
advertised, only for people to find out later they were not real and the advertisements were simply 
used to enable the selective recruitment of a limited number of people.  
 
 The applications in response to the advertisement were not, to my knowledge, either opened 
or reviewed until 6 months later, when a new CEO came to the plant.  But for daily workers, the 
advertisement was an additional source of frustration. None of the daily workers I interviewed on our 
mill considered putting in an application. Most told me it would all be based on connections and kusa -
literally meaning ‘courgette’ – the word used in Egyptian Arabic to speak of something being corrupt. 
Most did not believe it was worth the effort. If anything, it made them less certain of getting their 
long-awaited jobs, if they were now competing with new applicants. The advertisement did indeed 
encourage many “outsiders” and permanent workers, whose children and relatives were not at EISCO 
already, to apply for jobs. Now, they in their turn were hoping for contracts at EISCO. Thus if the real 
economy in Egypt was failing to meet people’s needs, an alternative economy of ‘hope’ had to be 
erected and maintained in order to contain the masses and keep them from despairing altogether. Of 
course if these farces were repeated too often, citizens would then stop believing in them.  But 
because these openings would usually lead to a few real jobs here and there, the rationale of waiting 
for a job did not lose meaning all together.   
 
Most importantly, the very logic of the police state that Egypt had become, especially in the 
late Mubarak era, meant that decisions over jobs were not made solely on economic bases, but also – 
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even mostly – on security grounds. Near to the end of my research inside the plant, around 8 months 
before the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2010, the Minister of Investment visited 
EISCO. On his visit he ordered that all workers should get an extra monthly bonus. The decision 
seemed completely illogical given that this was a state that was struggling with neo-liberal cuts in 
public spending, and given that no workers’ demands, riots or revolts for increased pay had erupted 
during this period at EISCO (although many riots were taking place in other public plants across Egypt). 
But this decision to distribute bonuses, as many understood it, was an attempt to buy workers’ 
support for Mubarak’s ruling party, the National Democratic Party, in the period before the 
elections54. These sudden decisions to throw in money here and there made workers somehow always 
anticipate a sudden change in policy regarding jobs, or the possibility of some fake advertisement 
turning into a real one. In October 2010 two months following the end of my fieldwork, I learnt, that 
management had given all daily workers at EISCO temporary contracts.  The decision seemed 
surprising at first, but made sense in the light of the  elections the following month. The continuous 
process of “not knowing what tomorrow brings”, however, as Egyptians in general and workers in 
particular often repeated, made the waiting and hoping for a job increasingly agonising for workers.  
“Whenever I ask my boss *about why contracts are not coming forth+, he says this is a national policy” 
Shams told me, “but nobody speaks about us”.  
 
VIII. Work as Stability and Future 
 
Daily workers used words such as ʾ istiqrar, ‘stability’ and mustqbal,‘future’ to describe what a 
job at EISCO meant to them. Most of them had worked in the private sector before, but found the 
irregularity of work, the long hours, heavy workload, strict work regimes, lack of rights and 
managements’ ability to dismiss them at any time hard to endure. EISCO represented one of the very 
few opportunities to find a sense of security and an ability to plan for the future, given the stability 
that the anticipated temporary contracts, which would eventually lead to permanent ones, could 
guarantee. The fact that, now that they worked for the state, rather than “for somebody”, they were 
no longer threatened with the possibility of being thrown out of work at any time was often identified 
by daily and temporary workers alike as a major source of security (and pride). While many public 
plants across Egypt were being privatised, downsized or liquidated under-neoliberalism, and real 
                                               
54
  One of the most startling things I discovered during the research was that the CEO of EISCO also had to act as 
the head of the National Democratic Party in al-Tibbin. The newly appointed CEO had in fact never been an NDP 
member but was asked to become one before his candidacy, so that he could go through the state security checks. He 
was then appointed the head of the NDP in al-Tibbin as soon as he became a CEO. 
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salaries in the public sector were going down, overall wages at EISCO had been rising steadily because 
of its political importance to the state. As Tarek told me: working in steel, cement or oil companies 
was said by workers to be ‘the primo’, and a source of material stability.  
 
But stability, as I have argued, is not just about material security. Considering stability as a 
value represented in the circulation of permanent work contracts enables us to understand the ways 
in which it is important to the community, in expressing relationality. Hoping for and desiring ʾistqrār 
('stability'), which workers describe as the goal of their work, should be seen in the light of wider ways 
in which labour is valued and people earn respect in Egyptian working class communities.  ʾistqrār 
enables workers to expand on their relations in the community, whether by marrying and reproducing 
or by earning the respect of others for fulfilling their relations to the household and community.   
 
The very idea that employment at the plant brought with it a ‘future’ was to a large extent 
related to the stability that came with permanent work in such a plant. One of the most indicative 
results I found in the survey I conducted in the plant was that almost none of the daily workers were 
able to join the local savings groups that were widespread in their community, in contrast to 
permanent and temporary workers, most of whom had become avid participants in these groups. 
Local saving groups, which are prevalent among neighbours, and sometimes among plant workers, 
require a steady income and are a popular way to plan for and work toward most major investments 
in the future, from marrying a son, to buying a house or land, to buying the gold offered as bride 
wealth, depending on the size of the saving group. For example, as soon as ʾ Amgad got his temporary 
contract, his mother encouraged him to join one of the local savings groups to start planning for his 
wedding, and he began making marriage plans. The very fact that workers could initiate such future-
oriented projects as soon as their incomes stabilised reflects why this job is considered ‘a future’.  
 
But the sense of ‘a future’ that workers spoke of was not just limited to future material gains 
they could make, but included a rather wider sense of futurity in the very organisation of their time as 
well. A sharp contrast was evident between the period when ʾAmgad's work life was very unstable, 
and the following year when he finally got a contract. I suggested that we could work together the 
following week, and also enquired why he hadn’t gone on the summer trip with his sister and the rest 
of the family. Jokingly, ʾAmgad responded “Wait, but I am now a muwaẓẓaf [usually meaning 
somebody who is formally employed, often in public sector or white collar work] I now have an annual 
vacation credit and sick leave that I must organise my plans according to”. The job at the plant 
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structured his experience of being in time in a way that enabled him to predict how his life could be 
structured over a longer period. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reported on the physical and social discrimination to which daily workers at 
the very bottom of the labour hierarchy at EISCO are subjected. To further understand their work 
experience, it examined daily workers’ aspirations to get contracts and the social context in which 
these aspirations grow into forms of everyday frustration. I have illustrated how these aspirations are 
politically manipulated by the state, making them a source of agony and trauma for daily workers. In 
absolute terms, daily workers at EISCO are far from being the most destitute of the Egyptian working 
classes. However, understanding their work experience in absolute terms risks missing the very 
conditions and meanings of their experience. It might seem that the pain of upwardly mobile people, 
so to speak, should not particularly merit our sympathy. But unless we take into consideration the 
complexities behind aspirations and life conditions, we have very little understanding of how these 
factors structure people’s lives. As Sennett and Cobb have argued, the changes in the lives of the 
workers who have followed an upwardly mobile path “mean more to them than a chance, or a failure, 
to acquire middle class things” (Sennett and Cobb 1972, p.18). Describing the case of upwardly mobile 
American workers from migrant origins, they also add that “the story these workingmen have to tell is 
not just who they are but what are the contradictory codes of respect in the America of their 
generation” (Sennett and Cobb, 1972 p.23). 
 
Permanent workers on the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill repeatedly told me that the media covers 
‘the youth problem’ but nobody covers the ‘fathers’ problem’; i.e. that of those who fail to secure jobs 
for their children, especially at EISCO, where fathers play such a big role in recruitment. Those men 
said that they were often compared by their families to others who had managed to get their children 
jobs, and were judged for their failure.  “It was as if they *family members+ were telling me I was of no 
value “ʾaka-innan-hum b-yqulu li ʾinta ma-lak-shi qima” an old permanent worker told me. At the 
same time, the senior manager responsible for administering temporary workers’ applications 
constantly complained of the stress these applications put him under. When the aforementioned job 
advertisement was made, he said: “for the five lawyer positions advertised, we have received 10,000 
applications. My phone has not stopped ringing, and every day I go back home, I have to go meet x 
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and y, who want to discuss the new job openings. The application period in the newspaper is a month, 
so the one who knows tells the one who doesn’t, and by the end, the whole of Badrashin (his local 
area) wants to work here. Sometimes the CEO himself wonders if the company is going to solve the 
whole of Egypt’s unemployment problem!”   
 
In turn, temporary workers spoke of not knowing whether they would be made permanent, given 
that at the time of my research most had not yet been there for three years, which is the period of 
temporary work required by law before getting a permanent contract. Temporary workers therefore 
could not be sure whether they would be dispensed with at any time. If everybody at EISCO was 
frustrated, how then could daily workers’ experiences be evaluated? I have suggested that to 
understand the experience of work and the vexation it may bring for members of different groups, it 
should be analysed within the context of the value of work in these groups’ lives and their ability to 
reproduce the values of their societies as a whole.  The intersections between people’s values and the 
politics of the institutions they are reproduced within are key to capturing this experience of work. By 
looking at the various ways ‘stability’ was articulated by different actors and institutions and how it 
was turned, at EISCO, from a social value into a productivist one embedded in calculative 
arrangements, I have highlighted the complex forms of government informing repressive and divisive 
labour regimes.  
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Chapter Five: Malik al- Nῑsh, the Gaze and Struggles for Family Reproduction 
among EISCO Households 55   
 
I. Introduction 
 
On a hot summer day in August 2010, duktur (‘doctor’) Hussam and I visited the family of ʿ amm 
Medhat in the balad (‘place’, but here meaning ‘village’) of al-Maraziʾ. ʿamm Medhat was our 
neighbour in al-Tibbin and duktur Hussam’s colleague in EISCO’s administration.56 In addition to the 
flat he owned in al-Tibbin, ʿamm Medhat had also recently built a Bayt ʿāʾila (‘family house’) in al-
Maraziʾ, his original home village, which is across the Nile from al-Tibbin and continues to house a 
large group of EISCO workers. ʾ Umm Lama, his wife, and their four children spent the three month-long 
summer vacation in the village every year. 
 
Lama, their eldest daughter and a final year sociology student at Helwan University, was 
getting married in two months’ time to a patrilineal cousin in the village. Lama’s gihāz (‘trousseau’) 
was piled up in one of the many rooms of this spacious village house.57 Her gihāz contained some of the 
most expensive household items, ranging from bed linen to kitchen utensils and from china to table 
napkins. After Lama and her mother showed me the gihāz, ʿamm Medhat remarked that he had just 
spent 15,000 EGP (approx. 1,500 GBP) on it in one day of shopping only, without even exhausting all 
the items on the list that Lama had prepared. ʿamm Medhat, like many EISCO men heading 
households, believed that having a marriageable daughter these days is a hamm (‘cause for concern’). 
He went on to explain that a daughter’s marriage today costs between 20,000 to 45,000 EGP (approx. 
2,000-4,500 GBP), which is higher than the average for a son’s marriage, which costs up to 25,000 
(approx. 2,500 GBP). Unlike the groom, who is responsible for renting a house, buying electrical 
supplies and all wooden furniture, the gold for the bride, mahr (‘dowry’), and the expenses of the 
wedding night, the bride,  or more accurately her family, is responsible for the gihāz, which consists 
primarily of consumer goods, whose prices have soared over the years. 
                                               
55
 During my fieldwork I promised the workers whose daughters were soon to be married that a chapter in my thesis 
would be devoted to malik al-nῑsh (‘the king of the niche’). I hereby fulfil that promise. 
 
56
 Duktur Hussam is the generous friend who lent me his house in the company town in al-Tibbin. ʿamm Medhat had 
an industrial middle qualification but ended up working in the planning department when he was offered a choice 
early in his career between working on the shop-floor or the administration, and opted for the option that demanded 
less hard work. 
 
57
 Gihāz is offered in the form of consumer goods to the bride and groom. 
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 ʿamm Medhat added, however, that it was women particularly that contributed to the increase 
in gihāz prices, since they were the ones who visited each others’ houses most often. This was more so 
in the village, where people knew each other well, he said.  Hajj ʿUmar, another EISCO worker I 
interviewed in the nearby village of Niguʿ al-ʿArab, said the same thing. Hajj ʿUmar also believed that 
these days girls and their mothers bi-yibuṣū l- baʿḍ (‘look to each other’) – by which he meant that they 
compare themselves to other mothers and daughters –  and thus,  end up buying “endless sets of 
towels and a thousand tea sets to put in the nīsh (‘niche’)”. 
 
The nīsh was introduced to the gihāz sometime within the past two decades. A furniture item 
common in many bourgeois houses, the nīsh consists of a wooden showcase, which the bride fills with 
different sets of china, and various tea sets and glasses. Throughout my fieldwork, male workers 
complained about rising marriage expenses, but the niche is a particular target for protest. Hajj ʿ Umar 
for example, said “huwa al-nῑsh dah ḥāga kunna nismaʿ ʿanhā ʾabl kidah” (“is this niche anything we 
ever used to hear about before?”), ʿamm Medhat explained that the reason they despise that 
particular piece of furniture is that it just gets stuffed with drinking glasses and teacups that the bride 
and groom never use, but which remain there only for display. But Lama disagreed with her father. The 
point was not the use of the objects, she said, but that she had to buy the best items to display in the 
nīsh because “ʿanā baʿmil l-nafsῑ ʾ ῑma” (“I am making a value for myself”). She had to show her in-laws 
in the family house she was about to live in that she and her family were capable of buying the most 
luxurious items. 58 
 
While the nῑsh had become a common object in many EISCO and non EISCO households, it was 
malik al-nῑsh (“the king of the niche”) that disturbed EISCO workers the most and made conversations 
about marriage livelier. Malik al-nῑsh is a new addition among niche sets. It is a golden-painted tea set, 
consisting of a large teapot and accompanying teacups. It costs about 350-450 EGP (35- 45 GBP) and is 
placed at the centre of the niche as a status symbol –  much as the Bonbonnière en Sèvres sits at the 
centre of the niche in some aristocratic and upper-middle class houses. In a large majority of EISCO 
marriages, the daughters’ gihāz is now expected to include malik al-nῑsh. It had become the object of 
much joking among workers and their families. Some fathers wondered why they could not just buy a 
“prince of the niche” or even a ”guard *ghafīr+ of the niche”. ʿ amm Medhat, for example, dismissed all 
                                               
58
According to the list of prices that Lama shared with me, the sets bought for Lama’s niche cost atotal of 1,565 EGP 
(156 GBP). This is approximately the cost of six months’ rent in some parts of the EISCO company town. 
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this as mere eccentricity, bidaʿ, and lamented the fact that new goods and practices were being 
constantly introduced.   
 
An integral part of EISCO’s recent social history is encapsulated by the access to items such as 
the niche and its “king”.  The negotiations around consumption practices among households of EISCO 
workers highlight wider social reproduction politics and aspirations in al-Tibbin. 
 
This chapter addresses EISCO workers’ sociality outside the plant. The previous chapters have 
illustrated how permanent workers occupy an elevated status on the shop-floor that enables them to 
de-facto control the workload and work relations.  Outside the gates of the plant, in areas where 
EISCO workers reside – such as the company town, the satellite cities in Helwan and in the villages 
surrounding the plant – permanent EISCO workers have also acquired a status similar to that of the 
middle classes in these areas. This status makes their households distinguishable in terms of structure, 
lifestyle and aspirations from those of other casual workers and to a certain extent of organised 
workers in the private sector who live in the bīyūt ʾ ahālī (‘family housing’) surrounding the company 
town.59 I look at the variety of households that have emerged with EISCO in order to link the individual 
histories of their inhabitants to the transformations in the political economy of the steel industry over 
time.60  I then compare the households of EISCO employees to those of casual workers, who live on 
the borders of the company town, in bīyūt ʾahālī.  The argument is that there is a stark difference 
between the life conditions of EISCO households and those of bīyūt ʾ ahālī. 61  The first is redolent of a 
labour aristocracy, whose interests often conflict with those of bīyūt ʾahālī residents. The ability of 
future EISCO generations to continue living the good lives of their families depends on inhibiting the 
social mobility of members of bīyūt ʾ ahālī. In other words, for the potentiality of their permanent work 
to be realised as a valuable property, permanent workers have to exclude bīyūt ʾ ahālī members from 
accessing it.  
 
                                               
59
 bīyūt ʾahālī often refers to housing built by people informally rather than state-planned, private or public, houses. 
The name reflects their run-down and impoverished status. Bīyūt ʾahālī in al-Tibbin today house both the tabābna, 
who are the sons of the soil in al-Tibbin and a large number of casual workers’ households. The houses are on the 
edges of the EISCO company town.  
 
60
 Throughout the chapter I use household and family interchangeably. As Mundy (1996) argues: “the distinction 
between household (actual domestic arrangements) and family (understandings governing the right relations between 
kin) *is+ proving singularly infertile for the analysis of Arab societies” (Mundy, 1996, p. 89). 
 
61
 EISCO households are not limited to the company town. They are spread all over Helwan and Giza mostly in rural 
areas and new satellite towns. In this chapter I only focus on the households in the company town given the sheer 
numbers and diversity of EISCO households elsewhere, which are difficult to cover systematically in this study. 
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EISCO households, though somewhat distinct as a group from those of bīyūt ʾahālī, are 
nevertheless by no means homogenous. One permanent worker and resident of the company town 
described EISCO’s households in the town quite accurately when he said they were made of “peaks 
and slippery slopes” (qimam wa munḥadarāt). By focusing on the quest for social mobility among this 
aristocracy of labour and the problems some of them face in extending their place in the social 
hierarchy to their children, this chapter highlights why many members of the EISCO community find 
the company town quite polarised. Put simply: some EISCO households have been more socially 
mobile and have become bourgeoisified. Others have failed to reproduce their social position and find 
themselves sinking into the more proletarian condition of casual workers in bīyūt ʾ ahālī. These internal 
distinctions among EISCO households are marked by their relative degree of differentiation from the 
residents of bīyūt ʾ ahālī. The latter, in a sense, contribute to the politics of ‘rise and fall’ among EISCO 
households by providing a yardstick against which they are measured. The changes in workers' 
relations and statuses inside the factory are thus traced here within the larger frame of the 
neighbourhood and locality. I look at how the neighbourhood is re-formed and re-negotiated along 
workers' status lines, taking lead from Donner's (2006) suggestion that the neighbourhood should not 
be considered by anthropologists only as a backdrop to the research, but that spatial delineations in 
the locality are implicated in the gender and class politics of the community.  
 
The proximity of bīyūt ʾahālī and the EISCO households makes them both integral to the way 
they view each other, and most importantly, to the way they view themselves. While EISCO 
households represent, to bīyūt ʾ ahālī households, the meaning of stability, the residents of bīyūt ʾ ahālī 
are a negative reminder to EISCO households of the consequences of no longer being part of an 
aristocracy of labour. Class is hence always relational in that it is expressed by groups in performance 
to others.  The imaginative appropriations of social status in al-Tibbin influence EISCO households’ 
everyday interactions with the residents of bīyūt ʾ ahālī and the way they prioritise their economic and 
social investments. Upwardly mobile EISCO households, who are a new middle-class, distance 
themselves from the residents of bīyūt ʾ ahālī in order to affirm their newly acquired status. They call 
them zibāla (‘rubbish’) or sūqiyyīn (‘market people’) and refrain from interacting with them outside 
formal occasions. This group’s preoccupation with the way they look, how they maintain themselves 
in society and the objects they own marks their social transition. On the other hand, the EISCO 
households that have been unable to meet their own social expectations often have to interact with 
the residents of bīyūt ʾ ahālī in order to generate capital and expand their relationality. They therefore 
cannot treat the residents of bīyūt ʾahālī with the same disdain as the first group, but must focus on 
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distinguishing themselves through an increased preoccupation with their images and with ‘perfecting 
the self’. Being even more focused on consumption and calculative practices, they worry about others’ 
looks, looking at others and comparing themselves in the community. Consumption practices are not 
only the outcome of social mobility, but more importantly a means by which the households that face 
a perilous future avoid social degradation. The gaze of others thus embodies the intimate politics of 
class. It conveys both the desire to construct relations in the community and be recognised by others 
as well as how social values overlap with market values as lives become progressively privatised and 
financialised.  
 
 Since the inception of EISCO, workers’ households have distanced themselves from the 
residents of bīyūt ʾahālī, perhaps in a subdued attempt to legitimise their stay on their expropriated 
land. But the recent gentrification of al-Tibbin made them even more invested in separating 
themselves from the latter. EISCO households have usually labelled al-tabābna, the predominant 
members of bīyūt ʾahālī, ḥarāmiyya (‘thieves’) for being involved in crimes (often targeting the 
infrastructure of the company town). The latter refer to EISCO households as ʾagānib (‘foreigners’), 
who are occupying their lands. Yet, the privatisation of the housing in the company town since 2006 - 
which allowed EISCO workers to buy the houses they rented from the plant and re-sell them on the 
market as they pleased - and the liberalisation of rents under the new tenancy law in 1996, have 
allowed some of the wealthy residents of bīyūt ʾahālī to move into the company town and become 
neighbours of EISCO households. This new physical proximity has thus accentuated distinctions that 
previously existed in the largely matter of mind. This latest stage in the long, history of relationships 
between households in the EISCO company town and those in bīyūt ʾahālī suggests that their lives 
have been so interwoven that their stories cannot be narrated separately.  
 
The chapter will first provide a brief background about the spatial arrangement of al-Tibbin. It 
will then follow with a theoretical discussion to frame the relation between factory, family and 
neighbourhood. The relation between consumption practices and the gaze is then presented before 
moving on to narrating life histories of different families from different parts of al-Tibbin and drawing 
some conclusions about the implication of market-isation of the town. 
 
II. The Archaeological Layers of the Company Town 
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The geography of al-Tibbin mirrors the historical evolution of the plant since its inception in the 
1950s.62 The company town, which accommodates EISCO households, occupies the central area of al-
Tibbin, extending from the gates of the plant in the east of the town almost up to the main road along 
the Nile to the west. The houses of al-tabābna, the original residents of al-Tibbin, were initially built 
on the agricultural land where the plant and the company town were later erected following the land 
grab. The houses have since been pushed to the fringes of the company town and al-tabābna now 
reside in bīyūt ʾahālī, groups of which surround the company town to the north and south, with a 
smaller group to the west by the banks of the Nile.  
 
The company town, on the other hand, is divided primarily into two main areas; Madinat al-
Sulb al-ʾAdima (‘The Old Steel City’) and Masākin al-Sulb al-Gadida (‘The New Steel Housing’). The first 
area was built with the inception of the plant in 1954 and is located in the area right by the plant 
gates. The second was built around the 1970’s to accommodate the new workers who were employed 
when the plant was expanded.  The New Steel Housing is adjacent to the Old Steel City and extends 
almost up to the main road by the Nile to the west of the al-Tibbin. The differences between Madinat 
al-Sulb al-ʾAdima and Masakin al-Sulb al-Gadida reflect the development of the steel industry over 
time. The inhabitants of the Old Steel City are considered the privileged members of the community. 
This is evident in the names that other residents of al-Tibbin, including those who live in the New Steel 
Housing, use when referring to them - for example as ‘bahāwāt’ or ‘fāfī’ . Bahāwāt is, according to The 
Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic (Hinds & Badawi, 1987) the plural of bey, which was formerly used as a 
court title for the second-highest ranking officers or officials.  Fāfī is slang for someone who is spoiled 
and does not have a strong character. As the wife of a steel worker who lives in the New Steel Housing 
remarked, the discursive contrast between 'The City', the abbreviation of The Old Steel City, which in 
everyday communication is referred to as 'The City' and  ‘The Housing', the newer part of EISCO’s 
company town, ‘The New Steel Housing', which is commonly referred to as ‘The Housing', itself 
reflects this difference in status between both areas.  
 
While the difference between bīyūt ʾ ahālī and the company town is the most striking for first-
time visitors to al-Tibbin, the difference in status between ‘The City’ and ‘The Housing’ is also 
important because it demarcates geographically the effects of the liberalisation of the economy since 
the 1970s on EISCO’s labour force. This difference captures the slow process of EISCO workers’ social 
fragmentation and differential success in reproducing their status which the previous chapters have 
                                               
62
 See figures 22 to 29 in Appendix for photo descriptions of the different areas in the company town. 
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highlighted. Although not all of the residents of the Old Steel City are successful in social reproduction, 
just as not all of those living in the New Steel City have failed in this field, the contrast between the 
general trends and characteristics of both spaces is revealing of the wider politics of reproduction in 
both areas.  Successful social reproduction depends on a variety of factors, which cannot be fully 
analysed in a limited project such as a PhD thesis. Ownership of land and other private property, 
support from family in the original home village, personal connections, moonlighting opportunities, 
access to credentials and personal perseverance and astuteness are all factors that contribute to 
families’ abilities to reproduce their position. For a labour force that approaches thirteen thousand 
workers, it has not been possible to systematically trace the influence of these factors, and a proper 
investigation of them is a task for future research.  For the task at hand, the spatial delineation of the 
EISCO workforce in upscale and modest areas, which mirrors its historical evolution and devolution 
over the long term, is one way to ask larger questions about the relational aspects of class politics. An 
exploration of the major characteristics and trends in each of the bīyūt ʾahālī, the Old Steel City and 
the New Steel Housing areas is necessary before further analysis is possible.  
 
a. Bīyūt ʾahālī  
 
al-Tabābna, the ‘sons of the soil’ in al-Tibbin, live in areas that are referred to generically as 
bīyūt ʾ ahālī, in reference to the type of housing prevalent in these areas. The sections they live in are 
also given specific names that sometimes reflect their living conditions. For example, al-Tibbin al-Balad 
and Tal ʾabib (‘Tel Aviv’) are located in the south of al-Tibbin. The name of the latter references the 
city in Israel, an indication of how harsh the conditions in the area are. al-Hikr al-Qibli, in the 
northwest, is an area known for the proliferation of drugs and arms, and al-Hikr al-Bahari, in the 
northeast,  is home to the tabābna, who were formally relocated by the state and given land titles 
after being displaced by the plant63 . Some of al-tabābna also reside and own land in the only 
remaining agricultural area north of al-Tibbin, called al-Malaʾa. al-Hikr al-Qibli, al-Hikr al-Bahari and al-
Malaʾa are separated from EISCO’s company town by a railway track that services the plant. The 
railway marks a boundary that separates the two communities. Bīyūt ʾahālī houses are easily 
distinguishable from those of the company town because they are made primarily of mud brick and 
                                               
63
 Ḥikr according to The Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic (Hinds & Badawi, 1987) means land owned by the government 
that is leased to a private tenant. This land is typically unused and rundown waqf land – an endowment under Islamic 
Law donated by a person or private entitiy for charitable ends and managed by the government’s ministry of ʾawqāf 
(plural for waqf). Ḥikr in everyday language often denotes a run-down and impoverished area.  
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are often only two to three stories high. The small workshops and little stores on the ground floors of 
the buildings animate the streets through day and night, while young people and children spend most 
of their time on the streets.  
 
The bīyūt ʾ ahālī are mainly inhabited by al-tabābna. The oral historical accounts have it that al-
tabābna were originally seven big families that settled in al-Tibbin and their offspring represent the 
majority of al-tabābna to date. Some of these families are of Bedouin origins, referred to as ʿarab. 
They remain in contact with the rest of the ʿarab tribes spread across Egypt, which increases their 
social networks. A few tabābna joined EISCO, but many did not. Those I interviewed have different 
explanations for this; some claim that they were often discriminated against for their large family 
backing, involvement in crimes and access to arms, and the more general reputation to be potential 
troublemakers. Others report that they themselves did not want to work in the plant because “al-
tabābna do not like working for somebody” and prefer working with kin and people in the same 
networks; while some did not want to work in the company that had stolen their land. Al-tabābna are 
divided between members of big families – primarily those who were able to keep the land, are 
involved in crime, have strong connections with the police and the local municipality and are generally 
quite wealthy – and the rest of the landless community, who are struggling to make ends meet on an 
everyday basis. Many of the wealthier tabābna, who were originally land-owners, have built brick 
factories in the nearby area of ʿarab Abu Saʿid, which used to belong to al-Tibbin. A large group of 
them also works in the scrap trade.   
 
 As mentioned earlier, residents of the company town are apt to refer to al-tabābna as 
‘thieves’. But the poorer members of al-tabābna are also not averse to using this same term to refer 
to their own community. They find that the criminal practices of the members of larger and wealthier 
families, who manage at times to recruit some of the poorer members of the community into their 
projects, bring this reputation to their community. For example, the EISCO rail tracks near the plant, 
which are used for transporting the iron ore from the mines in the eastern desert, are often stolen by 
tabābna for resale as scrap. Some al-tabābna also cooperate with the local police in collecting ʾ itawa 
(‘protection money’) from the micro-bus drivers that go from al-Tibbin to various places. Some of the 
disputed empty land within the company town is often taken over wadʿ yadd (‘a claim of ownership, 
of a piece of land usually, by means of force/settling on the land) by members of powerful families of 
al-tabābna, who argue that they are reclaiming the land originally stolen by the state, a practice that 
also increased following the 2011 revolution.  In addition, following the revolution, they have been 
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accused of being responsible for breaking into the plant to steal spare parts, leading the military 
council in charge in 2011-2012, at the plea of EISCO workers, to send in tanks to protect the plant.  
 
While the criminal activities of al-tabābna might reflect the power that large families have and 
their involvement in corrupt networks with the police, it also speaks of a community that is utterly 
oppressed, which often uses criminal activities as a fast, and perhaps even justifiable, means of 
accessing cash. The majority of al-tabābna, who are not wealthy members of big families, work as 
drivers, barbers, casual daily workers on construction sites, in brick factories, in the private sector or in 
small workshops. A large majority, especially of young people, is seasonally unemployed, and most 
struggle to find employment altogether. Recreational drug use, especially of cheap prescription drugs 
generically referred to as birshām (‘medicine’)  – most commonly painkillers such as tramadol, locally 
nicknamed farāwla (‘strawberry’) – are used widely by tabābna young people. 64  The distinction 
between al-tabābna, or more generally, those who live in bīyūt ʾahālī, and those who live in the 
company town is clear in the characteristics of both living conditions and family structures. al-Tabābna 
have large family sizes and their family members have little education. ʿamm zinhum, a tibbīnī I 
interviewed in bīyūt ʾ ahālī, told me what others from the community also repeated: “fil-tibbin  niẓām 
ʿaʿilāt ʾamā fil ṣulb niẓām ʿafrād” – (“al-Tibbin is based on a family system but the Steel [housing and 
city+ is an individual system”).65 He said, “ʾiḥnā hinā māl wi ʿizwa” – (“we are *dependent+ here on 
money and *large family+ backing”). 66 Young people in al-Tibbin, especially females, marry quite early, 
and very rarely work. The early age of marriage reflects the inability to financially support daughters 
for long periods of time and the low expectations about the marriage match. Work is also considered 
taboo for women among the poorer sections of society. But not all those who are in bīyūt ʾahālī are 
tabābna, some are migrants from different parts of the country, who have come to work in Helwan 
with tabābna; however, they share  large family sizes, low level of education, early age of marriage, 
restrictions on female work and precarious working and living conditions.  There are hardly any EISCO 
workers that are residents of bīyūt ʾahālī. 
 
b. The Old Steel City 
 
                                               
64
 The use of recreational drugs, especially painkillers, is also prevalent among youth in the company town but not to 
the same extent as in bīyūt ʾahālī areas. Cannabis, which is more expensive, is more in use among the former. 
 
65
 By al-Tibbin, here ʿamm Zinhum means the housing of al-Tabābna, i.e the bīyūt ʾahālī. 
 
66
 ʿizwa is a way to speak about having too many children that then become your source of pride, backing and support. 
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The Old Steel City, commonly known as The City, was built as the original company town of 
EISCO. Four-storey buildings, with two flats on each floor, are spread across the town. Each flat is a 
two-bedroom apartment. The houses were first inhabited by workers who were employed at EISCO as 
daily contract workers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These workers later acquired permanent 
work contracts and settled in The City. Today, their houses are mostly occupied by their children, who 
are themselves workers in the plant. Over time the household of The City became the privileged 
residents of al-Tibbin.  
 
Everything about The City makes it quite distinguishable from the rest of the housing in al-
Tibbin. It is marked by vast spaces and a quietness that are unknown in Cairo, one of the most densely 
populated capitals of the world. Transportation around The City are scarce. Most travelling is done on 
foot or by bicycle, which men use primarily to go to and from the plant. It is one of the very few spaces 
in Egypt were bicycle riding is not deemed an activity of ‘low status’. A few residents own private cars, 
which eases their mobility compared to the rest. The micro-buses that lead from The Housing to the 
roundabout at the centre of the City are the only connection between The City residents and the 
outside world, including the local stores and markets that abound in The Housing. Otherwise, The City 
is a self-enclosed space. Only a small vegetable market, surrounded by a handful of stores and a now 
defunct EISCO food cooperative, are found within in it. The prices at its market are higher than those 
in the main market by the main road near The Housing. To accommodate the lack of instant supplies, 
a few residents have secured permits from the local municipality through connections to open kiosks 
on the main streets, often right by their houses. These kiosks, which are run by residents to service 
other residents, further add to The City’s sense of seclusion. The shutters of the houses are also often 
closed because of The City’s proximity to one of the most polluting industries in Egypt, which showers 
every house with a daily share of dust. The closed shutters add to the sense of privacy and seclusion of 
the area.  The buildings in The City were originally separated by large spaces of greenery, but these 
were recently destroyed by the local municipality on an account of their alleged use as narcotic 
plantations and the improper sexual behaviour that took place in the bushes. Palm trees, which date 
back to when it was agricultural land owned by al-tabaābna, abound in The City, forcibly reminding its 
residents of the ‘original theft’ that gave birth to this place.  
 
The City also houses other institutions affiliated with EISCO.  These include the social and 
sporting club of the plant, which was established for household members of EISCO workers. The club 
has a large football ground, a swimming pool, a hockey pitch (EISCO was famous for its nationally-
174 
 
leading hockey team), a children’s playground, a special occasions ballroom, and a gym that offered 
aerobics classes for the female residents of the area at the time of my fieldwork. EISCO workers who 
could afford it organised their families’ wedding celebration in the plants’ club, often beside the 
swimming pool. This was considered more prestigious than traditional weddings that usually take 
place on the streets near to one’s house.  The city also houses the technical industrial school adjunct 
to the plant, whose students spend their last year training inside the plant. A metallurgical research 
centre affiliated to the Metallurgical Holding Company, a post office, a police station, a surgery 
hospital, and the now-defunct former headquarters of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party in al-
Tibbin are all also located in The City.  
 
 Every household in The City occupies a spacious two-bedroom apartment. These houses are 
mainly allocated to workers, because Engineers are said to have refused to live among workers, 
especially at the inception of the plant. My rough household survey shows, however, that a small 
number of engineers do in fact occupy some of the houses. The living conditions in the City reflect the 
path of social mobility of its inhabitants.  Having mostly joined the plant in a fairly destitute state, the 
inhabitants of The City fared well in the years that followed, which marked the peak of Nasser’s 
welfare policies. ʾUmm Kamal, one of the first residents, who arrived in The City with her husband, 
who joined the plant in 1959, was keen to share her recollections of the social transformation of the 
area. She tells me that at first nobody wanted to live in al-Tibbin. It was, she said, rather like living in 
the midst of the hills that surrounded the plant and the area was so empty, it was hard to do any 
convenience shopping, even for salt.  An EISCO bus transported the household members of employees 
to Helwan in order to do their shopping. Only those who had nothing to lose were willing to take a risk 
of living in this place. But ʿAbdou, the son of her neighbour in the same building and now a worker 
himself in the plant, reckons his father's generation became well off rather easily and quickly because 
kanū ʿāyshīn bi-balāsh ('they lived for free'). They did not have to pay for electricity or water usage, 
rent payments to the plant were very low, house maintenance was undertaken by plant technicians, 
they did not use transportation to and from work and members of their households were often 
transported by plant buses, including children who were dropped off at their respective schools and 
universities. It made for something like a “free life”.  
 
 This ease of life is reflected in household forms and child rearing strategies. The City is known 
for the high average number of children of its households compared to the average number of 
children of later EISCO workers, although it was not higher than the average completed fertility in the 
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1950s of eight children per mother (Robinson & El-Zanaty, 2005). Households in The City were also 
famous for the high level of schooling and education and the large proportion of children who were 
later employed in the plant. Daughters of the first generation workers were often able to complete 
university and female employment was prevalent, especially because many of the daughters of the 
workers occupied positions in the plant administration. Polygamy was more prevalent among male 
workers of the first generation in The City. They could afford to set up two different households. 
Divorce rates and unmarried women were also both high among their female children, reflecting that 
these women had the means to await the right suitor and to break up a conjugal unit and return to 
the paternal household to be supported by the father. Inter-marriage among children of the first 
generation of workers was common, as the young men met the aspirations of upwardly mobile 
households with marriageable daughters. Many of these daughters also ‘married well’ to doctors, 
engineers and business men and went to live in the Gulf.  The City households thus built up a form of 
social capital in the relations they fostered with each other and later by marrying one another. 
 
 ʾUmm Reda, for example, the daughter of a steel worker who grew up in The City but is now 
married to another steel worker and has lived in The Housing for over thirty years, summarises how 
the residents of The City are viewed by others. In The City, she says, “three quarters of them, their 
children have higher education and have travelled abroad. This is different from here. There you find 
the doctor, the lawyer and the engineer because people are old and their children moved up. They 
were people with high salaries back then. These are the bahāwāt (‘those of higher status’). They are 
different from us.” 
 
In addition to the housing allocated to workers since the 1950’s, a few other types of housing 
also exist in The City. The first are locally known as al-talātāt (‘the threes’), which are located in a 
special area in the North East of the City and are originally allocated to engineers and foremen. These 
buildings owe their name to being three-bedroom apartments. The city also boasts a few villas by the 
gates of the plant, which were allocated to the earlier CEOs and heads of mills whose families have 
retained them. When the Soviet technical experts assisted in the building of the second part of the 
plant between the late 1960s and early 1970s, they were provided separate housing to accommodate 
their families within The City. This area came to be known as the ‘Russian Experts’ City’. Residents of 
The City have a lot of memories from having lived side by side with the Soviets. While some recall how 
they were formally segregated, most of them remember the friendly exchanges they had. These 
exchanges add to The City residents’ sense of pride in their cosmopolitan character. When the Soviet 
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experts were expelled from Egypt by Sadat in the 1970s, their housing was allocated to EISCO workers, 
especially those with large families who needed to relocate to wider appartments. 
 
 Finally, The City also houses the ʿimārat ḥadīthat al-tashyyīd (‘newly built buildings’), which 
were built in the 1990s on the empty green areas between the old buildings of The City in order to 
accommodate more households from EISCO’s labour force. These are six-storey buildings, which were 
sold directly to workers in instalments in the late 1990s, in contrast to the rest of the houses in the 
company town, which employees rented from the plant up to 2006 when the housing was privatised. 
The newly built buildings were thus the first to accommodate ‘newcomers’ to the company town, who 
had bought or rented flats from EISCO workers. Apart from the new buildings, most of the buildings in 
The City are rather run down and dilapidated with leaking broken water pipes flooding waters onto 
the back of the houses, broken stairs and dim hallways. Maintenance used to be done by EISCO 
workers on behalf of the plant, but this stopped in the 1990s, as the plant increasingly decreased its 
welfare responsibilities towards residents. The state of The City buildings reflects the changing history 
of the plant, displaying a marked contrast between the spacious concrete shells themselves and their 
run down facilities, which have deteriorated over the years. 
 
c. The New Steel Housing 
 
 
Life in The New Steel Housing, commonly referred to as “The Housing”, is rather different from 
“The City”. The Housing shares none of the quietness and seclusion of The City. The main street 
leading in is busy with local shops that remain open throughout the day and night. They range from 
hairdressers, to pharmacies, to food and clothing shops, whose number seemed to increase every 
time I visited the area. The streets of The Housing are also busy with micro-buses, making its 
inhabitants quite mobile and engaged with the rest of the world. The Housing is also closer to the 
bīyūt ʾahālī areas, which surround from the north, west and south. The facilities in The Housing thus 
cater both to the EISCO workers and to the residents of bīyūt ʾahālī. The streets of the Housing are 
much more animated with young people and children, who also make use of the facilities in the area 
such as the local youth centre, the main schools, where most children of al-Tibbin are enrolled, and a 
private park. The area also includes the plant's consumer goods cooperative, which sells furniture, 
household supplies and children toys to EISCO workers in instalments; the main food market, which 
lies between the Housing and the bīyūt ʾ ahālī in the west; the private clinics of the local doctors, and 
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the main micro-bus stop. The Housing is the part of the company town that is always under pressure, 
in that it caters not only to its own residents but also to those of The City and the bīyūt ʾahālī. It 
represents in a sense, the “squeezed middle”. 
 
The Housing was built in the seventies to accommodate the growing number of workers at 
EISCO, especially following its expansion with Soviet assistance. The expansions had increased the 
workforce by almost 6,000 new employees in 1973 and then by another 5,500 in 1974. The total 
workforce had thus doubled from 10,973 employees in 1972 to 21,372 in 1974. Instead of two 
apartments with double bedrooms on each of the four floors, as in The City, The Housing buildings are 
each five storeys high with four apartments on every floor. Each apartment has one bedroom only, 
being referred to locally as ʾ uda wa ṣāla (‘a bedroom and reception apartment’). The relatively smaller 
living spaces by contrast to The City houses has thus influenced its household forms.  
 
But household structures were also affected by the significant reduction in state welfare 
provisions since the mid-1980s. The second generation of workers who inhabited The Housing 
struggled with difficult living conditions compared to the first generation who had moved into the City 
in the late 1950s. The size and structure of the families reflect these struggles. Their everyday 
practices and aspirations do to. Though the children of workers who live in The Housing still have 
credentials, they are not as highly educated as those of the first group that settled in The City. By the 
time the new workers were raising families in  The Housing, one of the sectors that liberalisation had 
hit the hardest was the education sector.  Al-durūs al-khūsūsīyya (‘private tutorial lessons’), which cost 
families a significant amount of money, especially those that take education seriously, became a 
prerequisite of advancement and achievement through the school system and onto the university. At 
the same time, competition for coveted university spots in ‘kuliyāt al-qimma’ (the top schools’) 
intensified as enrolment numbers in these schools did not increase to match the rising number of 
graduates of the school system. This has often meant that most children of workers that had settled in 
The Housing either made it only to lower-ranking universities – what one worker called ‘kuliyāt al-
shaʿb’ (the peoples’ schools’) – or stopped after acquiring a middle qualification. In addition, because 
the public sector across Egypt stopped hiring new recruits in the early 1990s and unemployment 
among the university-educated as well as the middle-qualified soared by the 2000s, education 
gradually lost value as a means of accessing a high-ranking job, especially in the public sector.  
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Workers’ daughters in The Housing were significantly dispossessed when overall 
unemployment rates had skyrocketed. The de-regulation of capital and labour with the liberalisation 
of the economy had cut employment opportunities for females and further ingrained sexism in 
everyday life. The preference for female employment in the EISCO community had always been 
towards a wazīfa (a public sector job or a white collar one) because of the reduced working hours, 
maternity benefits and legal protection. With these opportunities virtually unavailable for women 
today, most females at The Housing were thus encouraged to stay at home. The contrast with the first 
generation’s daughters, many of whom had worked at EISCO was striking. The daughters in The 
Housing did, however, sometimes work a little before marrying- either in private textile firms (which 
were considered of low status in the community because of alleged stories of sexual and romantic 
affairs and harassment from employers) or in local shops- to contribute to expenses of their gīhāz. 
They generally stopped working soon after marriage. But even those who did not have a prejudice 
against non-wazīfa work struggled to find jobs that met their educational qualifications.  
 
Workers’ daughters were also encouraged to marry early, though not as early as daughters in 
the bīyūt ʾahālī. Female divorce rates and the rates of unmarried women were also not as high as in 
the first generation in The City dwellers. Intermarriage among The Housing community was limited. 
Many of the young men did not meet the upwardly-mobility aspirations of EISCO females and their 
families. They were more likely to find a bride from al-balad, their home village, or sometimes from 
the bīyūt ʾ ahālī. In either case they tended to prefer a bride who was referred to as waḥda ʿ āyza tiʿīsh 
(‘one who wants to live’) that is the a female that accepts moderate living standards and does not 
make as many demands as would one from a wealthy family with high upward mobility aspirations.   
 
This cap on the upward mobility that education and jobs had offered in the past, in addition to 
the exposure to an increasingly financialised economy, made the residents of The Housing more 
preoccupied with conspicuous consumption and with the way they appear in the gaze of others.  The 
pressure of the liberalisation of the economy thus fell largely on households in The Housing, both in 
terms of reduced material opportunities and reduced expectations about the type of life they could 
lead. It should however be noted that the second generation residents of The City also struggled with 
similar concerns regarding jobs and education and at times suffered more profoundly the effects of 
the onslaught of neo-liberalism. This is partly because of their heightened expectations of the good life 
they would lead, which were fostered by the experience of their fathers’ generation. As we shall see , 
the aspirations for and expectations of stability, as well as the material conditions of workers, 
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contributed to their sense of rise and fall, and to these “hidden injuries of class” (Sennett & Cobb, 
1972).  
 
d. al-Tibbin in Recent Years  
 
Although the difference between the company town (comprising both The City and The 
Housing) and bīyūt ʾ ahālī continues to be the most salient in al-Tibbin, over the years the gap between 
households that occupy these three distinct sets of housing has narrowed while distinctions began to 
become more evident within the EISCO workers’ community at large. The opening up, since the 
1990’s, of a few private-sector companies in the area where EISCO sons and bīyūt ʾahālī residents 
worked together, the introduction of early retirement packages for EISCO permanent workers in 2001, 
and the mass unemployment among young generations, especially the university-educated, have led 
to some of the blurring of the original distinctions. The fragmentation of the workforce around the 
reproduction of the domestic sphere made the social reproduction of the EISCO community at large 
more difficult and complex. But what deepened the distinctions among EISCO workers was the 
gentrification of the Company Town, following the liberalisation of housing rents in Egypt under law 4 
of 1996, commonly referred to as qānūn al-ʾīgār al-gadīd (‘the new tenancy law’), and EISCO’s policy in 
2006 to enable its employees to buy, in cash or in instalments over ten years, the apartments they had 
rented from the plant over the years. The houses were offered at markedly modest prices and the 
majority of the workers were able to buy their houses from the plant. Most permanent workers were 
thus able to transform their access to a permanent contract into a form of housing property that their 
children could inherit. The housing property market that resulted from privatisation changed the 
nature of the company town and opened it to non-EISCO residents. 
 
Until 2006, most workers rented houses from the plant under the old tenancy law, according 
which leases were for an indefinite period of time – what is generally called mushāhra. This allowed 
the tenants’ family members to keep the house following the death of the tenant so long as the family 
members could prove they had been living with the tenant during the period of his tenancy. The rents 
were also regulated by the state and were remarkably low (at EISCO’s company town they ranged 
from 16- to 25 EGP/month, which is approximately 1.6 to 2.5 GBP/month). In the mid 1990’s, EISCO 
attempted to implement a policy that required employees whose family members no longer lived in 
houses rented from the plant to relinquish them to the plant following the retirement of the 
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employee. The policy was strongly opposed by EISCO employees, however, and the decision was never 
implemented. Employees’ family members were thus allowed de-facto to inherit the housing 
property, even before they had legally bought it from the plant, which was possible from 2006 
onwards. Although this de-facto property increased workers’ sense of stability and ability to plan for 
the future, it did not significantly affect relations in the community. 
 
More recent changes in the housing market have, however, totally altered the composition of 
the Company Town and relations within it. In 1996, the new tenancy law gave landlords sole authority 
to control the terms of the tenancy agreements as well as the rent. Prices in the Company Town rose 
significantly from 250 to 450 EGP/month(25 to 45 GBP/month) and with a lease that in practice 
ranged from one to five years. EISCO workers who rented out their houses, which they had bought 
following their privatisation in 2006, now did so under the new tenancy law. They thus brought new 
wealthy tenants into the Company Town, mostly richer members of the al-tabābna, who had 
previously lived in the bīyūt ʾahāli.  In addition, the housing market in the Company Town catered to 
the new young fixed-term temporary contract workers, who wanted to live near the plant but, unlike 
permanent workers in the past, were no longer offered housing by the plant (not even when their 
contracts were made permanent towards the end of my fieldwork). When the value of the Company 
Town houses increased almost tenfold between 2006 and 2010 because of the demand and the 
increase in housing property prices in Egypt generally, many permanent workers decided instead to 
cash in on their property or simply rent it out under the new tenancy law and build new family houses 
(bīyūt ʾaila) in their home villages instead, in the nearby land of al-Malaʾa or in other satellite cities 
surrounding al-Tibbin. Doing so enabled them and their children to cope with the Egypt-wide ‘housing 
crisis’, which the young generations suffered due to their inability to pay the increasing rents. By 
housing their children in their large family houses, the fathers replaced the previous role played by the 
state in both protecting tenants and offering new workers accommodation at cheap prices.  
 
Meanwhile, in the Company Town, the liberalisation of the housing market and the increase in 
housing prices brought in new residents who had much more financial liquidity and who contributed 
to the increased financialisation of everyday life and the consumerist practices in the area. The new 
residents belonged in part to the new middle class, which a large part of the class literature on Egypt 
addresses (Abdel Moty, 2002, 2006; Siyam, 1991; Waterbury, 1983; Zaalouk, 1989). This new class is 
generally considered to encompass those who made their wealth following Sadat’s Infitah – open door 
policies – which liberalised the economy and thus favoured those who worked in the construction, 
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financial and trade sectors, as well as those who worked in the Gulf during the peak of the oil boom 
and state employees who managed to make private gains.  The new residents in the Company Town 
from merchants and traders originally from al-tabābna to young police officers, private school 
teachers and returnees from the Gulf were better equipped to sustain the rising food and commodity 
prices in the area over the following years, and their presence threatened the ability of some of the 
EISCO workers to reproduce their class positions since it interrupted the old community networks of 
solidarity that existed among EISCO households. The presence of this new group in the midst of EISCO 
workers also introduced new consumer practices that the latter could not afford. These changes to 
the housing market challenged the boundaries that had previously existed between different parts of 
al-Tibbin and hyper-financialised the exchanges in the community. This in turn made the distinctions 
between those EISCO workers who were able to successfully reproduce the elements of a good life 
they had previously enjoyed and those who were unable to do so much more visible, as the 
subsequent sections will demonstrate.  
 
III. Company, Family and Neighbourhood  
 
While previous chapters have highlighted how kinship relations on the shop-floor affect the 
work regime, this chapter examines the circulation of labour in the community and the way factory 
work relates to wider life trends within workers’ households and their communities. Parry (2001; 
2004; 2005; n.d.) maps the relations between the industry and the family. He finds that permanent 
and contract labour in the state-owned Bihlai Steel Plant (BSP) in India have different marriage and 
childbearing practices and expectations which result from the different employment systems to which 
they are subject. In addition, he locates certain practices among permanent labour, such as the 
"housewife-isation" of women in the attempts to distinguish their wives from the wives of contract 
labourers, whose jobs often compel them to grant sexual favours. The different employment systems 
not only produce different material conditions but also different aspirations. The rate of suicides 
among household members of BSP workers are higher than those of the casual labour, largely because 
of their inability to meet the expectations that their employment had fostered over the years ( Parry, 
2012). The expectations that came with permanent employment at EISCO also structure workers’ lives 
outside the plant, especially because they are aware of their proximity to casual workers.  
 
 Those who were more upwardly mobile, such as the residents of The City, were hit hard 
however during economic downturns, not only because of their expectations and ambitions, but also 
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due to the limited social resources they had when the housing market in the company town was 
liberalised and the economy was increasingly financialised. The neighbourhood relations acted 
historically as a form of kinship in al-Tibbin. The establishment of the company town and the localism 
that marked the workforce, where the majority commuted together on company buses from the same 
villages and towns, created proximity between household and plant. Workers, including those in The 
City, therefore spoke of having been ‘one family’ in the past and of children growing up together, of 
wives cooking together, of breastfeeding each other’s children, establishing savings-groups in the 
same building and of being able to direct a visitor to the house of any member of the community.  But 
those who occupied The City had with time become less invested in the community and were rather 
focused on the improvement of the living conditions of their nuclear family through practices such as 
securing access to credentials, buying luxury items, marrying children in upper class areas and 
spending time socialising outside The City with other upwardly mobile friends. 
 
 Following Lockwood (1966), it could be said that the upwardly mobile residents of The City 
moved from a “proletarian traditionalism”, where solidarity emerges between members of the 
community of traditional industries such as docking and mining, and is expressed in ties of kinships 
and friendships becoming part of the work relationships, to an “instrumentalism”, which emerges in 
capital-intensive and highly technologised workplaces, in which workers are alienated at work. In the 
latter, work serves merely as a means to an end and workers focus more on making investments in the 
sphere of the family. Workers who resided in The City gradually resembled the instrumental workers 
mentioned by Lockwood. But those among them who were not successful in turning the potential of 
their property in the permanent work contracts into material gains for themselves and their children 
found themselves at the times of crisis with little social capital in their communities to rely on to 
provide them with security and act as a safety net during hard times. With few friends in the 
neighbourhood to rely on during major occasions such as weddings and so on and few collective 
initiatives to generate cash or enough savings-groups to maintain a steady stream of cash, these 
workers were hit hard by economic downturns. The discrepancies between those who continue the 
path of bourgeoisification – because of their access to other sources of capital – and those who fall 
down the ‘slippery slope’ become more salient.  
 
But unlike the workers in the UNSOR steel plant described by Mollona (2009), EISCO workers 
do not experience alienation at work, nor a total separation of the kinship and friendship ties inside 
and outside the plant. However, much like the instrumental workers described by Mollona, upwardly 
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mobile EISCO workers are increasingly focused on the betterment of their private domestic sphere 
and on consumption practices.  Although EISCO workers have more control over their work, they 
nevertheless regard it primarily as a means to realising the aspiration of stability and to passing on 
their position in the social hierarchy to their family members. They share with the ‘instrumental 
workers’ described by Mollona (2009) and Lockwood (1966) a trend towards bourgeoisification, which 
tends to result in limited local networks of kinship and friendship.  
 
In contrast, workers of The Housing, whose sociality resembles that of “the traditional 
proletarianism” are better able to accommodate the economic downturns because of their reduced 
expectations about life outcomes compared to the residents of The City, and because of the social ties 
that continue to exist in their neighbourhood to date, since they have not yet invested fully in the 
upward mobility of the family. Households in The Housing nevertheless continue to experience 
discrepancies between them, which are accentuated by the recent changes of the political economy of 
the community. But these discrepancies are not as extreme as those in The City. Social expectations 
about one’s future and kinship ties in the form of neighbourhood networks are two important factors 
in shaping the experience of mobility in al-Tibbin. 
 
Holmstrom (1984) proposes that kinship relations between permanent and contract workers – 
evident in co-habitation or in cash returns from migration that permanent labours send to contract 
labourers in the hometowns – do not lead to class distinctions among workers. This is however not 
true in the case of EISCO where to date the most salient distinction is between those who have a 
permanent contract (or whose family members who work on temporary and daily wage inside the 
plant are aspiring to attain one) and the casual workers, primarily al-tabābna who live in bīyūt ʾ ahālī, 
who cannot access the plant. Kinship relations between both groups are limited and their life 
conditions are very different. In fact, by asking management to give priority in employment to EISCO 
worker’s children and excluding ‘outsiders’, including applicants from bīyūt ʾ ahālī, EISCO workers are 
able to keep their class positioning. Although the property of the permanent contract is being 
devalued by the larger changes in the labour market that affect EISCO workers’ families, it continues 
to remain a major source of distinction between those that own it and those that do not.  
 
Households in al-Tibbin are based on the cycles of conjugal units, child raising practices and the 
terms of the shared activities of households. Marriage is the main institution around which family life 
and independent households are set up. Childbearing, in turn, is the most important element of 
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marriage. In al-Tibbin, like most working class and rural quarters of Egypt, women are called by their 
first son’s name, for example ʾ Umm (mother of) Muhamad. In the case that a woman has no sons, she 
is called by her first daughter’s name. Fathers, too, often take the name of their first child, and are 
called, for example ʾAbu (father of) Muhamad, though not as frequently as women. Once a woman 
has given birth to her first child, and especially as she grows older, it becomes less acceptable to use 
her first name and she is only called by the name of her first son/daughter.  This reflects in part the 
importance, on the discursive level, of marriage and children to ones’ identity.  
 
In her earlier ethnography Singerman (1996) thus finds that many of the informal institutions 
within communities across Egypt are created to meet the goal of marriage and transferring financial 
resources to the next generation in the hope of maintaining wealth, reputation and status. Most 
calculations about life regarding career choices, education, employment, consumption and saving are 
made with the anticipated marriage in mind (Hoodfar, 1997). The youth between the ages of 18 and 
25 constitute 25% of the population Egypt and their political economy is dominated by the material 
and social struggle to marry  (Singerman, 2008 p.77). With this demographic in mind and the 
importance of marriage and childbearing to achieving adulthood in this context, the focus on 
intergenerational transmission of resources and on reproduction of social status is thus integral to 
everyday class politics in al-Tibbin. 
  
Prior to the emergence of the studies of family history in the West, research into factory life 
was dominated by two teleological assumptions: that industrial life changed the family structure from 
extended to nuclear, and that industrial progress was based on the very separation of the two spheres 
of work and household. However, the findings of the Cambridge Group and those who followed 
suggested that the nuclear family existed before industrialisation, and that migrant workers’ relations 
with extended kin were not broken by migration but in fact were central to the industrialisation 
experience (Anderson, 1971; Goode, 1963; T. K. Hareven, 1982; Laslett, 1965; Laslett & Wall, 1972). 
Although family historians have been criticised for producing new typologies regarding the ultimate 
family forms, which facilitate industrialisation, their later critics concluded that a variety of family 
forms and household structures existed and assisted industrialisation (Flandrin, 1979; T. Hareven, 
2000; Kertzer, 1984). An alternative way to research the relations between households and factories 
was suggested by Davidoff and Hall (1987) in their landmark study that reconstructs the experience of 
middle-class families in eighteenth and nineteenth century England. They survey how ideas of 
domesticity in middle class families were cultivated based on conceptions of class performance in 
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relation to the aristocracy. They argue that “gender and class always operate together… that 
consciousness of class always takes a gendered form” (Davidoff & Hall, 1987, p. 13)67. Rather than 
assuming the pre-existence of diverse family forms across classes, Davidoff and Hall (1987) encourage 
us to think of familial inclusions and exclusions as a social principle on which class formation is 
essentially based. In a sense, gender and kinship are considered here as one important dimension 
through which class is experienced. 
 
In what follows, I map a variety of family forms that emerged with industrialisation in al-Tibbin 
and examine how household structures and domestic cycles vary according to employment. 
Contrasting the households of people from different classes in al-Tibbin highlights how class functions 
as a relational concept. Looking at three generations of EISCO households, I introduce different 
temporalities that shape the experience of labour through “the complex juxtaposition of different 
rhythms of time – individual time, family time, historical time – [which] makes possible a much needed 
nonlinear and non-Eurocentric approach to history” (Doumani, 2003, p. 2). The ways in which time 
and space are intertwined in the diverse parts of al-Tibbin, make the residents’ experience “multi-
dimensional, uneven and always a partial process” (May & Thrift, 2001, p. 10).  
 
I thus attempt to apprehend the changes in the domestic sphere from the point of view of 
their experiential nature, and not only from a structural perspective. Critiques have been levelled at 
the research on household structures for its lack of flexibility in conceiving kinship relations and for 
reproducing the categories used by the state in its statistics (Mitchell, 1991 in Mollona 2009a). To 
avoid this critique, the relational aspect of class formation I adopt here introduces kinship relations 
beyond the language of the state and the focus on blood ties and include instead wider networks of 
"relatedness" (Carsten, 2000). People in the company town of EISCO are wont to speak of the 
relations of ʿ ishra – intimate relations of friendship that grow with time – that developed between the 
neighbours and blurred the distinction between blood-based kinship and networks of relatedness. 
Neighbourly relations are hence of prime importance.  
 
Researchers working in Egypt consider these relations important cultural forms that promote 
survival among the working classes, and constitute a form of kinship (El Mesiri, 1978; Hoodfar, 1997; 
Singerman, 1996). They have even argued that relationality is itself a value among Egyptian working 
                                               
67
 Similarly, others have suggested the entanglement of gender and class in the expression of inequalities (Collier & 
Yanagisako, 1987; Fernandes, 1997; Rofel, 1999). 
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classes (Elyachar 2005).  Mapping the changes in the political economy of industrialisation in al-Tibbin 
should thus take into account not only the transformations in household structures and community 
relations, but also the meanings and values that shape the very experience of class.  
 
IV. Consumption, Property and the Gaze 
 
Consumption practices of different households across al-Tibbin are the vernacular through 
which class politics are best expressed. Mollona (2009a) suggests that the upwardly mobile proletariat 
who were being bourgeoisified at the UNSOR plant in Sheffield escaped alienation at work by making 
personal connections and attachments outside the realm of work through the focus on conspicuous 
consumption. From regular visits to shopping malls to acquiring training to work in middle class 
occupations such as nursing, workers in Sheffield were fully emerged in capitalist experiences that 
occluded their common proletarian class position, which was reflected in their inability to maintain 
these lifestyles when the plant was closed down. At EISCO, workers’ household were similarly 
preoccupied with owning ‘status symbols’ that expressed their upwardly mobile lives. They also re-
invented new marriage practices and exchanges and refashioned the way they dress to distinguish 
themselves. Their capitalist practices obscured the way their community was being fragmented into a 
bourgeoisie and a proletariat as well as the proximity of the downwardly mobile of them to casual 
workers on the fringes of the town.  
 
However, I also suggest another reading to workers’ focus on consumption, one which takes 
lead from Graeber’s (2007) argument that studies focusing on consumption do not question “why we 
call a certain behaviour ‘consumption’” and without defining it, we take it to generally mean “any 
activity that involves the purchase, use or enjoyment of any manufactured or agriculture product for 
any purpose other than the production, and exchange, of new commodities, basically anything people 
do when they’re not working for wages” (Graeber, 2007, p. 58). He presents an alternative 
theorisation of consumption as involving the production of human beings in ‘consumption spheres’, 
not only as labour power but as “internalised nexus of social relations” (Graeber 2007, p. 58). This very 
production of people is what social life is about, which the exceptional organisation of society under 
capitalism makes impossible to imagine differently (Graeber, 2007).  
 
By considering what we generally refer to as ‘consumption practices’ part of the way people 
are being produced, I highlight how they are not only a reaction to and expression of capitalist 
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developments but derive from a desire to be recognised and to belong to their community. To 
reiterate, desire always involves “a desire for some kind of social relation” (Todorov, 2001 in Graeber, 
2007, p.63) and  “there is always a quest for recognition involved, but owing to the extreme 
individualism typical of western philosophical tradition, this tends to be occluded” (Graeber, 2007, p. 
63). This internalised desire for recognition is reflected in people’s preoccupation in al-Tibbin with 
each other’s looks and the idiom of the gaze, which is often occluded by capitalist developments, 
which changed the meaning of desires at the root of definitions of consumption from one based on 
the need for recognition to idioms that reflect the eating of things and the buying of useless objects to 
be destroyed later.68 
 
To frame the relation between the two ways consumption practices can be understood - as a 
need for recognition and as useless capitalist endeavour - and the manner in which they relate to 
people’s preoccupation with others’ gaze, I turn to Todorov  (2001).  Todorov  (2001) is inspired by 
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s distinction between the two types of moralities: amour de soi (‘self-love’) and 
amour propre (‘vanity’) and his  introduction of a third type feeling that links both, which is the “idea 
of consideration” (Todorov, 2001, p. 12). Amour de soi is a positive notion which is the instinct for self-
preservation that is essential for human beings and the other. Amour propre is a negative one and 
consists of judging ourselves in contrast to others  and seeing ourselves superior or wanting them to 
be inferior. Rousseau’s contribution lies in introducing the third type of feeling, the “idea of 
consideration” which relates both moralities and is inscribed in the need to attract others’ gaze and 
the need for people to be seen by others (Todorov, 2001, p. 12). Unlike vanity, which is a negative 
vice, Todorov suggests the idea of consideration reflects a basic need by species to be seen. The gaze, 
and particularly, being concerned with people’s gaze or one’s own gaze at others is an idiom by which 
people in al-Tibbin express their concerns regarding social change. In what follows, I show how this 
preoccupation reflects both a need for recognition or an idea of consideration at times and at others, a 
politics of vanity produced by the privatisation and financialisation of life in al-Tibbin.  In so doing, the 
purchase of conspicuous objects is seen as part of the way people are produced in society and their 
labour is valued, as well as the constant capitalist appropriation of this labour and its value by 
substituting social values with economic and calculative ones.  
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 Graeber (2007) argues that this shift towards a focus on consumption ‘as the eating of things’, including phantasms 
and illusory optics, took place through a historical process since the Middle Ages of privatisation of desires, their 
feminisation and the rise of property rights in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The focus on consumption 
practices should therefore also be seen in the light of the rise of new types of private property at EISCO, for example, 
in access to contracts, social housing or other forms of wealth. 
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V. A Variety of Households  
 
a. A New Bourgeoisie 
 
The households of The City vary, but nevertheless share many similar characteristics. Their 
affluence is reflected in their size, structures and the life opportunities of their members. ʾUmm 
Bahgat was a widow in her late thirties, who lived in what used to be her in-laws’ apartment in The 
City. She owned a kiosk in front of her house on one of the main streets. ʾUmm Bahgat’s in-laws came 
to EISCO in 1956 from Sharqiyya. They had eight children, four of whom (three sons and a daughter) 
became employed in the plant and later went on to marry and live between Mayo and Turah, two 
cities both of which are better off than al-Tibbin. In addition, two of her sisters-in-law got educational 
diplomas and worked as teachers and now lived in Mayo. Teaching jobs for females and jobs in the 
public sector that enable a woman to be a muwazafa (civil servant, white collar worker or public 
sector employee) are held in high esteem in the community. Before he died a few years ago, Abdel 
Aziz, ʾUmm Bahgat’s husband, had abandoned home and had disappeared for twenty years. ʾUmm 
Bahgat’s father-in-law passed his apartment on to her family.  A fourth brother had travelled to Qatar 
but now worked as a casual worker. So apart from the latter, the family members have successfully 
reproduced their fathers’ social position despite the family’s large size. Half of the children had 
secured permanent work and an apartment for the coming generations.  
 
The retired steel workers who had become the elders of the community, and who meet 
regularly during prayer hours in the  mosque near her house, had used their relations in helping her 
secure the necessary connections for the permits for her kiosk from the local municipality. This 
support enabled her to make ends meet. The networks that the steel workers forged at EISCO, and 
continue to ritually reproduce at the Mosque, thus functioned as a source of capital in the community. 
 
 ʾUmm Bahgat’s household was not, however, an exception. Across from ʾ Umm Bahgat’s home, 
in the same building, lived Soheir, a divorced woman who occupied the apartment that belonged to 
her father, a deceased EISCO worker. Soheir used to be married to an EISCO worker herself before 
getting divorced. She now worked in the National Democratic Party's headquarters. On the second 
floor, Hani Radwan was an old worker whose four children worked at EISCO and had all moved to live 
in the upscale Mayo city. 
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 A few blocks away on the same street, ʾUmm Kamal lived with her son Kamal in what used to 
be her husband's apartment. She was among the first generation of those who moved to al-Tibbin, 
and came with her husband in 1959 after he was employed as a daily worker in the plant. He later got 
a permanent contract. She was eighteen when they moved and had only a preparatory school 
education. But her children were very different from herself and her husband. They had five children, 
but beyond childhood only two survived. Kamal, her eldest son, was now a worker in the plant; he 
lived in his father’s apartment, having refurbished it. His brother was a teacher of English in a local 
school who was also married to a teacher. Kamal had three children in primary, secondary and 
university education while his brother had two children in the prestigious English section of the 
Faculty of Commerce. A similar pattern was common among the rest of the community in The City, 
who were increasingly preoccupied with the education of their children. In ʾUmm Kamal’s building, a 
first-floor neighbour had twelve children with several wives between Cairo and al-Tibbin and another 
on the fourth floor had eight children, also from polygamous marriages. ʾ Umm Kamal recounted that 
this was common in the past as men had settled in The City and then started flirting in Cairo while 
their wives in The City had thought they were on night shifts at work.  
 
One of the eight children of the aforementioned first-floor resident was ʿAbdou, who now 
worked in the plant as a permanent worker and owned a kiosk in front of his father's apartment. 
ʿAbdou lived in one of the imārat ḥadīthat al-tashyyīd (‘newly built buildings’) nearby. He had worked 
in the plant since 1979 and moonlighted between different jobs that supplemented the 4000 L.E (400 
GBP) income he earned at the plant.  Of the eight siblings, four (including one sister) worked in the 
plant. Two other sisters had BAs, a third was a teacher, and one had divorced after marrying from the 
company town. ʿ Abdou said his father was mizwāg (‘a man who tends to marry a lot’) and could afford 
it because workers here lived almost for free.  
 
But ʿAbdou lamented the fact that his father had not invested in his education. This is why 
ʿAbdou himself had also studied recently and earned a BA in commerce, which he said made him feel 
quite established next to the engineers at work. ʿAbdou’s wife, whom he had met at EISCO, was also 
employed in the plant, until he encouraged her to take early retirement when it was first offered in 
2001. It was female workers who were mostly ‘encouraged’ to take up early retirement, on the 
pretext of being finally able to be ‘house-wived’. Although ʿAbdou’s children were not as lucky as he 
was, and yet, their father’s capital helps them survive. ʿ Abdou and his wife had four children. The kiosk 
that ʿAbdou owned was intended for his son but the latter preferred to look for jobs in Sharm al-
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Sheikh because there were no opportunities in The City. ʿ Abdou said he had opened the kiosk because 
he was basaʿid ʾ ibni –  helping his son. But even going to Sharm al-Sheikh to look for better paid jobs in 
the tourist industry required some capital to make the journey and live until finding a job. It was 
capital acquired over two generations of permanent work that enabled ʿAbdou’s son to try his luck in 
Sharm al-Sheikh. It was ʿ Abdou that first explained to me that he was investing so much in his children 
because al-Tibbin life was “made of peaks and slippery slopes ” (qimam wa munḥadarāt), by which he 
meant that some were moving upwards in the social ladders and others were sliding down. 
 
 Madām Zeinab was from the same building as Kamal and ʿAbdou but now lived in the imārat 
ḥadīthat al-tashyyīd. She was 51, had only a preparatory education and worked in the administrative 
section of the electric power department of the plant. Zeinab was one the few women who had 
worked on the shop-floor. She remembered that in the past there used to be more room for women 
to work on the shop-floor, although not in heavily manual tasks. This somewhat alludes to the 
relatively more egalitarian gender relations that existed with the inception of what Hatem (1992) 
called “state feminism” after 1952. Her upper status as a muwazaffa was reflected in the fact that she 
was called in the community by her name, Zeinab, with the title Madām, rather than being called by 
her son’s first name. Her work reflected also on certain dynamics of the household. It was her son, 
rather than herself or the daughter that made the tea when I visited them at their place, something 
that was very uncommon in both al-Tibbin, or the rest of Egypt as a matter of fact. When I commented 
on that, Zeinab’s daughter said in English that this was “a help yourself house” and her mother 
explained that because she was away at work most of the day, her children had learnt to become 
progressive about some aspects of the gender division of labour.  
 
 Like ʿ Abdou and his wife, Zeinab had also met her husband at the plant. In fact, everybody in 
Zeinab’s house seemed to have worked in the plant; this included her father, her eldest sister, her 
eldest brother and her younger sister, who also married an engineer from the plant.  But like ʿ Abdou, 
it was Zeinab’s children that now struggled with the task of reproducing their family’s position. Her 
daughter, who held a B.A. in geography and a diploma in computer  geographic information systems, 
was unemployed although she was willing to work. Her son had a B.A. in history but now worked for 
the nearby private-sector Mefco furniture plant as an inspector. When he applied for the job he had to 
keep quiet about having a B.A. “It was my fault that I am educated”, he told me ironically. Both her 
children were well into their twenties, but, sitting around their mother discussing their inability to 
access good jobs and having to rely on their family for a living, their maturation to adulthood seemed 
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to have been suspended. Though they had acquired middle-class manners, such as being more relaxed 
about fluid gender roles, as well as high educational credentials, they could still not replicate that life 
syle in their own lives without the steady support of their family.  
 
In The City, children of the ‘lucky generation’ of workers who had first occupied the company 
town struggled with social reproduction like the rest of the workers at EISCO, but they found this all 
the more difficult because of the higher expectations they had for themselves and their children’s 
potential to reproduce their position in the social hierarchy. This is also mirrored by workers who live 
in the upper-scale satellite cities of Helwan. For example, ʾ amm Mina, the shift head in the Pate- and 
Sheet-Rolling Mill, was earning a salary that reached 4,000 Egyptian pounds, equal to what the head of 
the mill was earning. ʾamm Mina built a family house for his children in al-Mashruʿ al-ʾAmrikī, where 
his eldest son lived in the upper floor with his wife, the daughter of an EISCO worker, and their two 
young daughters. ʾ amm Mina maintained a beautifully furnished house, with a fish basin, a pet dog, a 
large plasma screen television and an upscale kitchen. His eldest son Nageh, who had an upper-middle 
qualification in computer science, used to own a computer repair shop, which he could not maintain. 
Having lost the shop, he worked as a sales representative in a pharmaceutical company and struggled 
to make ends meet. When he was laid off from this job, his father bought a mini-bus for him to work 
as a driver. Nageh, his father later told me, suffered a stroke after a nervous breakdown, and lost his 
ability to speak as well as mobility in the left side of his body for a few months.  
 
When I met Nageh a year after I had first met him during the subuʿ of his daughter (‘the ritual 
celebration one week after a baby’s birth’), I almost did not recognise him. He was uncommonly quiet, 
looked much older and seemed to be drifting somewhere else. While the experience of being laid off 
and reduced to precarious living conditions is never an easy one, it was particularly difficult for those 
who had lived a good life and expected to continue on the path of upward social mobility enjoyed by 
their families.   
 
This anticipation of upward social mobility put different forms of pressure on various family 
members. Magdy, the father in the host family I resided with at the beginning of the research, 
maintained an extra evening job as aluminium trader in order to be able to finance the living expenses 
of his engineering student son, his studious daughter and his youngest son with a learning disability. 
Like most fathers in EISCO, he was almost obsessed with his children’s educational achievement. 
When Rami, his eldest son, did not achieve the grades that would get him into the faculty of 
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engineering at a public university, Madgy enrolled him in the lower-quality but more expensive private 
engineering school in Mayo, so that he may still make it as an engineer and avoid the people’s 
universities (kuliyāt al-shaʿb). Leila, his daughter, who was studious and smart, experienced 
continuous pressure from her father, who, she complained, never asked her anything about her 
personal life except her studies. Magdy wanted to make sure that Leila would be admitted to the 
faculty of medicine at a public university one day.  
 
Although Leila, like most children of EISCO workers was not heavily involved in household 
chores – in contrast for example to her cousin in the village – the psychological pressure that she 
underwent in order to keep performing well at school, and thus to contribute to the upward mobility 
of the family, was taxing on her self-confidence and the ability to enjoy other aspects of her life. As 
Parry (2005a) shows, similar aspirations for upward mobility also affected conceptions of childhoods 
at BSP, for example by making parents increasingly anxious about how time punctuated their life 
cycles, and leaving their children more free from household chores and duties, but trapped in the 
roles of perpetual children.    
 
As my neighbour in The City liked to say, The City, as a representative area for those upwardly 
mobile at EISCO, has produced a lot of “high ranking” people: football players, actors, women that 
married and lived in the Gulf or married high ranking policemen, even men in the army. The number 
of divorcee and unmarried females in the area confirmed this. In only the four buildings I mentioned 
above, there was at least one divorced and one unmarried female in each. Fathers here could often 
afford to house their daughters if the marriage broke down or never took place and the job market 
was not offering them the means to sustain themselves. In addition, as we have seen from the stories 
of Zeinab, ʿAbdou and Soheir and their relatives, intermarriage from within The City’s community of 
workers was prevalent because it met the expectations of families, whereas as I explore below, the 
situation of the second generation living in The Housing is very different. But The City caters today 
mainly to those who made it in the past and were able to maintain their status. It has nothing to offer 
for those who are not part of EISCO. Most young people of the third generation are thus dependent 
on their parents and have to flee The City to look for work. They, much like sons of daughters of must 
upwardly mobile workers, however feel the pressure of the economic downturns much heavily than 
the rest because of the expectations they had about the future.   
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b. The Squeezed Middle  
 
 The apartment of ʿamm Lotfi in the Housing was an impressive one. ʿamm Lotfi and his wife 
received me in their apartment, which was decorated with fancy ceramics, a fish bowl, a niche full of 
china, tea sets and glasses, a widescreen TV and a big photo of their late son, which gave the house a 
melancholic air that none of the other fancy goods around could hide. When I commented on how 
nice the house was, ʿ amm Lotfi told me quickly that he had refurbished the house with the money he 
received from his early retirement and that ages ago they had turned the balcony into an extra room.  
ʿamm Lotfi was born in the 1950s in Qena in the far south of Egypt, and had been employed in the 
plant since 1972. His father had died when he was young so ʿamm Lotfi had struggled to get a job. He 
had seven paternal uncles who were well off but, according to him, shāyfīn ḥālhum ('full of 
themselves'). Only one uncle was poorer than the rest and worked in the steel plant and he helped 
him get a job in there and in return he married his daughter as “radd gimīl” ('a return of the favour'). 
 
ʿamm Lotfi had four children; the eldest struggled with learning difficulties, and the second was 
killed in a car accident. Khalil, his third son, had an industrial diploma from the plant training school 
and was employed as a daily worker at Mefco, a private furniture company nearby. His youngest 
daughter was in secondary school. ʿamm Lotfi had wanted to secure a job at the plant for his son but 
was unsuccessful. Instead he decided to use the money he received when he opted for early 
retirement, following the death of his son, in refurbishing his house so that it would be a real asset for 
his children.  “qult ʾ arayaḥhum laʾininā mish hanʿish luhum, fa ma yibqush maḥrumīn w ma-yibuṣush li-
ḥad, ma-yibuuṣush li-ghirhum” – (“I thought I would like to make them comfortable because we won't 
live for them (forever). This way they don't feel deprived and won’t have to look to anybody else they 
don't look to others”). He went on to elaborate on what he meant by ‘looking to others’: “Ili-zayyinā 
yikhāf ʿ ala wilāduh. ʿ ashān mā-yiqulsh ʾ ishmiʿna dah ʾ abūh gāb luh, mā dah ʾ abuh shaghāl fi-il shirka w 
ʾanā ʾabuya shaghāl fi il shirka” – (“Those like us fear for their children. So they do not ask why his 
father got him *things+ when he works in the plant but my father works in the plant *too, but didn’t get 
me things+”). He paused for a few seconds and continued: “ʾanā tiʿibt fi ḥayāti fa mush ʿ āyiz ʾ atʿibhum 
maʿāyā wi ʿāyiz el ʿayil yiḥis birāḥtuh” - (“I suffered in my life so I do not want to make them suffer 
with me, and I want the kids to feel comfortable”). 
 
ʿ amm Lotfi later explained that even when he refurbished the house, he did not allow his 
children to carry sand along with those working in the house.  “There is no (such a thing as) children 
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carrying the dust, or carrying anything”, concluding that “ma itʿawidtish ʾabahdil  ʿiyāli” - (“I  did  not 
got used to debasing my children”). His son and daughter, who were present during the conversation, 
joined in to confirm that they had not carried or lifted anything while the house was being 
refurbished. What ʿ amm Lotfi was struggling with here was making sure that his children would always 
be seen as 'the same' as other children despite the ’qimam wa inḥidārāt’ or ‘peaks and slides’ that 
ʿAbdou had mentioned.  It was the appearance that met the gaze of recognition, which allowed the 
community to maintain itself and children to reproduce their father's position, if not by a job, then by 
a translation of their permanent contracts into a permanent house, conspicuous investments, or 
‘techniques of the self’ that enabled them to maintain their status even when other households were 
doing better, financially speaking. Appearance was important in creating the person and the social 
relations in the community. 
 
 In investing in a luxurious house, ʿ amm Lotfi was indeed reproducing the capitalist materialist 
ethos, especially that of those who are more upwardly mobile. But his preoccupation with the 
appearance of himself and his family in the eyes of others is important to the analysis. It highlights in a 
sense, how workers attempt to remain part of the upwardly mobile EISCO community at times when 
social exclusion is rampant. The focus on consumption as with acquiring malik al-nish, reveals a 
struggle not just to continue being recognised by others (and, as Lama put it, to “create one’s value”) 
but also to resist the shrinking of alternative opportunities to prove oneself that result from the 
deterioration of one’s material conditions. Hoodfar (1997) argues similarly that females in Egypt are 
invested in the calculations of marriage exchanges so deeply because they are denied any other way 
by which to achieve recognition, be it work, education or regular socialisation outside the house. 
Consumption, especially among the group of workers in The Housing, unlike those in The City, who do 
not have a well-to-do family background becomes a means by which to achieve recognition from 
others, to reproduce relations in the community, and, needless to say, to live by the capitalist ethic, in 
which social and economic values overlap. 
 
 Such investments in consumption are particularly important because the networks among 
workers that helped those in The Housing survive, which that facilitate and to some extent constitute 
what Lockwood (1996) would call their “traditional proletarianism” (Lockwood, 1966), are being 
largely diminished by the liberalisation of the housing, labour and goods market. ʿamm Younes came 
to live in The Housing in 1986. He was originally from Suez, and had earlier lived for a time in Kafr al-
ʿiluw before living in The Housing. He was married to his cousin from Suez, who did not work. ʿamm 
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Younes had three children. Nahed lived in Mayo city, and had a middle qualification; Fouad, aged 30, 
worked in a private company in Mayo; he had tried to get into EISCO but did not manage, even though 
his father had attempted to pay a bribe; and Sana was 22 and had a B.Sc. in computer science, but was 
unemployed. Sana had been looking for jobs but could not find any. ʿamm Younes depended on the 
informal saving groups in the community. He was a member of two groups: one for the house and for 
buying clothing for his daughter during ʿid and the other for his son to help save for his eventual 
marriage.  
 
But ʿ amm Younes’s area was changing completely. In his building, there were at present eight new 
tenants and residents, including a teacher, somebody from the local council, a retired worker who 
made his money in Libya and someone who worked in a private company. Of the original residents, six 
of them had sold their houses and bought some land in the nearby area of al-Malaʾa to build family 
houses for themselves and their children. Two returned to their balad (‘home village’). Returning to 
the balad or building new family houses in al-Malaʾa has become another way to deal with children’s 
inability to sustain themselves and their households. The break in the traditional networks on which 
ʿamm Younes was able to depend in everyday relations has put him at risk of sliding down the labour 
hierarchy. These networks, which were needed in most aspects of life, for example in contributing to 
saving groups, in having friends to help during aspects of marriage rituals – such as shayl al-ʿafsh, 
where young men carry the gihāz and transport it to the house – and in the exchanges in the 
community on various occasions had all helped sustain the relations of the community.  Although 
ʿamm Younes’s permanent contract made him distinct from, as we shall see, the workers in the bīyūt 
ʾahālī, yet his family’s inability to successfully reproduce the good life they were used to placed them 
in a precarious condition in the longer term.  
 
c. The Inheritance of Loss  
 
ʾIhab and Shaʾlan were two brothers who lived in bīyūt ʾahālī in al-Tibbin. ʾIhab was 30 and 
Shaʾlan 29. They were the eldest of eight siblings and they had originally lived in bīyūt ʾahālī, in the 
North of Helwan, in an area called ʿarab Ghunaym, in a bayt ʿila (‘family house’) together with their 
uncles and their families.  Their extended paternal family had occupied the second floor and uncles 
the first and third floors. Their father had been employed for ten years in a now-prestigious military 
production plant in Helwan The Arab Association for Industry-  al-hayʾa al-ʿarabiya lil-tasniʿ - but had 
retired for medical reasons twenty years before, which meant that his young family did not experience 
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many of the benefits associated with his employment. The two brothers had a middle school 
education, iʿdadiya, and now worked in a network set up as a barrād (‘those who do metal fillings’), 
which is one of the most financially rewarding jobs nowadays in casual work. They made on average 
40 EGP/day and an average of 1200 EGP/month (which is double what a fixed-contract worker of their 
age would make at EISCO). 69   
 
Their relatively good salaries had enabled them to marry two sisters, who had a slightly higher 
standard of education than theirs -the sisters had middle qualification in commerce- and whose father 
was an EISCO worker. They had gotten to know their wives through the sisters’ brother, who worked 
with them now as a barād. Unlike ʾIhab and Shaʾlan’s wives, their wives did not have the chance to 
work a little in a clothing shop or a textile plant to save up for their gīhāz before marriage. ʾIhab and 
Shaʾlan’s sisters had married at age 18, which is significantly lower than the average age of marriage 
among EISCO families.  None of ʾ Ihab and Shaʾlan’s siblings had been educated beyond middle school 
(one of the two sisters only had an elementary education) although the youngest of the eight brothers 
was joining a thanawiyya ʿ āmma (high school): as is often the case, the youngest members in poorer 
families enjoy the fruits of the better years of their parents. The contrast with the situation of their 
uncle, who was an EISCO worker and had four children is striking. According to ʾ Ihab and Shaʾlan’ their 
cousins are “mitʿalimīn ʾawī “ (“very educated”) and their uncle’s family “mustawa maʿishī aqal min 
mutawasit w dilwaʿtī mustawa maʿishī mutawasit” (“had enjoyed a lower than averageliving standard 
but now an average one”).  
 
Neither ʾIhab nor Shaʾlan had applied for work at EISCO. They both thought it needed too 
strong a wāsta (connection), which they did not have. Their younger brother ʿAli did take a job as a 
daily worker at EISCO in the hope of getting a fixed-term temporary contract, but lost hope after eight 
months and quit. He had managed to sustain his life while at EISCO by working simultaneously at a 
nearby workshop. Now ʿ Ali had a paint workshop that he had managed to start up. But the seasonality 
of its work made him complain of the lack of stability (“māfīsh ʾ istiqrār”). ʾ Ihab also said he used to be 
a good student and had been accepted to continue at the middle school of his father’s plant, but 
couldn’t because it would have cost his father 10 EGP per day, which they could not afford at the time.  
                                               
69
 A barād is known to make up to 80 EGP/day. My guesses are that because ʾAmgad, who was assisting me with the 
research, was present in the interview, ʾIhab and Shaʾlan did not feel comfortable sharing their actual earnings, which 
is higher than what they informed me. ʾAmgad was working on a daily wage then and was not certain whether he was 
going to receive a fixed-term contract or not. 
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Although ʾIhab and Shaʾlan worked in relatively higher-paid daily jobs and made double the 
salary of a typical EISCO worker of their age, they both said that if there had been a real opportunity 
they would have liked to work at EISCO, even at half their salary. At EISCO, they said, workers get 
insurance, pensions, benefits and a daily meal, whereas for them “māfīsh ʾistiqrār” ( “there is no 
stability”) . Their third brother had fallen off a scaffold at work and broke his legs and arms but had 
received no compensation whatsoever from his employer. In addition, the two brothers told me that 
they could not join informal saving groups – gamʿiyyāt – among their neighbours and friends because 
they could not guarantee a steady income every month. While most families in al-Tibbin cover 
marriage costs through participation in gamʿiyyāt, this option was not available to precarious workers 
like ʾ Ihab and Shaʾlan. Instead their uncle who worked at EISCO assisted in paying for their marriages 
expenses. Their uncle bought furniture on credit from the EISCO cooperative (gamʿiyya taʿāwuniya), 
which they could repay in instalments. Needless to say, not all who live in bīyūt ʾahālī have access to 
an uncle at EISCO. In order to afford marriage they thus generally have to call on their networks who 
are workshop owners and various traders for exchanges based on favours.  
 
But it was the lack of security of their house tenancy that bothered ʾ Ihab and Shaʾlan the most. 
Unlike EISCO fathers, who had managed to secure a house for their children through building a family 
house or owning their own houses, Shaʾlan and ʾIhab had to abide by the new tenancy laws. ʾIhab 
complained that this made his life very unstable because landlords were becoming exploitative in both 
the amount of rent they charged and the conditions of payment. He then had to move houses every 
couple of years. ʾ Ihab now lived in al-Hikr al-Bahari, renting a flat in what was originally a family house 
of a tibbīnī (someone from tabābna). But he had now decided to look for apartments in the more 
expensive EISCO company town because the landlords (i.e. the EISCO workers and their family 
members) did not live in the same house, which reduced despotism. He could also use the networks of 
his uncle to find a non-exploitative landlord who would not force him into signing an empty 
commercial note before engaging in a contract as many landlords customary do, or increase the rent 
significantly overnight and ask him to leave. Neither ʾIhab nor Shaʾlan could not easily plan for the 
future. They might have tried to save a little here and there, but could not join saving groups that 
sutain people over long period and the renting conditions made them even less secure about their 
living conditions. 
 
The case of ʾIhab and Shaʾlan shows why workers at EISCO value their jobs as providing 
‘stability’. As ʾ Abu ʾ Ilhami, a tibbīnī who lives in Tal ʾ Abib, told me, “whoever had a stable job *‘wazīfa] 
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in the plant is now comfortable” (“il ʾitwaẓaf ʾistarayaḥ”). “tiʿib mā tiʾibsh, māt mā mātsh ʿiyāluh 
biyāklu w yishrabu” – (“*whether+ he is ill, *or+ he is not ill, *whether+ he dies *or+ he does not  die, his 
children continue to eat and drink”). The life conditions of casual workers in the biyūt ʾahālī are 
strikingly different from those of stable workers; this is reflected in their household structures, their 
aspirations and their future orientation. The perpetuation of their lower position in the labour 
hierarchy is directly linked with EISCO workers’ prosperity. By limiting access to plant jobs to the 
relatives of EISCO workers, casual workers are condemned to remain in perpetual deprivation and 
insecurity. This is why they represent to EISCO workers the spectre of what they could have been, had 
they not owned the ‘property’ of their tenured employment. Given the rate at which the market is 
being liberalised and finacialised outside the plant, EISCO workers who fail to pass on their position in 
the social hierarchy to their children face a similarly precarious fate as those casual labourers. Yet the 
focus of EISCO workers and their families on upward mobility, and the bourgeoisification of some 
among them, prevents them from seeing themselves as possibly sharing the same future.  
 
d. Old Neighbourhoods and New Distinctions  
 
The newly erected buildings – ʿImārat Ḥadīthat al-Tashyyīd – were built by the plant around 
the mid  1990s to accommodate more permanent workers. They are spread across The City and are six 
storeys high with four apartments on each floor.  Each flat is a two bedroom apartment. Unlike the 
residential buildings in The City and The Housing, these were directly sold to permanent workers 
rather than rented. The original price at which workers could purchase an apartment in a newly 
erected building from the plant was 18,000 Egyptian pounds (1,800 GBP) with 4000 EGP (400 GBP) to 
be paid as a first instalment and then another 100 EGP (10 GBP) per month over the next ten years. 
This created a housing market fairly quickly, as some of those who had bought apartments sold them 
or rented them out to other non-EISCO families.  The sales in ʿImārat Ḥadīthat al-Tashyyīd started a 
trend that was intensified later in 2006, when the plant gave workers the opportunity to buy their 
own houses. 70 
                                               
70
 The houses in The City were sold to workers at 12,000 EGP in cash or 15,000 EGP on 10 years instalments; and the 
Housing apartments were sold at either 11,700 EGP cash or 18,000 EGP on 10 years instalments. The al-Talātāt houses 
of engineers were sold at 18,000 EGP on cash and the first floor and fourth floor for 12,000 EGP cash and at slightly 
higher rates in instalments.  But within years the prices in the housing escalated that an average apartment in The City 
had reached up to 150,000 EGP after refurbishing. An apartment in The Housing had reached 71,000 EGP and in an 
auction by the plant for an empty flat it was sold for 50,000 EGP. The al-Talātāt prices have gone up to 125,000 EGP 
and then 150,000 EGP towards the end of my fieldwork. At the time of my fieldwork, rent in The Housing had reached 
250-350 EGP/month, and in The City 350-450 EGP/Month. In contrast to bīyūt ʾahālī , rents ranged from 130 EGP to 
250 EGP to now even 350 EGP/Month. 
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 While most often the houses were rented or sold to new fixed-term workers who were sons of 
existing workers, many ‘outsiders’ also joined the community, which changed the distinct character of 
the company town. As Huda, the daughter of engineer Mansour in al-Talātāt told me as she spoke of 
the positive aspects of life in the company town: “kulahā mustāwayāt qurayiba min baʿḍ lakin dilwaqtī 
al-gudād ḥaga ṣaʿba” - (“it was all *people of+ similar status *who were living close to each other+, but 
now the newcomers are a difficult thing”). ḥaga ṣaʿba (‘a difficult thing’), is used in Arabic slang to 
speak of somebody who is of lower status or who is looked upon with disdain. The newcomers were 
repulsive to many of the company town families because many were from the well-off tabābna 
families, who could afford to either buy or rent in the area or because they were ‘nouveaux riches’ 
who had made their money relatively easier through trade or by travelling to the Gulf.  
 
The disdain that the old residents of the company town had for the newcomers was apparent 
in the undertones of their discourses- although some said that they simply hadn’t had a chance to 
come in contact with them. The City residents who considered themselves almost like a middle class 
were particularly scornful of them.   ʿamm Khalifa, my neighbour, for example, who lived in the 
building opposite mine in The City, explained to me that few engineers would live in the Ḥadīthat al-
Tashyyīd because, he added in English, the residents of the buildings were “rubbish”. ʿamm Shahir, 
another neighbour who was himself living in a Ḥadīthat al-Tashyyīd building, but was originally an 
EISCO worker and a son of an EISCO worker from The City, also used to call the residents of buildings 
zibāla (‘rubbish’) and ʾUmm Bahgat, the kiosk owner in The City, complained that the inhabitants of 
the sabaʿ ʿimārāt, which were seven consecutive buildings among Ḥadīthat al-Tashyyīd were just 
suqiyyin (‘people of the market’). But the newcomers, ʾUmm Bahgat told me, were not only in the 
Ḥadīth al-Tashyyīd, but were now renting and buying all over The City and The Housing. “Today you 
hear weird language being used by them, that I worry my children will catch”, she said, adding that 
she found ‘the new people’ to have no manners and even argued in loudly in their houses.  
 
ʾUmm Bahgat also lamented the loss of the gardens in the area and said that the new buildings 
had been built on the site of beautiful gardens that used to give the place its distinct character. The 
remaining gardens were now, she said, planted with narcotics, a practice she blamed on the 
newcomers. ʿ amm Khalifa also despised the newcomers who lived around him. He told me that in the 
flat above him, there was a new tenant, a woman who used to live in the ‘cabbage market’ (there is no 
actual place called cabbage market, but the label was intended to show how low her status is).  Her 
husband worked in Kuwait and this is how now they could afford to live in the City. “The City is 
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'Garden City' for them” ʿamm Khalifa said – ‘Garden City’ being an aristocratic/upper-middle class 
quarter of Cairo.  When his other neighbour on the lower ground floor turned her flat into a partial 
grocery store, he said “we should all be the same” and was rather disturbed by her trade. He justified 
his attitude on the premise that nobody should be allowed to trade in the area, or to change the 
character of the buildings. While ʿamm Khalifa was explaining that everybody should be equal in the 
community, he then later added that others in the neighbourhood were jealous of the new car he had 
bought. It seemed quite ironic that ʿamm Khalifa should be arguing for the importance of egalitarian 
relations at the very same time that he himself was distinguishing himself from with his car. 71 
 
The upwardly mobile residents of The City considered the newcomers to be a threat to their 
middle-class status, and, as the anecdotes above suggest, attempted to distinguish themselves from 
them in every way possible, often by suggesting that they were violating the egalitarian nature of the 
community. In The Housing, however, the residents did not look at them with as much disdain. They 
only stated that they felt like ‘strangers’ in the community because they barely knew people around 
them anymore. They repeated stories, which were also recounted by the residents of The City, about 
the neighbourhood having formerly been one family and that old relationships had been based on 
ʿishra – (friendliness/intimacy). They said no households used to close their house doors, – a practice 
that still remains in some places in The Housing – the women used to bake and prepare food together 
when their husbands went to work, and often did their house chores collectively. Now The Housing 
residents had little contact with the newcomers, and apart from very formal occasions, the two groups 
seldom interacted. Practices of nuqta – payments exchanged by households on different occasions, 
such as sickness, achieving a degree, marriage, childbirth etc. – had either been discontinued with the 
arrival of the newcomers or became otherwise limited, and very few new-comers were members of 
the savings groups in the buildings or the community.  
 
The residents of The Housing, however, experienced the privatisation of their housing and of 
their lives harshly because of the lack of community resources they could rely on in the face of price 
hikes and the marketisation of social life. The Housing residents, who were less advantaged than the 
The City residents, now found themselves being enmeshed with people who came from what they so 
as  a lower background. They thus focused, like ʿamm Lotfi, on making sure that their houses were at 
                                               
71
 A car was the symbol of social mobility in Cairo, and commuting in overcrowded, irregular and worn out public 
transportation or private micro-buses was often referred to as bahdala (‘discomfort’ or ‘abuse’).  
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least distinguishable from those of the newcomers, and that their children were content and confident 
and not looking at others with a sense of deprivation.  
 
The distinctions among the various groups of EISCO community appeared long before the 
newcomers had moved in – a fact that is evident in the differences between life in The City and life in 
The Housing. Old neighbours had been separated because some had fared better than others and 
moved away, or found lucrative jobs and ceased to interact with their older neighbours.  Yet, when a 
new group moved in more or less en masse into the company town over a comparatively short period 
of time, distinctions between neighbours became quite pervasive.  EISCO workers in turn became 
quite preoccupied with the threats to their status and the social reproduction in their families, which 
they expressed by distancing themselves from the newcomers.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The nuanced changes that ethnography brings out highlight how the preoccupation with 
moving up the social hierarchy, if not maintaining one’s position at least, divides EISCO community 
into two major groups: those who are able to produce ‘stability’ by turning the property of their 
contracts into a source of wealth, and those who struggle to remain part of the labour aristocracy, 
whose permanent work contracts gradually lose value because of an inability to secure upward 
mobility to their families or at best reproduce their current status and security. This fragmentation of 
the labour force over social reproduction, and their concern with securing jobs at EISCO for their 
children, also breaks workers’ de-facto control over the shop-floor and silences them against 
repression of the state and the neo-liberal restructuring plans. Yet, to the community in the company 
town their fragmentation and the gradual double process of bourgeosification and downgrading are 
obscured by their proximity to the casual workers in bīyūt ʾahālī, who continuously represent for 
EISCO households what they are not.  
 
The distinction that matters the most todate to al-Tibbin residents remains the one between 
those who have a permanent contract (or their family members who work on temporary and daily 
wage inside the plant and who are aspiring for one), and the casual workers, primarily from al-
tabābna, who live in bīyūt ʾ ahālī.  The permanent work contract is a form of property whose extension 
excludes other groups and whose potential value is realised by limiting EISCO jobs to EISCO families. 
Yet, the upsurge of food prices, shortages of housing, deregulation of tenancy laws, increase in 
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marriage costs and the erosion of collective resources all risk devaluing the property of this work 
contract when its potential is unmet. For now, this quasi property, or potential property, makes a 
significant difference for those who own it and enables them to see themselves, and be seen by 
others, as part of a different class. Class thus works as a dynamic social relation that develops in 
contingency with transformations in the locality. It is an on-going process which changes as new types 
of property emerge and old ones are devalued and groups are continually formed and re-formed. 
 
But the changes that EISCO households experienced with neo-liberal refroms also shaped the 
community in a variety of other ways and strengthened, undermined and introduced various norms 
and practices in everyday life.  The first was a reproduction of male dominance in society and the 
patriarchal family model, as adult sons and daughters continued to depend on their fathers in order to 
cope with the lack of job availability, increase in food prices, and liberalisation of rent prices. Fathers, 
in a sense, replaced the state in the role it played during the period of welfare capitalism. The 
patriarchal Middle Eastern family is thus not an acultural, apolitical, ahistorical phenomenon, but is 
reproduced through the interaction of domestic life with political economic transformations. In 
addition, the resort to co-residence and extended family households in order to accommodate the 
economic pressures on the younger generation devalued neighbourly relations as sites of intimacy and 
cultivation of kinship ties- especially with the influx of newcomers into the community and the gradual 
emphasis on blood ties and intra-household solidarities in order to cope with the difficult times. 
 
The coping strategies used by EISCO households proved harder on women than men. Thus the 
greater portion of the burden of liberalisation fell upon women, who were encouraged to retire early 
in order to provide cash for their family from their early retirement packages, were significantly 
unemployed and underemployed because the job market favoured unemployed men over women, 
and, finally, who continued bearing the household chores for larger families and longer periods. 
Women were encouraged to marry earlier and to stay in their marriages longer, and in rural areas the 
aversion to educating EISCO daughters continued, especially when men, as potential husbands, were 
becoming less educated in line with the job market. Meanwhile, men blamed women for being 
interested in senseless consumption, while they, the men, worked hard. This reproduction of the 
dichotomy between women as responsible for consumption and men of production appears primarily 
an attempt by women to undo the injustice done to them by reaping as many benefits as they could to 
maintain their own sense of self and value under conditions that denied them any chance to do so by 
other means.  
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As education lost its significance as a vehicle of upward mobility, other ways to distinguish 
oneself became widespread. The rise in consumerist practices, partly brought by the gentrification of 
the company town, was not only senseless as the men often suggested, rather, an attempt to 
maintain others’ gaze, to continue to feel the belonging to the community, and to make one’s labour 
valuable- albeit all mostly on capitalist terms. The “the idea of consideration”, suggested by Rousseau 
and later used by Todorov, as a way of understanding the preoccupation with other people’s gaze 
reflect people’s need to relate to society, while taking into consideration the growing convergence of 
social values into market values.  
 
Viewed together, these developments depict a group of workers who are struggling to 
maintain their status and security under the increasingly precarious conditions of life in Egypt right 
before the fall of Mubarak. The obsession of EISCO workers with social reproduction was both an 
outcome of work in the plant and a cause of their continued dispossession. The stability of their 
employment gave them the opportunity to enjoy a good life and to expect the same for their families 
in the future. The hopes and aspirations they had for the future made them acquiesce to privatise 
their collective knowledge at work and risk their eventual layoff, in return for bequeathing their 
contracts to their children, which at the end were granted to a very limited few and left many 
disappointed.  Outside the plant the collective living arrangements they enjoyed in the past, which 
helped them survive downturns, were devalued by their focus on meeting the social expectations of 
their nuclear families and the gentrification of their communities. Theteronormative bourgeois family 
arrangement reproduced, once more, a capitalist society.  
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Chapter Six: "A Changing History?" Unions and Workers' Collective Actions at 
EISCO 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In November 2008 I began my ethnographic research by gathering oral historical accounts from 
workers on the political left who had been active in the collective labour struggles at EISCO. My 
interlocutors were a mix of current and retired workers, who led, organised and participated in various 
labour actions in the plant as union members or as active workers. In due course, I learnt about union 
elections, collective actions and labour negotiations that had taken place at one of the most militant 
labour sites in Egypt. But I soon began to notice a certain silence in their narratives about the more 
recent history of activism in the plant. I found this silence intriguing. Many of my interlocutors often 
recounted the struggles between the early 1970's and 1989 with detailed precision, in a similar 
chronological order and placing emphasis on similar events and shared collective memories. Not 
unexpectedly, the 1989 plant occupations were most prominent of these narratives. The occupations 
were a landmark struggle in the history of the labour movement in Egypt. 1989 marked one of the most 
militant confrontations between workers and the state, which resulted in the death of one worker- ʿ abd 
al-Hay al-Sayed Hassan-, the torture of protest leaders and the detention of around two hundred 
others, including members of the public who had stood in solidarity with the steel workers. The passion 
and precision with regard to narrative was not always evident, however, when I raised questions about 
struggles post-1989.  I soon began to wonder if the canonisation of the 1989 strikes served as an 
unconscious covering over of a bleaker phase which the labour activists did not want to remember or 
emphasise.    
 
A few months later, when my informants and I felt more at ease in each other’s presence, some 
began sharing their more current concerns. A veteran activist, who had been a leading figure in the 
1989 strike, and who was detained and tortured then, spoke agonisingly of being baffled by what he 
saw as the disintegration of the ideas he believed in and fought for all his life. He was perplexed by the 
nature and pace of activism in the plant today. On a different occasion, I was introduced to another 
worker who used to be active among the leftist opposition groups in the plant but had recently joined 
the ranks of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, hoping to change things from within. These 
separate but significant encounters encouraged me to investigate what had happened to collective 
action at EISCO post 1989 and what the silences, traumas and defections were about. 
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This chapter explores why workers' activism at EISCO, which peaked in 1989, was not sustained 
over the following years and did not match the momentum of the more recent workers' collective 
actions, which have escalated since 2006 in Egypt. Since 1989, I suggest, the state dealt with EISCO 
quite exceptionally to other public plants. Needless to say, the tightening of the state security grip over 
EISCO out of fear of a repeat of historical events, especially given the large number of workers at EISCO 
and the strategic location of the plant among many public plants in Helwan, stifled its labour 
movement. But management also attempted to silence the militant workers by offering them secured 
employment and relatively high wages compared to the rest of public sector.  
 
So, in contrast to workers in many public plants whose salaries had been eroded since the 
inception of neo-liberalism, the salaries of workers at EISCO increased tenfold between 1989 and 2009 
and by 2009 workers were earning fourteen month worth of fixed-base wages in bonus pay. When the 
early retirement programme, which was set up in 1994, was introduced, workers across Egypt started 
being laid off and thousands of workers struggled to find alternative livelihoods. Those who did keep 
their jobs felt insecure about their future employment prospects. At EISCO, the early retirement 
programme was not however ruthlessly enforced, unlike at other places.  Apart from the employees 
who retired ‘voluntarily’ in 2001, when the programme was first introduced at EISCO, the rate at which 
early retirements took place in the following years did not reflect the ravaging dispossession and 
insecurity documented in other workplaces. The attempts to buy workers' consent by enabling them to 
maintain relatively good economic standards and secure livelihoods throughout the neo-liberal 
decades slowed down and altered the pattern of labour activism in the plant in the years immediately 
following 1989.  
 
Other dynamics, related to work structure, living conditions around the plant and union 
politics, shaped collective struggles at EISCO.  As highlighted in previous chapters, the plant's 
management fostered informal channels to negotiate work and to appease workers by capitalising on 
their aspirations for stability and familial reproduction. These were facilitated by attempts to 
decentralise decision-making under law 203 of 1991, which restructured management in public plants 
and increased nepotism in work negotiations. The hiring of workers' children, relatives and baladiyyāt 
(people who share the same local origins) when the plant reopened its doors for recruiting temporary 
contract workers in 2007 also created new channels for negotiating work. While these informal 
channels did not necessarily replace collective actions altogether, they did alter their pattern.  
Furthermore, the corporatist and corrupt nature of the single union representing workers in Egypt, the 
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Egyptian Trade Unions Federation (ETUF), which, since its inception under Nasser, had been an arm of 
the state, rendered collective action dependent on militant groups inside the plant, rather than on 
union representation. Since 1989, management then took advantage of the devisions and conflicts 
within those leftist groups that had led the movement over the years. In addition, EISCO is located 
amidst large and strategic public and private sector plants, which always made Helwan an area of 
considerable concern for the state. EISCO is also surrounded by many villages, where almost half of the 
workers live, and a large proportion of them own land. The location of EISCO and the multiple 
subjectivities of workers as peasants and workers facilitated the repression of the labour movement.  
 
Together, the combination of these elements limited the organised and coordinated collective 
actions at EISCO and made room for a sporadic and individualistic pattern of workers' struggles. 
Following 1989 the state smothered the labour movement by using violence and repression on the one 
hand, and hegemonic tactics on the other.  Coercion and consent were the two sides of the capitalist 
coin at EISCO. The Egyptian state’s response post-1989 does not only reflect the tactics of a repressive 
capitalist state, but also highlights how workers’ power forced capital to modify its strategies, as others 
have documented in a global context (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Meanwhile, the symbolic importance of 
the steel plant to Egypt’s post-colonial history stood in the way of liquidation, privatisation and 
dispossession, which threatened other public plants. EISCO’s historical past thus protected its future.  
 
II. The State, Unions and Class Consciousness 
 
In her ethnography of labour mobilisation in China, Lee (2007) shows how decentralisation 
policies of the state broke-up working class struggles into localised and dispersed forms of activism. 
The struggles of public sector workers who were made redundant and who went on strike against the 
retrenchment of their previous entitlements, became quite different from those of migrant workers, 
whose mobilisation, largely in private enterprises, centered on pay discrimination and on working 
conditions. The decentralisation of enterprises in Egypt followed the restructuring of the public sector 
under law 203 of 1991 on the pretext of increasing efficiency and accountability. Rather than awaiting 
decisions from the holding companies or the government, the plant CEOs were given authority to 
make decisions regarding purchases, recruitment and work policies. Every plant was also now run 
according to its own internal rules register, which were prepared during the 1990’s.  However, 
decentralisation policies in Egypt, like in China, localised labour struggles within different workplaces. 
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Building cross-workplace solidarities thus became much more challenging as fights with management 
became increasingly focused on internal working conditions and by-laws within each plant.  
 
With the CEO gaining more power and authority, politics became largely based on connections 
with ‘the man’. This was evident for example, at the public sector textile plant in Alexandria studied by 
Shehata (2009), where decentralisation policies increased authoritarianism in everyday work 
negotiations and the nepotism of the circles around the CEO. At EISCO this nepotism and the 
localisation of struggles in every workplace enabled management to tame the militant labour force. 
Thus EISCO workers did not forge resistance alliances with surrounding workers in the public, private or 
even informal sector in al-Tibbin, despite it being a largely industrial area. As in the case of China, 
collective actions were not stifled altogether, but they become much more, localised, spontenous and 
sporadic.  
 
However, divisions within Egypt’s working class existed before the decentralisation policies 
were enacted. Legislations pertaining to industrial work are largely in favour of public sector workers, 
who receive, at least on paper, legal protection from the state through regulated work conditions and 
pay, and union recognition.   Unions in particular have mostly representated public sector workers. 
Since its inception, the Egyptian Trade Unions Federation (ETUF) – the only legal trade union 
organisation in Egypt since 1957 –  has been biased towards public sector workers. ETUF is a 
corporatist body, which is organised hierarchically between local union committees, general unions by 
trade, and the ETUF board overseeing the federation, with power concentrated at the top of the 
hierarchy. In 2000, the ETUF’s total membership was claimed to be 3.8 million out of a total waged 
labour force of about 27 million (Beinin, 2012). The Trade Unions Law of 1976, which regulates the 
ETUF relations, stipulates that only workplaces with more than 50 workers are legally allowed to form 
local union committees, which are then represented in the respective general unions of their trades. 
However, in Egypt 98% of the workplaces in the private sector, including the informal sector, employ 15 
workers or less. They thus have no legal right to union representation (Beinin, 2010). Although the law 
allows workers from different workplaces to form a unified local union, the practical difficulties of 
doing so have largely prevented workers in the private sector from being represented by unions at all 
(Beinin, 2010). Private sector workers are therefore mostly not represented by unions72.  
                                               
72
 The first independent union to challenge ETUF was set up in 2008 by the property tax collectors, following a large 
strike in 2007. Since the January 2011 Revolution more independent unions are being set up, including in the private 
sector. 
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 Yet,  the unions’ actual roles and capacities determine to what extent union representation 
really contributes to the fragmentation of labour strugges. Rather than an institution representing 
workers, the ETUF has actually been an instrument fostering the interest of the state ever since its 
establishment. Under Nasser, workers could only become members of the ETUF on the condition that 
they were members of the Arab Socialist Union, at the time the only political party (Posusney, 1997). 
The position of the head of the union was held by the labour minister and Socialist Public Prosecutor – 
al-mudaʿi al-ʿām al-ʾishtirāki – who intervened constantly in union elections on the plant level. In 
addition, union elections at all levels – from the local union committee, to the general unions, to the 
union board – were all heavily regulated by the state security intelligence, which eliminated the 
candidates it deemed threatening to the regime’s stability. Not issuing candidates the statement that 
proves their membership in the union – possession of which is a condition for filing for candidacy in 
union elections – or directly rigging election ballot boxes were common practices of state security 
intelligence in Egypt (Beinin, 2010). Furthermore, the union board, which is made up of 23 seats, was 
mostly made up of workers allied to the regime. All of the 23 members in the union election round of 
2006-2010 were, for example, members of Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (Beinin, 2010). 
The interests of the union leaders were thus closely allied to the state from early days, which has 
contributed to a general tendency among many workers to consider union leaders abhorrent.   
 
The ETUF union was seldomly involved in affairs concerning work and workers inside the plant. 
Public sector wages are not decided upon collectively through union negotiations with the state, but 
unilaterally by the government (Beinin, 2010).  In addition, collective actions were illegal until a new 
labour law was enacted in 2003, which acknowledged workers’ right to strike, although it still made the 
conditions of realising such an action almost impossible to fulfill. Most of the collective actions and 
strikes that took place in Egypt since 1952 were thus organised outside the union structure. Union 
leaders and bureaucracy thus almost never organised or led strikes. Although some were supportive of 
workers’ organic collective actions, many were often critical of the actions or reported them to the 
state security (Posusney, 1997; Pratt, 2006; Shehata, 2009). Posusney (1997), however, demonstrates 
that at different points the corporatist union was able to mobilise on issues of nationwide concern 
when those issues coincided with union leaders’ opportunism and careerist aspirations, and when 
workers pushed them from below. The union’s mobilisation is evident, for example, in opposing the 
privatisation of public enterprises and delaying the enactment of the labour law. But on matters 
related to economic conditions and work relations inside different plants, the union did not represent 
workers, but mostly represented the state (Posusney, 1997).  
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The corruption of ETUF and its alliance with state security institutions distanced workers from 
union politics. Apart from the usual recourse to union leaders, in order to provide a connection for 
new recruits, to sort out a dispute between a worker and a manager over a pay cut, or get a priority for 
the summer holidays organised by unions, union leaders contributed very little to collective 
negotiations of work. Union elections at EISCO were thus largely based on the politics of baladiyyāt, in 
which workers elected their baladiyyāt in order to provide a direct connection to union leaders that 
they could make use of when required. In addition, at EISCO, as at the textile plant studied by Shehata 
(2009) the union was prolific at organising ‘exhibitions’ (maʿārid) of household supplies and school 
materials, from which the union leaders benefited through the commissions they secured from the 
retailers and suppliers. Most importantly, the union controls the workers’ social fund, which provides 
pensions and other valuable benefits. Their control over this fund has been a decisive factor in 
preventing new alternative unions from being set up.  
 
This is not to say that trade unions in other, less authoritarian states around the world have not 
often been co-opted by the state. Although trade unions provide some spaces of resistance, as Gramsci 
argues, states have repeatedly used civil society, including unions, in the “co-optation of the class 
struggle, the organisation of consent and the reinforcement of hegemony” (Parry, 2008, p. 3). Marx’s 
assumption that trade unions would become places for workers to come together and the seeds of a 
political party that will bring the revolutionary working class to power, has proved problematic in 
various historical episodes (Marx & Engels, 1948).  For example, in India, Parry shows how the unions 
of the public-sector Bihlai Steel Plant were instruments of state hegemony and management control, 
whereas unions in the private sector were used to achieve private aims. The competition between 
unions representing contract labour and those representing public-sector workers further divided 
workers.   In Egypt, the corporatist and corrupt nature of the single union did not lead to such tensions 
between different competing unions, as they were nonexistent. If in Bihlai, the presence of unions 
helped entrench divisions within members of the labour force in positions supporting either the 
contract or the BSP workers, in Egypt the absence of real unions contributed to exactly these same 
divisions. 
 
 As the ethnography by Shehata (2009) shows, the lack of union representation makes the 
negotiation between management - particularly the CEO – and workers unmediated by official 
institutions and dependent on workers' direct relations with the CEO. This, in a sense, made EISCO 
workers dependent on the relations they cultivated over the years inside the plant, and effectively 
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excluded the casual workers, who were striving to join the plant but had few connections inside it. It is 
probably why the latter were never able to set foot in the plant once jobs became scarce and 
connections more difficult to secure. The relations workers shared in the neighbourhoods surrounding 
the plant were thus deal-breakers to the politics of exclusion and inclusion. The fact that most workers 
came from or lived in the villages surrounding the plant, in al-Ṣaff in the south, the villages of Giza in 
the West of the Nile and al-shubak and kafr al-ʿiluw in the West of the Nile strengthened the relations 
of baladiyyāt in the plant and gave them wider resources to capitalise and wider connections. Casual 
workers around the plant who lived largely in informal housing in urban areas, for example, could not 
capitalise on similar relations.  Housing also give EISCO workers privileges over casual workers in 
negotiating with the state. In China, Lee (2007) finds that workers’ purchase of former welfare housing 
at state-subsidised prices provided an effective buffer, between the state and the public sector workers 
in the rustbelt area who were threatened with layoffs. Similarly in al-Tibbin, workers who purchased 
their houses in the company town since 2006 felt more secure and protected while negotiating work 
conditions individually with management.  
 
Workers’ proximity and access to agricultural land are also vital to shapping labour struggles in 
industrial areas. In China, for instance, migrant workers were tied to a rural household registration 
system, which gave them some land rights in their rural towns and villages of origin and reduced their 
antagonism toward the state. In, Egypt however, Toth (2002) found that in Egypt the strikes of Kafr al-
Dawwār were quite militant because the laid off workers, who did not own land, could not find other 
work opportunities in the mostly rural areas where there were no workshops. At EISCO, the 
combination of the industrial and rural character of Helwan gave plant workers some opportunities to 
moonlight while still keeping their jobs, and those who took early retirement had a relatively better 
chance to start a small project or workshop. In addition, a large group of workers had, over the years, 
managed to purchase pieces of land in their home villages surrounding the plant (or elsewhere). Those 
who did not purchase land rented some and then sublet it to other rural workers. This gave workers a 
multiple identity as both peasants and workers and provided resources during difficult times, much like 
the migrant workers in China, to cover major investments such as marrying a son or daughter, 
providing children’s university fees and so on. Although neither private sector workers nor EISCO 
workers received much, if any, support from the unions in Egypt, yet the difference in the security of 
their work, the conditions of their pay, and their relations outside the plant did not bring private and 
public sector workers together and neither did it subject EISCO workers to the same precarious life 
conditions endured by workers in the private sector. 
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Some of the literature on collective actions in Egypt relates their historical occurrence since 
1952 to a moral economy explanation, where workers hold the state responsible for continuing to 
provide for them, as initiated under the estatist policies established by Nasser, and revolt when 
experiencing a retrenchment of their entitlements (Posusney, 1997). Researchers thus investigate the 
changes in pay, benefits, perks and working conditions as a motivator for workers’ collective actions. 
While these variables have been influential in taming the once militant labour force at EISCO, a much 
overlooked factor is the centrality of intergenerational reproduction for workers- and more widely the 
relational aspect in class formation- a factor that has been key to understanding protests in other parts 
of the world, such as India (see for example Engelshoven, 2000; De Neve, 2008). I argue that one of the 
most important entitlements, which is often overlooked in the literature on protests in Egypt, is the 
legacy of employing workers’ children in public plants. EISCO’s ability to continue doing so and to 
capitalise on workers’ aspirations for ‘stability’ through new recruitment of workers’ relatives and 
through housing policies – in addition to the security of employment in the plant and the lucrative pay 
workers received – is decisive to EISCO not joining the momentum of protests since 2006.  And it is 
precisely the preoccupation with upward mobility that did not allow workers’ ‘class consciousness’ to 
materialise at EISCO.  
 
 The very idea that working-class consciousness will arise as a matter of historical necessity 
through the move from a “class in itself” to a “class for itself” was justly challenged by many who saw 
class as a “contingent outcome” (Hanagan, 1994) and a “continuous process” (Lockman, 1994a). In 
highlighting the relation between BSP permanent and contract workers, Parry (2008, p.3) argues that 
the “the crystallisation of their consciousness was impeded by social mobility.” Likewise at EISCO, the 
struggles for mobility impeded the development of class consciousness of workers who were largely 
fragmented around securing work contracts for their offspring. As previous chapters highlighted, 
EISCO’s labourforce was fragmented between those who managed to turn the property of their 
contract into a source of embourgeoisement for their families and those who were downwardly 
mobile, who were unable to use the ‘property’ of their contract in the social reproduction of the 
family.  Notably, the downwardly mobile did not see themselves in the same precarious position as the 
casual workers, because of their focus on their skills, their relations, and lifestyle, which they shared 
with more upwardly mobile workers at EISCO.   
III. Pattern of Labour Mobilisation at EISCO 1971-1989 
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In 1989 EISCO workers staged two occupations at the plant, first in July and later in August. 
Workers were calling for the plant's local union committee to be dissolved following its repeated 
cooperation with management. The collective mobilisation began when two elected board members 
were fired by the Minister of Industry when they exposed the union's complicity with EISCO 
management in supporting management’s decision to unfairly increase incentive pay for 
administration workers only, and not to include blue collar workers. The attempts to bring down the 
union were remarkable given that most of the collective actions in public plants in the eighties were 
mobilised over economic demands only. For example in 1983, the Light Transport workers in Helwan 
mobilised for an increase in per diems; in 1984 the Nasr Pipes Company called for an increase in 
incentive pays; in 1985 Kafr al Dawwār workers mobilised against the increase in bread prices, and in 
1986 ESCO mobilised for a stabilisation of weekly holidays (Barakat, 2007).  
 
The complicity of the union with management at EISCO echoed the corrupt practices of unions 
across Egyptian public industries. The demand of EISCO workers in 1989, namely that the local union 
committee be dissolved, could have thus been replicated in other plants, given its wider appeal to 
other public-sector plants. State security's response to workers' occupation of the plant for almost 24 
hours, and the successful coordination of solidarity between workers and their families outside, 
reflected the state’s anxiety over the prospect of the escalation of the protests and its potential 
snowballing effect in other plants around. Security forces intervened by attacking the plant, firing live 
shots at workers, detaining more than two hundred of them, torturing some of their leaders, holding 
civil society members who supported workers, and finally killing ʿ Abdel Hay. The death of ʿ Abdel Hay – 
the first worker elevated to the status of a martyr in the Egyptian public discourse since two workers, 
Khamis and Baqari, were sentenced to death at the Kafr al Dawwār Spinning and Weaving Plant in 
1952 – made EISCO's uprising remarkable in the nation's collective memory. The organisation of and 
preparation to the occupations, the sharp nature of workers’ demands, the cruelty with which the 
state security responded and the wide support from a variety of civil society members including actors, 
writers and journalists, all made this event a landmark in Egyptian labour history. 
 
The level of organisation of the occupation during its buildup, and later in the solidarity with 
detained workers, had taken some time to attain. The left had been organising workers in alternative 
spaces to those provided by the unions, although they also often worked from within the corporatist 
union and contributed to its tenacity (Posusney, 1997). Leftist workers at EISCO, for example, managed 
to gather almost 8000 signatures on a petition to overrule the union before the protests erupted. They 
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also formed groups in solidarity with the families of the workers, who were detained following the 
strikes and channelled the support coming from members of the public and the media through 
different solidarity committees. As Mustafa Hamdan, one of the leading members of the action, 
suggests, the events of 1989 were the outcome of many years of activism and collective actions in the 
plant. This is possibly one reason why many among the left continue to remember it with such passion 
and in such detail.  
 
Workers on the steel Plate-and Sheet-Rolling Mill remember 1989 with less passion than the 
leftist organisers. Many of the workers I asked about the events said that they had jumped the fences 
of the plant when the militant workers closed the gates and ran away back to their homes; some did, 
however, have a more nuanced story to tell. Although on the surface the second occupation was 
against the union, and called for the re-instatement of the two fired board members, on another level 
the occupation escalated because of a baladiyyāt dispute.  
 
Workers remember many versions of the story, but the one most commonly repeated has it 
that when leftist workers mobilised against the union and rallied workers in closing factory gates, those 
who were from al-Saff, to the south of EISCO – the place of origin of the once-head of the steel 
department, Sabry Abd Al Baki – found it a good opportunity to get their own back on the new head of 
the steel department, Hassan Abdel Latif, who was a rival to Al Baki. Hassan was the boss of Sabry and 
also the deputy CEO.  When he left the plant to travel abroad, Sabry oversaw the steel department in 
his absence. Sabry was notorious for the commissions he made and for hiring most of his baladiyyāt in 
the steel department from al-Saff. When Hassan returned, however, he moved Sabry to another 
department; it was said, to curtail his influence.  
 
When the 1989 mobilisation began, workers from al-Saff are reported to have kidnapped 
Hassan, locked him up in his office and humiliated him.  Some workers speculate that Hassan was the 
one that called the state security, and that is why the police arrived at the steel department, where 
ʿAbdel Hay worked, and was killed during the police attempts to rescue Hassan. The precise details of 
the occupations vary according to the interlocutors but the common story claims that the rivalry 
between supporters of Hassan and those of Sabry escalated the events. So, although a certain degree 
of organisation was probably due to leftist labour organisers, the militancy of workers was shaped by 
their multi-layered subjectivity.  
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In recounting the story of activism prior to 1989, workers on the left often began their narrative 
with the 1971 action, which was the first to take place in the plant since its establishment. It was also 
among the first collective actions in the country during this critical time following the defeat of the 
Egyptian army by the Israelis in 1967. Following the defeat, workers in Egypt were encouraged to make 
sacrifices for the sake of the ‘battle’ (al-maʿraka). The working week was increased from 42 to 48 hours 
without reparation to workers; forced savings were increased from one half to three-quarters of a 
day’s pay per month, and additional measures, such as cancellation of paid holidays, or ‘donations’ of 
compulsory pay for meals, uniforms, shift work, or dangerous jobs, were introduced in some plants 
(Posusney, 1997). In 1971, EISCO workers called for the introduction of new per diems and the 
overruling of the plant's union. Although the demand regarding the per diem rates was met, and other 
conditions of work were adjusted – including better remuneration for workers with middle 
qualifications –  still, 33 EISCO workers, mainly from the left, were later detained and sent to work in 
different Egyptian governorates, a tactic that the plant often used against ‘troublemakers’. Workers' 
participation in the 1977 famous bread riots in Egypt, and their opposition to a visit by Israeli President 
Navon in 1980 also became landmarks in the history of collective action because the demands they 
raised went beyond the economic concerns affecting workers’ everyday life. The 1989 strikes, although 
many-sided in goals and tactics, nevertheless followed on from a longer history during which EISCO’s 
militant workers raised progressive country-wide political and economic demands. 
 
Left-wing activism in the plant also went beyond collective actions and strikes. Leftists groups 
played an alternative leadership and coordinative role to that of unions. Leftist cores have operated 
historically at the Delta Ironworks in Shubra al-Khayma, the Harir and EISCO in Helwan, and the MS & 
W factory at Kafr al-Dawwar (Posusney, 1997). Radical workers from these plants trained others at 
EISCO on engaging in everyday labour relations and affairs, which granted them and their ideas some 
status among workers.  
 
A workers' publication, al- Ṣanāyʿiyya, was published inside the plant. It is said to have been the 
first self-funded publication by workers in Egyptian plants, whose aim was to help raise awareness and 
create solidarities among EISCO workers. Sherif Salah Al-Din, who later became a union member, 
recounted the conditions of publication of al- Ṣanāyʿiyya, with self-built machines that they hid in 
different places to overcome the regime’s ban on leafleting and tight control of publications. The left 
wing party al-Tagamuʿ had a branch in al-Tibbin, which is now closed. The branch also contributed to 
working class activism by publishing ʾAhālī al-Tibbīn- a publication addressing the work conditions in 
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the industrial area of al-Tibbin, which workers affiliated with al-Tagamuʿ were involved in publishing.  
Workers' collectives (ʾusar) were started up inside different mills in the plant in order to maintain direct 
connections with workers, participate in their social life, educate some in the tradition of the left's 
labour activism, and help recruit new workers to their ranks.  Leftist workers also remembered 
authoring proposals and studies on ways to amend specific workers' benefits and incentives, which 
they then presented to the board of directors of the plant.  
 
Despite the corporatist structure of the union and direct state intervention in union election 
results, which often brought in a majority of pro-management and veteran figures supportive of the 
regime, some opposition workers were still successful in joining the union and working from within. 
The first time the left ever ran for elections in the plant was in 1979. They won many seats in the 1979-
1983 election round. In the 1991 round, leftist workers also won many seats, although as a minority in 
a co-opted union, they often failed to serve the cause of workers' rights from within. Their presence 
within and belief in the corporatist union, in fact, legitimised the ETUF over the years (Posusney, 1997). 
 
That said, the role of the left in the plant should not be overestimated. All across Egypt,  actions 
were organised sporadically and informally (Posusney, 1997) and in many places leftist workers were 
unpopular because of their reputation as non-religious, as ‘good Communists’. In addition, some leftist 
workers such as Hamdan also believed left-wing activism in the plant emerged quite late, i.e. only in 
the early 1970s.  As products of the Nasserite regime themselves, they argued that they took some 
time before realising the deficiencies in Nasser’s regime and policies. Six leftist EISCO workers also co-
authored a book documenting the history of activism in the plant and titled it Malḥamat al-Ḥadīd w al-
Ṣulb- The Iron and Steel Epic. In the book they argued that in contrast to textile factories, whose history 
of activism pre-1952 produced veteran activists who guided the movement for decades, the iron and 
steel industry was rather nascent in Egypt and had not yet produced its own committed core of labour 
activists.  
 
Salah Al-Din also recounted the difficulties they faced in recruiting workers from rural origins- 
given that workers of rural and semi-rural origin constituted the majority in the plant- to the cause of 
industrial labour rights. He argued that those who owned some land or worked the land themselves 
were less interested in the struggles of factory workers. Exceptions existed, like Fawzi Mohamadein 
from al-Saff, a radical activist worker on the left, who was famous for having occupied the CEO’s office 
during the 1989 protests. Some workers in al-Saff found Mohamadein’s modest background- having 
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come from a less established family in the area- to have given him additional freedom of manoeuvre. 
The security’s clamp down on leftist activism was also firecer in the villages, where word of mouth 
circulated quickly. This further reduced the support for leftist workers in rural areas. Union elections in 
particular were largely based on supporting one’s baladiyyāt, especially in the rural areas around the 
plant, and leftist activists often chose candidates from large and established families in these areas to 
run as candidates. As Posusney (1997) argues, despite the left’s contribution to workers’ struggles, 
their inability to provide workers with material gains and alternatives of the size and scope unions 
afforded, thus prevented them from becoming a viable alternative to unions.  
 
The movement did, however, benefit from the support of other actors outside the plant. The 
nearby activists in the Helwan textile plant, Harareyat plant and aviation plant, already established in 
the activist tradition and in championing workers' rights, helped spread awareness among EISCO 
workers and encouraged them to form their own movement. The Tagamuʿ party, which when 
established became a hub for many of the undercover communist and socialist groups active in Egypt 
for many years, also strengthened the opposition to the state at the plant – especially for a short 
period in the 1980's when Tagamuʿ was heavily involved in the workers' cause.  The Tagamuʿ s relation 
with the labour movement later turned controversial when it adopted less confrontational tactics with 
the state. This started as early as 1989, at the very beginning of the EISCO protests, when Tagamuʿ 
party's mouthpiece openly critiqued workers for their militant confrontations. Over the years, my 
informants argue,  left-wing groups in Egypt grew distant from the workers' movements. This rift grew 
when many groups of the left adopted Stalinist ideology, which distanced them from supporting 
workers' collective actions.  Salah Al-Din however finds that working closely with veteran leftist figures, 
such as Egyptian labour and civil rights lawyers Nabil al-Hilaly and Youssef Darwish, and textile trade 
unionist from the pre-Nasser era, Taha Saʿad Uthman, shaped his class consciousness and remained a 
source of support and inspiration throughout his and other activists’ life.  
 
IV. Labour Mobilisation at EISCO post-1989 
 
In an unprecedented event in 1991, eight workers from the left at EISCO won union seats (out of a 
total of 21 seats) in plant elections. Saber Barakat, veteran labour activist, explained in a public talk 
that across Egypt, a large number of leftist workers in public enterprises won the 1991 union elections. 
The regime had refrained from heavy-handedly interfering in the election this round in an attempt to 
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test the capacities of the left. However, Barakat argues that members of the left did not make optimum 
use of this opportunity. Many of my informants agreed with Barakat's observation and explained that 
union membership is stifling for leftist activists, even when they are a majority, because, as Salah Al-
Din put it: "we get easily overwhelmed by the bureaucracy and level of negotiations the corporatist 
union work involves".  In 1993, the union at EISCO was dissolved after charges of theft and negligence 
in maintaining accurate financial accounts were filed against union representatives. The informants 
who were part of the union then, explained how members of the left had been tricked into holding the 
treasury seat of the union, which other political groups were very careful in avoiding, and thus ran the 
union finances without sufficient training in or understanding of the requirements of such 
responsibility.  
 
Dissolving the first leftist-led union in the plant was detrimental to both their reputation and future 
work in the plant.  Hamdan called the 1993 event bidāyat al-intikāssa ('the beginning of the setback').  
In the following elections of 1996, only four members of the left won union seats. Plagued by the 
reputation they had acquired in 1993, they were back to being a minority in a pro-government 
majority led union. The factionalism that began to arise among the groups from the left, and their 
disputes regarding the different strategies to adopt for their labour struggles, did not help their already 
weak position. In the 2001 elections the number of leftist leaders elected in the union was further 
slimmed down, and in the 2006 elections only one leftist worker was elected. He was an incumbent 
union member since 1991 who had a large following among his baladiyyāt from the village of Shubak 
because of belonging to one of the large landowning families. Becoming a union member gave him 
and his family added 'prestige'. 
 
Much like the record of union elections, the record of collective actions at EISCO post-1989 was 
also not promising. Apart from some mobilisation against the early retirement programme, including a 
short protest in 2003, very little large-scale mobilisation took place. Most of the actions that erupted 
concerned a single mill and often raised economic demands regarding incentives, per diem pay, perks 
and benefits. Workers often collectively refused to receive their pay on payday during these actions as 
a tactic to make their voices heard. But nothing was on the scale of the pre-1989 actions. None lasted 
longer than a day and most were quickly suppressed by state security.  
 
During my fieldwork starting in November 2008, a few labour actions took place in the plant, 
but were neither organised nor premeditated and were settled individually with little involvement 
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from either union members or leftist activist workers. Magdy, the father in my host family and a 
Christian worker at EISCO, went on a hunger strike in early 2008 when a fight between him and a union 
member ended with his transfer from one mill to another, in addition to a cut to his incentive pay. His 
ten day hunger strike, which resulted in his hospitalisation, was ended when the company 
management and state security negotiated with the coptic church in Helwan to pressure Magdy into 
ending his strike. Magdy received some support from leftist activists at EISCO and from various legal 
support centres, but it was the Church that cut the deal and tricked him into acquiescing by promising 
to revoke the decision to cut his incentive pay.73 The state and the church’s promise never materialised 
and it was only a year later after threatening to sue the plant that his paycut was revoked.   
 
On a different occasion, a one day strike took place when fixed-term contract workers in the 
transport department refused to drive their buses in the evening. Their action followed management's 
decision to abruptly terminate the contract of one of their colleagues. The workers also used the 
occasion to demand that their fixed-term temporary contracts be turned permanent. Management 
promised to reinstate the worker, which happened a few weeks later and a few months later, the same 
bus drivers were given permanent contracts, as related in chapter four. Bus drivers were particularly 
strategic to the plant and hence their action were quite successful. Another strike also took place 
when workers protested the CEO's decision to make their buses leave an hour late in retribution to his 
spotting of a few workers outside the gates before the end of working day. This ended quickly as soon 
as workers were made free to go. Most of these actions thus happened irregularly, often in response to 
an abrupt management decision. They were also not premeditated by ongoing mobilisation and did 
not involve a lot of organisation from workers and activists in the plant.  
 
In the following paragraphs I suggest some possible explanations to the change in labour tactics 
at EISCO and the dwindling success of pre-planned and organised actions. In contrast to many public 
plants, workers at EISCO have maintained relatively good economic standards throughout the neo-
liberal decades – reflected in their general pay levels, perks and economic benefits. Economic 
standards hence contributed to the slowing down in labour activism post-1989. However, the work 
structure, living conditions in the surrounding area, and workers’ aspiration to share their ‘good life’ 
with their children have refashioned labour relations, and consequently also the pattern of collective 
action at EISCO. 
                                               
73
 The bishop’s main support figure was a businessman, who was always present at the church’s premises, and who 
also was involved with state security intelligence. He was the primary figure involved in the negotiations with the 
latter.  
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V. Cracking Down on Dissent 
 
Following the events of 1989, EISCO's management and the state security became apprehensive of 
any collective action that would lead to “another 1989”. “If EISCO rises, everything else rises” Saleh, a 
leading figure in EISCO’s administration, explained when workers went on strike after the CEO locked 
their buses in. In his informal chat, he recounted why actions at EISCO were still closely monitored by 
state security. His description recalled memories of the sleepless nights he spent in 1989 being forced 
to make workers' files available to state security intelligence. His conclusion was that the sheer 
numbers at EISCO, its location among many public industries – such as the cement, coke, and water 
companies – and the memory of 1989, have all contributed to the heavy-handed approach to workers’ 
activism at EISCO 
 
Saleh told me that state security personnel are often on the phone with the administration during 
pay times and especially when they learn that workers in a mill  are planning to strike and refuse their 
paychecks.  The open channels between the plant security and state security allow the latter to 
monitor any mobilisation in the plant, he added. These channels, it is worth noting, were also 
pervasive at the public sector textile firm studied by Shehata (2009). Saleh disapprovingly recounted 
seeing state security personnel rigging union election results over the past few years, when he oversaw 
the vote counting. What Saleh recounted however, seemed unexceptional when on another occasion, 
one of the ex-leftists unionists gave me a leaked document from the CEO’s office that dated back to the 
late 1990s. This document was a letter sent by state security intelligence to the administration in all 
public-sector firms asking them to be alert to labour actions against privatisation policies and to 
ensure workers behind these acts were being cracked down on.  These overt attempts to control 
workers’ dissent were thus typical of the police state that Egypt had become over the past half a 
century or so.  
 
 But the state’s policing system was effective partly because other indirect tactics helped to supress 
workers' dissent. For example, since the 1996 union elections, management introduced a new system 
whereby elections would take place in every mill separately and then later become aggregated. This 
replaced the old system of voting on plant-wide candidate lists. These new voting bylaws, my 
informants explained, meant that activists from the same political groups, who worked in the same 
mills, were now competing against each other, thus reducing the group’s possibility of winning a 
majority of seats in the union.  
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In addition, what workers referred to as the taṭfīsh (‘forced quitting’) policies during the Aly Helmy 
years were crucial to shaping collective labour politics. 74  Aly Helmy’s management round coincided 
with the peak of neo-liberal policies in Egypt, which were quite draconian in controlling workers' 
mobility and time and often forced them to retire early. Some of these policies, for example, 
prohibited the trading of goods and services inside the plant.  The revenues made in the workers’ 
collectives – the ʾusar – from starting up small projects, such as running a mill cafeteria, were thus 
stopped and funds available for awareness-raising or social activities within the collectives were cut.  
Other roles previously undertaken by workers' collectives were retrenched. Management, for instance, 
used to allocate some of the production benefits of the entire mill to the mill’s collective, which in turn 
invested and distributed them. When this practice was interrupted, workers’ collectives lost more of 
their autonomy. The prohibition on trading inside the plant also lowered the sale of activist 
publications. Al- Ṣanāyʿiyya, for example, had previsouly generated funds for the movement's 
activities: each copy was sold for 10, and later 25, piasters. With the new policies, the publication 
stopped functioning as a vehicle for raising working class consciousness and solidarity. Even simple 
things such as posting the collective's agreed-upon rules, which my leftist informants remembered 
vividly, were banned with the new despotic managerial practices. Given the restrictions on workers 
actions and their collectives, engaging workers in the cause of workers' activism  became ever more 
challenging at EISCO.  
 
VI. Decentralisation and New Ways to Negotiate Work 
  
The introduction of law 203 in 1991, which clustered public plants under different holding 
companies, was meant to allow greater freedoms in decision-making regarding the liquidation, 
privatisation, reduction in size and breakdown of the holding companies’ subsidiaries. On the shop-
floor of a public textile firm, where Samer Shehata conducted ethnographic work, instead of 
decentralising decision-making by giving more powers to direct supervisors on the shop-floor, the new 
law fostered informal ways to negotiate work by giving too much unchecked powers to middle-ranked 
supervisors (Shehata, 2009). Similarly at EISCO, when workers remembered the good old days, they 
often spoke of effective foremen, mulāhzīn ʾakifāʾ, who mediated between workers and engineers. 
They shared stories about how as young workers they were penalised if they spoke directly to the head 
engineers and how when a worker had a complaint, he wrote it in a letter, which he gave to the 
                                               
74
Aly Helmy was the CEO of the plant between 1991 and 2005. 
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foreman to pass on to the head engineer. Today, by contrast, as chapter two illustrated, workers do not 
esteem engineers as highly and often comment on the latter’s increased presence on the shop-floor. 
Engineers and head engineers were often seen on shop-floors chatting to workers, directly 
administering holidays, incentive pays and penalties, and negotiating the workloads directly, thus 
taking on the roles previously played by foremen. Decentralisation policies, in some respects, inflated 
the engineers' responsibilities on the shop-floor without increasing their power.  Informal ways to 
negotiate everyday work were thus highly dependent on cultivating relationality on the shop-floor.  
 
The attempts to decentralise decision-making thus gave workers direct channels to affect 
management and advance their positions. Some workers, albeit the powerful and the better 
connected ones, benefited from this arrangement. But so did the security personnel in the plant, who 
collected more gossip and information by monitoring these informal networks. In applying the 
decentralisation policies workers were also recruited to become informants on their colleagues. During 
the early retirement program, workers often repeated to me, workers reported on their colleagues 
who had a second job, a second house, or were sleeping at work, all of which were used against them 
in forcing them to accept redundancy during ʿAly Helmy’s time. Informal negotiations thus rendered 
collective actions less pre-planned and more sporadic. That said, such negotiations cannot replace 
collective action completely, given that the informal system is not fair to everybody and some would 
likely resort to alternative collective actions to gain their rights. The widespread assumption that 
formal and informal politics are mutually exclusive must therefore be disentangled. 
 
VII. Labour Law 12 and Implications at EISCO 
 
At EISCO, the new labour law 12 of 2003, which enabled public plants to hire fixed-term temporary 
contract workers, also spread informal politics and tied workers' interests and those of the state. As 
mentioned earlier, when in 2007 EISCO reopened its doors to recruit fixed-term temporary contract 
workers, recruitment criteria gave priority to workers' sons, thus attempting to appease workers and 
buy their support for the unpopular neo-liberal policies. Giving priority to workers’ children in 
employement existed since the inception of the plant, but with limited job opportunities, employment 
became restricted to a privileged few who were sons, relatives or Baladiyyāt of permanent workers. In 
fact, permanent workers became the main recruiting agents in job-search networks. By exploiting 
workers’ aspirations for stability and incorporating kinship relations into the production regime, the 
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plant thus controlled dissent in the plant.  
 
Temporary fixed-term contract workers were denied union representation by ETUF under the new 
labour law. But midway through my fieldwork at EISCO temporary workers were allowed membership 
in the union. As I learnt later, the financial resources of the social fund run by the union were being 
depleted. The shrinking labour force of permanent workers was jeopardising the contributions to the 
fund. Thus the head of the union decided to include temporary fixed-term contract workers in union 
membership in order to benefit from their contribution to the social fund. Although union 
representation contributes only occasionally to everyday politics at EISCO, temporary workers’ 
membership in the union further eliminated potential antagonisms between permanent and 
temporary workers.  
 
 Like at EISCO, many public sector plants that went on strike in recent years recruited permanent 
workers’ sons and were also subject to the new labour law. So why did permanent workers elsewhere 
then still participate in collective actions? What seems to have been decisive in the configuration of 
the new labour law at EISCO is the rural nature of its surrounding area, where almost half of the 
workers reside.  The dependence on permanent workers in the recruitment of new fixed-contract 
workers coincided with the management's preference for hiring workers from the surrounding area, 
which is predominantly rural, to cut down on travel and housing costs. EISCO has thus seen an increase 
in the number of workers who come from rural and semi-urban backgrounds and a general trend 
towards the 'ruralisation' of the labour force can be spotted.  
 
For example, workers now ironically say that the plant’s workforce is predominantly from the 
nearby villages on the west of the Nile.  The head of the union, who has been in place since 1993, and 
is himself from Shubak, on the west bank of the Nile, is said to have recruited most of his baladiyyāt, 
and the head of personnel relations, from Badarashein, also to the west of the Nile, is also said to have 
favoured most of his baladiyyāt in recruiting new staff. This general belief is confirmed by the results of 
a survey I conducted at the Plate- and Sheet- Rolling Mill. Of the 70 permanent workers, 15 had 
originated in villages to the south of the plant (al-Saff and al Wasta), 20 had come from villages on the 
west bank of the Nile next to the plant (ʾayat, Shubak, Badrashin, Hawamdiyya, Abu Ragwan and 
Maraziʾ), 7 were from Helwan,  11 from Cairo and 16 from other governorates across Egypt. But with 
the temporary and daily workers there were no workers from other governorates and very few from 
Cairo. Thus out of the 30 temporary workers on the shop-floor, 11 were from the villages of al-Saff, ten 
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were from villages on the west of the Nile, eight were from Helwan and only one from Cairo. Daily 
workers reflected a similar pattern. Out of the 16 workers who filled in the survey, 6 were from al Saff 
to the south of the plant, 6 were from villages to the west, and 3 were from Helwan; one abstained. 
The melting pot that EISCO used to take pride in being was therefore being replaced by a rather 
localised and ruralised labour force. 
 
 Engaging workers who live in rural areas in the cause of the workers' struggles has been a 
difficult task for my left-wing informants, who repeat that workers who have more than one source of 
income, especially land tenancy or ownership, tend to have less interest in taking part in collective 
action in the plant75. In addition to having more than one source of income, workers from rural areas 
also tend to continue to live in their extended family houses, and many marry their cross-cousins. Both 
reduce the cost of living. In the case of EISCO, workers from rural backgrounds who became part of 
activist circles in the plant were more often members of bigger families who had wide political 
influence in their own bilād (local areas). These men often benefited the movement by their ability to 
rally large numbers of people, especially during elections, and in turn, they benefited from the prestige 
of union membership. Further research is needed on the relation between land holding, tenancy type 
and activism at EISCO, especially given the changes in the land tenancy law in 1997. But thus far, one 
can only infer from the experience of my leftist informants that workers of rural background, whose 
numbers and political weight have both increased under the new recruitment strategies, are less likely 
to be engaged in collective actions regarding work conditions in the plant. 
  
VIII. The Demise of the Left at EISCO and the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The changes that the groups of workers from the left have witnessed in their internal composition 
and in their strategies led to the dwindling of activism in the plant. The absence of new blood, 
especially that of young workers, in the leftist groups has been integral to their demise. The halt in 
recruitment for more than sixteen years did not allow an easy hand-over to a newer and energetic 
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 In the survey I conducted, out of 70 permanent workers, 43 said they had no agricultural land, 17 said they owned 
land (and one said he had sold it); three said they rented land, one both rented and owned land, and six abstained 
from answering. These numbers must be taken with a grain of salt because many of the workers were afraid of 
declaring land ownership. One worker asked if this was to prove that they were rich and told me he was not going to 
fill the survey and ʿamm Mustafa Hakim, who always spoke to me about the land he owned, wrote that he did not 
have land. Of the 30 temporary workers, 20 said they had no land, nine said they owned land, one both rented and 
owned land, one rented land and one abstained. Of the daily workers, nine said they did not have land, two owned 
land, two both owned and rented land and three rented land. The extent of land ownership and tenancy at EISCO 
shows that although it is not predominant it is still relatively common among EISCO workers.  
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generation. Not only did new fixed-term temporary contract workers not have the security of 
employment, which might prompt them to engage wholeheartedly in labour struggles, but the new 
workers also had no direct experience of workers' struggles that took place in the plant's recent history 
that would inspire their activism. 
 
In addition, members of the left, who led workers’ struggles in the plant prior to 1989, were later 
divided into two competing groups. The tensions between (and among) both groups significantly 
undermined their fight for a just working environment. The first group was supportive of the Tagamuʿ 
party with its non-confrontational policies. It had started a few independent initiatives which refused 
foreign funding, but it is constantly rather short of funds, which limits its activities. This group is led 
primarily by one of the two leaders who were detained and tortured during the 1989 uprising.  The 
other group, which is led by the other leader of the 1989 uprising, had established a labour activist 
centre that accepts foreign funding and is involved in giving support and guidance to workers.  As 
informants on both sides told me, the groups unfortunately ended up competing with each other in a 
rather personal manner, which weakened their chances of recruiting new people, who were easily 
baffled by these internal struggles. These struggles became more visible when the two groups tried to 
reach consensus over union candidates to support in elections, or in putting together stronger actions 
at EISCO. Ideological disagreements regarding the best paths to activism are quite common throughout 
history, but when the tensions run deep, they turn friends into rivals and the personal investment in 
these rivalries seriously harms the overall movement. EISCO activists today acknowledge, albeit sadly, 
that they are headed in the same bleak direction. 
 
The weakening of the Tagamuʿ party over the past two decades, as a result of its unassuming 
approach in the nineties and its corrupt and at times pro-regime practices in the 2000s, reduced the 
support that leftist activists received at EISCO. The demise of Tagamu' is evident the closing down of 
their branch in al-Tibbin and the fact that the labour meetings in their Helwan branch are attended by 
a mere handful of workers. The rise of activist centres championing workers' legal rights in Egypt has 
supported workers in taking their cases against management to court. Those critical of the role of legal 
labour centres, however, share Lee's (2007) concern that recourse to legality legitimises state power 
and reduces militant and revolutionary alternatives among workers’ collectivities.  The gradual rise of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in al-Tibbin and inside the plant since the late 1980's, when Sadat gave them 
wider space for operation, is another important development. The Brotherhood's leading figure at 
EISCO, Ali Fath El Bab, won a seat in parliamentary elections, which gave the group some support 
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inside EISCO. In recent years, leftist groups, whose influence is now significantly weakened, have had 
to coordinate with the Muslim Brothers during union elections. The Brothers’ strategies, however, are 
significantly less radical and often averse to confrontation and collective actions. The developments 
within the groups on the left and in the surrounding institutionst thus changed significantly the pattern 
of organisation at EISCO since 1989. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored why EISCO did not live up to its reputation as one of the militant sites 
of labour activism in Egypt following the uprising in 1989, and why, when a new wave of labour 
protests emerged in 2006, it did not reach EISCO. I have shown how the use of direct violence and 
heavy-handed interference from state security intelligence changed the protest dynamics at EISCO. The 
state’s attempt to co-opt workers through lucrative pay and the security of their contracts also slowed 
down activism at the plant.  
 
I argue that a widely overlooked factor in understanding changes in mobilisation at EISCO is the 
centrality of social reproduction for workers. The literature on labour protests in Egypt generally 
ignores the influence of employing existing workers’ sons in public plants. EISCO’s ability to continue 
recruiting workers’ sons, relatives and baladiyyāt and to capitalise on workers’ aspirations for ‘stability’ 
slowed down the momentum of protests and turned the pattern of activism towards smaller, less 
organised or pre-planned actions. The preoccupation with social reproduction and the fragmentation 
of workers between bourgeois and proletariat restricted a class consciousness from emerging among 
workers.  
 
The absence of real union representation did not bring private sector and EISCO workers 
together in collective actions. The localisation of struggles and the emphasis on  informal networks 
in recruitment and in the organisation of work, did not enable both groups to see their struggle as 
dependent on one another. In addition, the ruralisation of the labour force with the new 
recruitments at EISCO also undermined the need for collective actions, as workers experienced 
their labour from the viewpoint of their multiple subjectivities. The lack of new recruitments for 16 
years across the public sector also weakened the rank and file of leftist groups, who became 
entrenched in personal disputes between their leaders. The chapter thus argues that the class 
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consciousness of the workers was impeded by the politics of social mobility and the focus on the 
socially reproductive aspect of their labour. Such focus on social reproduction, similar to Mollona's 
(2009b) case, prevented workers from seeing their labour as relational and enabled permanent 
workers to acquiesce to the sharing of their skills with younger workers. Their acquiescence to 
state policies, in turn, continued to ensure their survival at the expense of exploiting other casual 
laborers outside the plant, and restricting their access to the good life they- the permanent 
workers- had enjoyed. The entitlements related to the wellbeing of their families, which workers 
held the state responsible for, made them unable to antagonise management, which continued to 
exploit their dependence on them and tightened its grip over their actions. The struggles in the 
plant thus focused on the very persona of the CEO or on the corruption of the union leaders. 
Corrupt individuals and not state capitalism were deemed responsible for EISCO’s demise.  
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Conclusion 
 
Since Egyptian labour protests escalated in 2006, a recurrent demand has been to give priority 
to permanent workers’ children in the allocation of new jobs in the public sector. Such demand has 
equally been championed by some of the new progressive independent trade unions that sprung up 
across the country following the revolution in 2011. Daily-waged and temporary workers now also 
stage protests on nearly a daily basis requesting permanent work contracts. The militant tactics they 
adopt in making their voices heard, despite their lack of job security, attest to the significance they 
attach to long-term tenured employment. In this work I have examined the politics around tenured 
employment in EISCO, one of Egypt’s oldest state owned plants. Ethnographic research with workers 
in al-Tibbin showed why the access to permanent work contracts is such a widely popular demand in 
al-Tibbin, as elsewhere in Egypt, and explained why public sector workers find that bequeathing their 
work contracts to their children should be a right. At EISCO the everyday politics around securing the 
future of ones’ offspring by passing on one’s work contract was partly behind management’s ability to 
silence workers against state repression and neo-liberal dispossessions.  
 
Workers’ pre-occupation with bequeathing their contracts to children suggests that capitalism 
works in multiple and complex ways, often experienced in contradictory terms by workers. Marx 
(1976) posited that capitalism expands through constant innovation in the means of production, 
which has often been understood to mean innovations in technology.  But expanding our 
understanding of production to include the four moments Marx and Engels (1970) highlighted in the 
German Ideology- that is the production of goods, social relations, people and needs- it is easier to 
conceptualise ‘the means of production’ as more than just physical capital and money. Two ways by 
which capitalism maintains its grip in al-Tibbin are the innovation in property relations and the re-
appropriation of social values into new calculative and economic practices. To continue generating 
surplus new private properties emerge, others are devalued, old collective properties are privatised, 
and the meanings people attach to their labour is re-appropriated. 
 
  On the shop-floors of EISCO permanent workers have de-facto control over production. They 
are almost like artisans, who take pride in their skills and the relations they fostered inside the plant 
over the years. When capital investment in renewing machines was curtailed following the neo-liberal 
reform program, workers’ skills and networks became even more important as a replacement for 
these investments. Counter-intuitively, permanent workers experienced the restructuring of the plant 
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and the losses it was incurring as an increased control over the work pace. Their experience was thus 
contrary to what Harvey predicted regarding time-space compression that would accompany post-
Fordist neo-liberal expansions (Harvey, 1989). Older forms of distinction on the shop-floor between 
workers and engineers were also contested. With the worn-out machinery, the central political 
control, and the skills and knowledge that permanent workers acquired, engineers’ access to 
educational credentials no longer functioned as a marker of status. If educational qualifications acted 
as a type of property in the past, it was now being greatly devalued. On the shop-floor of EISCO, quite 
unexpectedly, neo-liberal transformations empowered permanent workers and challenged the status 
and control of middle management. 
 
Despite their relative power on the shop-floor and the collective knowledge embedded in their 
skills, a form of “limited base” or “collective property” (Gudeman, 2008), permanent workers were 
gradually acquiescing to their own demise through their pre-occupation with hiring their offsprings at 
EISCO. Their work contracts, with the protection it guaranteed their skills, were thus treated as a 
quasi-property right, which they could bequeath to their children. To protect their children against the 
precarious life conditions that curtailed mobility and dispossessed lives outside the plant, workers 
invested themselves in getting them to work in the plant. The competition over such futures made 
them consent to their own gradual phasing out and the privatisation of their collective skills as they 
were transmitted to a new generation of temporary workers.  
 
 The introduction of temporary work at EISCO in 2007 gave permanent workers more control 
and enabled them to exploit temporary labourers at work, who in turn agreed to their exploitation in 
the hope of securing a permanent contract. Both groups happily said they were ‘like father and son’. 
Given that many fathers secured their children work in the plant, this idiom made sense. But the 
fictive kinship idiom and the presence of some real fathers and sons occluded the fact that a large 
group of permanent workers were not able to get their children hired in the plant. Instead permanent 
workers and their offpsrings were left to compete over a limited few job openings. Their competition 
became institutionalised when the plant introduced daily-waged work as an unofficial entry route to 
the plant. A new hierarchy emerged: powerful fathers got their children permanent work, fathers with 
less social resources secured daily waged work, and those who could not afford to sustain them while 
on daily wage or had little social resources, got none in. The hierarchal re-arrangement of labour at 
EISCO into daily-waged, temporary and permanent was regulated by waiting times, expectations, 
speculations and personal investments, which turned their aspiration for stability (ʾistiqrār) and their 
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hope to continue enjoying the good life they had in the past into a competition over job security and 
contract bequeathing. The widely appreciated value of ʾistiqrār was thus re-appropriated under 
capitalist state practices and turned from a social value into a market one that allowed the regime 
further political control. 
 
This was clearly identifiable in the EISCO company town, where the spatial arrangement of al-
Tibbin was organised over the politics of social reproduction and households’ abilities to provide a 
good life to the next generations, to secure means to reproduce their position in the social hierarchy 
or to move upward. Those with a permanent contract and successful in capitalising on it were 
becoming a new bourgeoisie. Others struggling to make sure that their children will have some 
security in the future were fighting against sliding down the social hierarchy. But the politics of the 
upwardly and downwardly mobile EISCO workers largely depended on excluding others from working 
at EISCO, primarily those who had no relatives or fathers in the plant. The relational politics of class 
were expressed through the access to a permanent contract as property. While some permanent 
workers were now a new bourgeoisie, casual workers on the fringes of the company town, with few 
connections in EISCO, remained perpetually proletariat. These interconnections, this thesis has shown, 
are at the heart of the on-going class formations and class politics in al-Tibbin. 
 
Permanent workers’ power, which were evident in large collective mobilisations in the past, 
was dreaded by management and the political elite. Permanent workers’ skills and ability to run the 
work with very little resources were vital to the protection of production. Their power forced 
management to continuously re-fashion the mechanisms of labour control at EISCO. EISCO played a 
predominant role in the history of nation-state making and had a symbolic importance to the 
successive regimes. It was thus treated quite distinctively from other public plants and its labour 
movement was tamed over the past three decades. If collective consciousness was ever present at 
EISCO, it was now impeded largely by struggles for social mobility. In yet another historical instance, 
the emergence of new private property, here a quasi-private property right in work, privatised lives, 
fragmented communities and engendered new class divides.   
 
The lines of class are thus continuously reworked through innovations in property relations, 
the way social practices, values and resources are colonised by market practices, and contingent 
developments in the environment (here al-Tibbin). Class politics is also expressed relationally through 
competition over social and intergenerational transmission of resources. This is essentially because 
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labour itself is relational (Mollona, 2009a) and immaterial.  It follows that EISCO workers are not best 
described as a privileged aristocracy of labour. Rather their ability (or inability) to turn the potential 
property of their permanent contracts into a source of long-tem security for their households, which 
today divides them between a bourgeoisie on the one hand and those who risk joining, in the near 
future, the precarious proletariat on the fringes of their town, on the other hand.  The politics of 
gender and kinship in al-Tibbin have been entangled with contestations of class in a way that “place[s] 
the domestic domain in economic and political history of the Middle East”(Mundy, 1996, p. 90). 
 
A better understanding of transformations in class relations in al-Tibbin would require research 
into a number of themes.  The ‘property’ in a contract needs to be situated against the other property 
relations which conditioned EISCO workers’ lives. For example, land ownership is widespread among 
EISCO workers, a large majority of whom reside in villages surrounding the plant. Mapping out the 
trends in land ownership, could provide a complex and critical understanding of how competing claims 
to entitlements and inequalities inform one another. This should also allow a systematic tracing of the 
various types of resources that upwardly mobile EISCO households depend upon in providing 
opportunities for a better future for their members. 
 
Furthermore, research in the villages around the plant could highlight how relations of 
baladiyyāt complicate the inheritance of permanent contracts between the formal dichotomy of 
individual (i.e. sons and daughters, or direct lineage) and communal (public) (Hann, 1998).  The 
preferences, timings, and nature of negotiations around the devolution of contracts between kin and 
baladiyyāt could shed light on the continuum between the individual and the communal in the social 
life and the community values that inform workers’ life choices and practices. 
 
Researching the implication of the codification, in plant regulations and state policies, of the 
practice of bequeathing contracts to one’s offspring could also inform our understanding of 
community relations and class inequalities. Further research could thus look into how the new 
independent unions, which have sprung up across Helwan, negotiate this right from a mere custom in 
public plants into an official legal entitlement.  Research into such codification could also reveal how 
claims to relationality, based on blood ties or reference to place or baladiyyāt among workers, are 
hierarchically re-arranged.  
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The successive waves of revolutions and uprisings that the Arab world witnessed in the recent 
years and the relative relaxation of state security’s policing of everyday lives suggest that the heroic 
people behind these events have given researchers new freedoms and opportunities to conduct 
ethnographic research on labour and to study the economic practices of the state. More research on 
the economic anthropology of the Arab world would clarify not only how despotic regimes persisted 
or were toppled but how capitalist policies are refashioned and reproduced under the new political 
conditions.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Cairo as it Appears on Egypt’s Map 
(Map Courtesy of Creative Commons of Wikimapia). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Helwan (spelt Hulwan) in the South of Cairo 
(Map Courtesy of Ahram Online Website) 
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Figure 3: Egyptian Iron and Steel Company and Adjacent Company Town 
(Red area indicates the plant’s borders, Blue area indicates the company town’s borders) 
 
(Map courtesy of wikimapia.org, Creative Commons License Attribution-ShareAlike (CC BY-SA), accessed on 
September 12
th
 2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 4: EISCO’s Company Town 
 
(Map courtesy of wikimapia.org, Creative Commons License Attribution-ShareAlike (CC BY-SA), accessed on 
September 12
th
 2012).  
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Figure 5: Map Showing Agriculture Areas to the South of EISCO 
(Map courtesy of Ahram Online) 
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Figure 6: Management Hierarchy on the Shop-Floor 
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Figure 7: The 3-High Rolling Mill 
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Figure 8: Steel Slab Released From Re-heating Furnace 
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Figure 9: Slab Slides on Rollers towards 3-High Rolling Mill 
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Figure 10: Slab Arrives at 3-High Rolling Mill to be Turned to Sheet or Plate 
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Figure 11: Producing Steel Sheets    Figure 12: Final Product after Trimming 
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Figure 13: Production Shifts at the 3-High Rolling Mill 
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Figure 14: Palm Tree Chaff Waiting to be Used in Production 
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Figure 15: Gasser, a Temporary Worker Prepares the Chaff 
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Figure 16: Getting Ready to Throw Chaff on the Slab 
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Figure 17: Using Chaff to Clear Oxides from the Slab 
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Figure 18: Using a Water Hose instead of a Hydro-Blasting Pump to Clear Oxides 
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Figure 19: Fadi Assists the Crane Operator with Crowbar to Attach the Sheaves 
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Year/Percentage 
of breakdown 
from total 
downtime 
External 
Factors 
Pre-planned 
Maintenance 
Production 
Breakdown 
Mechanical 
Breakdown 
Electric 
Breakdown 
2003-2004 9.1% 33.2% 4.4% 43.6% 9.7% 
2005-2006 12.4% 43.9% 1% 32.6% 10.1% 
2006-2007 10.5% 49.1% 1.1% 30.2% 9.1% 
2007-2008 8% 44% 1% 37% 10% 
 
Figure 20: Breakdowns at the Plate- and Sheet- Mill 2003-2008  
(Numbers Courtsey of Eng. Ibrahim Akl) 
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Figure 21: Brick Holds the Second Joystick Next to Control Room 
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Figure 22: EISCO’s Company Town 
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Figure 23: The Central Square of the Company Town 
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Figure 24: A Standard House in the Old Steel City 
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Figure 25: Old Steel City Combines Old Houses and Hadith al-Tashyyid Buldings 
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Figure 26: A Standard House in The New Steel Housing 
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Figure 27: The New Steel Housing 
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Figure 28: Bīyyt ʾAhali Area 
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Figure 29: A Standard House in Bīyyt ʾAhali Area 
